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•A* V • I' 

" 1 THE 

HISTORY 

OF 

GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 
ADMINISTRATION 

OP 

SCINDE, 

AND 

CAMPAIGN IN THE CUTCHEE HILLS. 



LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, 




WITH II APS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 



THIRD EDITION, 



LONDON: 

CHARLES WESTERTON, 
20, ST, GEORGE'S PLACE, HYDE PARK CORNER, 

185&" 



. A/ 4 




LIST OF APPENDICES. 



APPENDIX I. 

Beport of Kurrachee Collector on Criminal Trials under the 
Ameers, page 349. 

APPENDIX II. 
Extracts from a Beport upon Production by C. W. Bichardson, 
Esq., Deputy Collector in Scinde, 350. 

APPENDIX III. 
Extracts from Letters by Sir C. Napier to the Supreme Grovern- 
ment about the Mullaree Biver, 352. 

APPENDIX IV. 
Extracts from a Letter by Sir C. Napier to Lord Ellenborough 
when preparing to commence the Campaign against the 
Hillmen, 353. 

APPENDIX V. 

Extracts from Letters by Sir C. Napier to Lord Ellenborough 
and Sir H. Hardinge, touching the Mutiny and Sickness 
of Troops, 360. 

APPENDIX VI. 

Observations by Sir C. Napier on the 6th Section of the New 
Articles of "War for the Indian Army, re-introducing Cor- 
poral Punishment, 364. 

APPENDIX VII. 

Compressed Observations on the necessity of restoring Corporal 
Punishment in the Indian Army, 368. 

APPENDIX VIII. 

Memoranda on the Baggage of an Aj-my, addressed to Lord 
Ellenborough, 377. 

APPENDIX IX. 
Extracts from a Letter to Lord Bipon on Prize-Money, 386. 

APPENDIX X. 

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Bipon on the Hill Cam- 
paign, 387, 



iv 



LIST OF APPENDICES. 



APPENDIX XI. 
Names of the Volunteers from the 13th Eegiment who scaled 
the Rock of Trukkee, 389. 

APPENDIX XII. 
Extract of a Letter by Sir Roderick Murchison upon the Geo- 
logical Specimens collected by Captain Yicary in the 
Cutchee Hills during Sir 0. Napier's Campaign, 390. 

APPENDIX XIII. 
Letters by Sir C. Napier to the Governor of Bombay touching 
Eorged and Stolen Letters published by Dr. Buist, 390. 

APPENDIX XIV. 
Letters from Sir C. Napier to the Governor- General relative to 
Lieutenant- Colonel Outram's published Slanders, 392. 

APPENDIX XV. 
Extract from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the 
Governor- General about Medals, 394. 

APPENDIX XVI. 
Letters from Sir C. Napier to the "Widow of the Ameer Noor 
Mohamed — and Extracts of a Letter to the Governor- 
General touching the Secret Scheme of the Ameers and 
their Women, 397. 

APPENDIX XVII. 
Statement of General Hunter touching the Progress of the 
Horse-mart at Sukkur, 398. 

APPENDIX XVIII. 

Observations by Captain Rathborne, Chief Collector of Scinde, 
confirmed by Comments of Mr. Edwardes, Civil Magistrate 
at Simla, showing one source of immense profit to the 
Company by Conquest of Scinde, 400. 

APPENDIX XIX. 

Notes by Major Beatson on his March to blockade the Northern 
Entrance of Trukkee, 403. 

APPENDIX XX. 

Information relative to the Resignation of the Turban by 
Roostum — and Letter from Sir C. Napier to Sir Jasper 
Nicholls, 411. 



LIST OF PERSPECTIVE VIEWS. 



V. Zuraiiee, or Liillee Defile To face Page 199 

2°. Pass of Junimuck, with Encampment 201 

3°. Pass of Sebree 211 

4°. Pass of Goojroo 221 

5°. Defile leading from Deyrah to the Murrow 

Plain : 225 

6°. Trukkee seen through an opening of the Outer 

Screen of Bocks 226 

7°. Defiles threaded by Major Beatson 22 S 

8°. Head-quarter Encampment — Trukkee beyond 229 
9°. Bird's-eye View of Trukkee from the Height 

over the Encampment 229 

10°. South Entrance to Trukkee from the Exterior. . . 230 

11°. South Entrance to Trukkee from the Interior. . . 235 

12°. Interior of Trukkee 236 



Note. — The perspective views were drawn to illustrate Sir 
C. Xapier's campaign in the Cutchee hills, by Lieutenant 
Edwards, an officer on his staff. A love of art led that 
gentleman to aim too much at agreeable pictures ; and the 
austerity of the region has not been adequately rendered. 
The defiles threaded by Major Beatson, sketched by another 
officer, more truly depict the savage desolate nature of the 
crags amidst which the hill men were warred down, 



LIST OF TOPOGEAPHICAL PLANS. 



1°. G-eneral Plan of Scinde with the Cutchee 

Hills End of vol. 

2°. Enlarged Plan of the Cutchee Hills with 

Movements of the Troops End of vol. 

3°. Hypothetical Plan of Campaign To face page 288 



Note. — The rivers and streamlets marked in the Cutchee 
Hills, are but beds of torrents without water, except in heavy 
rain. The Teyaja alone flows continually, but at Heyrah it 
was only a yard wide during the campaign, and the whole 
region is inexpressibly arid. 



PEEFACE. 



When the History of Sir C. Napier's Conquest 
of Scinde was . published, an account of his after- 
administration in that country was promised as 
a sequel ; hence the present work, which includes 
also his campaign against the hillmen of Cutchee. 
It is dedicated, as the History of the Conquest 
was, to the British people, because from the people 
only can support be looked for against the un- 
ceasing efforts made to suppress the just claims of 
a victorious general, and successful administrator, 
to the applause of his countrymen. But to obtain 
that support ingenuously, the man's thoughts as 
well as his actions should be made known with all 
integrity — wherefore his opinions of government 
generally, of particular systems, and his views and 
feelings on every important occasion, have been, 
where the necessity of compression would admit, 
recorded in his own words. 

A more artful structure of composition might have 
been adopted to the advantage of the writer; but 
the original turn of genius, the natural temper and 
unsophisticated character of Sir C. Napier could not 



viii 



PREFACE. 



then have been presented with such naked honesty : 
nor could he be in any way so successfully defended 
from slanderers as by letting the reader hear him 
think aloud. Many of his opinions, thus recorded, 
will however be misunderstood, if taken other- 
wise than as applications to the peculiar customs 
and prejudices of the people he was dealing with. 
He might, for example, be supposed to advocate 
military in preference to civil government, if his 
reasoning on that head was not entirely dependent 
on the exigencies of a recent conquest over a 
violent, warlike race, which was to be at once 
controlled and civilized. In like manner his 
objection to the employment of civil servants, if 
not read with reference to the particular state of 
affairs at the time, and especial reference to his 
conviction, that the system of civil administration 
established in India was essentially vicious as well 
as inapplicable to the condition of Scinde, would 
seem to imply an indiscriminate contempt for all 
civil servants and all civil government. But this 
would be entirely opposed to his real sentiments, 
and to his practice ; for all his efforts were directed 
so to use his military power as in the shortest time 
to render the Scindian population fitted to receive 
and willing to uphold civil institutions, of which 
he laid the foundations. How he performed that 
difficult task this work will show ; and also the 
many obstacles opposed to his success ; for he was 
not a man working with and sustained by power — 
the flame of his genius burst upwards through the 
official ashes heaped to keep it down. Military 



PREFACE. ix 

despotism had no part in his scheme of government 
beyond the first necessity : and it may be here 
stated as a fact honourable to both, that his 
successor, Mr. Pringle, a Company's civil servant, 
zealous and of a just disposition, after two years' 
experience voluntarily proffered an acknowledg- 
ment of the great capacity for civil government 
evinced in Sir C. Napier's Scindian institutions. 



NOTICE. 



The author having reserved to himself the right 
of giving permission to translate this work into 
German, has done so, and it will be immediately 
published in Germany under that authorization. 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 
ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



CHAPTER I. 

When Shere Mohamed, called the Lion, was defeated CHAP. i. 
near Hyderabad, his vanquisher publicly declared that 
another shot would not be fired. This was ridiculed as a 
vain boast, but it proved a sound prediction, and well 
founded on the following considerations. 

A country peopled by distinct races, having different 
religions and opposing interests, could not furnish either 
the passions or the material means for a protracted contest 
under misfortune. The Scindian proper, the cultivator of 
the soil, was but an oppressed bondsman, an unarmed 
slave, and the destruction of the ameers was his deliver- 
ance. The Hindoos, numerous, timid, and of a faith con- 
demned by Beloochee and Scindian alike, were an isolated 
plundered people and sure to accept peace with protection. 
The Beloochees only had an interest to prolong the war ; 
for having been habitually oppressors they desired to 
maintain their profitable ascendant position. But they 
had lost two great battles, their treasury had been taken, 
six of their princes were captives, and their political and 
military organization was so shattered they could not take 
the field again for regular warfare, while the diversity of 
religion and interests was a sure bar to any general insur- 

B 

4 



2 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. I. gent resistance. Moreover, the Belooch polity was feudal, 
1843* an( ^ ^ s na tural tendency to disunion was augmented in 
Scinde, because the sirdars and chiefs owed service to 
many heads, — each ameer being sovereign — and though 
their princes lived in families and even in the same for- 
tresses, it was in hatred, agreeing in nothing save to oppress 
their subjects and turn the land they misgoverned into a 
wilderness for hunting. 

Mohamed, the Lion of Meerpoore, was the hardiest of the 
Talpoorees, but he had been signally defeated at Hyderabad. 
At Meeanee he had not fought at all, and his failing to 
do so, though caused partly by the rapidity of the English 
leader, resulted chiefly from a miscalculation of chances 
and advantages ; for, Sobdar excepted, the ameers had 
been to him always inimical, and he, thinking like all 
of his race the British could not stand before the fierce 
swordsmen gathered on that fatal field, moved slowly. 
Victory he knew would render the other Talpoor princes 
more insolently encroaching towards himself, and he re- 
served his contingent force of twelve thousand warriors 
entire, to influence the after-arrangements. While on the 
march he heard with astonishment that the battle was lost 
and the Talpoor dynasty overthrown; whereupon, falling 
back to Meerpoore, he offered peace, yet insincerely and 
only to gain time for collecting all his own feudatories and 
rallying the fugitives from Meeanee. But though a tempo- 
rary union of the tribes had taken place before that battle, 
old feuds were not forgotten, and only the Lhugarees and 
Nizamarees, under the leading of Ahmed Khan, the chief 
who assailed the residency, joined him in mass; the others 
held aloof, or came with broken numbers, for they had little 
love towards him, and six thousand of their bravest were 
stretched in death on the gory banks of the Fullaillee. 

Great was the Lion's intrepidity to lift his standard amidst 
all this carnage and terror, defying the conqueror in the 
very heat and flush of victory, when by merely remaining 
quiet he might have retained in safety his dominions and dig- 
nity ; and had this gallant effort been made from national 
feeling, the English leader would have felt it a painful duty 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



3 



to strike the valiant prince. But the deliverance of an CHAP. I. 
oppressed people, and the safety of the whole Christian 
community in India, then seriously menaced by the recent 
Mahometan success at Cabool, were in one and the same 
scale with the interests of his country and the honour of 
his army, while in the other were only gallantry and 
tyranny — wherefore he smote the last ameer as he had 
smitten the first, renewing the terrors of Meeanee and ren- 
dering them indelible. 

Shere Mohamed, thus stricken, could not become the 
leader of a protracted warfare, and indeed many chiefs 
and sirdars had abandoned his cause between the two 
battles, proffering their salaam, or fealty, to the English 
leader, who treated them so as to excite hope for the 
future and stifle any lurking attachment to the fallen 
dynasty ; no difficult matter ; for though it came within 
the Talpoor sirdars' notions of honour to uphold the 
family sovereignty while any of the princes struggled in 
the field, there was no attachment of that kind between 
the ameers and their feudatory chiefs. As princes 
they had warred for the Talpooree dynasty, not for the 
interests of the Belooch race; and the latter had as- 
sembled in arms neither from personal attachment nor 
from national feeling, for being recent and isolated con- 
querors they had dominion without a country. They 
were moved to fight by religious hatred and a desire to 
maintain their power of plundering and oppressing, their 
pride and cupidity being excited by the Affghan successes. 
" We are braver and more numerous than the warriors 
under Ackbar at Cabool 33 was their cry, u the Feringhees 
at Sukkur and Kurrachee are not so many as those he 
killed : no, not by half ! why then should we not destroy 
them also?" 

Now the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad dissipated 
all this swelling fierceness, and Sir C. Napier, judging 
that having found him too strong in battle they would, if 
beneficence followed victory, prefer his rule to that of the 
ameers, resolved to treat them with a munificent libe- 
rality. Those who submitted, soon discovered that their 

b 2 



4 



sir charles napier's 



CHAP. I. bravery in fight was a recommendation ; and they felt his 
1843 generosity was innate, not assumed, when they saw the cap- 
tive ameers, from whom nothing was to be gained, treated 
with a respectful and forbearing humanity even while 
their conduct was dangerous and offensive. Moreover, 
the great sirdars and chieftains, those who were still in 
arms and those who had submitted, were for the most 
part at feud with the Lord of Meerpoore, and in a man- 
ner absolved from fealty towards the other ameers by 
reason of their captivity ; wherefore it was reasonable to 
suppose they would, if their own possessions and dignities 
were assured, make their salaams in good faith. 

These considerations led the English leader to look on 
the Lion as an isolated chief whose bravest followers had 
fallen in battle, leaving him without material resources 
for regular warfare, and without influence beyond his own 
feudatories — as one also, who, notwithstanding the great- 
ness of his mind, despaired of success from irregular war- 
fare, because his flight had been to the desert when all his 
insurrectional resources were in the Delta. For there 
was his richest territory, there his most numerous 
feudatories ; and the country itself was so intersected with 
canals, so dotted with forts, so overspread with unhealthy 
marshes, that difficulties almost insuperable at that time 
would have opposed the progress of the British, more espe- 
cially during the inundation which was close at hand. 
To fly from such a lair was to say hope was lost, and 
formed one of the many reasons which prompted the 
confident assertion that the conquest of Scinde was 
effected by the battle of Hyderabad so far as arms were 
concerned. It was the prediction of a sagacious mind, 
not an idle boast, and when the government of the country 
was conferred on him, Sir C. Napier evinced the sincerity 
of his conviction by proceeding at once to establish a 
polity which made no distinction between the vanquished 
Beloochees and the delivered races of Scindees and 
Hindoos. 

Having fixed notions of government, he rejected the 
vulgar opinion that Indian statesmen were to be guided 



ADMINISTRATION" OT SCIXDE. 



5 



by something occult and peculiar, not by great principles CHAP. I. 
based on the common nature of man. Condemning the j^J" 
system of the East Indian Company, he applied to that 
body the poet's character of Lord Bacon, at once the 
meanest greatest of mankind, and thus analyzed its policy. 

"To the genius of some goyemors-general and some 
military commanders, and to the constant bravery of the 
troops, belongs all the greatness j to the Courts of 
Direction, designated by Lord TTellesley as the ( ignomi- 
nious tyrants of the East/ all the meanness. Xot that 
directors have been personally less honourable than other 
gentlemen, but that they are always in a false position, as 
merchants ruling a vast and distant empire solely for then 
private advantage. Xo man ever seeks to be a director 
from mere patriotism or thirst for military glory unac- 
companied by pecuniary profit ; and hence, when the 
Court does send out a governor-general of great mind, 
which is not often nor willingly done, it treats him as if 
he were unworthy to possess power at all. This is natural. 
Their objects are not alike. His will be the welfare, the 
aggrandizement, the unity of a hundred and twenty m illi ons 
of people committed to his charge: theirs the obtaining 
all possible profit from the labour of those people. If the 
safety of their empire demands a war the directors object ; 
not as it inflicts miseiy, but having personally a brief 
tenure of power they dread loss of profit. This feeling 
has always led them to quarrel with then best governors- 
general. The merchant, unable to distinguish between 
wars for self-preservation and conquest, objects to both as 
lessening immediate gain j and it must be admitted that the 
former has in India always involved the latter/' 

{e The mercantile spirit weakens if it does not altogether 
exclude noble sentiments, and the directors have always 
regarded their armies with a sinister look. The bravery 
and devotion of their troops, not their own commercial 
skill and enterprise, have expanded then original small 
settlement on the Hooghly to a mighty empire ; and yet 
on every accession of territory the soldier has been treated 
as unfit to govern what his sword had won ; on each new 



6 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



acquisition a civil establishment has been fastened, incon- 
gruent with the military barbarism of the people to be 
governed bnt fulfilling the conditions of patronage and 
profit which make the Direction an object of desire. For 
those civil servants have much higher salaries and allow- 
ances than the military servants have, and the proprietors' 
dividends are thus lowered as the directors' patronage 
becomes augmented, the true nature of the transaction 
being covered by loud protestations against all wars/' 

" In this manner a vicious circle of policy is completed, 
and a solution furnished of that seeming paradox, that 
while the instructions issued by the directors for the 
government of the East have always been moderate and 
opposed to aggrandizement by war, their empire has been 
continually augmented by arms and little or nothing has 
been effected for the welfare of the people. The truth 
being, that men momentarily possessed of power at home 
object to war lest it should diminish immediate profits; 
but when the soldier has won new dominions the suc- 
cessors of those ephemeral sovereigns hastily gather the 
private advantages. They denounce war notwithstanding, 
because it is easy and graceful to be philanthropic in 
words ; and the topic furnishes convenient arguments for 
supplanting the military by civil establishments to the 
advancement of their own private family interests." 

"All this is detrimental to the Company's general 
interests ; for those civil servants are, with splendid 
exceptions, ignorant of great principles, devoid of business 
habits, and therefore wasteful of the new resources. The 
more experienced men naturally abide by their old high 
and lucrative offices, with the details of which they are 
familiar, and decline new duties in perhaps insalubrious 
localities and amongst a people with whose language and 
customs they are unacquainted. Wherefore nepotism works 
freely, and young, and often very incapable men, are sent 
to acquire experience and fortunes at the expense of the 
proprietors' dividends, by misgoverning newly conquered 
territories. Unknowing how to rule even a settled 
country, they have to create every branch of administra- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



7 



tion, and must necessarily manipulate roughly, and as it CHAP. I. 
were with horny hands when the nicest touch is essential Jjj^j" 
— meddling arbitrarily and ignorantly with social and 
financial affairs where error may give mortal offence, where 
parsimony may be folly and extravagance madness." 

This picture of the civil service in India has been con- 
firmed by the Honourable Mr. Shore — one of the body 
and well acquainted with his subject — an honest bene- 
volent man, whose exposition, published in 1837, has never 
been controverted ; although he has effaced the directors' 
pretensions to moderation and justice, by showing that 
their public instructions, so lauded for their ethics, have 
invariably been neutralized by an appended provision, 
that nothing was to be of force which tended to lower 
dividends. Sir C. Napier, because he accepted Mr. Shore's 
exposition as coinciding with his own observation, has 
been called an enemy to all civil servants, and has from 
many of them suffered wrong; but he only condemned 
a system under which the best must misgovern, as 
founded on false principles. Personally he judges the civil 
service to be like all other bodies, furnishing good and bad, 
clever and foolish persons ; and he has always been glad 
to act with those of sound heads and honourable views, 
though he refused to bend his experience of mankind to 
newspaper dictation, and the narrow conceit of men who 
assume that long residence in the East confers an other- 
wise unattainable capacity for Indian government. 

Spurning such arrogance, he remarked— " that length 
of residence and sensual indulgence weakened body and 
mind, and give only aptness for official details without 
enlargement of ideas ; and most of those persons, gene- 
ralized as ' Old Indians,' because they have worn out origin- 
ally vigorous appetites and feeble minds while enjoying 
large salaries and the adulation of black clerks, who do 
all their duties, imagine they only know the East. Despising 
and avoiding the society of the natives, they yet pretend 
to know the characters of those natives, and call them- 
selves the Statesmen of India! There are however 
amongst those vegetations of a rank soil, men who do study 



8 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. I. the people, who know their customs and their history, 
lg43 applying minds of a high order and powerful energies to 
their work ; and pre-eminent in that class are the unco- 
venanted servants whose enterprise has brought them in 
mature life to India — men who cannot live in luxurious 
ease, and therefore the most valuable of the Company's 
dependants." 

That the people of India had feelings in common with 
the rest of the human race the new governor thought no 
fallacy, and he imagined two years might suffice to fill any 
head with all the knowledge of peculiar customs necessary 
for modifying general principles which nature designed it 
to contain. With those notions he classed and epitomized 
the character and interests of the people under his govern- 
ment in the following manner. 

" The money-seeking Hindoo goes about all eyes, and 
with fingers supple as his conscience, robbing everybody by 
subtlety as the Beloochee robs them by force. To him 
the conquest must be as a feast and a blessing of grace." 

"The Scindee, strong and handsome, is indolent from 
the combined effect of heat and slavery ; but he has fine 
natural qualities, and his bondage being of recent date he 
may be reclaimed and fitted for independence — to him 
also the conquest is a blessing, and it shall be my business 
to make it a feast." 

" The Beloochee, though fierce and habituated to acquire 
property by violence, is shrewd, and has a strong though 
savage sense of dignity and honour according to the 
customs of his race. A combination of coercion, of re- 
spectful treatment, of generosity and temptation, may 
therefore bend him to better habits, without breaking the 
chivalric spirit which is now his best quality. He fought 
desperately for the ameers, because to fight and plunder 
was his vocation ; but neither he nor his particular chief, 
nor the ameers, fought from national feeling ; education 
and habit have divested all three of patriotism in the 
European sense. The Beloochee warrior loves his race, his 
tribe, not the general community, which he regards but as 
a prey and spoil. The chief's allegiance to the sovereign 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



9 



being feudal is slight, and the more easily snapped, because CHAP. I. 
the ameers, personally odious, are captives ; a consider- 1843< 
ation of weight in all countries, but especially so in the 
East, where the fealty is to the throne not the person." 

1 f Strongest of the influences which brought the warriors 
to battle was their natural fierceness, excited by unbounded 
confidence of success and the hope of plundering an army 
more affluent than that which had been despoiled the year 
before in Afghanistan. But there was also latent fear. 
For conscious of their own ferocious design to massacre 
every European in Scinde, they thought the English had 
discovered the project — as indeed they had — and meaned 
to revenge it in kind. They had seen them in peace, 
under the mask of treaties, seize Sukkur, Bukkur and 
Kurrachee, and naturally concluded they would go further 
in war, and either slay all the Beloochees or reduce them 
to the grovelling condition they had themselves reduced 
the Scindees. With men of this temper a change of 
dynasty will be little regarded if their own dignities and 
possessions are respected ; and as it is a desire to obtain 
property, and not any abstract love of glory which impels 
them to war, their contempt for industry may be abated 
by the attraction of honest gains — when debarred of profit 
by violence they will seek it in commerce and agriculture, 
if openings are famished to them." 

' ' To meet the requirements of these different races in 
the present circumstances my policy must be, while fast- 
ening on the country a strong military gripe, to apply all' 
softening and healing measures to the vanquished race, 
all protective and encouraging measures to the liberated 
populations — to make strong even-handed justice be uni- 
versally felt — to draw forth the abundant natural resources 
of the country, and repair the terrible evils of the ameers' 
misgovernment. The trading Hindoo will then attach 
himself to a system which protects his calling and opens a 
wider scope for its exercise. He will for his own sake give 
timely intelligence of designs to restore the oppressive 
yoke of the Beloochees, and the rich Banians have a won- 
derful knowledge of all that is passing." 



10 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. I. " The Scindian cultivator will not be less earnest to 
1843 support a government which raises him to independence, 
and encourages his labour on a grateful soil ; and he is not 
deficient in strength of body or spirit to defend himself 
against attempts to renew his bondage. He may also be 
stirred if necessary against Belooch ascendancy through 
the Kallora prince, who is alive and not without influence 
over the former subjects of his family. Residing in the 
Punjaub, he has claimed of me the restoration of his 
dominions, offering half the revenues and magnificent pre- 
sents ; but affairs not being in a state to require his inter- 
ference, my reply was, ' When you can give back the lives of 
my soldiers who fell in battle to dethrone the ameers, 
can repay the expenses of the war and furnish a tribute, 
we will negotiate/" 

With these views, Sir Charles Napier, who had all his 
life studied the great principles of government, and in 
Cephalonia tested his theoretic convictions by successful 
practice, soon framed a political edifice of which justice 
and diligence were the beams and jointings. Nor did he 
lose time in nice consideration of the ultimate appearance 
of his work ; for he thought delay in satisfying the minds 
of the Scindian and Belooch races as to their condition 
under the conquest, might produce a partisan warfare more 
costly and dangerous than any momentary defect in his 
plan of government. Hence, while his cannon still re- 
sounded on the banks of the Indus, he had made known that 
all persons, whether of high or low degree, were confirmed 
for the time, and would be so permanently, according to 
their behaviour, in the employments they held under the 
ameers ; and that all rights and possessions would be safe 
from confiscation, save those of the people who contrary 
to the faith of nations had assailed the residency. Then 
as governor he made his proclamation of conquest, short 
and decisive. "The Talpoors have been overthrown by 
the British and are dethroned — Scinde belongs to them 
no longer. All revenues paid to the ameers are now to 
be paid to the English. Hitherto armed men have been 
treated as soldiers fighting by the orders of their masters. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



11 



From this time forward armed men assembled shall be CHAP. I. 
treated as robbers and outlaws. Slavery is abolished 1843 
throughout the land, and all people are invited to return 
and live peaceably at their homes.-" And this well-judged 
general system of conciliation was supported by a very subtle 
and sagacious stroke of policy ; for finding the numerous 
tenants and debtors of the ameers were influential persons, 
he released them from their liabilities, observing, that 
" between a ruler with a sponge and one with an iron 
sceptre there would be no hesitation, and the cause of 
their creditors would be permanently abandoned." 

Lord Ellenborough, judging that a government spring- 
ing from conquest and to be administered by the conqueror 
should for a time at least be sustained by the sword, made 
that of Scinde military and despotic ; and the new governor 
immediately announced "that the conquest of a country 
was sufficient convulsion for any people to endure, without 
adding thereto abrupt innovations on their social habits ; 
wherefore no avoidable change was to be made in the laws 
and customs. The executive officers were only to correct 
those evils which the tyrannical Belooch conquerors had 
inflicted, thus teaching the people that the coming of the 
British was a redemption from slavery and not a mere 
change of masters." 

This was a wise measure that could not have been 
effected by a civil government, which must have had its own 
disturbing organization with great expenses, and would 
thus have planted the seeds of discontent, to grow into 
insurrection, as happened afterwards in the Punjaub ; but 
a despotic military government was no disturbing event, 
being only the substitution of an English for a Belooch 
master, with the accompaniment of justice and wisdom 
instead of cruelty and oppression. The dulness of Indian offi- 
cial forms was however disturbed, and severe censures were 
passed by men, who blinded with going round in a political 
mill, imagine there is no other road of governing and regard 
vigour on great occasions as the sign of indiscretion. The 
abolition of slavery, proclaimed in obedience to Lord 
Ellenbor ough's orders, was condemned with peculiar vehe- 



12 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. I. mence. " It would produce discontent — it was unwise — 
1843> why vex the people with such spurious philanthropy?" 

Such were the cries of men startled from their monotonous 
self-sufficiency by the rustling wing of genius passing over 
their official dormitories. Their opinions were not shared 
by the slave-girls of the harems in Scinde, who all rushed 
forth to liberty and their homes ; nor during the whole of 
the subsequent administration was any resistance made, or 
even a complaint uttered against the edict, though at first 
infractions happened and were punished. 

The new governor was very desirous < to be known to 
the people as a peaceable ruler, but withheld for some time 
after the battle of Hyderabad, the full action of his 
authority,. because the flitting operations of the Lion gave 
the robber bands in the Delta an excuse for calling them- 
selves his soldiers. Hence the English leader, knowing 
what force there is in a name, would not apply a corrective 
until he had put down the ameer himself ; observing that 
while those bands had a nominal sovereign they would have 
moral strength, and using his name might raise their pre- 
datory hostility to the dignity of insurrectional warfare. 
Then the Lion, active and hardy, would shift his operations 
to the Delta where he was most to be feared ; and where, 
besides the force he could bring with him, he had four 
thousand feudatories, and could rally twenty thousand 
fierce Beloochee swordsmen, roving since the battles about 
Scinde and ready for any mischief. 

This also was the time when the factious enemies of Lord 
Ellenborough at Bombay were most active to make their 
foul prognostications, of evil, realities, urging the Beloo- 
chees to insurrection and the sepoys to mutiny; but the 
English general's resources and energy went beyond their 
ken, and as they made their malignant hopes their guides 
they were signally foiled. The crisis was however dan- 
gerous ; for though the Delta could have been surrounded 
and the Juts and Khosas — two tribes driven by the ameers' 
tyranny to live as outlaws in the great desert — could have 
been brought against it, a horrible war of extermination 
would have ensued, and reinforcements must have been 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



13 



drawn from India when all Lord Ellenborough's vigour CHAP. I. 
could scarcely keep down insurrection there. In fine, fifty 
thousand men would have been required to crush an 
insurgent warfare in the Delta, and meanwhile the hill 
tribes on the north-western frontier of Scinde, robbers 
by vocation, would have poured down on the plains like 
streams of lava. 

It was this danger, lurking in the swamps of the Delta, 
that had induced Sir C. Napier to brave the deadly sun of 
Scinde in June, when despite of a heat which the Beloo- 
chees vainly imagined no European could support he 
finally crushed the Lion, and forced him to fly across the 
Indus to the mountains of Kkelat, which ended the 
insurrectional danger. But, as the Lion, accompanied by 
the Lhugaree chief, Ahmed Khan, both having treasure, 
then endeavoured to stir up the mountain Beloochee tribes 
and the AfTghans of Candahar to war on Scinde, the 
Bombay faction clamorously and joyfully pointed to their 
efforts as certain to produce a partisan warfare which would 
finally deprive the British government of the recently 
conquered kingdom. 

But when the Lion was driven from Scinde the dis- 
orders of the Delta were corrected with martial severity and 
promptitude. No longer able to call themselves the ameeiV 
soldiers, they were hunted down as robbers by those very 
villagers who would have joined them in arms under the 
Lion's orders — so imposing is established government even 
under the most revolting forms. The prisoners were 
punished more or less severely at the places they had 
plundered ; and those who had perpetrated murders were 
hanged with labels on their breasts, bearing legends in 
three languages, to the effect that they were put to death, 
not for opposing the British but for killing villagers. 
Amongst those executed was the murderer of Captain 
Ennis, and it was the general's intention to hang the 
Ameer Shadad, having full proof that he was the instigator 
of that barbarous action ; but Lord Ellenborough forbade 
the punishment, and that high-born ruffian and loathsome 
sensualist became the cherished favourite of the Bombay 



14 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER ? S 



CHAP. I. faction for having cruelly murdered a sick and defenceless 
1843 British officer. 

While thus displaying his power and sternness against 
criminals. Sir C. Napier restored to the chieftains and 
sirdars who made salaam their rich swords, as he had 
before restored those of the ameers. They belonged to 
him of right, and their aggregate value was great, seeing 
that four hundred chiefs had submitted and many others 
were ready to do so ; but between gain and greatness it 
was never in his nature to waver : the fiercest chief however 
trembled when his weapon was restored with this stern, 
though flattering admonition. " Take back your sword. 
You have used it ivith honour against me, and I esteem a 
brave enemy. But if forgetful of this voluntary submission 
you draw it again in opposition to my government, I will 
tear it from you and kill you as a dog." 

All the sirdars were permitted to wear arms as a mark of 
dignity, and to show the governor's confidence in them; but 
their retainers were disarmed and with them the camp fol- 
lowers of the army — fifteen thousand — who had taken advan- 
tage of the times to commit excesses. The chiefs of tribes 
on the western bank of the Indus were treated however 
very warily ; for Beloochistan proper was mountainous, and 
the Scindian tribes had both feuds and friendships with 
those of Khelat and of the Cutchee hills. Many of the 
western Scindian chiefs had not made salaam; and the 
general, who was chary of pressing them as the political 
agents had during the Afighan war, and with very bad 
results, refrained from disarming their followers as he had 
done on the eastern bank of the Indus, lest apprehension 
of further innovations should produce a confederacy. 
Rigorously speaking therefore only the eastern bank of 
that river could be called a subdued country. But with 
his usual subtle policy he effected the object of protecting 
the villagers on the east from individual Belooch insolence, 
by causing every Beloochee who passed the Indus from 
the west to be disarmed, as if it were a process of war, 
giving the spoil to his soldiers, and thus the thing passed. 
However, to protect the Scindees on the western bank 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



15 



from being plundered, he told the hill tribes, dependent CHAP. I. 
and independent, that he would put all of their race to lg43< 
death who passed the Indus from the west with arms ; 
and if they offered violence to the Scindees on that side 
he would enter their hills with fire and sword. 

These were no mean proofs of resolution, for more than 
twenty thousand roving swordsmen were then on the 
western side ; and he dared not arm the Scindees in 
defence, because strong-handed robbery had been so long 
the prevailing system that every young man, almost every 
boy, who could procure a sword or matchlock thought it 
glorious to become a robber. His indirect policy was 
however so effectual, that the country, which just before 
the conquest and during the war had been overrun with 
armed men spreading terror and misery, soon presented the 
aspect of a peaceful community ; and that surprising result 
affected men's minds and disposed them to accept the 
new government with cheerfulness while they trembled at 
its power. 

There were also particular instances of impartial justice 
which made a profound impression upon all classes. A 
Parsee merchant was murdered on the highway and his 
goods carried off; two armed Beloochees were tracked and 
seized ; they had obeyed the orders of their chief, they said, 
and the . goods were in his house. He was demanded from 
his tribe and was given up ; the proofs were clear, and all 
three were hanged many miles from any soldiers. This 
could not have been done for a political matter, but the 
general, subtle in his policy, knew the tribes would not 
risk the anger of a conqueror for a mere criminal, and by 
the population at large the punishment was loudly ap- 
plauded with this significant remark — " The Padishaw 
kills nobody for himself." And thenceforth wherever he 
went the people crowded to see the "just Padishaw." 

This moral contentment was aided by a superstitious 
feeling, common to Beloochees and Scindees. For imme- 
diately after the " murder of the Kalloras" so the epoch 
of the ameers'" accession was designated by the Scindees, 
while the Bombay faction called the latter " Patriarchal 



16 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



chap. I. Princes/ 3 no rain fell for six years, famine was in the land, 
1843. and as the Kalloras were a sacred race this drought was 
judged an effect of divine wrath. But at the commence- 
ment of Sir C. Napier's warfare abundance of rain fell for 
many successive days, a refreshing dispensation which had 
not happened for several years before, and this, being 
compared with the tradition of the Kallora drought, was 
viewed by both races as a sign that the ameers' time was 
come and the English a favoured people. That notion, 
and the steady discipline of the troops, the umemitting 
activity of their chief, his manifest love of justice, his 
confirming all persons in their possessions and employ- 
ments, and a great reduction of taxation, with entire 
suppression of the oppressive violence previously accom- 
panying government exactions, created a wonderful affec- 
tion for his rule. Only four months before, the people had 
seen him descend on their country with all the terrors 
of war, an irresistible conqueror, and already they felt him 
as a peaceful legislator, striving to improve the condition 
of all, whether well-wisher or enemy : wherefore they ac- 
cepted his administration as the effect of a benignant fate. 

His power was military and despotic, but neither harsh 
nor capricious, for he put a bridle on himself by promul- 
gating a formal code of regulations in judicial proceedings, 
which admitted all the ordinary legal forms of the land, 
with the superaddition of English revision, guided by 
an honourable sense of equity and referable in all 
serious cases to his own supervision — his confirmation 
being essential to legal execution. And he rigidly re- 
strained his own paramount power within the published 
regulations, save where the absolute safety of the conquest 
demanded an unusual exercise of authority. Meanwhile, 
founding his policy on the idiosyncracies presented by the 
three races, he endeavoured to conciliate the great 
Beloochee chieftains and sirdars with a generous treat- 
ment, and a respectful acceptance of their notions of 
honour without reference to a European standard, which 
they could not comprehend and would have submitted to 
only as the imposition of a conqueror. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



17 



Always however, he restricted this to matters not CHAP. I. 
affecting those below them ; for he sought not the hollow 
distinction of pleasing the great and powerful with an 
underworking of misery for the multitude. And knowing 
the human mind is never better disposed to gratitude and 
attachment than when softened by fear, his iron hand was 
felt within the velvet glove, that all might know he pro- 
tected their lives and fortunes from a sense of benevo- 
lence, not from fear or weakness. " It will not do," he 
observed, " to let their barbaric vanity gradually wipe away 
the fear cast on them by the two battles." But to soothe 
the pride of the chieftains and sirdars while their entire 
submission was exacted, the queen's picture, covered with 
a curtain from the gaze of private men and retainers, was 
shown to those who made salaam; a ceremony so agree- 
able that every new batch eagerly demanded to see the 
" Great Padishaw's face." 

Nevertheless they did not understand how a woman 
could govern ; nor clearly comprehend the nature of the 
governor-general's power. They knew the last was of 
superior rank to the general, and thought he might, after 
the eastern manner, at some time put him to death and 
seize his wealth ; but judging that a difficult affair, seeing 
how strong he had been in battle how entire was the 
devotion of his troops, they with profound reverence 
accepted him as their immediate lord. One old chief 
being told of the queen's rank and power, exclaimed, 
" But sahib she did not beat me at Meeanee ; you are my 
king now" Another asked, "How far off is she?" So 
and so. "And you are next in rank?" "No! The 
governor- general is so in India." "How far off is he?" 
" He is at Calcutta." " Oh 1 1 have heard of Calcutta, and 
it is far off; — you are at Hyderabad. Answer me one 
thing. Cannot you cut off my head?" "Yes ! if you do 
not obey." " That is enough, I am your slave" 

They looked on the head of the army as the head of 
everything, and that alone justified Lord Ellenborough 
in constituting the government a military one, and con- 
fiding it entirely to the conqueror, of whom all were in 

c 



18 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. I. dread, and from whom therefore benefits flowed with more 
1843 grace and effect. His appointment was however, a signal 
for the outbreak of malignity incredibly base, and so 
inveterate that it continues to this day. Emanating 
originally from the council and some of the permanent 
official persons of the Bombay government, it was sup- 
ported by their dependent and expectant partisans, all 
stung to the quick at the loss of the sinister profits in 
perspective from the accession of new territory. But foul 
as their own bad deeds would it be, to make this ac- 
cusation without reservation or exception — there were 
civilians in office who opposed and disdained this hosti- 
lity, men whose honour demands respectful acknowledg- 
ment, and amongst those highest in position and character 
Mr. John Warden must be named. 

Incessant efforts were made by this faction to render 
the military government of Scinde a failure. Newspaper 
organs openly, and expectant tools secretly were set to 
work in England and in India to vilify the victorious 
general; and they were countenanced and encouraged by 
the directors and by the Board of Control under Lord 
Bipon, whose injurious and offensive conduct towards Sir 
C. Napier shall be exposed, because it is not fitting to re- 
spect folly when it degrades authority by insulting merit. 

In July Lord Ellenborough placed the Scindian govern- 
ment in direct communication with the Calcutta council, 
to relieve it from the interested meddling of Bombay. 
The official expectants at the last place, having then no 
hope either to force their way, or to sneak, into lucrative 
Scindian appointments, nothing was too gross for the 
polluted pens they hired to blacken Sir C. Napier and lower 
his exploits. " He had not gained victories, he had slaugh- 
tered some poor half-armed people who made no resist- 
ance" — "Scinde was a waste of sand" — "a Golgotha, 
foully and murderously obtained, a disgrace only to be 
put away by restoring its patriarchal princes." 

Then he was " an imbecile ruffian, delighting in car- 
nage, faithless, rapacious, a liar who disgraced the army, 
and stained the glorious age of Wellington." — " Why did 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



19 



not the sepoys rise and put an end to the fellow's doings? CHAP. I. 
He had brutally torn away the ornaments of the ameers 5 1843> 
women and dishonoured his uniform" — " Luxuriously 
changing his residence to feast on the delicious pulla 
fish, he was encircled by parasites who hourly promul- 
gated shameless falsehoods to prop the reputation of his 
ridiculous system of government, which all 'Old Indians' 
knew must fail." — " He had taken the traitor Ali Moorad 
to his bosom" — a traitor because he had not warred 
against the British troops ! — " had loaded him with pre- 
sents, had conferred on him the possessions of the plun- 
dered patriarchal princes of Scinde! and was at once his 
benefactor and dupe." 

Foremost to predict disaster was Outram, the discarded 
political agent, who announced, that forty of the younger 
ameers were at large, that while they were so, continual 
insurrections would disturb the English rule, and after 
ten years of guerilla warfare the country must be restored 
to the fallen princes — with much more of a like bald 
presumptuous talk, showing the vulgar character of his 
mind, which could see and exaggerate difficulties but had 
no resources for overcoming them. His predictions were 
echoed by most of the Indian and not a few of the London 
newspapers ; and though the course of this work will show 
how the touch of genius bursted these bubbles, the new 
governor's labour and difficulties were much augmented 
by these infamous arts of men, who with official power to 
do evil had hearts and heads so gorged with malice and 
falsehood that there was no room left for honour or 
patriotism. 

Few persons could have borne up against such a torrent 
and fury of abuse, and such malignant and foul official 
thwarting ; fewer still could have worked a way to order 
and a fair frame of government through such a chaos ; but 
the indomitable energy of Sir C. Napier may be thus 
judged. He had three distinct governments to correspond 
with — Calcutta, Bombay and the Board of Control — and 
often from the stoppage of daks and other circum- 
stances, as many as a hundred letters would arrive 

c 2 



20 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. I. 



1843. 



See conquest 
of Scinde. 



together in the midst of arduous military operations ; and 
through them he had to work while acting against the 
Lion, while subjugating the Delta, tranquillizing the popu- 
lation, organizing the administration, and establishing 
his general scheme of polity. The sun-stroke received 
in the field had so debilitated him, that the medical men 
urged him to quit Scinde as the only chance of life, and 
Lord Ellenborough, with a rare generosity, proposed to go 
in person to that country and conduct the government 
there until his health was restored. That he would not 
suffer, and though he could only write lying on his side — 
the heat being above 132° of Fahrenheit in an artificially 
cooled tent — though frequently at the point of death from 
exhaustion, he with stupendous energy continued to labour 
until he had reduced the evil influences of war insurrec- 
tion and social confusion to placidity, and cast the foun- 
dations of a new civilization. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



21 



CHAPTER II. 

Having to create all branches of administration, and CHAP. II. 
reform the social system, the general's first object was to ~£ 
find qualified subordinates. Everything was new, there was 
no guide, the land and its conditions were to be studied, 
and for the civil branches of administration the choice 
of men was restricted ; nevertheless, with a happy fortune, 
he found what he sought in his army, and by soldier 
civilians , the administration of Scinde was established 
and conducted with far less expense, and more activity, 
than it could have been done by civil servants. 

This is not conjecture. The expenses of Outranks 
political agency had been by Sir C. Napier abated sixteen 
thousand pounds annually; and his own monthly con- 
tingent charges varied from six and ten to one hundred 
and fifty rupees, whereas Outranr's had been as much 
as sixteen thousand ! Moreover certain civil servants 
had been sent from Calcutta for the administration of 
Upper Scinde, with a promise, as they said, of an esta- 
blishment ; which in India generally means a large retinue 
of clerks to do business while the heads of the depart- 
ment recreate themselves. Sir C. Napier would not allow 
of these clerks and called for work ; this was at 
first peremptorily refused; but finally two of the gentle- 
men wrote an expostulatory letter to their superior, Captain 
Pope, the collector, declaring they obeyed him with dis- 
gust and detestation ! Lord Ellenborough recalled them, 
and a Mr. Richardson, appointed by the general, did 
singly for five hundred rupees a month, and without any 
disgust, the work for which they had received above two 



22 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. ii. thousand rupees. Scinde was then left in the hands of 
!843. the military men, and though in addition to their own 
business the arrears of the political agency, neglected by 
Outram, were to be brought up, a solid framework of 
administration was soon laid, fit for immediate usage, 
yet capable of receiving improvements without alteration 
of the general form. 

The governor, being the only visible source of power, 
surrounded himself with troops that all might remember 
the sword would uphold what it had won. But those 
troops were also disposed with reference to the chances 
of insurrectional and partisan warfare from the hill tribes, 
who might be stimulated to hostility by the Talpore 
princes still at large, or by their own appetite for plunder. 
Affghan or Seikh invasions, events then considered veiy 
likely to happen, were also contemplated, and the military 
arrangements were so contrived as to meet all these chances, 
and preserve internal tranquillity without affecting the 
discipline and readiness of the army for active service, and 
without bringing the soldiers into contact with the people 
except in powerful masses : the troops thus obtained, in 
addition to their real power, all the imaginary power of 
the unknown, to augment the fear and wonder which 
their prowess in battle had created. 

This system was directly opposed to that of the political 
agents, who had during the Affghan war always spread 
their forces, and with a baneful result ; but it was Sir 
C. Napier's fixed conviction that the civil and military 
forces should be kept entirely distinct in their support 
of government. "Soldiers," he said, "were instituted to 
fight declared enemies, not to be watchers and punishers 
of criminals ; they should be, in thought and in reality, 
identified with their country's glory — the proudest of 
her sons — and never employed to enforce the behests of 
the civil administration until the civil power was found 
too weak. A contrary system lowered the army to a 
criminal police, hurt the soldiers' pride, and by dissemi- 
nation and ignoble contact injured their discipline and 
high feeling. It also substituted for the civil, a military 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



23 



force too easily had recourse to, thereby abating the CHAP. II. 
vigilance activity and resolution which ought to be cha- 1843 
racteristics of civil power. And to these general considera- 
tions he added two especial ones, of weight in Scinde, 
namely, that the sepoys should be debarred from forming 
too close friendships with the people, while the latter 
would be saved from the domineering arrogance of soldiers 
flushed with conquest; an arrogance which renders all 
armies, in every foreign country where they have long 
acted, whether as friends or enemies, so odious that no 
policy can counteract it when once entertained. 

With these views he embodied a numerous police, com- 
posed chiefly of Scindians who had been so employed by 
the ameers ; but the greater number had suffered in person 
or family from the cruelty of those princes, and bore 
towards them the hatred of emancipated slaves to cruel 
masters. They were at first timid, the natural result of 
oppression, and very impatient of discipline, deserting 
when checked \ but by mixing with them bold adven- 
turers, Patans and Rajpoots, and even some of the minor 
chiefs who had fought at Meeanee ; and by giving them 
a handsome uniform, and a military organization under 
European officers, the necessary courage was created, and 
they soon acted alone or alongside the troops on the most 
dangerous services. 

By degrees their numbers were increased to two thousand 
five hundred, divided into three classes, namely, the city, 
the rural and the mounted police. The first were for the 
great towns. The other two, clothed and armed in a 
different manner, were designed for the protection of the 
plains j and they were to act not only against ordinary evil- 
doers, but against the plundering hill tribes on the west of 
the Indus, aiding the troops if the incursions called for mili- 
tary operations. They protected small stations, guarded the 
daks, escorted criminals and treasure, enforced executions, 
relieved the soldiers from many isolated minor duties, and 
formed a body of excellent guides in war. When circum- 
stances called for the combined service of all the forces of 
government, the rural police, finding themselves then 



24 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. II. elevated to the dignity of soldiers, acquired greater confi- 
1843. dence and courage to perform the duties imposed on them 
when alone — duties which as regarded the hill tribes were 
at once honourable and dangerous, being in fact partisan 
warfare. 

Uncontaminated by the ignoble, though necessary em- 
ployment of detecting and dealing with rascal offenders in 
the great towns, which belonged entirely to the city police, 
the rural police soon caught the spirit of their organization, 
and, finding themselves well supported by the government, 
at first fell into the extreme of being too rough. Their 
duty was however very trying, and especially with the 
Beloochees, their recent masters ; if they had not been 
haughty they would have been cowed by those fierce pas- 
sionate men, and would probably have finally coalesced 
secretly with them ; indeed a fear of this termination 
made the general very cautious in checking them, until 
the course of their duties had produced some sharp fights, 
in which several were killed on both sides : but then, 
knowing the feuds thus engendered would bar any 
coalition, he proceeded to enforce a vigorous discipline. 

While establishing this power in support of the govern- 
ment and arranging his military system, he organized 
the civil gradations of administration in the following 
manner. 

Immediately beneath himself sat a commissioner for 
civil affairs, Captain Brown, the person in Scinde best 
acquainted with the country. All matters relative to the 
taxes and customs were referred in the first instance to 
him for examination and report. His title was afterwards 
changed to that of secretary to the government, but his 
functions remained the same. 

The whole country was divided into three great col- 
lectorates or districts, namely, Sukkur, Kurrachee and 
Hyderabad, and there was a separate collectorate for 
customs. The first embraced all the dominions on the 
right of the Indus as far south as S eh wan. The second 
included all Scinde on the right bank, from Sehwan 
to the coast. The third extended from the boundary of 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



25 



Ali MooracPs territory in the norths to the mouths of the CHAP. II. 
Indus, and to Cutch eastward, being bounded thereby the 
desert. At each station was a chief collector, having 
under him three sub-collectors disposed in the most con- 
venient places for superintendence and communication, 
and each sub-collector had a staff of subordinates. 

Every month the collectors sent statements of receipts 
and expenditure to the commissioner of civil affairs, who 
laid them, with his observations, before the governor, 
without whose direct authority no expense could be 
incurred. 

At the end of each month a report was made to the 
governor-general ; stating the disbursements in gross, the 
receipts, the balance in hand, the average price of labour, 
and cost of food for five persons, together with explana- 
tions of the causes producing a variation in the balance 
from one month to another. To this was appended a 
memorandum upon the extent of country newly irrigated, 
in square measure, the length of roads made, the public 
buildings begun or finished, and the height of the waters 
of the Indus. 

Each station was supported by a body of police under a 
European commander, and protected by a powerful mass 
of regular troops, always within reach, yet only to be 
employed when the police and irregulars being unable to 
resist incursions the duty became a warfare. 

At Hyderabad, which was at first the seat of govern- 
ment, the police were under the European captain of 
police, who had European lieutenants at the other stations, 
the responsibility for discipline, payments and organi- 
zation being as rigorous as for troops of the line. 

To sustain the rural police, the irregular cavalry, 
composed of men who disdained the company of persons 
lower in degree, were distributed between the collectorates 
and around them ; and though disposed in smaller bodies 
than the regulars were still in masses. 

Every branch of the physical force was thus kept 
distinct ; yet combined for general purposes ; and each 
was stimulated to excellence by unity of purpose and 



26 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. II. employment. For as the city police stood between the 
rural police and the more degraded of the population,, so 
the rural police stood between the city police and the 
irregulars, troops whose pride prevented familiarity with the 
people; and all three hedged round the regulars, who were 
never interrupted in their discipline by being detached on 
police duties, and never degraded in their own estimation 
by intercourse with criminals. Remaining in masses, they 
were isolated mysterious objects of terror and respect for 
an uncivilized people, who knew them only by their 
terrible deeds in war. Meanwhile the police being in 
constant contact with the population were forced to exert 
all their energies, having however, where overpowered, the 
irregular horsemen to look to for support, and finally the 
regular troops, of whose strength in battle the most exag- 
gerated notions had been formed. 

To these gradations of authority was added another, 
which Sir C. Napier indeed found in existence, but gave 
to it an entirely new direction ; adapting it with a subtle 
policy to his schemes for regenerating the social condition 
of the people. The land of Scinde was divided into 
districts of various extents and value, called kardarats, 
and over each was a Kardar or headman, answering to the 
cadi of the Arabians. They were nominally only allowed 
to decide in small causes, and to a certain extent punish 
summarily with fine and imprisonment, but in practice 
they exercised power of life and death and torture ; and 
though in capital cases they referred to the ameers it "was 
but a form, as those princes always decided on the recorded 
evidence of the kardar, who collected their land revenue 
and customs, and rendered in person an account every 
half-year at Hyderabad. In some districts they farmed 
the customs and land-taxes, and were then generally very 
harsh and oppressive, frequently fining and torturing the 
miserable ryots to increase their own gains : one kardar 
was said to have realized in a year fifteen hundred pounds 
by fines alone. 

These men had necessarily great influence with the 
people; but they were from fear the slaves of the Beloochee 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



27 



sirdar, or chief, to whose jagheer or estate their villages chap. II. 
belonged, and were consequently enabled to oppress but 
not to protect those under them; and like all slaves 
they were venal, knavish and deceitful. Nevertheless Sir 
C. Napier, true to his avowed principle of causing as little 
disturbance as possible in the social relations of the people, 
continued the kardars, because they were a link of order 
to which the population was accustomed ; but he gave 
them large salaries, to prevent any indirect taxation for 
their own behoof ; and he attached them to the collector- 
ates, with a warning that being thus part of and directly 
responsible to the government, the continuation of their 
appointments would depend upon their good beha- 
viour. 

If the villagers preferred just complaints against any 
kardar, he was removed and otherwise punished according 
to his offence. Their interests being thus bound up with 
the well-being of their people and their conduct closely 
watched by the officers of the collectorate they became 
circumspect, and willingly served a government from which 
they derived high pay without the odium and vexation of 
being at once slaves and tyrants, suspected by their 
masters and hated by their constituents. 

This circumspection however, was not of immediate 
'growth; many of the kardars, concluding the governor's 
regulations were like eastern laws, to be broken by the 
powerful, behaved oppressively. Prompt punishment cor- 
rected this error, but the danger of such misconduct in- 
duced the establishment of sub-collectors with assistants ; 
and they and the officers in command of distant out- 
posts received magisterial authority, that the delinquencies 
of the kardars might be more readily checked. The 
population was thus generally encouraged, and a heavy 
blow was given to the feudal or clan system, which Sir 
C. Napier designed to break down without appearing to be 
an enemy ; for the kardars, no longer dependent on the 
Beloochee sirdar for existence, did very soon, as was 
expected, become protectors of their villages against the 
injustice of the chiefs ; and were, on appeal, in rightful 



28 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S 



CHAP. II. cases supported by the government, which thus only 
1843 appeared as an arbitrator not a meddler. 

The villagers had been too long enslaved and were 
still too fearful of their tyrants to dare being in the wrong 
at first ; and before that spirit could arise, the clan 
system would, it was judged, be broken down and the 
influence of regular government prevail. But if con- 
trary to expectation the villagers were in the wrong, the 
redress awarded the chief would attach him to a system 
which protected his rights and saved him from the 
employment of armed men to enforce his just demands ; 
for under the ameers all was effected by violence, and the 
retainers invariably exacted more than the right, im- 
poverishing their employers both ways. He was thus also 
saved from feuds, which in Scinde were infinite, and 
virulent to an almost incredible degree. 

It was noticed by the duke of Wellington that one of 
the greatest dangers to the Indian empire from every new 
acquisition of territory, was " the throwing out of employ- 
ment and of means of subsistence, all who had previously 
managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, 
or plundered the country 

This danger, peculiarly formidable in Scinde, where not 
an official body but a whole race had plundered the 
country, was completely obviated by the employment of 
the kardars, and by the organization of a police which 
attached so many loose dangerous men to the govern- 
ment ; and by the still more prudent course, of preserving 
the Beloochee noblemen in their possessions and folio w- 
ings, under a peaceable tenure. 

The system of collectorates and kardarats soon affected 
the revenue favourably. The receipts, which in the first 
month were not above three thousand pounds, rose in July 
to above ten thousand, and many evasions and false modes 
of collection were discovered ; and many false oppressive 
kardars were punished. This increase during a time of 
war and trouble, and when the ameers' taxation had been 
reduced, proved that a great revenue could be obtained. 
It was certain also to be augmented by an increasing 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



29 



population. For already the people of Kandahar were CHAP. IT. 
flocking to Shikarpoor, to enjoy the protection of a man 
who so regarded and upheld justice, that men were under 
him in the midst of war and conquest safer than with 
others in profound peace. The Scindees, satisfied with 
a little food, easily obtained, were indeed disposed to 
indolence as the greatest pleasure and contrast to their 
former state of forced labour; but it was foreseen and so 
happened, that new wants and the example of strangers, 
joined to judicious taxation and encouragement of labour, 
would in time stimulate them to draw from the rich soil 
beneath their feet an increasing amount of its inex- 
haustible productions. 

Many attempts were made at first, to impose on the 
new government and ascertain the character of its chief. 
One was conspicuous from the extent of its aim, and the 
amusing facility with which it was disposed of and future 
projects of a like nature precluded; for it was an effort to 
establish a precedent which would in its effects have 
caused universal confusion. The Hindoo merchants, ever 
watchful to gain, and now stimulated to revenge for 
the Beloochee sirdars' former oppressions, thought to get 
back not only the loans forced from them under the ameers, 
but compound interest on an original interest of thirty, 
forty and even fifty per cent. : and to establish a ruling 
precedent they first claimed from the ameers. The general 
at once perceived the extent of their drift, and foreseeing 
that the ameers, if referred to, would admit any claim, how- 
ever false or usurious, were it only to make the English pay; 
and because they would calculate, that if restored, as they 
then expected to be and as the faction at Bombay gave 
them hopes of being, they could reclaim all these false debts 
and easily recover the money by torturing the claimants. 
Wherefore seeing that a door would be thus opened to 
endless false pretensions and incalculable mischief, he thus 
answered the rich Banians, who put their case in the 
following plausible manner. "You sahib, having con- 
quered the ameers and seized their treasure are respon- 
sible for their debts ; we invoke your sense of justice. 



30 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. II. To us they owe much." The sum was immense, the claim 
1843 clearly a forged one ; for the ameers often took but never 
borrowed, save in the way of forced loans, well understood 
to be confiscations — their way being to make the rich 
Banians bid as at an auction for their own noses and ears. 

To have dismissed the matter at once in the exercise of 
absolute power would have been easy, and without evil 
consequences ; but the general, desirous to give a public 
check to the concoction of such schemes in future, thus 
replied. " The ameers were your friends when you lent 
this money, but they were my enemies, and I never 
heard of men fighting battles and risking the dangers of 
war to serve their enemies. I shall therefore keep what 
I have won for my government. You know that all taxes 
and debts due to the ameers previous to the first battle 
have been remitted; how then can I be justly called 
upon to pay their creditors for money advanced before 
that epoch— and advanced to enable them to make war 
upon me ? Your claim is of this class, and so far from 
paying, my intention is to have all loans to the ameers 
examined, with a view to the infliction of a fine upon their 
creditors for having assisted my enemies." 

" We then are ruined, sahib — we must starve — we must 
die ! " 

" That," he replied, " will be very convenient ; for I am 
about to construct a large cemetery and shall want bodies 
to put into it — be therefore at ease, when you die I will 
take you under my protection and bury you honourably \" 
They laughed and the matter terminated. 

The whole revenue would not have sufficed to meet such 
hollow demands, but privately small claims were examined 
and paid, when found just, as a matter of generosity not 
of law, and this cutting of the Gordian knot was indis- 
pensable, and within the rights of a conqueror, creating 
neither surprise nor discontent, even with these usurers, 
who could produce no proofs in support of their demands. 

To the collectorates was attached the judiciary system, 
that protection might march abreast with taxation. Each 
collector was a superior magistrate ; the sub-collector and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



31 



the officers commanding certain outposts were inferior CHAP. II. 
magistrates, and all were restricted in authority by the jjjjjj' 
following regulations. 

The military magistrate was to make a preliminary 
investigation, assisted by the cazi, a kind of judge-attorney, 
who was to expound the Mahometan law and the customs 
of the place — and as between man and man, the Maho- 
metan laws are simple, clear and very just. This was 
however only to aid the magistrates, who decided accord- 
ing to their own equitable notions unfettered by legal 
niceties ; a freedom of judgment which was given because 
prompt redress and punishments in every-day occurrences 
were essential to tranquillity, and to the first progress 
of the government machinery ; and in the choice of 
collectors regard was had to moral qualities, as well as to 
abilities. Indeed all appointments, from the highest to 
the lowest, were given to men who had served well in the 
campaign — and all recommendations and requests from 
England, whether of friends or of powerful people, were 
denied. — u Those who won the land have the first right to 
govern it if competent to the task," was the invariable 
answer, and not until their claims were honourably satisfied 
would the general look even towards his own family. 

Magistrates had arbitrary power to decide in all cases 
which they were competent to hear, yet they were pre- 
monished to attend to the cazi, unless they doubted his 
integrity, and their power was to be exercised under the 
following regulations. 

Where the property in litigation exceeded twenty-five 
rupees the evidence was to be recorded in Persian, and no 
civil suit could be entertained for any sum except on a 
written petition in the same language, on the back of 
which the magistrate's decree was to be recorded. 

No suit involving the right of property in land was to 
be judged by any save chief collectors and their immediate 
assistants; and all the military magistrates were bound 
to transmit to the collectors of their districts, on the first 
of each month, a report of the cases decided by them 
during the previous month. 



32 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. II. In the criminal jurisdiction a number of specified minor 
I843" offences were left to the discretion of the assistant magis- 
trates, but the more serious were for the decision of the 
collector; and where the sentence was to be executed 
without appeal, the maximum of punishment was six 
months' ordinary imprisonment, or three months' with 
hard labour ; twenty-four lashes, or a fine of one hundred 
rupees : but only one of these penalties could be inflicted 
for a single offence, and none of them save for offences 
specified in the regulations. Where the punishment 
exceeded this scale the sanction of the governor was 
necessary; and when the fine passed twenty-five rupees, 
or the incarceration more than one month, a record of 
the case and sentence was made in the Persian language, 
whereas minor causes were merely entered officially in a 
book. 

This system was in conformity as to the general frame- 
work with the nominal laws of the country under the 
ameers ; but with these appreciable improvements, — that 
they were real — that the European magistrates, higher in 
character and station, were less liable to be swayed by 
private motives than the kardars — that their authority was 
more restricted by forms, their proceedings more frequently 
and rigorously revised — that their punishments were 
clearly defined and all torturing and oppression prohibited. 
The ameers, seeking to obtain as much revenue as possible, 
were indulgent to oppressive kardars, whereas the English 
ruler, seeking only to insure justice was vigilant to restrain 
and inexorable to punish them. These differences were 
soon widely made known, for on several occasions, kardars 
convicted of oppression were degraded and punished in 
the presence of the people they had wronged. 

In capital cases the proceedings were entirely different. 
The magistrate had to take down the evidence in writing, 
and transmit it to the judge-advocate-general of Scinde — 
Captain Young, a qualified person and of great justice and 
industry — who had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough 
at the request of Sir Charles Napier. That functionary, 
after due examination, placed the record before the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



33 



governor, with his own observations upon the legal and CHAP. II. 
equitable points, and the latter imposed upon himself the 1843 
enormous labour of analyzing, in conjunction with the 
government secretary, every document of this nature, 
before he even affixed his order for a military commission 
to try the accused. 

Trials were conducted under rules, having for aim to 
elicit the truth without a slavish adherence to lawyers' 
dicta, and the minutes were laid before the governor by the 
judge-advocate-general, with an opinion as to the proceed- 
ings, finding and sentence ; whereupon the former again 
went through the case before decreeing execution. He 
never augmented punishment, or inflicted it of his own 
authority, though that was unlimited ; for he could put 
men to death without responsibility, save to his conscience 
and public opinion ; but conscious of the weakness of 
human nature when invested with unrestricted power, he 
voluntarily created these checks, and entailed upon him- 
self these oppressive examinations, without evading, or 
shrinking from them, during the whole of his government. 
Whether in peace or war in quarters, or in the field, no 
serious sentence was executed without his having previously 
made himself master of the case, and duly reflected upon 
what justice and policy required. 

This union of legislation, judgment and execution, was 
undoubtedly the essence of despotism ; but though lean- 
ing theoretically to the doctrine which opposes all capital 
punishment, Sir C. Napier thought the arguments in 
favour of that doctrine were only applicable to a high- 
wrought state of society, which furnished so many other 
modes of repression for crime. " They who adhered to it 
in Scinde," he said, "would soon be thrown into the 
Indus" — " Beccaria and Livingstone would find it hard to 
rule Beloochees without capital punishment." 

Death however he inflicted only for murder ; a restric- 
tion which did not prevent his rule being at first more 
stern and life-taking than comported with his natural 
benevolence ; giving him constant care and anxiety, which 
combined with other vexations affected his health. For 

D 



34 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. II. the habits of the Beloochee race had been so barbarous, 
jj^J their customs so ferocious, and the worst examples of 
cruelty and all odious vices had been so constantly given 
by the ameers, that a general depravity of feeling pre- 
vailed and could only be corrected by fear. Torture, 
and mutilations worse than death were common punish- 
ments, applied not only by the ameers but by their nobles, 
and even by the kardars of villages. Child-murder, espe- 
cially of females, was so common as to be the rule not the 
exception, and was indeed with them no crime. Whenever 
a woman was guilty of infidelity, or even suspected — and 
that suspicion was excited by trifles, and often pretended 
from interested views — one man would hold her up by the 
hair while another hewed her piecemeal with a sword. To 
kill women on any pretext was a right assumed by every 
Beloochee, and they could not understand why they were 
to be debarred. 

A man had been condemned for murdering his wife ; 
his chief sued the general for pardon. " No ! I will hang 
him." " What ! you will hang a man for only killing his 
wife ! " " Yes ! She had done no wrong." " Wrong ! 
No! but he was angry! why should he not kill her?" 
"Well, I am angry, why should not I kill him?" This 
conviction of their right to murder women was so 
strong and their belief in fatalism was so firm, that many 
executions took place ere the practice could be even 
checked ; but, finding the general as resolute to hang as 
they were to murder, the tendency after a time abated, 
and to use his significant phrase "the gallows began to 
overbalance Mahomet and predestination." They were 
however a stubborn race, and their contempt of death may 
be judged of by the following anecdote, chosen rather for 
its forcible portraiture than its singularity as to the indif- 
ference displayed. A Beloochee condemned for murder 
walked to execution conversing with calmness on the 
road; when turned off the rope broke and he fell, but 
started up instantly and with inexpressible coolness said 
" Accidents will happen in despite of care ! try again /" 
Sir C. Napier classed under the head of slavery, the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



35 



dragging young girls from their homes for the harems CHAP. II. 
of the great; and often he rejoiced at being the instru- 
ment of Providence to suppress the cruelty exercised 
towards women, though to do so, he was forced to wield 
the sword so terribly in battle and give the axe of justice 
such a sweep ; but the feeling respecting the non-right of 
women and children to their existence and freedom 
demanded the sternest repression; for the examples of 
unmitigated cruelty and debauchery given by the nu- 
merous ameers, had a wide currency which sharp justice 
only could counteract. From that painful duty he did 
not shrink; but his repugnance to take life acted strongly 
in confirmation of his conscientious resolve to spare him- 
self no labour in the examination of all judicial matters — 
five or six hours' sleep in the twenty-four was his only 
relaxation from care, and that not always permitted. 

He also put down the practice of suttees, which how- 
ever was rare in Scinde, by a process entirely character- 
istic. For judging the real cause of these immolations to 
be the profit derived by the priests, and hearing of an 
intended burning, he made it known that he would stop 
the sacrifice. The priests said it was a religious rite which 
must not be meddled with — that all nations had customs 
which should be respected and this was a very sacred one. 
The general affecting to be struck with the argument 
replied. " Be it so. This burning of widows is your cus- 
tom ; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also 
a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, 
and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall 
therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned 
when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to 
national customs !" No suttee took place then or after- 
wards. 

Even-handed justice was naturally offensive in a certain 
measure to the Beloochee race, whose long-exercised 
supremacy was thus broken down ; but they had expected 
a cruel overbearing master in their conqueror, and finding 
him the reverse, resigned themselves with eastern quietude 
to their " kismet" or fate ; and brutal as they were in 

d 2 



36 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. II. many ways,, their faults were more those of education and 
1843 false pride than any innate depravity: nature had not 
given them such fine persons without corresponding qua- 
lities of mind, and to their chivalric notions the general 
diligently appealed, adding a soothing flattery, and opening 
new views of self-interest. 

All the land in Scinde belonged to the state, and 
grants of it, called jagheers, were made by the ameers 
on the feudal tenure of bringing so many swords and 
shields into the field when the prince called for them. 
These jagheers could always be resumed, and the smaller 
jagheerdars were liable to constant capricious removals 
from one estate to another, the ameers invariably seeking 
profit by the change. But the tenures of all were very 
uncertain, seeing that their masters, acknowledging no 
law but their own will, or fears, watched eagerly to re- 
sume jagheers whenever a favourite was to be endowed 
or a spirited man crushed. Even the greatest chiefs were 
at times dispossessed, and with the possessions of the 
chiefs went those of all his personal followers. Then he 
would take shield and matchlock, to live by plunder ; and 
so long as he abstained from the ameer s' private estates 
and money, he was free to rob all others if his hand was 
strong. 

Inconceivable as this may be to civilized men, it was the 
custom in Scinde ; and one of those customs which must 
have dissolved the ameers' power, or rather the whole 
frame of society in a short time, if the conquest had not 
interfered. It had already taken a singular social form. 
To rob an unprotected stranger was a matter of course, and 
the exacting of black-mail, after the manner of the Scotch 
Highlanders, was also established ; but in Scinde, a run- 
ning account was kept on the following curious basis. If 
two tribes were at feud and one found the balance of loss 
in cattle or goods against it, the overplus was charged 
to some weaker tribe, upon whom a foray was made to 
enforce this strange debt. Yet social intercourse was not 
broken thereby; the robbed men, with a civil salaam, 
and pretending to know nothing of the act, asked the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



37 



robbers to aid them in spoiling a third tribe to the same CHAP. II. 
extent, and thus a species of poor-law was enforced by 1843 
arms. 

Change of jagheers, and often entire deprivation, had 
been very frequent under the ameers, and upon that 
uncertainty of possession the English general founded his 
main resource for attaching the Beloochees to his rule,, 
without lowering their dignity or reducing their imme- 
diate follower s 5 means of existence. England he told 
them neither wanted nor would have the aid of warriors 
on the feudal system, her regular army was sufficient, as 
they had learned to their cost ; hence no service of sword 
and shield could repurchase their jagheers, which were all 
forfeited by the conquest. Nevertheless he would restore 
them, with this condition — that when any public work 
was in progress through their jagheer, each jagheerdar 
was to provide labourers with mattock and spade in the 
same proportion as he had before been bound to provide 
warriors with matchlock and sword ; and it was his design 
to commence such works as would enhance the value of 
their possessions. This was assented to, and thus another 
sap was laid to the feudal system without being discovered. 
For he did not deceive himself in supposing that the great 
men, thus made permanent landholders, would accept 
Scinde from his hands as a country, instead of from the 
ameers as a spoil. 

These measures being taken with the powerful classes, 
it remained to improve the condition of the people at large, 
and to draw forth the resources of the subdued land — 
a land so rich by nature that it was said " it might be 
tilled with a man's nails." The general aspect presented 
great leading features which served as guides for the 
fixture action of administration. First of these was the 
Indus, with its periodical inundations, which, like that of 
the Nile, was at war with the desert, and the cause of all 
fertility ; but though capable of being made in time 
the great artery of commerce with the Punjaub and the 
nations of Central Asia, the aid of art was required, and 
expenses which should be the consequences rather than 



38 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



chap. II. the exciters of commerce. It was of varying depths,, 
1843f capricious in changing its bed, and subject to whirlpools 
of such extraordinary violence as to turn even a steamer 
round with amazing velocity. It would not suffer build- 
ings near its stream. " I have/' said the general, " seen 
from the deck of a steamer as much as half an acre of the 
bank carried away at once." The navigation also required 
boats of a peculiar construction, and there were no perma- 
nently accessible ports at the different mouths — Kurrachee 
was forty miles from the nearest navigable branch of the 
river, and, though the best port of Scinde, was very in- 
convenient at all times, and in the monsoons nearly 
unapproachable. 

From river commerce therefore Sir C. Napier expected 
little advantage, until Sukkur and Kurrachee should 
become populous ; and for the moment he looked only to 
assuage the most prominent dimculties, leaving to time 
and the enterprise of merchants, the development of the 
great commerce which he foresaw would finally spring up, 
if not repressed by bad government and wars. Never- 
theless, in anticipation, he thus early meditated a great 
scheme of river police to be continued by the khan of 
Bhawalpore, which would secure trade for hundreds of 
miles up the Indus, and render Kurrachee an emporium. 
Meanwhile the value of the Indus for interior traffic, and 
for its influence on agriculture attracted his immediate 
attention, and the engineers who were employed to take 
the levels found the bed of the river above the plane of 
the surrounding country ; wherefore it was apparent that 
scientific operations, which were immediately set on foot, 
would, with no great expense, control and regulate the 
irrigation of the land and be productive of immense 
wealth and prosperity. 

Next to the river came the mountains and the desert 
for consideration. The Hala range, bounding Scinde on 
the west, touched the Indus at Sehwan, but receded below 
and above that point, so as to leave wide extents of fertile 
country, of which the northern was the richest and most 
important. It was the most exposed also to the plunder- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE. 



39 



iiig excursions of the kill and mountain tribes, and hence CHAP. II. 
protection by arms and administration was more needed 1843< 
than peaceful works on that side. 

On the east Scinde was bounded by the Thur or great 
desert, which only left a narrow strip of land between it 
and the river, and continually advanced where not re- 
pressed by the hand of man ; but between absolute waste 
and absolute fertility, there was a line ten or twelve miles 
broad and nearly four hundred long, which partook of 
both characters, and could by artificial means be restored 
to the latter. Moreover, during his march to Emaumghur, 
Sir C. Napier had discovered, what no European had before 
known, that a range of fertile hills with rich woods was 
to be found on this neutral ground, lining the west bank 
of the Narra river, which fended off the naked waste of 
sand. 

This Narra, whether a natural channel or entirely arti- 
ficial, had at one time run near Omercote in the desert, 
and it was thought — if re-opened — that it would restore a 
great track to agriculture — the newly-discovered hills 
would then furnish a retreat and shelter from the raging 
heat to a population settled there. A corps of surveying 
engineers was obtained from Lord Ellenborough to examine 
and report on the practicability of this great scheme, 
and with a benevolent elation of mind at the prospect, 
Sir C. Napier exclaimed. " If I can restore this immense 
Mesopotamian plain to cultivation I shall do much for the 
people of this great country, to which I have done no 
injury, no wrong, and I shall laugh at the cant of c Fallen 
Princes' 93 

South of Hyderabad was the Delta of the Indus, 
naturally the richest portion of Scinde, but the most 
intricate, the most insalubrious, and, because of these 
things and the wild character of the population, the most 
chfncult to govern. All ameliorations there required great 
caution, lest discontent should render it a Scindian 
La Vendee. 

Such was the general aspect of the country, and it 
brought conviction, that the first and greatest efforts for 



40 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. ii. the general welfare must be directed to encourage agri- 
1843> culture and small trading, by laws, by public works, and 
an improved system of irrigation which should give full 
effect to the annual inundations. River commerce could 
only be a secondary consideration, though not to be 
neglected ; but it was foreseen that internal and external 
trading — then principally carried on by caravans — would 
augment when the vexatious restrictions of the ameers 
were exchanged for facilities and encouragement, which 
would lead to the use of the river, and ultimately develop 
the great resources and advantages of Scinde. In fine, 
Sir C. Napier's view of the matter was thus laconically 
expressed. " Control the robbers. Control the waters. 
Open the communications, and the natural richness of 
the land and the variety of produce ivill do all the 
rest." 

There was however a strange obstacle to be overcome — 
scarcely could a handicraftsman be found ! The ameers 
and sirdars in their short-sighted tyranny had laid that 
branch of industry waste ! They forced carpenters, smiths, 
builders and other artisans to work for low, or rather 
nominal wages — seeing that half their scanty earnings 
were taken as a tax for license to work at all ; and of the 
other half a moiety went to the collector as a present. If 
the starving workman was importunate, or that his work 
did not give satisfaction, he was assailed with blows, or 
suffered the loss of nose or ears; wherefore, knowing 
that, unlike the poor serf who tilled the soil, they could 
gain bread in other countries, the artisans gradually aban- 
doned Scinde, and those who remained were hard to find, 
and so few that even a small house could not be built. 

This was an obstacle severely affecting the welfare of 
the troops, for whom it was the genera? s anxious desire 
to provide good barracks — having in every quarter of the 
globe seen that bad barracks were a powerful cause of 
crime and death and general unhealthiness with British 
soldiers. Everywhere he had found them inconveniently 
planned, ill situated, and exhibiting the extravagance, the 
negligence and criminal indifference in the authorities 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



41 



to the lives and morals of the troops. Hence one of his CHAP. n. 
first objects was the construction of barracks, which should 1843 
give the soldiers a fair chance of health. This want of 
artisans stopped him short in that and other public works ; 
but to remedy the evil he proclaimed in Scinde and the 
neighbouring countries his need, inviting craftsmen of all 
kinds, with assurance of employment at high wages. His 
reputation for good faith soon brought many, and their 
demands were, at first, as he expected, exorbitant, exceeding 
in the proportion of ten to one the wages under the 
ameers. The English community then took alarm, and 
many persons proposed, according to Indian notions, that 
a maximum should be established. To this a deaf ear 
was turned as being unjust and financially impolitic ; and 
because a few years' experience of such social protec- 
tion would give the Scindians spirit, if the country were 
given back to the ameers, to resist the oppressions of those 
tyrants, and thus mankind would be benefited. 

There were however strange notions of political eco- 
nomy afloat. An official person wished to compel the 
fishermen on the coast to drag for pearl oysters in despite 
of their objection that few pearls were to be got at that 
season, and as they were only paid for the number they 
obtained their families would starve, whereas by fishing 
for sharks they could support themselves. 

" Are we here," the general asked, " to protect the poor 
or to rob the people of the land?" 

" To protect the poor." 

" Do you call forcing them to labour for the govern- 
ment and starving some twenty families protection?" 

"But they won't starve, they acknowledge they can 
get pearls." 

"Would they fish for sharks if they could get more 
money by dragging up pearls ?" 

" No, I suppose not, but the revenue will suffer." 

" Have we any right to prevent them winning their 
bread as they think best themselves ?" 

" No." So the matter ended. 

This liberal policy was successful ; the remuneration for 



42 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. II. labour gradually found its level; a high one, but that was an 
1843 effect of previous oppression ; and it was within the general's 
views to encourage industry at the expense of luxury. 

In September the administration was arranged in all 
its branches, and Sir Charles Napier, whose bodily powers 
were then nearly expended, transferred his quarters to 
Kurrachee ; partly to recover his strength, principally 
because it was more suitable for the seat of government, 
being the key of the country politically, militarily, and 
commercially. But previous to describing his government 
when in full activity, a general recapitulation of what he 
had achieved since his entrance into the country will not 
be misplaced. 

In October 1842, the political and military affairs of 
Scinde had been placed in his hands at a crisis of great 
danger, when the disasters in Afghanistan had shaken 
the British Indian empire to its centre ; he was a stranger 
to the people and the country, and ill seconded by some 
of the political agents, yet in three months he had laid 
open the hostile designs and intrigues of the ameers, had 
broken their combinations and forced those of Upper 
Scinde, when on the point of assailing his troops at an 
inconvenient moment, to fly to Lower Scinde without a 
sword-stroke. At the same time he detached Ali Moorad 
the most powerful of them from the family alliance, and 
made him a firm ally. 

In January 1843, he marched into the desert and 
destroyed the fortress of Emaumghur, thought by the 
Beloochees to be impregnable. 

On the 17th of February, with less than two thousand 
fighting men he defeated thirty-five thousand Beloochee 
warriors, killing nearly six thousand in a battle of four 
hours' duration — which gave him the strong fortress of 
Hyderabad and six sovereign ameers as prisoners. 

During the remainder of February and the first three 
weeks of March, he constructed an intrenched camp, 
and a fort to protect his steamers, while he maintained a 
very dangerous position with unsurpassed resolution in the 
face of thirty thousand fresh enemies. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



43 



On the 21st of March, he with five thousand men CHAP. II. 
defeated twenty-six thousand strongly intrenched under 
the Lion at Dubba, in a battle of three hours 3 duration, in 
which five thousand Beloochees were killed — and then with 
matchless activity reducing the fortified towns of Meerpoor 
on the edge and of Omercote in the heart of the desert, he 
regained Hyderabad on the 8th of April, before the inun- 
dation of the Indus could break up his communications. 

During the remainder of April and in May he repaired 
the fortress of Aliar-ka-Tanda ; strengthened Meerpoor; 
digested and proclaimed the principles and plan of his 
government, and partly by menace, partly by clemency, 
brought four hundred of the great sirdars and chiefs of 
tribes to submit. Meanwhile, keeping the plundering 
bands of the Delta in check, he organized a steamboat 
expedition to re-open his communications up the Indus, 
which had been intercepted by the tribes from the west ; 
and at the same time arranged an immense combination 
of troops, from posts hundreds of miles apart, to crush the 
Lion, who had not only raised another army but prepared 
the conquered Beloochees about Hyderabad for a general 
insurrection. 

Early in June, though the mercury stood at 132° of 
. Fahrenheit in an artificially- cooled tent, he marched from 
Hyderabad, and having by a dexterous stroke of policy 
prevented the breaking out of the general insurrection, on 
the 8th entirely crushed the Lion. While thus employed 
a sun-stroke reduced him to the last degree of bodily 
weakness, yet in this state he entirely suppressed the dis- 
turbances of the Delta, completed the organization of 
his government, and brought the country to a state of 
general tranquillity. 

In September, the labour endured, coupled with the 
effects of the sun-stroke, had so affected his health, that 
the medical men told him he must go to Kurrachee 
and quit work or prepare to quit life and work together. 
Work he would not abandon, but consented to try Kurra- 
chee, and arrived. there just ten months after he had first 
set foot on shore the year before, having in that time 



44 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. II. achieved the conquest of a great kingdom, and organized 
1843 the government of a numerous people, already taught to 
regard him as a just ruler. 

But now the Bombay faction, those persons who had 
been constantly denouncing him, and continued to 
denounce him to the world as a man of unmitigated 
ferocity, pretended alarm for the consequences of his 
conciliating system of government. — " He was encouraging 
and trusting men who were unworthy of trust " — "The 
Belooch chiefs were deceiving and would betray him" 
— " Shere Mohamed was arousing all Beloochistan for 
war " — " conciliatory measures were weakness, and would 
produce mischief." Sir George Arthur, the governor of 
Bombay, was fortunately so far influenced by these asser- 
tions as to allude to them in his letters, which elicited the 
following reply, shaking the flimsy texture of woven folly 
to pieces, and showing the power with which the land was 
held. 

" Shere Mohamed has gone to Kandahar, leaving his 
family behind ; from which it would seem that he means 
to return. Meanwhile he is his own ambassador; and a 
king who is his own ambassador is also a beggar, and not 
much to be feared. We are friends with the great chiefs 
of Scinde, and will, I hope, continue so. Those who . 
croak should say what they fear. Suppose the chiefs 
should prove traitors ! Have I not got my troops in 
hand, and in masses ? They are not scattered in feeble 
detachments, they cannot be cut off. Are not my maga- 
zines full ? Do I not maintain discipline ? Have I not 
repaired all fortified places that ought to be defended, 
and thrown up new works everywhere that they are likely 
to be required ? In what point then am I careless ; and, 
unless that be shown, where is the mischief of con- 
ciliation ? If the whole country were in arms I could do 
no more than I do now. I am ready to encounter fifty 
thousand enemies by merely sounding a bugle. I am 
indeed but half-prepared against climate, but that I cannot 
help. I cannot make workmen labour as I wish, and 
were I to punish these wild fellows they would disappear." 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



45 



CHAPTER III. 

At Kurrachee Sir C. Napier opened his administration CHAP. III. 
with a careful examination of the collectors' and engineers' 
reports, relative to the state of the people under the ameers 
and the prospects of Scinde under an ameliorated system. 
It then appeared how terrible a scourge is bad government, 
how wide it spreads, how deep it penetrates ; how infinitely 
more devastating and dreadful it is than war, which is 
generally but a transient blast, exciting the highest ener- 
gies of man as it passes, and consequently leaving behind 
it the vigour necessary to repair its evil effects. Nor are 
those effects so far as agriculture is concerned very lasting, 
or the plains watered by the Po, and those through which 
the Scheld passes, which have for centuries been the 
battle-fields of Europe, would not exhibit, as they do and 
always have done, the highest cultivation. 

In war also, when not too prolonged, the dignity of 
women gains most, because they are of necessity imbued 
with high and serious thoughts, and the passions excited 
tend in both sexes to exalt the imagination and forbid the 
access of baseness. National not civil warfare however it 
must be, for the last belongs to bad government, and must 
be reckoned among its dreadful consequences. In Scinde 
the unmitigated evils of such government were exhibited 
in shocking characters ; and it was for the conqueror, the 
man of war, to remedy them. They were indeed such and 
so deep-seated, that only a conqueror could arrest their 
rapid progress towards entire desolation. 

The land, as before noticed, belonged entirely to 
the state, and the ameers raised the chief part of their 



46 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. ill. revenue from it ; exacting their dues with shocking 
1843. cruelty — mutilations and tortures. Nominally the sove- 
reign's exaction was but half, yet various minor oppressions 
made the land-tax upon the ryots amount to two-thirds, 
or more, of the gross produce. It was levied also capri- 
ciously, and at some places in money, but generally in 
kind, the realizing money upon which gave rise to new 
exactions and oppressions. 

Under the Kalloras the ryots had hereditary tenures, 
which gave them an interest in the soil ; and always Scinde, 
from its natural fertility, when tolerably governed, had 
been a rich and productive country. The ameers, seeking 
only personal profit, broke all the ancient tenures, rendered 
the husbandman a mere slave, and turned nearly a fourth 
of the finest land into hunting wildernesses. They gave 
still greater tracts of equal fertility, as jagheers, to indolent, 
careless Beloochee chiefs, who cultivated scarcely a tithe, 
caring for nothing beyond their immediate ease and feudal 
dignity. 

But those jagheerdars were themselves subject to heavy 
oppressions, and the greatest could not get from their 
jagheers an amount equal to that obtained by the ameers 
on government lands ; while the minor ones, from inability, 
or neglect to provide water-courses, indispensable to 
fertility in Scinde, often found it impossible to collect half 
that amount : hence their turbulent urging of wars 
between the ameers to obtain plunder and pay. Their 
daughters were excluded from inheritance; their sons 
were only accepted when supposed intelligent enough, 
and willing, to forward the paramount interests of the 
ameers : and they had on such occasions to make great 
presents. 

The grain taken for the land-tax was sold by the ameers 
to their subjects, and often they forced their umbardars or 
corn-factors, generally Hindoos, to take it at a price fixed 
by their own authority — thus in 1842-3 Musseer Khan 
compelled his umbardars to purchase rice in the husk at 
twenty-six rupees, though they could only obtain from 
eighteen to twenty rupees for it when cleaned. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



47 



Irrigation being the sole source of fertility in Scinde, CHAP. III. 
the ameers were driven by necessity to foster it, and they 1843> 
increased the number of canals cut by former governments 
for extending the waters of the Indus to inland parts 
during the periodical inundations. They were partially 
cleaned once a year at the government expense ; which 
was however small on the whole matter, because the 
greatest part of the country was a dead level below the 
water-line of the flood. Where it was more elevated the 
Persian water-wheel was used. For this indispensable, 
self-interested, aid to agriculture one-half, in some cases 
two-fifths of the produce was levied on the jagheerdars, 
according to the method of irrigation employed — the 
highest tax being where new canals had been cut. But 
those proportions and all others were nominal, the mode 
of ascertaining the government share varied under every 
ameer, and even varied under the same ameer. 

One was the " buttaee " system, or taking the govern- 
ment share in kind on the gross produce when harvested. 
Another, called the " kasgee," was by estimating the value 
of the growing crops, the kardars fixing the government 
share, which the cultivator was bound to deliver to the 
ameer's corn-factor thrashed and winnowed. A third 
mode, called the " danbundee" varied only from the 
kasgee in this ; the value of the growing crops was in the 
latter made after measurement of the land — in the for- 
mer by a mere inspection. Both were preferred by the 
ryot to the buttaee, because under that many impositions 
were superadded ; such as the maintenance of the govern- 
ment " chokedar," who guarded the crops while ripening — 
and the feeding and feeing of many retainers of the kardar, 
while the latter was making the buttaee. The mode also 
was often varied at the caprices of ameers and kardars; 
and the ryots were frequently charged with head-money, 
and the expense of carrying the government grain to the 
stores. When, as often happened, the ryot had not seed 
left for his next year's crops he was forced to buy back his 
own grain at enhanced prices from the ameers. 

These oppressions had caused the abandonment of great 



48 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. III. districts of good land, and two tribes, the Juts and Khosas, 
1843. tad gone off bodily to the desert to live by the strong hand. 

Throughout the country cultivation was withering away, 
and the ryot passed a life of hopeless wretchedness, while 
the handicraftsmen nearly disappeared altogether. 

Nor were the manufacturers and tradespeople better 
treated, though the extreme subtilty of the Hindoo trader 
gave him some protection. In times not remote, Scinde 
had been celebrated for its cotton fabrics and shawls. 
Tattah a town near the lower Indus, was the chief seat 
of this industry and was then rich and populous : it was 
now desolate, and the whole country for forty miles was 
a waste ! At Tattah also was found a man who had been 
shut up twenty-six years in a small cage and become 
idiotic. It was said, that having committed some crime, 
the ameers made his family responsible for him, and in 
terror this method of security was adopted. But the 
ameers' condemnation as rulers is not to be taken from 
isolated cases, it was written on the broad surface of the 
waste around Tattah in unmistakeable language. There 
was the fair sheet of fertile land, spread out by the Almighty, 
and upon it those men had scrawled in horrid characters, 
desolation ! For miles beyond the precincts of the shrunken 
ruined city, the plain was covered with tombs of fine 
cut stone, showing the numbers and riches of the olden 
people, who had been succeeded by the scanty squalid 
population now burthening the shrivelled agricultural 
resources. Brutal government only could be assigned for 
this change. The ameers had crushed agriculture on land, 
and on the water had nearly annihilated traffic by vexa- 
tious and oppressive imports and transit duties; a few 
years more and the whole country would have become a 
howling wilderness, and the tyranny which had thus over- 
whelmed a community of a million of human beings with 
misery, in a land fertile enough to subsist ten millions in 
comfort, would have dissolved of itself. No modern war 
ever did, or could produce such devastation, such ruin as 
this; and the Scindian conquest, so foully decried by 
interested calumniators, was a providential interference to 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



49 



restore civilization and bring hope to the hearts of a CHAP. III. 
despairing people. 1843 

Although far from having the pestilent climate attri- 
buted to it by those who were not allowed to plunder its 
revenues, Scinde has very unwholesome localities and 
sickly seasons, caused by the vehement heat, the marshes 
left by the inundation, the malaria produced by the exten- 
sive hunting-jungles, and vast tracts of fertile land left 
uncultivated by the wretched Scindees who were unable 
to sustain the oppression of their Beloochee masters. But 
there are many places exceedingly salubrious ; Kurrachee 
is especially so; and good government with extended 
cultivation would certainly again render Scinde as healthy 
as in the days when it supported great cities and teemed 
with riches. To confer that good government, to restore 
that salubrity and those riches, was Sir C. Napier's ambi- 
tion, and he made his public works travel abreast with 
the other branches of his administration, as far as a 
country nearly denuded of artisans and the usual resources 
of civilization would permit. 

His views were large, his activity incessant, and as the 
remains of ancient cities and stations were numerous he 
naturally looked to them as guides ; but the speculations 
of learned men and travellers about Macedonian stations 
on the Indus he held in no reverence when he saw the de- 
structive rage of the river, and knew it must have changed 
its bed a hundred times in as many years. Yet there were 
places, such as Roree, Sehwan, and Jurruk, a point below 
Hyderabad, where solid rock controls the rushing waters, 
and judging those to have been the olden stations of im- 
portance he directed his attention to them while considering 
how to consolidate his conquest. The soldiers' health 
was however the most pressing consideration, and pre- 
vious to quitting Hyderabad he had commenced capacious 
barracks, well raised above the exhalations from the earth 
and twenty-five feet in height, with double roofs and upper 
ventilation ; and always attentive to the general welfare, 
he built these barracks of fine burned bricks, with a view to 
revive the pottery manufacture at Hyderabad, which under 

E 



50 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. til. the ameers' tyranny had decayed. He would have adopted 
1843 the same model at Kurrachee, but barracks had been com- 
menced there before the war according to the usual habits 
of those who construct the sties generally appropriated 
for the British soldier, and he could only amend them by 
giving verandahs ; yet he commenced and in time finished 
new barracks for a troop of horse-artillery on his own 
plan, and they remain, a pattern of excellence. 

His other public works were as follows. At Hyderabad 
he repaired and strengthened the ameer's great fortress, 
completed his own intrenched camp, organized the steamer 
station at Kotree, and advanced the fort commenced there 
between the battles. He showed also how the Indus 
might be restrained from swallowing the land in its ca- 
pricious gluttony as it descended to the ocean. This 
Kotree fort was originally raised two hundred and fifty 
yards from the. river on the right bank, and yet three days 
of inundation brought the main stream within a hun- 
dred yards; whereupon, as an experiment, thick stakes, 
twelve feet in length, were planted along the bank and 
firmly backed with brushwood, and that simple expedient 
gave hope of controlling the ravages of a stream which 
at times would carry away whole shikargahs, to the equal 
detriment of the land and its own navigation. 

Eastward of Hyderabad the large fortress of Aliar-ka- 
tenda was restored, the walls of Meerpoore were repaired, 
and bridges were cast over the greater nullahs, between 
it and Hyderabad, to secure communication during the 
inundations. 

Within the desert Omercote was strengthened, and its 
communications with Meerpoore, and with Boog in Cutch, 
was assured by the occupation of many small forts. 

Cutch had been taken from the Bombay presidency and 
placed under Sir C. Napier, but the Bombay political 
agent had remained there, an honourable amiable man, 
and a zealous public servant, yet without military know- 
ledge, which had caused embarrassment and some danger 
See Conquest during the partisan warfare in the Delta. The general had 
of Scmde. therefore asked to have Colonel Roberts, the able officer 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



51 



who captured the Lion's brother, placed at Boog in an CHAP. III. 
independent military position. Lord Ellenborough with l84 «, 
his usual judicious promptness made him also political 
agent, a situation for which he was eminently qualified, 
being intimately acquainted with the Rao and the people, 
and having extraordinary influence with the Juts, the 
Khosas, and other wild tribes in that quarter. He was in 
fine the fittest man possible for the post ; but the removal 
of a civilian, added to the loss of the general control, was 
clamorously denounced at Bombay as a treacherous op- 
pression ; for to replace a man unqualified from peculiar 
circumstances, with one essentially able, at a crisis of 
danger, was for the faction an inexpiable offence. 

Below Hyderabad, Jurruk was surveyed, with a view 
to form another great steamer station ; and above Hyder- 
abad, a military post was designed for Sehwan, notwith- 
standing the heat, which is so great there that the natives 
guard against it during the raging months by keeping their 
turbans and even their bedclothes constantly wetted : yet 
with the aid of good barracks, and employing only sepoys 
under certain conditions, it was hoped to maintain a mili- 
tary post. 

I^>rth of Sehwan, the places of Sukkur Bukkur and 
Roree — by the natives run into one name — and all the 
other military points were strengthened, and a large serais 
or mercantile depot, was projected. It was designed by 
Lord Ellenborough, who thus early sought to prepare 
for a great commerce with Central Asia by the Indus 
and its confluents. A trading port at Sukkur and docks 
for building the smaller boats required for the upper 
branches of the rivers were to be added, and Sir C. 
Napier established at a later period a great central mart 
there, especially for horses, by which he hoped to supply 
the Indian army with the fine strong animals of Affghan 
and Turkistan at a much less cost than the slight Arabian 
horses were obtained for. This vast scheme would have 
quickly established a trade between Central Asia and 
Bombay, but when several hundreds of fine horses had 
been sent to Bengal, at less than half the cost of the inferior App. XVII . 

e 2 



52 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. in. Arabs bought for the military service, official jealousy, 
1843 folly or self-interest, interfered. An order arrived to 
stop the trade, which was thus, with many other noble 
schemes and beneficial plans, thwarted after Lord Ellen- 
borough's departure by the perversity of boards and 
councils, who would not tolerate such disturbance of their 
official monotony. 

To the eastward of this triple station, the surveying 
engineers were, as before said, employed to ascertain the 
facilities of re-opening the Narra river, and restoring to 
fertility the wooded hills and the long tract of country 
lining that great watercourse. 

On the westward of the Indus, works involving the 
future prosperity of Shikarpoor and the health of a wide 
district were projected. That town was rapidly regain- 
ing its former opulence and importance through the 
immigration of merchants and men of capital, who flocked 
from the surrounding states, and even from distant parts 
of India, to live under the protection of the just governor of 
Scinde. Sickness was however always prevalent both at Shi- 
karpoor and at Sukkur, and Sir C. Napier remarked that 
when the one town was salubrious the other suffered from 
pestilence, an alternation which followed certain changes of 
the wind. Wherefore, concluding the malaria came from 
swampy ground lying between the towns and periodically 
inundated by the overflowing of the Indus, he projected 
two great sanitary and commercial works, namely, a raised 
causeway to connect the places for trading and military 
intercourse, and a bund, or dike, to bar out the inun- 
dation : the last a great affair, for the construction, of 
very considerable height and solidity, was above thirty 
miles long. 

Kurrachee was not neglected in the scheme of public 
constructions. Plans were prepared for fortifying the 
cantonments and rendering that station the great military 
hold of the British in Scinde ; and as the population was 
increasing in a very sensible manner, civil works were 
projected to support a prosperous commercial city, and 
make it the great port of the Indus. Many and great 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



53 



obstacles were however to be overcome. The neighbour- CHAP. III. 

hood was hilly, but the actual shore so flat and the 1843 

harbour so shallow that vessels had always difficulty in 

making the port, and in the monsoons did not attempt it. 

To remedy this a lighthouse was built, and to render the 

port commodious, the construction of a pier or bunder, 

was at once commenced on so great a scale, that, besides 

the land approaches, it was to be carried nearly two miles 

into the water. 

The works designed to protect the port and the rising 
city were likewise very considerable, and measures were 
taken to finish a great watercourse, called the Ghara Canal, 
commenced at a former date to join the port with the 
Indus. Swimming-baths were constructed for the use of 
the troops, and the chief commissary, Major Blenkins, 
undertook the superintendence of a large tract of ground 
appropriated for a government garden, which under his 
able management soon produced every species of vegetable 
indigenous to Scinde, and all kinds of European esculents 
besides — and so exuberantly, that while three thousand 
soldiers were amply supplied without cost to them, and 
the officers purchased at a cheap rate, enough remained 
for general sale to repay the expense fourfold. Scurvy 
which had previously prevailed to an alarming extent then 
disappeared entirely, and fine plantations of trees were 
laid out, promising shelter and recreation for the popu- 
lation at no distant time, for vegetation is very rapid and 
luxuriant in Scinde. 

To nourish this garden and provide for the health of the 
rising town, levels were taken and a plan laid down for 
turning a small river called the Mullyar or Mulleree, run- 
ning at the distance of twelve or fourteen miles, not only 
into the government garden for irrigation and fountains, but 
into the houses of the town and cantonments for health and 
convenience. Finally it was to be conducted by pipes to 
Keymarree point, where the great mole was to end in deep 
water, and thus supply the shipping, at once ; an object of 
great importance, because the vessels only got water with 
difficulty from a distance inland, and at a great expense. 



54 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. in. The facility of executing this great and useful project was 
ascertained, and the estimated cost not more than a thou- 
sand pounds a mile ; but the scheme was not ripe before 
Lord Ellenborouglr's recall, and the government which 
succeeded him could never be induced to sanction the 
expense, or even to notice the letters proposing it, though 
Appendix in. the health of the soldiers and of the population was 
grievously affected by the bad water of Kurrachee. 

It may here be observed, that in all things Sir C. Napier 
was strongly supported by Lord Ellenborough ; and with 
respect to the public works enumerated above, some were 
of that nobleman 5 s conception, in others he had been 
forestalled. One had been simultaneously planned by 
both, namely, the restoration of water from the Indus to 
Cutch, which the Kalloras first, and then the ameers, had 
with a fiendish policy — only second in enormity to the 
monstrous conception of Albuquerque to destroy Egypt by 
turning the course of the Nile — cut off at Shah Bunder in 
the Delta ; thus giving the people of Cutch up as a prey 
to the encroaching waste. Lord Ellenborough however, 
merely proposed to make the Indus reflow in the with- 
ered district ; Sir C. Napier projected the restoration of 
the Narra, not only to benefit Cutch, but to recover the 
great and fertile strip of land before mentioned as 
bounding that river on the west. Unhappily this last 
project was too great to be executed from the resources of 
Scinde alone, and the officials of the supreme government 
always repressed instead of encouraging the noble and 
beneficent plans of the Scindian governor. 

These many and great works were not dealt with in 
that easy method by which some men have obtained 
unearned fame — namely, by issuing orders for their con- 
struction, leaving to others the finding of means, and 
to their own successors debt. Sir C. Napier was practi- 
cally acquainted with every branch of execution, whether 
for the excavation of canals, the construction of piers or 
the erection of edifices, and he decided with a full know- 
ledge of the subject in detail. His plans involved indeed 
great expenses from their number, their magnitude, the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



55 



scarcity of artisans,, and the high wages these last CHAP. III. 
demanded — wages which he was continually importuned 1845 
to regulate by tariff — but for him who was casting the 
foundations of a great community, the permanent rights of 
labour were far more important than any temporary in- 
convenience, however great. Hence, holding fast to great 
principles in all branches of administration, he rigorously 
squared his undertakings with his means, and for public 
profit, not display. 

His receipts however more than kept pace with his 
expenses. The revenue under the ameers had sunk to 
forty lacs, which was far below that raised by the Kal- 
loras, or even that of the Char-yar. But all their re- 
ceipts were the offscourings of oppression, not the surplus 
which the country under honest government could fur- 
nish without pressure, and the English ruler peremptorily 
rejected remorseless taxation. He strove instead to ascer- 
tain and restore all the natural resources, to re-open, 
enlarge and invigorate the closed or shrunken arteries of 
public prosperity, and trusted to the renewed vitality of 
the community for future profit. His early revenue was 
therefore small, the first financial year, reckoned from 
the battle of Hyderabad, giving only ninety thousand 
of the four hundred thousand pounds, said to have been 
paid to the ameers. But war had raged during full six 
months of that period, much grain had been carried off by 
the Beloochee troops, and when peace came the English 
collectors could not for several months extend their 
operations far from the camps, lest the roving Beloochees 
should fall on them ; for no military escorts were allowed, 
nor had the general any desire to be involved in premature 
police difficulties with such fierce and dangerous fellows 
for the sake of a small increase of revenue. Moreover Ali 
Moorad's revenue and that of the districts of Subzulcote 
and Bhoongbarra, made over to Bhawalpoore, had been 
included in the ameers' receipts. 

From this restricted, imperfect collection, a surplus of 
seventeen thousand pounds in money was obtained after 
defraying all the civil expenses ; and the estimated value of 



56 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. III. the public grain in store was much greater — an example 
1843> of economy combined with efficient work, contrasting too 
strongly with the extravagance and inefficiency of most 
other administrative establishments in India not to give 
offence. The comparison was dangerous, and to blind the 
public a clamour was raised about the burthen and 
expense of Scinde — the statistics published being not only 
false in themselves but improperly loaded with the cost of 
the troops quartered there. To this was added also the 
equally false assertions, that the country was not subdued ; 
that the people — that term being used without discrimi- 
nation for all the inhabitants — sighed for the return of 
their Patriarchal Princes, and would rise at once for their 
restoration, but for the enormous force maintained to keep 
them down. 

The expense of the army in Scinde certainly exceeded 
the revenue derived from that conquest, because a very 
powerful body of troops were by the general government 
quartered there ; not for the purpose of overawing the 
people, who were rejoicing or contented according to their 
races at the change of government ; but to be ready for 
the exigencies of an extraneous war, which, actually be- 
ginning at Gwalior, was very likely to break out also 
in the Punjaub, and might from thence extend to Affghan- 
istan. The expectation of it had also rendered Beloo- 
chistan and the hill tribes bordering Scinde uneasy and 
dangerous. It was not Scinde therefore, it was India that 
required these troops, and their cost was a general charge 
which in no manner depended on the state of affairs in 
the former country. But the most artful turn given 
to this unfounded clamour was the assumption that 
any extraordinary number of troops were maintained in 
Scinde at all ; for, with exception of some increase to the 
Scinde irregular horse, not an extra man had been raised 
for the conquest or the holding of that country. The 
troops employed were of the ordinary standing army of 
the East, and would have been embodied though Scinde 
had never been entered. They were merely pushed 
forward into advanced cantonments on a new frontier, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



57 



and it might with equal propriety have been alleged CHAP. III. 
that Hampshire was a peculiar burthen on England be- 1843. 
cause a large garrison and expensive dockyard is there 
maintained. Scinde, when conquered, was an integral 
part of the Indian empire and subject to the influences 
and effects of the general policy of that empire, which 
was at this time menaced by two great wars. 

It was said also, and with as little truth, that the 
former frontier of India towards Scinde, being more 
restricted, would have enabled the Company to reduce 
their troops ; but the new frontier was in fact the shorter 
and stronger, and the conqueror was soon prepared, and 
proposed, to maintain his conquest when not menaced by 
a Seikh war, with as few troops as had been employed 
in Scinde before the conquest ; and not only to pay 
the whole cost of these troops from the resources of the 
coimtry but to provide a large surplus for the general 
treasury. 

This clamour would have been here unnoticed, as being 
part of the filth with which every man who travels fast on a 
great road must expect to be spattered, if it had only been 
the cry of those from whom it appeared to come ; but it 
was supported and encouraged by the directors, by the 
Council of Bombay, and by several members of parlia- 
ment ; and it has ever since been directed unceasingly to 
the ruin of all the great public works and admirable 
arrangements of the first Scinde administration. Yet those 
arrangements and constructions were worthy of all support, 
having in view to make Kurrachee an emporium for trade 
with Central Asia, and to organize institutions capable of 
sustaining a great and prosperous community. Thus, 
scarcely was the war ended when the surveying engineer 
establishment was spread over the country, laying down the 
principal geographical points for an accurate survey, and 
taking the levels of the land and of the Indus, with the 
object of organizing a complete scientific system of irriga- 
tion. The shikar gahs also, covering one-fourth of the 
fertile country, were taken in hand as having become state 
property j and they were full of very fine timber, infinitely 



58 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. in. valuable, as supplying fuel for the steam navigation of 
1843. the Indus ; but being too extensive and choked with fallen 
trees and j angle, the first measure was to give the people 
the loose timber for the pains of fetching it away. This 
was followed by the appointment of a commission to 
class and regulate them as forests, and set out such fertile 
tracts as might be deemed most fitting for cultivation, 
to be held under government tenures calculated to encou- 
rage agriculture — in fine those receptacles for wild beasts 
were made to yield revenue to the government, wood and 
grass to the villages, and timber to the towns, and for 
export. 

While thus providing for internal tranquillity and civili- 
zation, Sir C. Napier had also to arrange his foreign policy, 
for the comprehension of which it is necessary to give 
a descriptive sketch of the states bordering on Scinde, 
commencing with Cutch. 

The Rao of Cutch was an ally at whose court a British poli- 
tical agent had long resided; and his country was important 
from its situation and from the unsettled tribes on its borders. 
Through Cutch, by Deesa, was the direct land communica- 
tion with Bombay, always of great importance when the 
monsoons cut off the sea intercourse. It was to secure this 
communication that Omercote and Meerpoore had been 
repaired, and so many forts restored, and bridges cast 
between those places and Hyderabad. Cutch was also of 
direct interest in regard to the Delta. Colonel Roberts 
could raise on emergency as many as two thousand 
Khosas and Juts, who, abhorring their ancient oppressors 
the Beloochees, were ready to pour with fire and sword 
upon those of the Delta if an insurrection called for such 
a measure. Meanwhile his great influence over those 
tribes secured that line of communication from disturbance. 

Eastward of Cutch was Guzerat, under the Guickwar; 
and northward of Guzerat were the states of Joudpore 
and Jessulmeer, of old the independent countries of the 
bravest of the heroic Rajpoots, now subjected allies of the 
British, having political residents and being entirely under 
the power of the Indian government ; for they were 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



59 



hemmed in on the east by India, and on the west was the CHAP. III. 
great desert, across which only a few lines dependent on lg43 
the wells led to Scinde. 

The communication with Jessulmeer was direct from 
Roree, and on that side, within the desert, was the fort 
of Shah-ghur long held by Roostum's nephew Mohamed, Plan 1. 
but evacuated when the Lion was finally defeated. It was 
then taken possession of by the British, though belong- 
ing to Ali Moorad as a turban appendage, compensation 
being promised, but neither the Bombay nor the supreme 
government up to this time have redeemed that promise ! 

From this geographical trace it may be seen, that the 
eastern frontier of Scinde, which was however very unde- 
fined, because the ameers with a sinister policy had 
removed the boundary-marks and destroyed all records, 
was defended by Meerpoore, Omercote and Shah-ghur ; 
that it was fringed by allies who had no interest to betray, 
or make war, and being watched and controlled by a gar- 
rison at Deesa and political agents at J oudpoor and J essul- 
meer, were unable to effect mischief if so inclined. The prin- 
cipal passages across the desert were thus secured, and the 
communication between Scinde and Bombay was assured 
by land when the monsoons debarred intercourse by sea. 

Tracing the line of frontier further northward, a state of 
great importance presented itself, namely Daodpootra or 
Bhawalpoor. It had long been protected from Runjeet 
Sing's ambition by the British government, and Lord Ellen- 
borough had recently restored to the rajah the districts 
of Subzulcote and Bhoongbara, formerly torn from him by 
the ameers. He appeared faithful, but Sir C. Napier was 
disquieted that great interests should depend on an eastern 
prince, who might be coerced by the Seikhs, then very 
menacing towards the British. The rajah's subjects also 
leaned strongly towards those who desired the downfall of 
the Feringhees ; and his territory, lying between the great 
desert and the lower Sutlej and lining the banks of the 
latter, gave him power to intercept the direct commu- 
nication between the north-west provinces of India and 
Scinde, by land and by water. This might prove infinitely 



60 SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 

CHAP. in. dangerous if war happened with the Seikhs, and hence, as 
1843. ^ Qe feith of the supreme government was so pledged that 
the rajah's dominions could not be absorbed while he was 
true to the alliance — which he could yet betray at a critical 
moment without previous indications of enmity — the 
general used every means to conciliate and attach him 
more closely. 

On the north-east, Scinde was closed by the Mooltan 
country, which, spread between the lower Sutlej and the 
Indus, descending below the junction of those rivers to 
Kusmore. The dewan of this territory, a tributary of 
Lahore, called Sawan Mull, father of the since noted 
Moolraj, was reputed able and prudent, and professed 
great friendship for the conqueror of Scinde; but the 
latter easily detected the Seikh feeling behind the screen 
of protestation, and towards Sawan his bearing was that of 
offering no offence, yet plainly intimating that any hostile 
indication would be instantly resented. 
Plan l &2. North-west of Scinde was Cutch-Gundava, belonging to 
the khan of Khelat, and connected with the lower Indus 
by a range of peculiarly savage rocks called the Cutchee 
hills, which run nearly perpendicularly westward, from 
the river, towards the Bolan mountains. In those hills 
dwelt dangerous tribes, namely, the Mazarees next the 
Indus, then the Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees and 
Kujjucks, all of which were subdivided into smaller 
tribes. 

North of the Doomkees and Bhoogtees were the Mur- 
rees and Keytrians. One branch of the Mazarees, lying 
on the Indus, owed allegiance to the Mooltan man ; but 
the other tribes were claimed as subjects by the khan of 
Khelat. The Murrees denied his supremacy, and were 
themselves of better customs and civilization than their 
neighbours. They had been unjustly meddled with during 
the Affghan war by the political agents, and their prin- 
cipal fort of Kahun had been occupied ; but they defeated 
one British detachment under Major Clibborne, destroyed 
another under Lieutenant Clark, a young officer of pro- 
mising ability and heroic courage, and finally forced the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



61 



political agent to recall Lieutenant Brown from Kahun, CHAP. III. 
after a long and most intrepid defence. 1843, 

The Jackranees, Bhoogtees, Doomkees, and one branch 
of the Mazarees, were avowedly predatory, fierce, daring 
absolute robbers, but calling themselves Lootoos or 
plunderers. They had indeed some chivalric feelings and 
customs, yet were still robbers, ferocious and devastating, 
despising civilization, thinking all property belonged of 
right to the sharpest sword, and the plains made by nature 
and cultivated by man for their spoil. Very powerful they 
were, and northward and westward they had a vast sweep 
of mountains inhabited by kindred tribes to retire upon 
if pressed by superior forces, while on the south they were 
defended by the desert of Kusmore, eighty miles wide, 
which separated them from Scinde. This waste, they, 
knowing the wells and preparing beforehand in the recesses 
of their wild hills for expeditions, could easily pass, but it 
was hard for troops to cross and attack their rocks in 
return, which made them incredibly insolent. 

Westward of these people was the Khelat country, 
inhabited by Beloochees. During the Affghan war their 
capital had been stormed, and their khan, a popular prince, 
killed ; wherefore the nobles were enemies of the British. 
But the son of the slain khan, a youth of eighteen, had 
been restored, had received money and personal kindness 
from Sir C. Napier, and being of a grateful disposition 
was, so far as he was his own master, friendly ; wherefore 
the general corresponded with him amicably, giving 
advice and support against his turbulent sirdars, and 
against the AfFghans of Candahar, who continually 
menaced him. * 

On the west, the Scindian frontier rested on the Hala 
mountains, and between them and the Indus, next the 
desert of Kusmore, was the country of the Chandikas 
and other tribes, previously of the same plundering habits 
with the Cutchee tribes, but now subjects of the British 
government. Below them to the southward were the 
Bins and Lhugarees, touching on the Indus at Sehwan ; 
and between that point and the sea- coast were the 



62 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. in. Jokeas. Beyond the Jokeas was the jam of Beilas 
1843> country,, a dependant on Khelat. These different tribes 
partly occupied the plains, partly the mountains, for the 
frontier of Scinde included the eastern slopes of the 
Hala range ; but the western slopes were inhabited by 
the Khelat tribes, who shall be in future called the 
Mountain tribes, in contradistinction to the Cutchee Hill 
tribes, whose fastnesses, though of wonderful ruggedness 
and strength, were not of altitude entitling them to be 
ranked as mountains. 

All these tribes, Scindian and Khelatian, the general 
sought by a mixture of generosity, justice and severity, 
to conciliate with the new order of things, and he was not 
unsuccessful; his rough dealing with the jam of the 
Jokeas has been related in the Conquest of Scinde, and 
coupled with the following treatment of Wullee Chandia, 
the head of the Chandikas, illustrates his policy. This 
last chieftain had followed the British army with ten thou- 
sand warriors so closely, just before the battle of Meeanee, 
that he was within one march of it when the action 
was fought ; and if Outranks imbecile counsel had then 
weighed so much as to cause the delay of only a few 
hours, the Chandikas would have fallen on the rear 
during the fight. Wullee' s march was stopped by the 
victory, and he retreated across the Indus to his own 
country, where in concert with others he resisted all 
Ali Moorad's attempts to take possession of the lands 
ceded in right of the turban. These confederates being 
too strong for the ameer, he proposed a conference, to 
which they came, twenty-nine in number, with a hundred 
and fifty followers ; but Ali having prepared an ambus- 
cade killed several and captured the rest, amongst them 
Wullee Chandia. 

Proud of this perfidy, he brought his prisoners to the 
general, expecting applause, while the captives looked 
only for that death they would themselves have inflicted 
in like circumstances. Both were disappointed, Ali was 
publicly and severely reproached for his want of faith 
and compelled to give all the chiefs presents in amends ; 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



G3 



find they were restored not only to liberty bnt to their CHAP. III. 
possessions, with encomiums on their bravery, and expres- 184 3 
sion of sorrow for the base treatment they had experienced. 
The scene with Wullee was thus described at the time. 
" He is a fine vigorous old man, resembling in look a 
large owl ; for his white hair and beard, thick and 
clustering like feathers, discloses of his bronzed counte- 
nance little more than a very hooked nose and two im- 
mense round black lustrous eyes, which he kept fixed on 
the general without a wink, and in perfect silence, until the 
speech which announced his restoration to freedom was 
interpreted. Then he eagerly asked, ' Is this true ? Am 
I free ? Ma}' I go?' ' Yes \' The old man rushed with- 
out another word from the house, and made for his own 
country with headlong haste ; and it was falsely supposed, 
with a heart more touched by the wrong than the redress ; 
but when safe amongst his tribe he exclaimed ' The 
Feringhee general has given me my life, my land and my 
sword, I am his slave/ " The course of this work will show 
how he kept his word. 

Having thus described the frame of nations and tribes, 
of mountains and deserts, in which Scinde was set, it 
remains to treat of Ali Moorad, whose dominions, situated 
within the boundaries, seemed as a flaw in the jewel; for 
this prince still governed after the manner of the ameers, 
and though his ruling was of necessity ameliorated, the 
contrast between it and the new government offered a 
striking contrast. That he was allowed to have any 
dominions at all was a constant theme for abuse with the 
degraded faction at Bombay, which, loud in reprobation of 
the dethronement of the ameers who were enemies of the 
British, was indignant that he amongst them who was faith- 
ful should be treated with justice. " He was a vile traitor 
because he had not fought alongside of the other ameers — 
he was infamous, a coward, a liar, a monster, because he 
had not aided to destroy the English army! Sir C. Napier 
had trusted entirely to him — had heaped presents upon 
him — had added to his territories and was his dupe." 

These efforts to pervert the public mind were so far 



64 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



chap. III. successful as to produce a vague general notion that Ali 
18 43. Moorad had been trusted, had conferred and received 
presents, and had augmented his dominions. Outram even 
asserted, in an official document, that a promise of addi- 
tional territory had been made ; having no other foundation 
for the tale than the working of a brain, at that time 
more confused than ordinary by anger and mortified 
vanity. It is therefore fitting here, to give a succinct 
sketch of the real intercourse, though involving some 
repetition of what has been already told in the Conquest 
of Scinde. 

When the resolution of Lord Ellenborough to form 
new treaties with the ameers was first made known, Ali 
was as inimical as the rest to the English alliance, until 
he found that Boostum' s eldest son, Hussain, a violent 
man, had by threats induced the old ameer to contemplate 
a violation of the laws of succession established by the 
" Char-yar" which conferred hereditary rights on the 
brother in preference to the son. Before that period Ah 
had been forced to take arms against Boostum and his 
sons, and had defeated them ; yet was so mild in victory 
that the others deceived him by feigned reconciliation, and 
thus regained all they lost by arms. 

When Sir C. Napier took Scindian affairs in hand Ali 
demanded a conference, at which he asked for aid against 
his family opponents; but was distinctly told to expect 
neither aid nor opposition, save what the treaties war- 
ranted. Soon afterwards Boostum renounced the turban 
in favour of Ali Moorad, and this being according to the 
" Char-yar" law of succession, and consonant to the 
Mahometan law and the treaties, the English general 
was bound to maintain it ; but he first ascertained that it 
Appendix XX. was a voluntary act. Boostum subsequently asserted that 
he was coerced, and, revoking the instrument, conferred 
the turban on his son; but this investiture was con- 
trary to the law of the family, and to the Mahometan laws, 
and so far from being coerced he had refused the English 
general's offered protection at the time. 

With the turban went certain possessions in the nature 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



65 



of crown property ; the fortress of Emaum-ghur was in that CHAP. III. 
predicament ; and it was under Ali Moorad' s authority as 
wearer of the turban that Sir C. Napier took that place — it 
was with his concurrence also, for the ameer fired the first 
gun with his own hand, that it was destroyed. The desert 
expedition therefore, was not, as falsely represented by an 
Indian official personage, an act of aggressive war, but the 
fulfilment of a formal treaty which bound the British to sup- 
port each ameer in defence of his rights; for Ali Moorad was, 
against all law and justice, there opposed by his nephews 
in rebellion : but Sir C. Napier placed so little trust in him, 
that he was compelled to march with the troops lest he 
should deny having assented to the operation. Afterwards, 
under Lord EllenborougFs instructions, Ali was, as having 
been faithful to his treaty, confirmed in all his possessions, 
although the English map of Scinde was thereby blotched 
and the unity of territory acquired by the conquest broken : 
but this example of good faith had a beneficial influence 
on all the wild chieftains, who judged from thence that the 
restoration of their possessions would not be disturbed. 

Lord Ellenborough had also empowered the general 
to define and settle the boundaries of Scinde on all sides, 
and he had, consequently, negotiations with the khans of 
Khelat, Bhawalpoore, Jessulmere, Joudpoore, and with 
Ali Moorad. He had therefore to confer land, to grant 
and withhold advantages, a power which would in the 
days of Clive have been worth many lacs of rupees ; and it 
was natural for the Bombay faction, sighing for such 
large opportunities, to suppose this had not been thrown 
away. Nevertheless the only present received by Sir 
C. Napier was a cock and some addled eggs from Ali 
Moorad, when in the desert ; and he was so little grateful, 
that when the ameer asked for an elephant as a mark of 
honour it was given with this characteristic speech and 
condition. " I take no presents, and cannot afford to make 
any j and if the governor-general objects to this, you must 
return the animal or pay its value into the treasury." 

To maintain this ameer's right of territory was im- 
perative ; yet there was no point of Indian policy more 

F 



66 



SIR CHARLES NAFIER's 



CHAP. III. condemned by Sir C. Napier, than the having native 
1843. sovereigns within the empire. " The princes and nobles 
of the East M he said, ' ' hated the British as intruders, but 
the people liked them as being better rulers. To the 
people then the British should look for the permanency of 
their empire; whereas, by leaving them to the ruling of 
their own princes and nobles, they were retained in slavish 
ideas of obedience to men who were enemies, and who 
thus obtained a supporting power which might and ought 
to be used against them — and it also retarded civilization/' 
In this view he aimed to raise an independent spirit in the 
Scindees which would lead them to resist the restoration 
of the ameers' or any other tyranny. 

Ali Moorad's perfidy to Wullee Chandia, induced the 
general to watch him closely. He placed a political agent at 
his court, and interfered, though amicably, in the choice of 
his ministers ; for the ameer, young and sensual, neglected 
business, and it was important not to let an enemy of the 
British lead his councils. He was also stringently taught, 
as shall be hereafter shown, that on good behaviour his 
sovereignty depended ; a teaching essential to the security 
of Scinde ; for his territory was so situated on both sides 
of the Indus that it commanded the navigation, cut off 
Roree, Sukkur and Shikarpoor from Hyderabad, and was 
on the north all but in contact with the robber tribes. On 
the south-east it approached Sehwan, where the Hala 
mountains strike on the Indus ; and it was everywhere 
fertile and dotted with forts — that of Dejee-ka-kote being 
surprisingly strong from situation. To his court all the 
Talpoor princes still at large naturally looked; so did 
the Affghan chiefs of Candahar, and the sirdars of Khelat ; 
Dejee could cover a large assemblage of armed men, and 
Ali had a right to keep Beloochees and Patans in his 
pay. 

High faculties were required to maintain the conquest, 
and they were signally displayed, since it was maintained 
without commotions, while a new system of government 
was established with so much judgment that the delivered 
Hindoos and Scindees were not more attached to it than 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



67 



the vanquished Beloochees ; but the acquisition had been CHAP. III. 
made by the sword, and always the general nourished a j^J" 
salutary fear of his arms, by keeping his force so efficient, 
and so disposed, that neither internal nor external enemies 
could draw reasonable hope from its weakness. This 
vigilance deprived the Bombay faction — certainly not the 
least virulent enemy of tranquillity — of hope from insur- 
rection, and therefore a new clamour was raised, that the 
occupation of Scinde had weakened the frontier of India. 
When noise and falsehood are the main resources of 
faction, a dogma, founded on some general truth crook- 
edly applied, is always given as a rallying cry to save 
the multitude the trouble of reasoning ; here it was said, 
"that while Scinde was under the ameers India had a 
desert frontier to the west, and deserts are the strongest of 
all frontiers." That deserts are generally the strongest 
frontier was the small nucleus of truth crookedly applied ; 
for the desert frontier of India was not given up, but 
strengthened. 

Who were the external enemies on the west ? Affghans 
and Beloochees of Khelat, who might move of their own 
hatred or be pushed on and supported by Persia at the 
instigation of Russia. 

Who were those on the north and north-west? The 
same Affghans stimulated by the same powers ; and the 
Seikhs. 

But for Persia, the Gedrosian desert of Alexander is 
more formidable than the Thur which separates Scinde 
from India ; and the Persians must invade by Herat and 
northern Affghanistan — to descend afterwards by the Bolan 
Pass, or slide down behind the Hala range and enter 
Scinde by the coast-line. In the first case they would come 
upon Bukkur and Hyderabad, in the second upon Kurra- 
chee, three fortified places which they must take, and after 
passing the Indus would still have the Thur desert between 
them and India. 

Were a great combination of nations, Persians, Toorko- 
mans, Affghans, Beloochees and Seikhs to be precipitated 
upon India, the line of Ferozepoore, where the Sutlej 

f 2 



68 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. in. offers but a feeble barrier, would probably be chosen, but 
there the vaunted desert frontier ceases. Then, and in 
all cases, Scinde under the ameers, and also Bhawalpoor, 
would have been forced to place their resources at the 
invader's disposal, whether for passing the Thur against 
the Bombay Presidency; or for pouring by Ferozepoore 
upon Delhi ; but while a British force held Scinde, and 
was based on Kurrachee, having a sea communication 
with Bombay, how could the invaders pass the Thur? 
They would not be able to pass the Indus, guarded as it 
would be by steamers and strengthened by fortresses. 
Wherefore the conquest of Scinde, which attached a 
delivered people to the British government, strengthened 
instead of weakening the Indian frontier on the south- 
west ; and furnished a secure base for an army to operate 
against the flank and rear of invaders moving by the 
north-western opening against Delhi. It also rendered it 
unnecessary longer to keep troops, as had always been done 
before, at Deesa, Joudpoore, Jessulmere and other points, 
to watch the ameers, who were significantly called by the 
duke of Wellington, the "pirates of the southern Indus." 
In fine it was a conquest beneficial to India, to humanity, 
to commerce, and all the mental garbage of newspapers 
will be unable to sully its reputation; but it may be 
assumed as a maxim, that whenever a clamour is raised by 
many newspapers together something unsound is at bot- 
tom ; for neither oppressed men, nor straightforward men, 
have much influence with such publications, and the 
concurrence of many in one cry indicates active intrigue. 

Sir C. Napier had to guard five hundred miles of com- 
munication, and the four great stations of Kurrachee, 
Hyderabad, Sukkur and Shikarpoor. 

Shikarpoor, being close to the Cutchee hills, required a 
strong garrison, which however depended for support on 
the greater military station of Sukkur. 

Hyderabad, governing all the central parts of Scinde 
and the head of the Delta, was secured by the ameer's 
great fortress, the intrenched camp, and the steamer 
station at Kotree. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



69 



Kurrachee had walls, a native fort and an intrenched CHAP. III. 
cantonment. !843. 

Around these stations, each of which had its peculiar 
commandant, the regular forces were destined to move if 
invaded, and they were kept well supplied with military 
stores and provisions, while the armed steamers preserved 
the water communication between them. But to enable 
the troops to move freely to a distance, a general system 
of fortification was pushed forward as speedily as the 
great dearth of workmen and materials would permit, for 
Scinde had been a country of destruction not of pro- 
duction. The plan was the same for all, namely, one large 
fort or citadel as a safe magazine ; and in connection with 
it, according to the localities, martello towers to be 
defended by a few men. On this plan Shikarpoor, a 
walled place and with three native forts, only required 
martello towers ; Sukkur having its stores in Bukkur, 
which was impregnable to any force not having a mortar 
train, was in the same predicament. Hyderabad had the 
ameeer's fortress, which was to be connected with the 
intrenched camp like Athens with the Piraeus, but by 
towers instead of long walls ; and the haven for steamers 
on the opposite bank of the river was protected by the 
fort of Kotree. 

Kurrachee, the point of connection with Bombay and 
the place where the last stand must be made against inva- 
sion or general insurrection, was to be protected by a 
regular fortress having eight or ten bastions, and furnished 
with a tank of never-failing pure water. The magazine- 
forts at each station were calculated for a garrison of three 
hundred men, though capable of holding more ; and 
the martello towers were to have twelve men with an 
18-pounder. A wing of a regiment therefore sufficed 
for the security of each station, and two regiments and a 
half would secure all the great points. Each place of 
arms was safe, because they were all impregnable to storm, 
and no insurgents could have a battering train ; the great 
bulk of the army was therefore free to move in mass to 
any quarter, which in a country so extended and so inter- 



70 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. in. sected by canals and shikargahs was no mean military 
18 43. consideration. 

It has been before shown bow the police and irregnlar 
cavalry were grouped around the masses of regular troops, 
to preserve internal tranquillity and watch the robber 
tribes ; but with so long a frontier exposed to so many 
barbarous plundering hordes some additional protection 
was required ; and in that view leave, or rather instructions 
were obtained from Lord Ellenborough, for the same 
design occurred simultaneously, to form a fighting camel 
corps, on the model of the dromedary corps employed by 
Napoleon in Egypt; and the general also added to the 
Scinde horsemen a second regiment which was commanded 
by Captain Malcolm, a young officer of courage and 
ability. The camel corps was under Lieutenant Fitzgerald, 
whose invincible strength, courage and activity, was admi- 
rably suited for the sudden rapid and arduous duties 
expected from his corps, which was thus organized. 

Each camel carried two men, one armed with carabine 
and sword, the other with a musquetoon and bayonet, the 
musquetoon being formed by cutting down and repairing 
condemned arms found in the Kurrachee stores. One 
man guided the animal and fought from its back; the 
other was to act as an infantry soldier, because the robbers 
were habituated to fire from the fissures and holes in the 
plains, where neither lance nor sword could reach them. 
If assailed by superior, numbers the camels were to kneel 
in a ring with heads inward and pinned down, thus 
furnishing a bulwark for the men ; and it was proposed to 
give the soldiers spears also, but this was relinquished at 
Fitzgerald's desire : the question however remains open, 
because the corps never had to break through a body of 
swordsmen, which would have been the test of utility for 
the spear. On the camels were carried the men's packs, 
cooking utensils and beds, the latter forming part of the 
saddle ; and thus a body of soldiers capable of acting as 
infantry when required, having no tents, commissariat, or 
baggage to embarrass them, could make marches of sixty 
miles in twenty-four hours even with the bad camels at 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



71 



this time furnished by Scinde ; but of eighty or even CHAP. III. 
ninety miles with finer animals, and consequently no ^£ 
other troops could keep up with or escape from them. 
When formed, the camel corps was sent to aid the cavalry 
employed to watch the Cutchee hillmen. 

With this general view of the condition of Scinde and 
its political and social relations to surrounding tribes 
and nations, the narrative of events which follow can be 
read with a better understanding. 



72 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEll's 



CHAPTER IV. 

CHAP. iv. During the voyage to Kurrachee Sir C. Napier reco- 
1843> vered some strength, but his medical advisers still urged a 
change of climate, to which he would not consent, because 
the great machine he was constructing could not advance 
without his superintendence, and he held his life no 
counterpoise to that interest in the public scale. " There 
are," he said, " many men more competent to govern 
this country, but they are not on the same vantage 
ground; they have not the influence of victory; the 
horses here are wild, but know my hand; with another 
they would start off while he was gathering up the 
reins." 

At first his government proceeded happily, but soon, 
as if to try the temper of his spirit, a strange pesti- 
lence came raging through the land, bearing down men 
and institutions. In the course of October and Novem- 
ber, not one person, from the commander-in-chief to 
the drummer, in an army seventeen thousand strong, 
escaped its visitation : there was nobody strong enough 
even to make out a report, and in some regiments no 
medical man was able to attend the hospitals. It did not 
however assail all quarters at once, it ran as it were 
through the forces, and at first was supposed to be the 
result of cessation from fatigue and excitement ; but that 
notion vanished when the people of the country fell even 
more rapidly than the soldiers. 

It stopped agriculture, for the people were too ill to 
work ; it drove away all the foreign artisans in fear ; it 
spread north, east, south and west, and was by all men 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



73 



regarded as a strange unrecognized visitation. Fortu- CHAP. IV. 
nately it was not very fatal, but with officer and soldier 1843> 
it laid mind and body prostrate ; very few had energy to 
rally for a long time, and at one period the Cutchee hill- 
men might certainly have sacked Shikarpoor and Sukkur, 
and devastated Upper Scinde, for there was not a soldier 
on his legs to oppose them, and the moral influence of the 
general alone kept those plunderers in check. He was 
suffering severely himself, but his spirit did not sink. 
Presenting an undaunted front, his language to the tribes 
and surrounding nations was even more imperious than 
when his army was effective and flushed with recent 
victory. But while his official correspondence proves that 
he gave himself no relaxation from labour, his private letters 
show how hard the bodily struggle was, and how he 
yearned for that ease which his sense of duty would not 
let him accept. 

During this pestilence the Bombay faction laboured to 
excite the Beloochees to fall on the sickly soldiers, and 
the Bombay Times pointed out in detail the best mode 
for killing them ; but these flagitious efforts had no effect; 
tranquillity prevailed, and in the Delta so great a change 
had occurred, that when all the collector's escort fell ill 
the Beloochee peasants of the place voluntarily guarded 
him. Everywhere officers travelled or followed the 
chase, singly or in company, traversing the country in 
various directions, and in safety; to travel in the im- 
mediate neighbourhood of Bombay was far more dan- 
gerous than to penetrate the wildest tracts of Scinde, and 
yet it was shamelessly asserted at the former place, that 
the Scindians were panting for an opportunity to massacre 
their oppressors ! But the people knew the conquerors 
were not oppressors ; they saw that they assumed no 
haughty superiority, offered no insult, made no exactions ; 
their own customs were respected where not opposed to 
morality; taxation was reduced, vexatious restrictions were 
abolished, agriculture encouraged, trade fostered — and 
as the chief was, so were the subordinates in office. 
The money spent by the troops was also felt as a sensible 



74 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. IV. advantage-, because it was not first taken from the labour- 
ing man by taxation ; and therefore they bad not to work 
twice for it, as the celebrated William Cobbett said in 
reply to Justice Bailey, when, with the political folly of an 
English judge seeking to prop a harsh sentence, the latter 
announced from the bench that " Taxation was a benefit 
to the labouring man because the money went back to him 
as wages." In fine there was no oppression and therefore 
no oppressors to rise against. 

Early in December the sickness abated, but it was 
followed in the spring by a flight of locusts which devoured 
nearly all the rising harvest, scanty in itself from the little 
labour previously bestowed during the pestilence. Those 
destroyers were succeeded by an anomalous rising of the 
Indus which increased the distress, and meanwhile me- 
nacing political and military events demanded the utmost 
vigilance and extensive preparations. 

It has been shown that, strictly speaking, only the eastern 
side of the Indus and the country immediately about Kurra- 
chee were subdued ; for though the jam of the Jokeas, whose 
territory extended from near the latter place to Sehwan, 
was entirely controlled, the country above Sehwan belonged 
to chiefs who had made no submission, and were intimately 
connected by blood and habits with the Khelat moun- 
taineers and the robbers of the Cutchee hills. And these 
last, though disregarding the Bombay exhortations to a 
general insurrection, were not unlikely to be stirred to plun- 
dering incursions by the money which the Lion and Ahmed 
Khan Lugharee might offer them. External circumstances 
also tended to excite those tribes to mischief; for in 
December it was secretly known that a great confede- 
racy was in progress to overthrow the British power in 
India, and the state of Scindhia, better known as Gwalior, 
was breaking out into open war. The Mahometan popu- 
lation of the empire was not to be trusted ; Nepaul was 
more menacing than friendly ; the Seikhs, in a state of 
military anarchy, seemed disposed to cross the Sutlej ; and 
their kindred in the protected states on the left bank of 
that river were ready to join them. The spies said the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



75 



Affghans were likewise preparing to move down the Boian CHAP. IV. 
pass upon Shikarpoor. isu. 

With these stimulants to their natural cupidity, the 
Khelat mountaineers and Cutchee robbers could not be 
expected to remain quiet ; already one incursion had been 
made by the Doomkees near Larkaana, and that tribe 
was peculiarly connected with the Khelat sirdars and 
Affghans of Candahar, who desired to overthrow the young 
khan because of his alliance with the British. There was 
fear therefore that a general burst of these wild mountaineer 
tribes would devastate the western side of Scinde ; for to 
use the English general's words " Gwalior and the Punjaub 
were in arms, the independent hill tribes were like ban- 
ditti listening for the sound of carriage- wheels, the Scin- 
dian Beloochees on that side were between a growl and a 
bite, and Ali Moorad apparently turning traitor in the 
midst of the sickening troops." 

Amongst those who gave secret information was the 
Persian prince, Agha Khan, whose real title was the Emir 
of the Mountains, he being the lineal heir of the ancient 
"assassin." Though no longer the terrible being who 
made kings tremble in the midst of armies, this wandering 
occult potentate still possessed secret but great power; 
and his people, spread over Asia from the Indus to the 
Mediterranean, supplied him with a revenue, and with 
information sure and varied. He had come to Scinde with a 
train of horsemen before the conquest, knew of the ameers' 
design to assail the residency, had remonstrated against it, 
and afterwards gave such information on that subject as to 
render Outranks imbecile vanity on that occasion most 
painfully prominent. He and his horsemen had acted on 
the side of the British during the war, and he received a 
pension from the supreme government ; but his position 
and proceedings were suspicious, and he was watched and 
even prevented quitting Scinde, when he designed to make 
some intriguing religious excursion to Bhagdad. Never- 
theless he was on friendly terms with the general, and now 
told him the Affghans of Candahar, and the Beloochees of 
Khelat were in close amity with the Lion — that all the 



76 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IV. Scindian chiefs west of the Indus had secretly assured that 
!844. ameer they were ready to raise a religious cry against the 
British and restore him to his throne — that Ali Moorad 
had written to the same effect, saying eight thousand of 
the troops were then prostrate with fever, the remainder 
tottering from debility, and if the Affghans would only 
send two thousand men down the Bolan Pass they could 
destroy all the Feringhees. To this the government 
moonshee, Ali Akbar, whose intelligence and fidelity were 
alike unquestionable, added, that there certainly was a 
great combination of the Indian powers in progress, and a 
secret intercourse going on ; but he thought the nations 
in the immediate neighbourhood of Scinde dreaded the 
" Bahadoor Jung," the great warrior, so they called the 
general, too much to break out unless some remarkable 
opportunity tempted them. 

Of Ali Moorad the moonshee did not speak, but there 
were grounds for suspecting that ameer's fidelity, besides 
the report of Agha Khan. He had dismissed his minister 
Sheik Ali Houssein, the fast friend of the British, and had 
written to the general so insolently as to indicate hostility . 
This it was supposed he dared not have done, unless some 
great support was at hand, which could only be looked for 
towards Gwalior, the Punjaub and Affghanistan — for Ali 
knew well the Beloochees alone could not contend against 
the British. 

Very gloomy was the prospect of affairs, and it must be 
admitted that great moral intrepidity and a sure per- 
ception of chances were required to control the crisis, 
when it is considered that Sir C. Napier, just emerging 
from war, and while establishing a new government to 
which so many interests and different races of men were 
to be reconciled, had his whole military force suddenly 
paralyzed in his hands by an unheard-of sickness, which 
at the same time nearly stopped the social existence of the 
nation — that he was menaced by foreign invasion, by 
the supposed treachery of Ali Moorad, and the partial 
insurrection of the western chiefs, at a moment when he 
was personally reduced to extreme bodily debility by an 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



77 



illness so depressing to the mind, that at Knrrachee CHAP. IV. 
alone several officers had become insane for a time, others 1844 
childish, and four committed suicide. Finally, that while 
struggling under these accumulated difficulties, those from 
whom he had a right to expect every aid and support, 
were assailing him with secret enmity and the most in- 
credible virulence of abuse ! Nevertheless with a won- 
derful moral force he carried himself and the people he 
ruled, triumphantly and without commotion through all 
difficulties. 

His first efforts were directed to obtain sure intelligence 
that he might regulate his operations justly, and he had 
before established several good channels, independent of 
accidental sources such as the Persian prince afforded. 
The Sheik Ah Houssein, a man of great shrewdness and 
wide influence, was one of these channels; and a sure one, 
for he knew his own fortune was bound up with the 
British supremacy in Scinde. Ah Moorad disliked him, 
and by the dethroned ameers he was counted a traitor j 
he was also odious to the Patans in his master's pay, 
because of his nepotism, the rock on which men in his 
position generally split ; but these things made him the 
more adhesive to British interests. Through the rich 
Hindoo merchants holding jagheers from the Scindian 
government, whose interested vigilance never slept, and 
whose means of gaining intelligence were extraordinary, 
sure intelligence was had, and the military spies were good 
and active. Wherefore, feeling he could not be politically 
surprised, the general sought to dissipate the storm as 
regarded Scinde with a combination of moral and military 
influence, founded on his judgment of the barbaric cha- 
racter generally and of Ali Moorad' s in particular ; but first 
he put his outposts on their guard by the following instruc- 
tions addressed to the officer commanding at Shikarpoor, 
the point most exposed to an attack from the Affghans 
and Cutchee robber tribes. 

"Be vigilant, and with your hrmdreds, aided by a fort, 
you may defy as many thousands of the enemy ; yet with 
British soldiers against Beloochees and Affghans a fort 



78 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. TV. should only be a refuge for sick men and stores. If an 
1844. enemy approaches you, attack him and put it clean out of 
his head that he is going to besiege you. If he comes 
within ten miles of Shikarpoor, get near him in the night 
and fall on him at dawn if he is not too numerous ; if he 
is too strong let him come closer to the town before you 
attack him ; but in any case attack. — The only difference 
is that if he is very strong he must be allowed to come 
closer to the fortress than if he is weak. If his numbers 
be overwhelming you must wait for aid from Sukkur, and . 
the commandant there has orders to move to your suc- 
cour, yet in a mass, nothing must be done by driblets. 
Bukkur must be secured, but every man not employed for 
that object must march on Shikarpoor, whence you must 
be prepared to sally with your whole force the moment 
the guns outside are heard. I do not apprehend any 
attack but forewarned is forearmed." 

This warning was a precaution against the Lion, who 
was among the Affghans of Candahar, and in communi- 
cation with the robber tribes, and hence, down the Bolan 
Pass and from the Cutchee hills the coming of his war, if 
it came at all, was to be expected ; and it would be no 
slight one, seeing the robbers alone could bring down 
twenty thousand of the fiercest swordsmen of Beloo- 
chistan, and if reinforced by Affghans, and aided by any 
treachery on the part of Ali Moorad, they could not but 
prove formidable. 

Ali Moorad's temper and projects were next to be tested. 
He had a reputation for courage and hardihood, but Sir 
C. Napier, knowing him to be addicted to drinking and 
the zenana, thought his intrepidity would not prevent him 
from securing his own safety in Dejee previous to the 
breaking out of mischief ; for that fortress, perched on the 
summit of a lofty isolated rock, was by the Beloo- 
chees considered impregnable. It was so to any- 
thing but bombardment, and the general, in anticipation, 
sent a train of mortars, — some of which he immediately 
obtained from Bombay, — up the Indus to Sukkur, which 
was only three days' march from Dejee. This measure, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



79 



ostentatiously taken to give notice that he was jealous of CHAP. IV. 

the ameers' conduct, being arranged, he asked to have the 

regiments most afflicted with the sickness relieved by fresh 

troops ; and he would have gone himself to Sukkur, but 

that he feared a fresh access of fever, which might from its 

peculiarly depressing effects prostrate his energies when he 

most needed them. Indeed he was then so weakened 

that his medical advisers and all his friends earnestly 

pressed him to quit Scinde as the only hope of saving life ; 

but to their solicitations he replied thus. 

" If it were to save, not mine but a thousand lives I 
would not go. Were I to do so there would be wild work 
here ; and a man wanting my accidental advantages could 
not bring affairs to a happy conclusion. I cannot there- 
fore in honour leave Lord Ellenborough in the lurch of 
this political sea. I know my team, but a far more able 
man could not get on the box before the horses would 
start off. Chieftains and tribes who obey me willingly 
because of my victories would rise against a new comer ; 
from me they would take a kick with more patience than 
a sour look from another whose force they had not proved 
in battle. f General ! give the word and I follow you 
with ten thousand shields against the Seikhs. All Scinde 
will rise at your command against them. You are my king, 
I will hold your stirrup and never quit it.' This speech 
was recently made to me by the Belooch commander- 
in-chief who opposed me at Meeanee, and I believe him. 
An English general may not try experiments, but were I 
a sovereign I could lead all the Beloochees against the 
Seikhs, and do many greater things that are not to be 
attempted by a servant. With the prestige of victory 
anything may be effected with these people ; but a new 
man without it, having at this moment the Lion and the 
Affghans on the west, the Seikhs on the north, and an 
army crippled with sickness, would be lost if a rising 
were to take place. Every blockhead would then be 
pressing advice on him, he would be unable to distinguish 
the right road and all would be confusion. How then 
can I consistently with my duty to Scinde, to England, 



80 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. IV. to Lord Ellenborough, throw up the reins at such a time ? 
1844> Impossible ! I must stay and bide what will. There are 
thousands here in more danger from disasters than I am 
in from sickness, and I will sink or swim with those poor 
fellows." 

In this mood he awaited the crisis, resolved, if Ah 
Moorad gave offence, to assail Dejee, and so doing he 
judged he should by one and the same blow reduce that 
ameer and suppress any general conspiracy of the Belooch 
chieftains — such as the Persian prince had supposed to be 
in progress — arguing thus. (C If Ali resists me there must 
be a general confederacy, for I know he is not, though so 
reputed, of that hardihood to fight alone ; and if I take 
him in his celebrated fortress, it will so terrify the tribes, 
that their confederacy will melt away or they will pre- 
maturely break out during the siege, for they think 
Dejee invulnerable ; but sixteen heavy shells falling into it 
every five minutes will break down that conceit." 

To test Ali Moorad' s firmness, when the mortars had 
reached Sukkur and attracted his attention, a gentle 
recommendation to restore Sheik Ah Houssein was for- 
warded. It had no effect, and then so rough an admo- 
nition followed, that Sir George Arthur and the com- 
mander-in-chief Sir J asper Nichols, who happened to be at 
Bombay, objected to its being sent thinking it would force 
the ameers into hostility. Sir C. Napier had judged his 
man more sagaciously. While the Bombay faction was 
representing him as the dupe and rewarder of Ali Moorad' s 
treachery, he forced that prince to an entire submission. 
The sheik was restored to the ministry with an assurance 
that the ameer had never thought of setting aside that 
worthy councillor — that his own back had been bent at 
the idea of the governor's displeasure, but now finding his 
conduct approved, his heart danced like the sunbeams on 
the waters of delight — with other like flowers of Eastern 
composition, — upon which the general drily remarked that 
the " weight of sixteen mortars would have rendered the 
complaint in the spine incurable." At this time he 
described Ali Moorad as an inebriate, hunting, zenana- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



81 



going fellow, who would, if not stayed by fear, help to cut CHAP. IV. 
the English off as readily as any of the dethroned ameers ; 1844 
afterwards he judged better of his disposition, though not 
of his head, believing drink rather than treachery had 
excited him to insolence. 

Internal treason being thus restrained, external dangers 
were regarded with less anxiety, and by the end of January 
the resolution with which the crisis had been outfaced was 
rewarded by a change in the aspect of affairs. The troops 
were then rapidly recovering strength, the field artillery 
had been well horsed, the police all armed, clothed, and 
sufficiently disciplined to contend with the wild forces 
of any enemy. Colonel Roberts had organized a strong 
body of irregulars in Cutch, a thing vainly attempted 
before by the Bombay political agents, and the desert 
chiefs, bordering on the Run of Cutch, even proposed to 
relinquish their predatory habits and settle in Scinde, so 
entirely had the new governors reputation subdued their 
lawless and fierce tempers. These were events of consider- 
able importance, inasmuch as they completely guaranteed 
tranquillity along the eastern frontier of Scinde. Shikar- 
poore was therefore immediately reinforced from Sukkur 
with three field-pieces, a regiment of irregular cavalry and 
one of infantry, making up a force sufficient to defy the 
Affghans and hillmen united; and the void thus left at 
Sukkur was filled up by regular cavalry and a field battery, 
which were sent from Kurrachee up the eastern bank 
of the Indus. At the same time, Fitzgerald's camel corps, 
now organized and able to march sixty miles a day, went 
up the western and more dangerous side of Scinde, to 
Larkaana ; and between those bodies the armed steamers, 
ascending the river, formed a link of connection. Thus, 
^hile the important points of Shikarpoore and Sukkur 
were being reinforced, the troops destined for that service 
acted as roving columns, traversing the country in various 
directions, appearing stronger than they really were, and, 
as always happens on such occasions, were still more 
magnified by rumour. 

These complicated movements, the exaggerated numbers, 

G 



82 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. IV. and the whispered ultimate intentions, were all calculated 
1844 to distract and keep in a state of suspense, unfavourable 
to conspiracy, the western Beloochee chiefs who might be 
inclined for commotions. Meanwhile the 13th sepoy 
regiment came from Bombay to Kurrachee, and Sir Robert 
Sale, the renowned defender of Jellalabad, assumed the 
temporary command at Sukkur, bringing with him his 
own 13th veteran European regiment, then on its return 
to England. Scinde was thus well garrisoned, and the 
danger of having to fight external and internal enemies 
with an army paralyzed by sickness was removed ; but the 
views on which Sir C. Napier acted will be best shown by 
extracts from an official memoir, in which he opposed a 
proposition to withdraw a European regiment in De- 
cember 1843, when the sickness was most prevalent. 

" Scinde is now quiet, I know not that Beloochistan and 
the Punjaub are so ; and if they become disturbed Scinde 
will not be tranquil, because the Mahometan population, 
so recently subdued, cannot be expected to remain free 
from the external influence of nations having the same 
faith. The people of Scinde are like all other people, there 
is no mystery in governing them — they will be quiet when 
they believe it for their interest, and when that interest 
demands an insurrection they will rise. The Beloochees 
are robbers by habit, and will probably be disposed to rise 
if an attack from without offers an opportunity to plunder 
the Hindoos and Scindees. Our troops must cross to the 
western bank of the Indus to collect in the north if the 
Punjaub becomes disturbed and an attack is menaced 
from Beloochistan. It will then be necessary to place 
the country, south of a line drawn from Kurrachee through 
Hyderabad to the desert, under the guard of troops from 
Cutch ; and that is one of the reasons why I wished to 
have Cutch under the control of an able military man like 
Colonel Roberts, instead of a political agent. 

" The question of reducing or strengthening the force in 
Scinde depends upon the state of the Punjaub. Scinde 
internally is tranquil, but, until the agitation in the Punjaub 
subsides and our government is firmly established here, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



83 



two European regiments are necessaiy. The question is CHAP. IV. 
one of general politics. If the Punjaub becomes hostile the 
mountaineers of Beloocliistan will probably become so 
likewise, and if so, Scinde must be strongly guarded." 

This was his opinion in December, but in the latter end of 
J anuary, when a battle near Gwalior had been fought by 
Sir Hugh Gough — when his own adroit policy had stifled 
any disposition for commotion amongst the western chiefs 
— when he had collected his army in three masses, at 
Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Sukkur, with a strong ad- 
vanced guard at Shikarpoore, the whole pointing as it were 
in march against the Seikhs of the Punjaub, he again 
developed his views of affairs. 

" If the Seikhs cross the Hyphasis, I shall move every 
man I can spare, without danger for Kurrachee and Hyder- 
abad, upon Sukkur, and if possible lead a handy force to 
the vicinity of Ooch, to hold Bhawalpoore and Mooltan 
in check. If the former is faithful, I shall perhaps act 
against Mooltan ; but I cannot cross the Sutlej unless 
I have security for the Bhawalpoore man's faith — that is 
to say Ms person in my camp — he might otherwise cut off 
my supplies from the south, and my Hue of retreat. In 
fine any demonstration I can make in favour of Lord 
Ellenborouglr's operations on the Upper Sutlej I will 
make, without waiting for orders ; for if the battles near 
Gwalior have not been decisive, and the Seikhs cross the 
Hyphasis, my communication with Ferozepore and Agra 
will be cut off. 

" The Seikhs, it is said, can turn out seventy thousand 
men, of which forty thousand are well disciplined and 
armed, and they have a powerful artillery. "Wherefore, if 
I can keep Scinde quiet and hold the Bhawalpoore man 
firm to our alliance, I shall do as much as seventeen 
thousand sickly soldiers can well manage in this hot 
climate. I fear my despatch to Lord Ellenborough has 
not reached liim, but I shall act without orders if necessary, 
and as my movements do not depend on his the failure of 
the despatch is of little consequence. If I steady Bha- 
walpoore I shall do much ; if I also draw off the Mooltan 

g 2 



84 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IV. force I shall do great things — more perhaps than I expect. 
1SU> My opinion is however, that the Seikhs will not now 
attack, because, if the Gwalior army has been quite 
beaten, there will be twenty thousand troops disposable 
for the Hyphasis, besides the force already on that river. 
Gwalior is indeed a long way from the Hyphasis, and 
that may expose the left bank to be ravaged, but the force 
left there ought to be and I suppose is strong enough to 
defend that river." 

That an extensive confederacy against the British power 
existed in the latter end of 1843, is certain, but the vigor- 
ous policy and military energy of Sir C. Napier stopped it 
as regarded Scinde ; and it was extinguished generally by 
the battle of Maharajapoor gained near Gwalior. British 
India was thus replaced in a commanding position, was 
freed from serious internal mischief, and had only the 
external hostility of the Seikhs to look for. The opera- 
tions which led to this state of affairs were certainly the 
results of Lord Ellenborouglr's military policy, which was 
so exactly timed as to break at once the wide-spread 
conspiracy; and as he was personally engaged in the 
battle, a victory gloriously terminated the series of able 
measures by which he had dragged the British power up 
from the depths of degradation and disaster into which it 
had been sunk. The success at Gwalior was not however 
necessary to the maintenance of English supremacy in 
Scinde. Neither the Affghan nor the Khelat tribes, nor 
the Lion's influence, nor the treason of Ali Moorad — if he 
had fallen away from his alliance — nor all those things 
together, joined to a defeat at Gwalior, could have pro- 
duced more than a momentary commotion — except while 
the soldiers were down with the fever : for so entirely were 
the three races now aware of their advantages under the 
British rule, that they would have taken arms to resist a 
change sooner than to forward one. Some Talpooree 
sirdars might indeed have felt bound in honour to join a 
prince of their family who appeared in arms, but the 
general feeling in favour of the English was evinced in 
an unmistakeable manner. The police were aided by 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



85 



Beloochee villagers to arrest armed deserters who resisted CHAP. IV. 
capture; and where murders were committed, not of isu. 
Europeans for they were never molested, but of women, 
or in quarrels, the criminals were delivered up, though the 
crime itself was held to be venial. In fine genius had 
done its work. 

But if Lord EHenborough, following the Indian system, 
had restricted his lieutenant's discretion and power by 
official rules, misplaced and inapplicable to the circum- 
stances and the people, the conquest would have ended as 
in Affghanistan, with a terrible disaster, and the treason- 
able hopes and efforts of the Bombay faction would have 
been realized. For so complicated were Scindian affairs, 
civil and military, so nicely depending upon delicate and 
timely management of men and interests, that none but 
he to whom victory had given a key to the cipher could 
have rightly interpreted the characters. In other hands 
the massacre of a second British army would have hap- 
pened, would have been followed by a Seikh and Affghan 
invasion, an insurrection of the Mahomedan population of 
India, and the open or secret defection of the preserved 
sovereignties within the old frontier. Scinde was therefore 
a great acquisition, and its condition and value at this 
time were well set forth by Sir C. Napier in the following 
condensed extract from a memoir, drawn up in reply to an 
official question as to the policy of repairing or destroying 
the many native forthwith which the country was spotted 
like an angry leopard. 

" The forts should be let alone. In this climate dilapi- 
dation does not make rapid progress. To repair one fort, if 
required, would not be difficult ; to repair them generally 
would be very costly, the advantage small ; for the people 
here and immediately around us, having no artillery, can 
neither attack nor defend a fort with success against the 
British. 

" This is a frontier country which may be defended 
with comparatively few troops ; the large force now here 
is required only for the moment, because of the dis- 
orderly state of the Punjaub and the conquest being so 



86 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. IV. recent — the present establishment need not be perma- 
1844. nent. 

" Scinde furnishes a valuable frontier for North- Western 
India, in a commercial as well as a military view. 

" In a commercial, because of its river, which will facili- 
tate the introduction of goods from the north ; and as it 
has but one sea-port, that of Kurrachee, the custom-house 
duties may be cheaply collected. The desert will also avail 
to prevent contraband trade, because the passages across 
are few and easily guarded. As a military frontier, it 
protects the left flank of an army defending any of the 
five rivers of the Punjaub, which as lines of defence may 
be said to radiate northward from Mittenkote, on the 
upper frontier of Scinde. Any of those rivers would 
furnish a well-defined frontier for North- Western India ; 
but while Scinde was in the hands of the hostile ameers 
the left flank of all those lines could be taken in reverse. 

" Reasoning therefore on abstract military principles, 
the defence of the Hyphasis or Sutlej — the actual fron- 
tier — would have been weak without the close alliance of 
Bhawalpoore, which however could hardly have maintained 
its alliance if pressed by Sawan Mull of Mooltan on the 
north, and by the ameers of Scinde on the south. The 
desert would have been no barrier for India against the 
ameers — they could have passed it in many places — it 
offered a strong barrier for them; because they could 
destroy or poison the wells, or defend them by the very 
forts which are the subjects under consideration, but 
which would have been efficient against an invasion from 
India. Now they are of little military advantage, because 
we command both sides of the desert. The conquest of 
Scinde has therefore strengthened the line of the Sutlej. 

" It remains to treat of the military advantages pos- 
sessed by Scinde itself for its own defence, on a line of 
five hundred miles, traced from Mittenkote to the mouths 
of the Indus. 

" An enemy invading it north of Hyderabad, would 
find the desert before him and a British force on both 
flauks ; he must therefore change front to the right or 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE. 



87 



left. If to the right, the troops in Southern Scinde would CHAP. IV. 

be concentrated at Hyderabad, with a line of fortified 1814 

posts behind them on one side, as far as Oniercote, all in 

a good state, having been repaired or newly constructed 

by me immediately after the battle of Hyderabad with 

design to provide a secure communication with the Delta. 

Thus concentrated at Hyderabad, the southern force would 

have six lines of communication and of retreat, by which 

supplies and reinforcements could reach it from India, 

according to the season of the year. 1°. To Kurrachee. 

2°. The mouths of the Indus by Yikkur. 3°. To Bhoog 

the capital of Cutch. 4 C . To Guzzerat. 5°. To Deesa. 

6°. To Balmeer. 

u Three of these have ports which ought to be protected 
by works ; the other three are land communications, 
and that by Omercote on Deesa I have secured with 
fortified stations. But while the enemy thus turned 
against the force of Lower Scinde, which from the variety 
of communications could move in almost any direction, he 
would have his flank vexed by the armed steamers on the 
Indus, and they would insure the British communication 
with the northern force based on Sukkur; for an army 
cannot march very close along the banks of the Indus, 
because of the numerous large watercourses and cuts for 
irrigation. 

" The northern force would be in direct communication 
with the army on the Sutlej, and the other flank of the 
invader would be pent in by the desert ; he would there- 
fore perish, unless he gained a victory by forcing some 
of the strong positions furnished, at every half-mile of 
ground about Hyderabad, by the nullahs, which could be 
easily and rapidly intrenched. The British force could 
even then, though defeated, dispute the ground inch by 
inch down to the sea ; or go across the desert to the 
eastward ; or even cross the Indus, and taking Kurrachee 
as a base of operations, and being in communication with 
Bombay by sea when the monsoons did not prevail, could 
act on the enemy's rear. Thus, all circumstances of 
climate and ground considered, to pass the Indus between 



88 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IV. Mittenkote and the sea would be a dangerous operation 
1844. for an invader, 

" If he turned to the north, after crossing that large and 
dangerous river, he would meet with difficulties of a like 
nature ; for the Sukkur force would have two lines of com- 
munication and retreat open, and reinforcements would pour 
down the Sutlej by water and through Bhawalpoore by 
land. If he did not move northward, the British troops 
at Sukkur, taking a position on the edge of the desert with 
Shah-ghur and Jessulmeer in their rear, could menace his 
right flank, which would compel him to follow them into 
the desert ; while the force at Hyderabad and that coming 
down from Ferozepoore, could close on both his flanks and 
on his rear, and cut off his supplies without abandoning 
their own lines of communication. 

"These observations show that Scinde has by the con- 
quest become a compact defensible well-defined frontier for 
India ; but when it was in the ameers' hands, it compelled 
the Indian government to keep large bodies of troops at 
the eastern side, on a longer and weaker frontier-line, less 
defined and more costly. By that conquest also a native 
power, having a regular organized government vehemently 
hostile to the British, was put away — a power which could 
at any time have passed the desert to attack the Indian 
frontier in its whole length; but which could not be so 
easily attacked in return, because whoever commands 
the watercourses is master of the desert. Upon these 
grounds it may be assumed that few regular troops will be 
wanted hereafter for the defence of Scinde ; and those less 
for the security of the country than to give a strength to 
the frontier-line of the Upper Sutlej which it does not 
naturally possess. 

" Kurrachee, independent of its great importance in the 
general system of defence, will become so rich that it may 
tempt the hill tribes to rush down and plunder it : where- 
fore large fortifications are there requisite. 

" Ahmed Khan, in the Hala mountains, should likewise 
be made a fortified sanatorium, if found to be as salu- 
brious as report makes it. But as yet its quality of 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



89 



climate lias only been tested in cool weather : it must CHAP^l 
likewise be tested in the heat of June. Its position is 1844. 
good, and it covers the only known north road from 
Kurrachee to Sehwan, which runs through the wild tracts 
of country formed by the roots of the Hala hills. Those 
hills are full of passes and scantily inhabited, yet the road 
is one of great traffic, and fever is said to be unknown at 
Ahmed Khan. 

"All this seems irrelevant to the question of retaining or 
dismantling the native forts ; yet it shows that if the main 
points be strongly occupied, and yet fortified so as to be 
defended by a few men, their usual garrisons can on 
sudden emergencies send roving columns to suppress any 
insurrection. But if all the native forts are repaired and 
garrisoned, the troops in Scinde must be largely aug- 
mented, and parcelled in detachments, which a well-planned 
insurrection, boldly executed, and so timed as to turn the 
raging sun to account, might cut off or starve into sub- 
mission if not kept constantly stored with many months' 
provisions, which would be a constant expense. If so 
stored, the garrisons might indeed resist but could not 
march out to quell disturbances : moreover, most of the 
forts, having been constructed with reference to the facility 
of obtaining water, are situated in low marshy places and 
very unhealthy. 

" The plan adopted is to keep the troops as much as 
possible in masses, and always in readiness to move in any 
direction to awe internal enemies. Against an invader 
the force of Southern Scinde will assemble at Hyderabad, 
and at Sukkur on the Indus ; but if an enemy approach 
by the coast road from Soono-Meeanee, on the edge of 
the Gedrosian desert, Kurrachee will become the point of 
concentration instead of Hyderabad and Sukkur, and 
there are to the westward strong positions, on the Arabis 
or Hub river, which have been partially examined. If 
he forces them he will still have to besiege Kurrachee 
before he can approach the Indus, which he will find in 
those lower parts without fords, and without boats, save 
those armed and organized to prevent the passage — in 



90 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. IV. itself a difficult operation even without opposition — but 
1844* what army could bring a siege-train through Beloochistan 
to reduce Kurrachee ? 

"Our present state of affairs may be thus described, 
We are only just getting firm hold of Scinde — we have 
had a terrible sickness, and have not yet sufficient cover for 
the troops because of the difficulty of obtaining artisans — 
we were, previous to the conquest, and are still, very igno- 
rant of the country — we have had to contend with 
prejudice raised against us by the majority of the Indian 
newspapers, which have, though in vain, laboured to 
make the officers appear dishonourable, to create mutiny 
amongst the sepoys, and to excite the Beloochees to rise 
upon us during the sickness. Yet with all these impedi- 
ments to overcome, we have obtained a grasp upon the 
country which the forces of all Central Asia cannot loosen. 

"From the first, the plan developed above, has been 
pertinaciously followed with a prospective not a momentary 
expediency ; where a fortification could not be constructed 
from want of time or means, houses were loopholed, to be 
afterwards expanded to permanent works ; therefore all 
that has been effected forms, however minute in itself, a 
portion of a general plan, and belongs to the system. The 
conquest of Scinde does now, and will still more hereafter 
add to the security and strength of the north-western 
frontier of India, and it covers the south-western fron- 
tier. So far from adding to the expense of the Indian 
government, it will diminish it and augment the revenue 
of the Company ; not only by the excess of receipts beyond 
expenditure, but by obviating the necessity of keeping on 
the Sutlej, and from Ferozepoor down to Cutch, so large 
a force as must have been maintained had Scinde remained 
under the ameers. 

" The dangerous position of a British army on the upper 
Sutlej may be well conceived, if Scinde, Gwalior, Nepaul 
and the Punjaub were hostile and united, an event which 
was very probable after the disaster at Cabool ; for the 
princes of those states did certainly send confidential 
agents to arrange treaties by word of mouth, and the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



91 



extent of their secret coalition can never be ascertained, chap. IV. 
This danger would have been very great if they had been 
allowed time to complete their arrangements : and there 
will always be peril, while native princes are left on their 
thrones within the frontier. The people indeed are gene- 
rally with us ; but the people will follow their native op- 
pressors, because they are not civilized enough to think for 
themselves. 

"An extension of territory is however by no means 
desirable. The upper Sutlej is a better frontier-line than 
the upper Indus. The conquest of the Punjaub will soon 
be forced upon us, but it is not at all desirable. It would 
indeed be desirable to possess Bhawalpoore, and Scinde 
was certainly necessary to the security of the north-eastern 
frontier. The cry raised against the conquest, is as incom- 
prehensible as the reasoning on it, which would set aside the 
safety and well-being of a hundred millions of people to pre- 
serve the power of a few treacherous chiefs, whose rights 
were founded on violence and treason of a recent date. 

" As we cannot take possession of Bhawalpoore, the next 
best thing is to make the Nawab both friendly and power- 
ful, he will then have more to lose if he behaves ill. 
His dethronement would give us an unbroken frontier-line 
from the mouths of the Indus to the sources of the Sutlej, 
and the great advantage of having a river for a frontier is 
obvious. It furnishes a definite boundary and does not 
separate the people on its banks, they mix as civilization 
advances. A mountain frontier prevents friendly inter- 
course between the tribes on each side ; they pillage each 
other to the great inconvenience of the most civilized, 
and a state of aggression and hatred becomes permanent 
and virulent. 

" The western frontier of Scinde under the ameers, was 
the Arabis river, which can be traced northwards for about 
one hundred and thirty miles; from thence the boundary- See Plan No.l. 
line was a chain of hills, forming part of the Hala range of 
mountains and also about one hundred and thirty miles 
in length, ending near Chandia of the Chandika tribe. 
From Chandia it strikes off, for one hundred and forty 



92 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IV. miles in a north-eastern direction, running parallel to the 
1844 Indus at an average distance of forty miles, until it 
touches the foot of the Cutchee hills and there turns down 
to the river, which it falls upon at Kusmore. That por- 
tion which joins Chandia to the Cutchee hills is chiefly 
desert, and the whole line of boundary is positively defined 
by rivers, mountains and sandy wastes : it is generally 
well known, and a good frontier to adhere to on that side. 
The resources for defence are also very good on the lower 
and on the upper parts ; but the Hala range is not known 
beyond the general character of mountains, namely that 
they have their ordinary passes, and can be crossed every- 
where when circumstances require the effort." 

Such were the external relations of Scinde, its interior 
condition and its intrinsic value shall be shown in the 
next chapter. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



93 



CHAPTER V. 

Notwithstanding the disturbance of the civil adminis- CHAP. V. 
tration, caused by the visitations mentioned in the fore- j^JJ 
going chapter, the progress of the public works and the 
vigorous repression of crime, taught the people, that while 
force was exhibited good only was intended. Inquiries as 
to the natural and artificial productions were set on foot, 
and it was found that in pottery the Scindians were pe- 
culiarly skilful, that the Tattah manufactures might be 
in time revived, and the natural productions were rich and 
varied. Grain of all kinds, which might be grown in un- 
limited quantities, opium, tobacco, soda, indigo, alum and 
sugar. Iron was to be found in the Hala mountains, and 
near them sulphur of the first quality, easily obtained; 
saltpetre was abundant, and in the Delta were discovered 
beds of the purest salt fourteen feet thick. Vast tracts 
of fine timber lined the banks of the Indus, and every- 
where the land gave the lie to the shameless assertions that 
Scinde was a "barren waste, incapable of sustaining a 
large population." Cotton, indigo, and sugar, only wanted Appendix II. 
the advantage of good methods of cultivation to exceed 
the same products in any part of India, and Sir C. Napier 
endeavoured to improve the sugar cultivation by pro- 
curing West-Indian canes from Egypt, where they had 
been introduced with success ; but this effort was malig- 
nantly frustrated by Bombay officials, who retained the 
plants there until they died. 

The new police were now creeping over the face of the 
country, establishing their power by degrees and enabling 
the collectors to organize the judicial system, to obtain 



94 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. V. information, enforce the collection of taxes with greater 
1844 impartiality,. and protect the gathering of the autumnal 
harvest on which the revenue chiefly depended. 

No site for a sanatorium had yet been discovered, and the 
want of healthful barracks could not be remedied, because 
a scarcity of artisans was renewed by the recent pesti- 
lence. A first effort to establish a sanatorium at Ahmed 
Khan, the favourite residence of the great sultan of that 
name, had not been fortunate, and the failure, conjoined 
with want of cover, compelled the hurried building of 
barracks — when the artisans returned — at great cost, and 
before the best sites could be ascertained. Meanwhile the 
soldiers were hutted in various parts, and moved, when 
circumstances would permit, according to the season, so 
as to avoid the evil influence of the river. But that like- 
wise was attended with difficulties ; for during the inun- 
dation the waters pursued them everywhere over the 
plains, while the mountains were generally without water, 
and without roads for the conveyance of provisions and 
materials for hutting. These embarrassments, which 
were cruelly augmented by the effects of the fever on the 
population, had rendered the cool season nearly a blank 
for work, and the administration had now to drag itself 
along as it could in the raging heat. 

Amongst the many vexations to be encountered, none 
were more wearisome than the thwartings of official 
men — not only those impelled by factious motives but 
others, described as good men and honest, but little 
men, who sincerely believed the governor of S chide ought 
to be gibbeted as an example to innovators; and who, 
with their official meshes tied him down as Gulliver was 
by the Lilliputians : and whenever he broke loose which 
was not seldom, a flight of small poisoned missives were 
sure to follow. When all his time and energies were 
required to insure tranquillity and the safety of his army, 
hundreds of letters, especially from the Bombay govern- 
ment offices, civil and military, were transmitted to and 
fro three or four times on the commonest matters, while 
the most important ones were indefinitely delayed; and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



95 



this immense unnecessary labour was, there is much reason CHAP. V. 
to believe, imposed on him in a climate proverbially dis- 1844 
tressing and exhausting to European constitutions, pur- 
posely, in the villanous hope of destroying life ! 

Amidst these difficulties the protection of Upper Scinde, 
west of the Indus, against the mountain and hill tribes 
was become a subject of great anxiety. Many chiefs of 
the former had not made salaam, and two were in arms, 
plundering. The latter were at open war on the simple 
principle of spoil, without pretending a political motive ; 
and though the irregular cavalry had been well disposed, 
and precise arrangements made for its protective action 
along the tormented frontier, the hillmen's forays were 
made with circumstances of frightful ferocity, and there 
was danger of the example exciting not only the Khelat 
mountain-tribes, but the Scindian chiefs of the Hala 
range to the same courses. To prevent this, Fitzgerald's 
camel corps was quartered at Larkaana, and he was ordered 
to construct a strong fort there as a base for his opera- 
tions. Soon after his arrival he made a march of one 
hundred miles in twenty-four hours, and carried off a 
criminal chief from the midst of his tribe, which so awed 
the other recusant Scindian chiefs, they offered to make 
their salaams. Even the hillmen became alarmed, a mo- 
mentary fear as after events proved, yet it gave the poor 
villagers a short respite. 

At this time all danger of an Affghan descent to raise 
the Beloochees in favour of the Lion ceased. For that 
unhappy prince having besought the aid of the Candahar 
chiefs, was by those perfidious barbarians treated, as he, 
a barbarian himself, should have anticipated, and as the 
general had foreseen when he described him as a king who 
was his own ambassador. Having got all they could from 
him by cajolery, they set persons at night to converse with 
his servants, telling them to provide for their own safety 
as the ameer had been sold for two lacs and a half to the 
" Bahadoor J ung." The poor exile thus deceived, mounted 
his horse and fled to the Cutchee hills, where he was well 
received, and commenced anew his efforts to raise com- 



96 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S 



CHAP. V. motions in Scinde ; but as the Bhoogtees, with whom he 
18 44. resided, were then at fend with the Murrees his schemes 
failed. The hopes of the Bombay faction were thus again 
baffled ; and their political prophecies as to insurrections, 
were at the same time signally belied by the sudden sub- 
mission of all the western Scindian chiefs. These men, who 
had hitherto held out, were now induced by Fitzgerald's 
vigorous action and the growing influence of the new 
government to submit. One hundred and fifteen came 
down towards Kurrachee with their armed followers — in 
number an army — on the 21st of March, but halted 
within ten miles and sent this laconic message — We are 
come. 

The reply was — Good! but come not with arms or woe 
awaits you ! Down went all the weapons and they entered 
the camp like suppliants. 

Greeted somewhat sternly, they were asked why they 
had not come sooner? "We were too much frightened 
to appear in your presence." 

Of what were you afraid ? — " We do not know, but 
we come now to lay ourselves down at your feet, you are 
our king, we pray for pardon ! " 

Well, chiefs ! Answer this ! Have I done evil to any 
person except in fair fight ? — " No ! you have been mer- 
ciful to all, every one says so." Then why were you 
afraid? — "We do not know, you are our king, pardon 
us and we will guard the country from your enemies." 

I do not want you to guard anything, you saw my 
camel soldiers, I can send as many regiments as there are 
camels. I can defend Scinde, I do not want you to 
defend it, I want you to be good servants to the queen 
my mistress. — "We will be!" — Come then and make 
salaam to her picture. They did so, and were thus 
addressed. There is peace between us. All Scinde 
now belongs to my queen, and we are henceforth fellow- 
subjects; but I am here to do justice, and if after this 
voluntary submission any of you rob or plunder, I will 
march into your country and destroy the offender and his 
tribe. Chiefs ! you all know I won the battles when I had 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



97 



only five thousand men, I have now fifteen thousand, and CHAP. V. 

a hundred thousand more will come at my call ; you will 

believe therefore that this is not an empty threat ; but let 

peace be between us, and I give back to all their jagheers, 

and what they possessed under the ameers." Then they 

all cried out, " You are our king ! what you say is true, 

let it be so ! we are your slaves ! " 

These terms being settled, they were told the troops 
should be shown to them in order of battle. They did 
not like that ; few had ever seen a European, they knew 
nothing of civilized customs, feared it was a design to kill 
them without danger, and their terror, which had been 
very evident throughout the conference, visibly augmented. 
The general observing this conversed familiarly with 
them, and discovering some who had been in the battles 
and knew him again by sight, he bantered them, de- 
manding why they had run away when his cavalry charged 
at Dubba ? ' ' Because we were frightened answered one 
with a quiet simplicity ; and that also was the reason I 
did not come here sooner ; for it is said that you like the 
men who stood and fought better than those who fled — 
and I fled." Another shrewd old chief being told he had 
been close on the rear of the army with ten thousand 
men while Meeanee was being fought, quickly answered 
" No ! I had only eight thousand." Then he named 
the tribes who were in march to join the ameers, showing 
that more than eighty thousand warriors would have 
been assembled if that battle had been delayed; and 
these statements tallied so accurately with the reports 
of the spies at the time as to leave no doubt of their 
correctness. 

This conversation excited merriment with the majority, 
but the general, whose jests and behaviour were all 
calculated, observed several stern-looking men who could 
not be moved to laughter, and who were evidently ready 
for mischief when opportunity offered, bending only to 
circumstances: wherefore, persisting in his design to 
give them a lesson as to what they might expect in war 
by showing them his troops, he drew out two European 

n 



98 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. V. and two sepoy regiments, six guns well horsed, and his 
I84Z own gu^ds of one hundred Scindian cavalry. 

The reluctance of the chiefs to appear at the review 
was not disguised, yet they came to his door on horseback 
at the hour appointed, purposely a late one, and rode to 
the field, where the troops, after marching past, formed line 
and threw out skirmishers. Of this they all seemed to think 
little; but when the line advanced their thoughts changed. 
" That is the way you came on at Dubba," exclaimed a 
brave Lhugaree leader, and the others cried out, u By 
Allah ! it is a wall.— A moving wall. Nothing can with- 
stand that. Oh Padishaw, you are master of the world !" 
A long and well-sustained file fire with a cannonade was 
then opened, and continued until the air was so agitated 
they could not hear each other speak, whereupon the fire 
suddenly ceased and the line charged shouting. These 
two things astonished them most ; they had heard of the 
great rapidity of the British musketry fire, but had not 
believed in it. Soon the artillery sought refuge, as from 
cavalry, and the troops formed squares. It was then 
dusk and the sheets of bright flame covering those small 
masses, with the rapid march of the guns over the rocky 
heights in the vicinity, amazed and delighted them. 
When their exclamations discovered this temper of mind 
they were dismissed with assurance that they had received 
the honours paid to kings in Europe, which pleased them ; 
and the general was satisfied that fear, and content as to 
their future condition, would keep them true, unless events 
very unfavourable to the British supremacy should arise to 
awaken other thoughts. 

Now he felt master of Scinde, as a conqueror and as a 
legislator ; for all these chiefs had submitted voluntarily, 
and his policemen, who had fought several times success- 
fully with the smaller robber bands, had been generally 
aided by the Beloochee villagers. They were also become 
so amenable to discipline, that one of their native officers, 
having robbed by virtue of his office in the eastern 
manner, and flogged a villager, was sent under guard of 
his own men to the place of his offence, was forced to refund 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



99 



the sum taken, had his uniform stripped off, and received CHAP. v. 
in right the number of lashes he had bestowed in wrong. 1844# 
A kardar also of great power and influence, possessing a 
jagheer of fire thousand acres, being detected in public 
frauds and oppression of the poor, lost his jagheer, was 
mulcted in five hundred pounds, and sent to work on the 
roads in chains. These examples spread far and wide. 
" This is justice" exclaimed the people. " When before 
this was it ever known that the officers of the government 
were punished for ill-treating a poor villager ? The 
padishawis great, he is just." 

In April, the sick being reduced from twelve thousand 
to less than nine hundred, the roads and levels for the 
canals, the general surveys, the barracks, and the mole 
making good progress, and the universal goodwill to- 
wards the government being apparent, the organization 
of two battalions of native Beloochee troops was com- 
menced, with a view to lessen the number of regular 
soldiers employed in Scinde. The general knew those 
battalions, although there were amongst them men who 
had fought at Meeanee, would be true against the Seikhs j 
and if an insurrection happened their defection would be 
of little consequence beyond the loss of their arms. Of 
insurrection however, he had so little dread, that he would 
have restored two regiments to the Bombay government, 
being certain, if the Punjaub was settled, he could hold 
Scinde in tranquillity ; but the nations and tribes beyond 
the frontier were all disturbed by the Seikh commotions, 
and some new menacing movements by the Cutchee hill- 
men, and the unreasonable alarm which they created in the 
mind of the officer commanding at Sukkur gave him at 
this time uneasiness. 

General Sale had come to Kurrachee on his way to 
England, and his temporary successor, conjuring up ima- 
ginary enemies, thought and said he should be Cabooled, 
though not more than six thousand warriors could come 
against him from the hills before reinforcements arrived. 
The Cabool massacre had indeed terrified all British India, 
and still haunted weak minds j showing how justly Napo- 

h 2 



100 SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 

CHAP. V. leon assigned the greatest proportion of force in war to 
1844 moral influences. Sir C. Napier as keenly sensible of the 
truth of this maxim as his subordinate was of the Cabool 
influence, sent Brigadier Simpson to take the command 
in Upper Scinde ; and meanwhile, as the spring harvest was 
gathered and the submission of the hundred and fifteen 
western chieftains complete, he resolved to put in execution 
a measure commanded by Lord Ellenborough at the close 
of the preceding year, but which the sickness and other 
events had delayed — namely to issue a summons for all the 
Scindian Beloochee chiefs to meet in Durbar at Hyder- 
abad, and there do homage on her majesty's birthday. 

Such a great ceremony was desirable, as a sign and a 
warning to surrounding tribes and nations that Scinde was 
irrevocably and willingly a British province; but when Lord 
Ellenborough called for it, neither he nor Sir C. Napier ex- 
pected more than two or three thousand Beloochees, chiefs 
and followers, to assemble. Now it was discovered that twenty 
or thirty thousand would appear, and not a Durbar but a 
formidable army, which might in a moment take offence 
and renew the war, was to be dealt with. The affair was 
serious, and recourse was had to policy for rendering it 
harmless ; yet the general was proudly confident it would 
end in a signal rebuke to the detestable factions, which in 
Bombay and in England were then daily announcing that 
force alone prevented a general insurrection. 

He might however have reasonably feared violence at 
such a meeting, for scarcely could a tribe be named which 
had not to deplore the deaths of their bravest warriors 
slain in the battles : one old man had lost his whole tribe, 
none were left but himself ! Yet often he came to see his 
conqueror, received presents from him, and would find 
consolation in speaking of his own calamity, never show- 
ing anger though nearly crazed with grief. Nevertheless 
the presence of many a desperate vengeful Beloochee, 
brainsick at the fall of his race, was to be expected ; and 
as they were all fatalists, careless of life and holding 
assassination to be no crime — some of them also religious 
fanatics — a sudden death-stroke, covered by a tumult and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



101 



followed by a combat, was far from unlikely, even though CHAP. V. 
no previous design of violence had been entertained. 1844. 
For such risks however his mind was always as well 
prepared and braced as it was for open battle ; and the 
unshrinking nerve with which he could sustain the ap- 
proach of seeming mischief had been previously shown in 
the following remarkable manner. 

An Indian sword-player declared at a great public 
festival, that he could cleave a small lime laid on a man's 
palm without injury to the member, and the general 
extended his right hand for the trial. The sword-player, 
awed by his rank, was reluctant and cut the fruit horizon- 
tally. Being urged to fulfil his boast he examined the 
palm, said it was not one to be experimented upon with 
safety, and refused to proceed. The general then extended 
his left hand, which was admitted to be suitable in form ; 
yet the Indian still declined the trial, and when pressed, 
twice waved his thin keen-edged blade as if to strike, and 
twice withheld the blow, declaring he was uncertain of 
success. Finally he was forced to make trial, and the 
lime fell open cleanly divided — the edge of the sword had 
just marked its passage over the skin without drawing a 
drop of blood ! 

But this meeting involved great political interests, and 
other than personal dangers were to be apprehended; 
wherefore, as before observed, recourse was had to adroit 
management. First, under pretence of sparing the chiefs 
a long journey, those of Upper Scinde were required to 
wait on General Simpson at Shikarpoor, by which a part 
of the multitude was thrown off. And at Hyderabad, the 
place of conference was appointed between the Phullaillee 
and the Indus, the western tribes being to assemble on the 
right bank of the latter river, opposite the intrenched camp ; 
the eastern tribes on the right bank of the Phullaillee, and 
consequently on the left bank of the Indus. The steamers 
were to float between the two bodies which therefore 
could not unite, and the concentrated British troops were 
covered from both by the rivers. 

With these precautions the assembling of an unusually 



102 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. V. large British force could be avoided, which was desirable, 
1844. because of the heat, and because insolence might be excited 
by an appearance of fear ; and any show of distrust might 
produce panic, seeing that the Beloochees, arguing from 
their own customs, were not devoid of suspicion that a 
general massacre was designed. There were however to be 
four thousand men and sixteen guns, having the support of 
a fortress and an intrenched camp covered by two rivers, 
on one of which were the armed steamers; and it was 
arranged to call the Beloochees over the river by tribes — 
none to pass either stream until called. It was also pro- 
claimed, that chieftains only should appear at the assembly 
armed. Thus preserving the haughty tone and domi- 
nation of a conqueror, the general calculated that he 
should awe those wild warriors, most of whom only knew 
of him by his battles, while he tested their temper, seeing 
that any violation of this command would have argued a 
readiness for violence. 

The Durbar was appointed for May, and meanwhile, 
taking an escort of sixty irregular horsemen, Sir Charles 
rode to Hyderabad through the Jokea territory without 
attending to frequented routes. He had been strongly 
advised not to do so, heard of strange difficulties, which 
he disregarded, and found as he expected a generally 
fertile district with easy passes over the lower ranges 
of those very hills which had been described to him 
as of terrible asperity. In one of them his attention was 
attracted to the colour and great weight of the stones, 
indicating the presence of iron, and he was afterwards 
informed by a Beloochee chief that iron was there obtained 
and used in the fabrication of arms. 

While at Hyderabad he visited the field of Meeanee, 
where a large tomb was^being raised by the Beloochees 
over the body of Jehan Mohamed, the chief killed in 
single combat by Captain McMurdo. Another was com- 
pleted over the brave swordsman who had assailed himself, 
and was slain by Lieutenant Marston. This tomb was on 
the spot where the man fell. That of Jehan was advanced 
far beyond the line where the British troops fought, as if 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



103 



he had broken through — an indication of military pride CHAP. V. 
not lost upon the legislator : he viewed it as marking a 1844. 
generous love of honour in the Beloochee race which 
could be made available for attaching them to the new 
government. 

Having terminated the business which brought him to 
Hyderabad, he returned to Kurrachee by a different road, 
taking notes of all that might conduce to the future 
welfare of the country ; but while thus engaged he was 
disquieted with news of another incursion made by the 
Bhoogtees, Jackranees and Doomkees, at the instigation 
of the Lion, and executed with unusual ferocity. For it 
was not common with the Beloochees to ill-treat women 
and children in their feudal wars; yet here they had 
destroyed the village of Mean-Ka-Kote, killed forty 
people, and cut off the hands of children to get at 
their bracelets ! This ferocity, and the dreadful misery of 
the frontier inhabitants exposed to such inroads, made 
him resolve, if gentler means failed, to compel those tribes 
to become quiet neighbours, either by stimulating other 
tribes to hostility against them, or by subduing them 
with regular warfare, and sweeping them from their hills. 
By the first he hoped to make them settle further from 
the frontier, and to that he was most inclined, foreseeing 
all the difficulties of the second ; one or other was how- 
ever imperative ; for the mischief was become intolerable 
in itself and pregnant with future evils. Already Cutch 
Gundava had been rendered desolate, and the Scindian 
frontier was nearly as miserable ; few villages were left 
standing; and scarcely any cultivators were to be found 
between Shikarpoore, and Poolagee the stronghold of 
Beja the Dhoomkee who had made this inroad: with 
exception of a few idle men in league with the robbers, 
the whole population was preparing to emigrate. 

Beja Khan, celebrated for his strength, courage and 
enterprise, was embued with an inveterate hatred of the 
English, having been, as he asserted, perfidiously entrapped 
during the Affghan war by Captain Postans, a sub-political 
agent. His wrongs however could not be considered at 



104 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. V. this time, because he had, after his liberation, made a 
1844, treaty with the British ; and though a subject of Khelat, 
which was in alliance., had now ravaged a part of Scinde. 
The khan of Khelat himself had received a considerable 
sum of money from Sir C. Napier and was inclined to hold 
faith ; but he was a boy, unable to control his Durbar, 
and being menaced and interfered with by the chiefs of 
Candahar was thus openly disobeyed by Beja Khan, who 
was also secretly encouraged by the Khelat sirdars. 

This state of affairs was very disquieting. The Scinde 
frontier was being depopulated, the governor's reputation 
must sink in the opinion of the surrounding people if he 
did not avenge the injury, and military negligence had 
certainly caused the disaster. The irregular cavalry 
disposed along the frontier were sufficient to have pre- 
vented the foray, or at least met and punished the robbers, 
and some signal chastisement was therefore called for; 
but as the hot season was rapidly advancing, to take the 
field then would cost the lives of many soldiers. The 
raging sun had been indeed braved the year before to 
break up the Lion's power and effect the sudden conquest 
of Scinde — those objects being sufficiently great to justify 
the measure — but the punishment of these robber tribes 
was not commensurate with the risk, and therefore action 
was reluctantly suspended until the cool weather. 

The hope of civilizing those wild people by gentle 
means, grafted upon a vigorous repression of their lawless 
proceedings, was however still entertained; and in that 
view it was designed to inform them that past transgres- 
sions would be pardoned if they ceased from further 
offence ; if not, their country would be devastated ; but 
previous to sending this message, an untoward event 
intervened to give a new aspect and greater importance to 
their warfare. It happened thus. Sir C. Napier had been 
importuned to allow of an attempt to surprise Beja in his 
town of Poolagee, because Fitzgerald of the camel corps, 
who had formerly resided there, thought his knowledge of 
the place would enable him to take the chief in his bed. 
Such a stroke would have been very conducive to the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



105 



general's views and lie consented. He had not been told CHAP. V. 
Poolagee was a walled place or lie would have refused 1844> 
altogether ; but he knew a watchful barbarian like Beja 
was not to be taken by a careless operation, and that 
failure would be hurtful in a political view and dangerous 
to the troops employed; wherefore he enjoined absolute 
secrecy as to the enterprise, and ordered the following 
dispositions to be observed. 

The camel corps was to make a forced march of sixty 
miles to reach Poolagee; the irregular cavalry was to 
follow in support, and be in turn supported by infantry 
with guns; moreover, not liking to trust the operation 
entirely to the sanguine young man who had proposed it, 
nor the superintendence of it to the officers in temporary 
command at Sukkur and Shikarpoor, he desired that 
nothing should be attempted until General Simpson, then 
on his way to assume the chief command in Upper Scinde 
and well instructed as to this particular enterprise, should 
arrive. With these precautions he thought no serious 
mischief could happen. But war is never without its 
crosses from time, circumstances, and persons ; Simpson 
was not waited for, secrecy was not observed, and the 
system of supports was entirely neglected. 

Five hundred horsemen under Captain Tait, and two 
hundred of the camel corps under Fitzgerald, marched 
across the desert, lost their way, and arrived at eight 
o'clock in the morning, exhausted with fatigue, before a 
fortress, defended by a good garrison of several hundred 
matchlock-men under Beja, who had obtained accurate 
knowledge of the design. Fitzgerald with impetuous 
resolution led his men against the gate, designing to blow 
it open with a sack of powder; carried by the same 
sergeant who had effected that exploit at Ghuznee in 
Lord Keane's Affghan campaign; but the Bhooghtees 
killed the gallant sergeant with nine other soldiers, and 
wounded twenty-one. How Fitzgerald escaped death none 
could say, for striding in his gigantic strength at the head 
of the stormers he was distinguished alike by his size and 
daring, and well known of person to numbers of the 



106 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. V. matchlock-men on the walls, yet he returned without a 
1844 wound ! Irritated by his repulse, and naturally vehement 
he would have renewed the attack, but Captain Tait 
ordered a retreat. This was made with difficulty and 
could not have been effected at all, if water had not been 
found at an abandoned post in the desert called Chuttar, 
fortunately overlooked by the enemy when filling up the 
other wells to impede the march. From Chuttar the 
retreat was continued to Kanghur, the nearest Scindian 
post, by an uninterrupted march of seventy-five miles 
under a burning sun, which was sustained with noble 
energy. Only one exhausted soldier fell during the 
movement, and a few moments after a Jackranee came up 
and cut him to pieces ; but vengeance soon followed ; the 
same Jackranee having tried to spy in a village, was seized 
and delivered up by the villagers, and being a noted 
ruffian was immediately hanged. 

Great had been the firmness of the sepoys in this affair, 
and the two young officers who had acted so rashly fell 
sick with chagrin; but the intrepidity displayed at the attack 
and the hardihood of the retreat, were so conspicuous, the 
general smothered his vexation — which was yet so great 
as to bring on fever — rather than augment their mortifi- 
cation. He was at first inclined to go to Sukkur, but was 
withheld by a motive that had actuated him from the 
time he won his first battle, offering an illustration of 
the subtle combinations of moral and material power by 
which he effected such great actions. Once placed in the 
commanding position of a conqueror he had resolved never 
to appear where he could not strike heavily, lest the fear 
of his prowess should abate. After the battle of Dubba, 
thinking Omercote would resist and he should not have 
time to besiege it, he would not go there in person ; and 
now he would not approach the scene of this disaster 
until the season should permit him to take the field in a 
formidable manner. 

While revolving in his mind a remedy for the political 
mischief this failure jnight produce, another proof of the 
entire ascendancy he had obtained over the Beloochee 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



107 



race was furnished by the two powerful chieftains of the CHAP. V. 
Chandikas and Mugzees — the first a Scindian, the last a \^ 
Khelat tribe. Hearing of the defeat at Poolagee, they 
proffered their swords to war against Beja and against 
their old master the Lion. Wullee the leader of the 
Chandians, whose vow of fidelity has been recorded, was 
foremost on this occasion to offer his services, and they 
were gladly accepted, as certain to occupy the attention of 
the robber tribes during the hot weather ; at the termi- 
nation of which more formidable combinations could be 
made. Nor was the brave old Chandian slack to fulfil 
his promises. Before the 15th of May he killed above 
forty of the Jackranees and sent in more than five hun- 
dred head of their cattle. 

Beja's foray — instigated by the Lion and for his 
behoof — furnished another proof that the ameers had 
no hold over the minds of their former feudatories. No 
man assumed arms in their favour ; not a sound of 
sedition was heard ; and two of the most powerful tribes 
had, as just shown, voluntarily taken arms to punish the 
predatory invaders. The fame of the exploit, magnified 
by Beja himself, spread however, far into Asia; he was 
looked to as a chieftain capable of defeating the Fering- 
hees, and thus obtained a swollen reputation and immense 
influence ; but for the ameers no man would fight, none 
desired their return. Yet this time was chosen by the 
Bombay faction to proclaim that the submission of the 
people was that which the lamb paid to the wolf, and 
that they only watched an opportunity for insurrection ! 

The condition of Scinde was at this period very happy 
in all things save the killing of women in families, and 
these predatory excursions ; but Sir C. Napier's determi- 
nation to free the country from both those evils was thus 
expressed. — "1 have declared that women shall not be 
foully murdered, and that merchants shall travel in safety. 
I have hanged twelve men to repress the first crime and 
I will hang twelve hundred if necessary. For the robbers, 
if they will not be quiet and give hostages for their good 
behaviour, I will with an army, lay their country waste. 



108 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. V. They come with fire and sword into our territory ; they 
1844. shall be visited with fire and sword in return ; and I will 
undertake that without compunction, because I can save 
their women and children although they have not re- 
spected ours." There was however another subject of 
disquietude thus described. 

ce Seikhs and Mooltanees have certainly glided through 
the hills with a view to depredations — a strong indication 
of what the Punjaub army, which is now gathered on the 
right of the Sutlej will do. The lawless state of that 
army must bring on a war. It is impossible that the 
Indian government can permit seventy thousand armed 
ruffians to hang on her frontier, ready at any moment — 
without war proclaimed — to rush across the river and 
ravage our north-western provinces ; nor can the govern- 
ment afford the expense and vexation of keeping up there 
and in Scinde strong armies of observation. The frontiers 
of Mooltan and Scinde touch, and for my part I will not 
suffer the kick of a fly from Sawan Mull. He professes 
friendship and he shall keep faith or take the conse- 
quences. Yet I pray that he may not provoke me, that 
no war may break out, I want to see no more; it is 
fearful work in its best form, and revolting to me. I 
hate it, though humanity will certainly gain by a Punjaub 
conquest as it has done by the Scindian one. What 
I rejoice to look at is the zeal with which our young 
officers, my soldier-civilians, work, in defiance of the sun 
and of fever and the debilitating influence of climate, to 
do good and dispense justice to the people ; and I believe 
the latter are sensible of their merits and grateful, for 
everywhere we meet with civility and all the appearance 
of goodwill." 

The time for holding the great Durbar having now 
arrived, Sir C. Napier repaired to Hyderabad, travelling 
under a sun which was beginning to shoot its fiercest 
rays. The fortress was restricted in size for holding the 
conference, and danger was to be dreaded if it was filled 
with fighting men while an army of Beloochees was with- 
out ; but the necessity of having shade for all overruled 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



109 



this objection, and the chiefs were admitted inside with CHAP. V. 
their followers, under the regulation before mentioned. 1844< 
Amongst them were a thousand jagheerdars, who, from 
fear and distrust, had never before submitted, but now 
made their salaams and received pardon. It was a spec- 
tacle of great magnificence and still greater interest. 
Nearly twenty thousand Beloochees, horsemen and foot- 
men, in their bright tinted habiliments, crowded the banks 
of the two rivers, on one of which floated the armed 
steamers. Under that brilliant sky the many-coloured 
multitudes, bearing the flags and streamers of their tribes, 
were seen lining the banks of the rivers, while tribe after 
tribe passed amidst discordant shouting and the thundering 
of guns in salute. All were obedient to the order about 
arms, and all hastened to proffer their entire submission 
to the man who had, within a few miles of that place, only 
fourteen months before covered the ground with their 
slaughtered kinsmen. 

lie received them day after day, he walked amongst 
them, he was closely surrounded by hundreds; yet no 
man thought of revenge, none proffered a word of anger — 
the battles had been fairly fought, the blows manfully 
exchanged, and all remembrance of the hurt was merged 
in a feeling of gratitude to the conqueror who had so 
promptly stayed the terror of the sword and substituted 
for it a beneficent legislation. The speeches of the chiefs, 
filled with eastern compliments, were only accepted as 
sincere when corroborated by their actions; yet there 
were feelings exhibited which could not be mistaken. 
One very old man endeavouring to force a way to the 
general was pushed back; but he struggled and cried 
with a loud voice I will not be put back I have come 
two hundred miles to see him and I will do so — let me 
pass. 

During the three days of the ceremony a hot wind 
from the desert struck fourteen European soldiers of the 
86th dead, and the regiment afterwards became very 
sickly for a time. It was a grievous calamity, and the 
Bombay faction did not fail to raise a cry of murder; 



110 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. v. saying the deaths arose from exposing the troops to 
1844> protect Sir C. Napier; but it so happened, the greatest 
number of men stricken were not in any manner con- 
nected with the guard of honour, which was by these 
malignant persons called a guard of safety — though it 
was never near his person — because their hope that his 
career would have been ended by an assassin's knife was 
disappointed. Accident and the governor-generars orders 
had forced him to hold this great meeting in the heat, as 
the necessity of putting down the Lion had compelled him 
the year before to take the field at the same season — and 
these things he did, " because without them results which 
appeared to the unthinking as easily arrived at could 
not have been attained ; but they are vital experiments." 
The cry of blood raised by the Bombay faction was 
however only an ebullition of rage at seeing its vile 
prognostications so signally falsified. 

At this memorable Durbar was arranged that most 
delicate and difficult portion of the basis of all government, 
— the tenure of landed property. Under the ameers it 
had been variable and insecure. The jagheers, some of 
which were sixty square miles, had been always granted 
on military service tenure; but the jagheerdars were only 
tenants at will, and that will very capricious, the whole 
system going to foster a community of legalized robbers. 
Sir C. Napier had before substituted mattock and spade for 
the service of shield and sword, the jagheerdar being 
bound to produce labourers for public works instead of 
warriors for public mischief. Now he restored to the sons 
of all jagheerdars who had fallen in battle against him 
their fathers' lands ; and to them and all others he gave 
the choice of paying rent instead of holding their land on 
the service tenure. 

This rent was not based on the value of the jagheer — 
that would have been resisted sword in hand, because the 
lands had been received as gifts of fortune and favour, not 
as estates nicely balanced as to labour and value. It was 
calculated on the expense of the military service which had 
been attached to it ; and if a jagheerdar said he was unable 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



Ill 



to pay the rent, he was offered the land for a life purchase, CHAP. v. 
and even longer, on condition that so much of the jagheer 1344. 
as would, if let to ryots, pay the rent demanded, should be 
withheld by the government. This gave a secure tenure 
of the remainder for life ; but when those shrewd men 
were told the monthly expense of the retainers they were 
bound to produce would be the basis of calculation for 
rent, they answered, that when called out in war they had 
the chance of booty and the general could not go to war 
every month ! No ! nor every year, was the reply; and 
therefore, if the expense be eighty rupees, for example, the 
government calls upon you, not for that sum monthly, 
but for half of it yearly. 

Satisfactory to many was this arrangement, and the 
portion of land resigned was let to ryots upon terms, to be 
hereafter mentioned, which soon furnished the whole rent 
originally demanded, and widely extended cultivation. 
Thus, with great policy and imperceptibly to them, the 
greater jagheer dars were made proprietors, and the smaller 
ones yeomen, interested in the welfare of the land, instead 
of being savage warriors, prowling robbers and seditious 
subjects, always ready to excite commotions for the sake 
of spoil. Sir Charles Napier knew time only could con- 
solidate such a project; but government lost nothing 
save military service which it did not want ; and meanwhile 
the jagheerdars, having a secure tenure and no hope from 
commotion, acquired an interest in the welfare of their 
ryots. He expected also that the successful industry of 
the cultivators settled on the government lands, would 
stimulate the hitherto predatory Beloochee to seek profit 
from agriculture — and the readiness with which many 
jagheerdars accepted the terms, the evident disposition of 
the poorer Beloochees to traffic, and the eagerness of the 
ryots to obtain government grants, led him to think a 
generation might suffice to change the character of the 
population, and render Scinde one of the richest and most 
industrious of the East. To forward this he contemplated 
a cautious system of resuming jagheers where there was 
default, designing to parcel them out in such proportions 



112 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. V. as would raise the cultivators to the condition of substantial 
!844. farmers, and thus gradually reduce the territorial power 
of the great chiefs and sirdars. And from all jagheers he 
took away their royalties ; that is to say, the right which 
they conferred of life and death and unrestrained taxa- 
tion. 

Having thus commenced his system of rent with the 
consent of many jagheerdars, for he forced it on none, he 
was indifferent as to regular payments for a few years, his 
object being, not revenue but civilization; and he foresaw 
that a comparison of the holdings on the different tenures 
would be entirely favourable to those who accepted his 
terms. For on one side would be a tenant for life secured 
by law in his rights ; on the other a tenant at the will of 
government, and in many instances at higher cost, 
because bound to provide labourers for public works, 
which the other was exempted from by paying rent. This 
comparison he expected to do the work of legislation, and 
produce a landed aristocracy interested to maintain ^)rder; 
whereas, if the ameers' system had been preserved, the 
great feudal chiefs would have paid nothing to the state, 
would have remained powerful in arms, and compelled the 
government to maintain a large force to control them, 
instead of ruling through them with the aid of a few 
hundred policemen. 

These and other great administrative measures, embodied 
in official reports, being laid before Sir Robert Peel, caused 
him to express astonishment at the comprehensive views 
of government therein disclosed. "No one" he said, 
" ever doubted Sir C. Napier 3 s military powers, but in his 
other character he does surprise me — he is possessed of 
extraordinary talent for civil administration." Now it 
cannot be supposed that Sir Robert Peel's astonishment 
sprung from the vulgar contracted English notion of 
military men's intellects ; he must have known that a 
consummate captain cannot have a narrow genius, and 
that service in every part of the globe must have furnished 
such a person with opportunities for observing different 
forms of government — hence his opinion thus emphatically 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



113 



expressed, must be taken as an assurance that lie thought CHAP. V. 
Sir C. Napier's system superior to the general plan of 1844> 
ruling in India, for to that, as Sir Robert Peel well knew, 
it was entirely opposed. "With civil servants as as- 
sistants," said the general, " Scinde would have been 
thrown into complete confusion, and the expense of pro- 
ducing that confusion would have been immense." 

Most of the Scinde administrative measures were 
adopted without reference to Calcutta, because of the 
distance, and the Scindian sun, which left little time for 
action ; but always they were supported by Lord Ellen- 
borough ; and if half the year was denied to activity by the 
raging heat, oppressive correspondence and all fear of 
responsibility was spared to the anxious administrator 
by this confidence from a man who only knew him by his 
exploits. It was not so with the minor authorities, on 
whom, having the troops of two presidencies under his 
command, he was in a great measure dependent; the 
secret enmity of those meddling subordinates was always 
disquieting, and at one time drove him to declare that 
he would not be responsible for the discipline of his troops. 
These vexations were increased by a vicious habit with 
courts-martial, of misplaced leniency towards officers — a 
habit which, as commander-in-chief, Sir C. Napier after- 
wards endeavoured to reform ; but at this period it was in 
such mischievous activity that two surgeons guilty of 
constant inebriety while engaged in the hospital duties, 
were suffered to remain in the service, a source of misery, 
terror and death to the sick soldiers ! 

And now happened an event surprising to all persons 
but the man affected by it, an event which rendered 
Sir C. Napier's after career one of incessant thankless 
labour without adequate freedom of action. Lord Ellen- 
borough was suddenly recalled. Not unexpectedly to 
himself, because he knew his government had aroused all 
the fears and hatred of the jobbing Indian multitude, and 
all the fierce nepotism of the directors ; but to reflecting 
men, it did appear foul and strange, that he who repaired 
the terrible disaster of Cabool should be contemptuously 

i 



114 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. V. recalled by those whose empire he had preserved ; that 
1844, England and India should be deprived of an able 
governor, at a terrible crisis which nearly proved fatal, to 
gratify the spleen of men incapable of patriotism and 
senseless in their anger. Sir C. Napier felt for the welfare 
of his country too much to be silent on that occasion, and 
the following expression of his indignation, addressed to 
Lord Bipon, prophetic as it was just, may partly account 
for the unmitigated hatred of those whose conduct he 
thus denounced. 

" Lord EHenborough has opposed peculation, but folly 
and dishonesty have defeated ability and honesty, which 
being in the usual course of human events does not 
surprise me. It seems that the ' suaviter in modo 3 with a 
Cabool massacre, is preferred to the c fortiter in re' with 
victory. To expend millions in producing bloodshed is 
preferable in the eyes of the Court of Directors, to saving 
India and the prevention of bloodshed. Lord Ellen- 
borough's measures were taken with large views of general 
policy, and were all connected in one great plan for the 
stability of our power in India. They were not mere 
expedients to meet isolated cases. The victory of Maha- 
rajapoor consolidated the conquest of Scinde, and the 
conquest of Scinde was essential to the defence of the 
north-western provinces of India and the line of the 
Hyphasis. The whole has been one grand movement to 
crush an incipient but widely extended secret coalition — 
the child of the Affghan defeats — which would have put, 
probably will still put our Indian empire in peril. 

" This great defensive operation, hitherto successful in 
the hands of Lord EHenborough, has not yet been termi- 
nated ; nor can it be while the Seikh army remains without 
control ; for I fear that powerful force by no means parti- 
cipates in the horror of war which appears to be enter- 
tained, very properly, by the Court of Directors and 
Lord Howick. Yet there is a time for all things said the 
wisest of men, and I cannot think the time for changing a 
governor-general is when in presence of seventy thousand 
armed Punjaubees. I indeed believe that possession of 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



115 



the Punjaub is not desirable for the Company ; the CHAP. V. 
Hyphasis forms a better frontier-line for our Indian 18 44. 
territory than the line of the Upper Indus, and is more 
compact now that we have Scinde : we have enough of 
territory — more than enough ! Nevertheless this country 
of the Punjaub must be ours : all India proclaims that 
truth by acclamation. If not taken, the ravaging of 
our finest provinces can only be prevented by a large 
standing army in observation on the Hyphasis, with the 
example before its eyes of the Seikh army profiting by 
successful mutiny ! That Seikh army is also recruited 
with our own discharged men, who are in correspondence 
with our soldiers; for since we have abolished flogging 
every crime is punished with dismissal from the Com- 
pany's service — none other is now permitted- — and thus 
we are daily recruiting the Seikh army with our well- 
drilled soldiers; for the men we discharge for trifling 
offences go in great numbers to join the Punjaubees. 
This I do not think sagacious on our part. The question 
therefore is no longer, whether or not we shall increase 
our territory, but whether we shall hold our present position 
in India, or run the risk of being beaten to the sea. 
' Aut Ccesar aut nullus ' applies emphatically to our present 
power in India. 

"To destroy the Seikh army will not I believe be so 
easy as people seem to imagine ; and if we are beaten back 
across the Hyphasis, as we were by the AfFghans across 
the Indus, the danger to India will be very great ; and it 
will, as far as I am able to judge, show that policy to be erro- 
neous which leaves native princes on their thrones within 
our territory, or rather within our frontier. This policy 
was I suppose formerly found useful and safe ; but it is 
now replete with danger when our great extent of dominion 
compels us to scatter our forces. To return to Scinde. 
Some of the Punjaubees from Mooltan may insult our 
northern frontier, a portion of which borders on the land 
of Sawan Mull. If so I am determined to resent it, and 
I hope for the support of the supreme government, because 
every insult we put up with is certain to shake the alle- 

1 2 



116 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. V. giance of the Beloochees in Scinde. I know that I am 
1844. accused of wishing for war — that is false ! I have seen 
too much of it. I detest it upon principle as a Christian, 
and from feeling as a man. I am too old also for the 
fatigues of war, especially where the heat is so exhausting. 
My wish is to rest. Yet I will not suffer her majesty's 
arms and the Company's arms to be insulted, and patiently 
wait while the enemy gathers his hordes to attack me. I 
take, and I will take all possible military precautions, not 
because I love war, but that I do not love to have our 
throats cut. A procrastinating diplomacy is the game of 
the barbarians, and whoever is blinded by it will be 
defeated. 

" In the Murree and Bhoogtee hills the predatory tribes 
are now fostering the ex- ameer, Shere Mohamed, with a 
view to hostilities in Scinde, and if they be not crushed 
when the season opens mischief will ensue. We cannot 
in the heat do anything ; but I must attack them in winter 
if I can, though I well know it is a thing difficult to 
accomplish. It has indeed occurred to me to take them 
into our pay as the more humane course, but I fear the 
supreme government will not consent to the expense : one 
or other course must however be pursued, or a very large 
force must be constantly maintained at Shikarpoore. An 
attack on those people may possibly hasten a war in the 
Punjaub; but I am daily more disquieted about our 
Scindian frontier ; I do not clearly see how far this border 
warfare will go, and I well know it is the most difficult and 
dangerous to conduct that can possibly be. All within 
Scinde is tranquil/' 

When Lord Ellenborough was thus recalled, by an act of 
arrogant power so indefensible as to force from the duke 
of Wellington the only passionate censure he was ever 
known to use with respect to public affairs, the oligarchs 
who perpetrated the wrong, proceeded consistently, but 
shamefully and ungratefully, in India and in England, to 
assail the general whose victories and administrative talents 
consolidated that policy by which the recalled nobleman 
had re-established their tottering empire. Foully they 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



117 



assailed liim through every channel that corruption and CHAP. V. 

baseness could penetrate ; that is to say as a corporation ; 1844> 

for amongst the directors of the time were men too 

honourable to engage in such passages; but as a body 

they did encourage expectant parasites to assail Sir 

C. Napier with such vituperation as only parasites are 

capable of : nor did they confine this enmity, as shall be 

shown, to revilings and falsehoods. There is however a 

time for baseness and a time for virtue to triumph — there 

is also a time for retribution — and it came. Bending in 

confessed fear and degradation, these trafficking oligarchs 

were afterwards forced by the imperious voice of the 

nation, to beseech the commander they had so evilly 

treated, to accept of higher power and succour them in 

their distress ! God is just ! 



118 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S 



CHAPTER VI. 

CHAP. VI. Untoward as the Poolagee disaster had been, the extra- 
ordinary marches made by the troops, unheard of before 
in that season of heat, gave the hill tribes an uneasy sense 
that where such men were to be encountered, or evaded, 
there would be little safety for future incursions. Nor 
was Wullee Chandia's enmity a matter of small moment 
for them. His power was considerable, he was crafty in 
their own method of warfare, he had a blood-feud with 
the Doomkees which rendered him inveterate, and from 
his stronghold, thirty miles west of Larkaana, he could 
launch several thousand warriors against their hills, where 
the Murrees were his allies. He had before the Poolagee 
expedition done so much, that at the great Durbar the 
general publicly gave him a sword of honour, girding it on 
himself in presence of the assembled chiefs and sirdars. 
Wullee in return promised to press heavily on Beja, 
which he could with less fear attempt, because he had the 
British posts as well as his own fortress to fall back on. 

The spies now asserted that the tribes, elated by the 
defeat of the English, were assembling in great numbers 
around Poolagee, with design to bring the Lion into 
Scinde ; but the general was not deceived ; for though he 
knew they had schemes of that nature, he judged this 
congregation to be defensive, because they were poisoning 
the wells in the desert, and the Murrees were at feud 
with and actually fighting the Bhoogtees and Doomkees. 
The villagers also, encouraged by the avowed resolution to 
repress the robbers were beginning to defend themselves 
against small bands, and had even made several prisoners. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



119 



Meanwhile a native officer in Ali Moorad's service CHAP. VI. 
arrested five Boordee chiefs who though subjects of that 1844> 
ameer had plundered some Scindians near the Indus — 
these Boordees being indeed as lawless as any of the 
hillmen. Thus far all was satisfactory. But notwith- 
standing these many favourable circumstances unceasing 
vigilance was necessary; for the Lion was hovering in 
the hills, on the side of Shikarpoore, with a strong body 
of horsemen, and Ali Moorad though he dismissed his 
Patans as a proof of his fidelity to the alliance, re- 
ceived and entertained with honour four of the exiled 
Talpoorees, his nephews and cousins, while the great 
Durbar was being held ; and they, thinking Sir C. Napier, 
then in the midst of twenty thousand Beloochees, would 
be embarrassed to refuse their demands, had the temerity 
to claim the restoration of their possessions and the 
right of residing in Scinde. They were undeceived by 
a peremptory order sent to Ali for their arrest ; but 
afterwards, all the Talpoor princes still at large, the Lion 
excepted, were received and suffered by the supreme 
government to remain at Ali Moorad's court, causing 
constant embarrassment. 

Affairs remained in this state until June, when two 
painful and important events occurred, namely, a suc- 
cessful incursion of the Jackranees and Doomkees, and a 
mutiny of sepoys at Shikarpoore, both resulting from mis- 
management and attended with deplorable circumstances. 
The mutiny was thus caused. Several Bengal regiments 
being ordered from the north-western provinces of India 
to occupy Upper Scinde, refused to go there without 
higher allowances, but after some trouble and the dis- 
banding of one corps, marched, the 64th regiment setting 
the example, for which it was imprudently praised and in 
some degree rewarded. Finding Sukkur and Shikarpoore 
better quarters than they had expected, these regiments 
were quiet for a time, but the 64th, having been as they 
said, and truly said, promised the higher allowances before 
they marched by their Colonel Mosely, refused the lower 
rate at Shikarpoore, and again broke into mutiny. 



120 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S 



CHAP. VI. Had this happened when the nations around were 
lg44 combining, and the old troops down from pestilence; or 
even later when Sale's departure left the temporary 
command to a man who feared to be " Cabooled," the 
result might have been fatal. The actual danger was very 
great ; for the other Bengal regiments were said to be only 
withheld from joining the 64th by anger because it had 
broken the bond of the first mutiny — a slender thread of 
fidelity which must soon have snapped when it became 
known that the 64th had been deceived. An undecided 
officer in command would have been lost ; but fortunately 
Brigadier- General Hunter, a Company's officer sent by 
Lord Ellenborough to succeed Sale, was then at Sukkur 
— a man of an intrepid temper. He ordered the regiment 
down to Sukkur, thinking to quell the mutiny by personal 
remonstrances ; but he was assailed by missiles, and finding 
the men in that mood brought out the whole garrison of 
Sukkur, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, disarmed 
the rest without spilling blood, and compelled the regi- 
ment to cross to the left of the Indus, there to await 
orders. 

Colonel Moseley was afterwards tried and dismissed 
the service, but meanwhile, twenty ringleaders being con- 
demned to death, six were executed ; yet the regiment 
was still insubordinate, and Sir C. Napier taking away 
its colours, ordered all men of a second degree of guilt 
to be discharged, with an intimation that one step further 
in mutiny would cause the discharge of the whole. He 
had no other means of making an example, but he dis- 
charged the men reluctantly, thinking the system impolitic 
and pushed to an unjust extent in the India army. — u The 
sepoy," he said, " formerly looked to his regiment as a 
home ; but if he is to be discharged after long service, 
for trifling offences, perhaps on the complaint of some 
passionate young subaltern as the custom is, he can- 
not retain that feeling of attachment to his corps 
which gives the government such moral power over the 
army." 

General Hunter was unjustly treated on this occasion. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE, 



121 



His services were indeed finally acknowledged, but he was CHAP. VI. 
at first reprimanded when he should have been com- 1844> 
mended without stint, having done much and done it 
well, and in good time, as the following summary will 
prove. The Lion and Ahmed Khan Lugharee were, during 
the mutiny, not far from Shikarpoore with a body of 
horsemen from the Cutchee hills, and fifteen Talpooree 
princes were then in Ali Moorad's court, distant but a day's 
march; some of these had been very forward in com- 
mencing the war which ended in the conquest, and all 
were ready to fight again if opportunity offered — there 
were large magazines at Sukkur and Shikarpoore, and a 
considerable treasure at the former place, where all the 
European ofhcers were, with their wives and children, at 
the mercy of the mutineers : for all the men of the 13th, 
the only European regiment there, were then down with 
the sickness and could not have resisted five or six native 
regiments in rebellion. The artillery and stores would have 
been seized at Shikarpoore, and that place sacked and the 
Europeans murdered ; the hill robbers would then have 
come to share in the plunder, and with the insurgent troops 
would have afterwards assaulted Sukkur. Treasure, guns, 
stores, lives, all would have been lost, the ameers 5 standard 
would have been again hoisted, and Ah Moorad compelled 
to join it ! This terrible train of mischief was cut off by 
the vigour of General Hunter, and in return he was 
reprimanded ! 

Sir C. Napier attributed this ill usage partly to secret 
enmity against Lord Ellenborough, who had appointed 
General Hunter; partly to a jealousy about Bengal troops 
which affected some military functionaries, who seemed 
anxious to make the commander-in-chief a grand Lama 
only to be known through his permanent staff. Sir Hugh 
Gough was always upright, honourable, frank and generous- 
minded, without guile or intrigue; but a bad system 
enabled the Adjutant-general Lumley and the Judge- 
advocate-general Birch to press General Hunter, and they 
did so until the governor-general, Sir Henry Hardinge, to 
whom Sir C. Napier appealed, corrected the error. Mean- 



122 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. vi. while the opportunity for slander was not overlooked by 
1844. the Bombay libellers. Lauding Hunter's conduct, as 
indeed it deserved, they represented Sir C. Napier, who 
was then straining every nerve to defend that officer, as 
striving to ruin him and being stopped in that dishonour- 
able course by superior authority ! 

Nearly coincident with the mutiny happened the other 
disastrous event. 

Captain McKenzie of the 6th irregular cavalry having 
allowed a detachment of grass-cutters, and an escort 
under a native officer to forage eleven miles from 
Khangur, their careless attitude induced a roving band 
of robbers led by Beja Khan to surprise them. The grass- 
cutters and many of the escort were slain, more than two 
hundred in all, and fifty of the horsemen who escaped 
were wounded. McKenzie hearing of the event pursued 
the hill-men in vain, and after an exhausting march 
returned without having seen an enemy. The general 
expressed his discontent in a public order, and the more 
strongly because McKenzie was connected with him by 
marriage. " The detachment/ 5 he said, " should not have 
been sent to such a distance, when an enemy was near, 
without strong support and under good arrangements. 
No officer should quit his saddle day or night while a 
detachment was out of the cantonment ; the commander of 
such an outpost should be always on horseback, sword in 
hand — he should eat drink and sleep in the saddle — no 
outpost officer had a right to comfort or rest until all 
was safe ; and that could never be in the presence of such 
an active enemy as mountain robbers were in every 
country where they existed. It was useless for officers 
to gallop their troops over a country after mischief had 
been done — that only harassed men and horses, and 
was a mark of inexperience — it was to play with the 
enemy/ 5 

This action was magnified by the tribes into a victory 
over the British, the fame of it spread to Candahar and 
even to Cabool, and every encouragement proper to 
increase the pride and hopes of the robbers was given by 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



123 



the Bombay faction through their newspaper organs. CHAP. VI. 
Then the insolence of Beja and his confederates became 
unbounded, their inroads more frequent, and the troops 
were fearfully harassed, yet unable to give that protection 
which the distressed and harried people cried for with 
piteous accents. McKenzie asked for inquiry, but it was 
refused, and like a gallant gentleman, he sought and 
found another and a better mode of sustaining his reputa- 
tion. Keeping incessantly on the watch, after one failure 
from the heat in an attempt to surprise a hill-fort in July, 
he got notice in August that five hundred hill men, horse 
and foot, were only sixteen miles from Shikarpoore. With 
a forced march of nearly forty miles he got between them 
and their own country, and cut to pieces all their infantry, 
but then cavalry escaped dining the fight. Two hundred 
robbers fell, and then was brought out in full relief, the 
slanderous enmity and falseness of the Bombay faction : for 
when the reproachful order upon the first disastrous affair 
appeared, the hired libellers, thinking to find in McKenzie 
a coadjutor, pestered the public with denunciations of the 
tjTannical and brutal treatment he had experienced from 
his general ; but when he had thus honourably amended 
his error, they accused him of having attacked and mur- 
dered, in revenge of his former failure, a set of innocent 
villagers, calling them robbers ! 

But Sir C. Napier had an exact inquiry made, and it 
appeared, that if any villagers were amongst the slain they 
were Boordikas, Ali Moorad's subjects, who had joined 
the robbers and fallen in their ranks with like weapons 
and dresses. They could not have been distinguished, and 
there was no need to distinguish them from their com- 
panions, being like them robbers, with the additional 
offence of acting against the orders of their prince. The 
truth was, the disaster of the grass-cutters, following on 
the defeat at Poolagee, had so elated the tribes they 
thought the hour for destroying the English was come, 
and this inroad was made with a view to plunder Ali 
Moorad's territory previous to a general outbreak. Their 
hopes were known, and some Boordikas having joined with 



124 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VI. arms to partake of the spoil, fell, fighting valiantly, for in 
1844# that country all of the Beloochee races are brave. Their 
destruction had a great effect. The tribes suspended their 
inroads, and the ill-affected villagers, previously surly and 
disobliging, came to fair observances, aiding the grass- 
cutters to find forage for the cavalry. Meanwhile the 
Bhoogtees and Murrees, always at feud, had another battle, 
and the latter being worsted called upon their friends the 
Chandikas for help, but when the chief Wullee answered 
this call he also was defeated. The general then offered 
to divide the land of the Bhoogtees, Jackranees and 
Doomkees, between the Chandikas and Murrees, if they 
would drive those bad tribes away from the frontier 
altogether, thinking thus to war down the robbers 
by their own kindred. The effect of this offer shall be 
shown hereafter, and as no other military actions occurred 
at that time, the progress of the civil administration claims 
attention. 

In the judicial branch, the diligence of the functionaries, 
and their efforts to dispense even-handed justice had 
produced general content, and emboldened the people in 
the assertion of their rights. The women also loudly 
proclaimed their approval of the new social system. 
" Formerly," they exclaimed, " there was no peace. * 
Feuds and family quarrels rendered our lives miserable, — 
now there is a f bundobust,' a fixed rule, and we are no 
longer so wretched." And as death was rigidly inflicted 
for murder, an impression began to prevail that it was 
unlawful to kill women from caprice. These and other 
proofs that he was largely benefiting his fellow-beings, 
sustained Sir C. Napier under the burden of serving a 
thankless government. Other crimes of a heinous nature 
were not common, and the robbing of merchants and 
traffickers, though not entirely suppressed because of the 
nearness of the hills, was abated by the police, now become 
a solid force. The Beloochee battalions were also ad- 
vancing in discipline, and many of the warriors who 
fought at Meeanee continued to accept service in them as 
sepoys. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



125 



Industry of all kinds was reviving ; and so widely spread CHAP. VI. 
was the reputation of Scinde for security, that rich mer- i 8 44. 
chants and numerous cultivators from distant countries, 
were constantly coming there to settle. The population 
of Shikarpoore, and still more that of Kurrachee, aug- 
mented monthly, and even English and Parsee mercantile 
men were beginning to turn their attention to this line for 
trade with the interior of Asia. The factious newspapers, 
disregarding all these proofs of tranquillity, were still 
indeed proclaiming, that inveterate hatred filled the minds 
of the people ; but the falsehood became notorious, when 
the Bombay government, tormented by insurrections, the 
result of oppression, was compelled to recall troops from 
Scinde to maintain its own authority by the unsparing use 
of fire and sword. 

From recent occupation, and the many adverse natural 
visitations, the financial resources could only be vaguely 
judged at this period, but there was promise of unlimited 
future prosperity. And notwithstanding the difficulty of 
ascertaining all the sources of revenue, notwithstanding 
the time required to examine the ameers' system, to 
adapt new rules to the habits of the people, and to organize 
the collection over so vast an extent of country — notwith- 
standing the numerous frauds attendant on the sudden 
rupture of social and administrative habits of laws, 
customs and authorities — notwithstanding the plague of 
locusts which swept away the revenue by devouring the 
harvests — notwithstanding the pestilence which affected 
the physical exertions of the new functionaries and sen- 
sibly lowered the receipts by checking cultivation, imposts 
being chiefly paid in kind, the soldier civilians, amongst 
whom the collectors Eathborne, Pope and Goldney, were 
conspicuous for zeal and ability, had obtained sufficient 
revenue to provide for the whole administrative expenses, 
including every salary, from that of the governor to the 
lowest servant — including also the camel corps, and more 
than two thousand policemen of whom eight hundred 
were cavalry. Sixty-seven thousand pounds sterling re- 
mained, and were credited in August to the general 



126 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VI. treasury in aid of the military expenses and the public 
1844. works — a sum more than double the expense of the 
barracks, which had been of necessity pushed forward with 
least regard to economy. This first development indicated 
great prospective advantages when the collectors should be 
more able to discover and cherish the resources of the 
country. And so economical was the administration, that 
all those expenses had been provided from a sum not 
much exceeding two hundred thousand pounds sterling, 
while the collectors judged four hundred thousand pounds 
would be the immediate, and one million the final standard, 
without pressure on the people, for to raise revenue with 
public suffering was contrary to Sir C. Napier's notions of 
government. 

" Taxation here," he observed at this time, " is still too 
high, but it requires delicate management to lower it; 
for the taxes have been so ill arranged, that if a bad one 
be removed before a good one is prepared to replace it, 
the revenue may be ruined in a moment. The whole 
system must be revised, and that cannot be done until we 
are more firmly established. Hence I am compelled to 
let matters remain as they are for the moment, except 
relieving the poor labouring ryot, from whom one-half the 
produce of his land is taken ; but that shall be brought 
down to one-third, and then increasing comforts will 
increase industry and bring up the revenue again in a 
better manner. When we first hired labourers here at 
very high prices they were lazy, and if checked went off ; 
but now, having experienced the increased comforts com- 
manded by money, they even submit to punishment rather 
than lose employment. The more men get the more they 
want, and to this feeling alone I would trust for resistance 
to the ameers should the government be so mad as to 
restore those tyrants." 

This restoration had become a great object with the 
Bombay faction when it had no longer hope to plunder 
Scinde under the forms of governing. The aim was to 
throw it back to the ameers, in the not ill-grounded 
expectation that they would provoke a renewed con- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



127 



quest, under better auspices for official peculation and CHAP. VI. 
nepotism. In this view petitions and memorials filled 1844 
with charges against Sir C. Napier, pretended to be from 
Koostum and the other ameers, but really framed at 
Bombay, were transmitted to England, where they were 
secretly countenanced by the Court of Directors, and 
openly by some members of parliament. Happily with 
no ultimate effect ; for if those princes had been rein- 
stated, the Mooltan insurrection under Moolraj, instead 
of being suppressed by a British army from Scinde, would 
have been sustained by a hundred thousand Beloochees 
from that country, and probably by the forces of Bhawal- 
poor also. 

It has been shown that the regular Indian military 
establishment had not been augmented for the conquest 
of Scinde, or for the retention of it ; the troops assembled 
there having reference to the menacing state of the 
Punjaub and the general interests of the empire. The 
real strength of the British in Scinde was that the people 
could live under the new government; they were well 
fed and with their bodily sufferings their abject spirit 
was departing. The ameers without a foreign army to 
aid them would have been driven forth again by their own 
subjects; yet to restore them was seriously proposed in 
England and India, and merely from factious motives — 
" It would be such a triumph over Lord Ellenborough V 
True enough that saying was, but it would also have been 
a triumph over England and over humanity. 

The public works came under two heads, civil and 
military. The first, founded on rigid calculation as to 
their prospective advantages, were profitable investments 
for the Company. The second were profitable investments 
for England ; because to save her soldiers' lives by building 
good barracks, and to secure the frontiers by well-dis- 
posed military works, are profitable even when commer- 
cially viewed. Moreover Sir C. Napier's measures were 
profoundly calculated for laying a solid foundation to 
sustain the superstructure of a great community, which 
he was striving by moral influences to establish on the 



128 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. VI. banks of the Indus. Under the fostering care of Lord 
Ellenborough this project would assuredly have been 
accomplished in all its gigantic proportions ; but as many 
of the most essential parts were afterwards stopped, both 
by the interference and the negligence of superior power, 
it will be here only necessary to give a general indication 
of their nature and design. 

" When I can master the sun, the river and the rob- 
bers, the people will turn their rich country to account, 
for themselves and for the revenue." This observation 
showed the extent of Sir C. Napier's views and his 
difficulties; but to that he added "It is difficult to get 
engineers, for there is in India an abundance of civil 
servants with enormous salaries, while to provide officers 
is less regarded and there is a dearth of engineers." 
This obstacle was the more serious, because Scinde had 
been the country of feudal chiefs, and consequently the 
military establishments of civilized nations were not to be 
found in it at the period of the conquest. " We are more 
like a colony in a desert than a civilized community," 
was his forcible expression. Everything had to be created, 
and it was truly marvellous that in so short a time, not 
merely the semblance of but a really energetic and to 
the people satisfactory system of administration had been 
established. It was however only by incessant labour and 
pains that result was obtained ; for the springs and wheels 
of the great machine did not fall at once into their right 
places, like soldiers at the bray of a trumpet — the trum- 
pet's sound was indeed heard throughout the land, com- 
manding, but the strong skilful hand was also there, 
organizing and compelling. 

Most sorely felt among the difficulties springing from 
the paucity of resources, was the want of large buildings 
in which to lodge the troops; and the construction of 
barracks had been the most serious charge on the surplus 
revenue and the least satisfactory, because there was no 
time to choose sites when every day lost was a soldier's life 
lost. Moreover the Company's system which forces officers 
to become accountants rather than engineers, was, and is, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



129 



in India defective, and incredibly expensive. At Kur- CHAP. VI. 
rachee the barracks, projected on a bad model when that 
town was occupied during the Aflghan invasion, had been 
with the usual official inattention to the soldiers' well- 
being, built with wood, sent from Bombay, but previously 
used in other edifices and unfitted for its purpose. And 
there were other impediments to a remedy which were 
thus described in November 1843. " Public works go on 
slowly in this country. The people are idle, the climate 
enervating; the materials are brought from a distance 
with great difficulty; the working hours are few, and 
everything is against the engineer even if he has health. 
The sickness has hitherto prevented progress. Everybody 
has been ill and very ill. Nor have we workmen now — 
where four hundred were previous to this sickness pro- 
cured at Hyderabad by the engineer he cannot now pro- 
cure fifty ! The country people are more sickly than the 
soldiers, and until this great and unparalleled sickness 
passes away nothing can be done \" 

Kurrachee, the seat of government, was to be fortified 
so as that no Asiatic assault could succeed; yet in 
such a manner as not to prevent its expansion into the 
emporium of trade for the nations bordering the Indus 
and its great confluents. In this view the plan embraced 
a large extent of ground, including the town the canton- 
ments and the port; and the flanks of some near hills, 
called the Pub and Ghisree mountains, were probed for 
springs, with a view to conduct their waters by a natural 
fall to the cantonment, in addition to the stream of the 
Mullear river. It was contemplated also to procure Chi- 
nese immigrants, whose skilful industry might forward 
the establishing of gardens around Kurrachee, and stimu- 
late the natives to improvement : a wise plan but derided 
by those who pass their lives in condemning works which 
they have neither the energy to undertake nor the capacity 
to understand when undertaken by others. It was said 
"The Scindians won't learn, they are wedded to their 
own ways." A trite observation and true enough in most 
things, was the reply, but not as regards luxuries and 

K 



130 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VI. vices; they are learned rapidly and good vegetables here 
]844 are luxuries ! 

The badness of the port has been noticed. The ships 
lay near an exposed point,, while the troops or merchan- 
dize were passed across a creek in open boats, which had 
often to remain out all night ; and always the soldiers had 
to wade far, after landing, through deep mud, to the detri- 
ment of their health. To obviate this, a military road to 
the shore was constructed, and from thence the mole was 
to be cast across the mud and waters of the creek to the 
distant point, to enable vessels to load and unload at all 
times without difficulty. The sickness had disabled the 
few workmen available at the beginning of the year, but 
four hundred were afterwards obtained from Bombay, and 
progress was made in this great work, which was to 
run two miles through mud and water, and was become 
important for the future destiny of the town. For it was 
now proposed by the supreme government to send the 
Bombay reinforcements and stores for the army on the 
upper Sutlej through Scinde, thus furnishing a decisive 
argument in favour of that country having become the 
frontier of India. 

To connect the port of Kurrachee with the nearest 
branch of the Indus, was essential to rendering the latter 
the great artery of trade — which was not then the case, the 
richest traffic coming by caravans from Sehwan, by Ahmed 
Khan, along the road under the Hala mountains. Where- 
fore to give the great river its due importance, the 
unfinished choked channel, called the Gharra Canal, be- 
fore mentioned as running towards the Indus from the 
Ghisree creek near Kurrachee, had been surveyed, with a 
view to restore its navigation and form a station near its 
junction with the river at Jurruck. Meanwhile the mili- 
tary communication with Hyderabad was by land, through 
Gharra to Tattah, where the troops embarked to pass 
up the Indus, but subject to many difficulties ; for the 
embarkation and navigation of the Indus were difficult, 
and the river so capricious at Tattah, that vessels would in 
the evening have deep water close to the shore and next 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



131 



morning find a high sand-bank. Three days were usually CHAP. VI. 
required afterwards for the voyage to Hyderabad when the 
current was strong, and often the men had to wait a day 
and a night or more at the unhealthy Tattah station. 

To remove these embarrassments a carriage-road from 
Kurrachee was projected, to run northward of Gharra to 
Khotree, opposite Hyderabad, by which the land-march 
was augmented thirty miles, but the troops at once reached 
their final destination, and could cover the additional 
distance in two days or even in one on emergency; it 
was designed also to conduct a branch from this road to 
Jurruck where the rocky banks always insured the em- 
barkation. On this road, of about a hundred miles, were to 
be erected sheds, to contain the wing of a regiment and 
to mark the halting-places, by which the labour and time 
of pitching striking and loading tents would be saved and 
the marches made in the coolest time ; an advantage to 
be appreciated by those who know how helpless and phy- 
sically weak inexperienced troops are when first disem- 
barked in a strange country. 

Such were the works proposed for the district of which 
Kurrachee was the centre ; all of immediate and obvious 
utility, yet having reference to the future wants of a rising 
community; but they and many other great projects 
were for the most part set aside or stopped by the general 
government which, though continually importuned, would 
not give the sanctions necessary, or even answer the letters 
addressed to it on the subject. 

Taking Hyderabad as the next centre, the plans were 
on the same great scale and with the same reference to 
the future. 

The brick barracks have been noticed, the improvements 
being lofty rooms, double roofs, good ventilation, and the 
securing of the lower story from the pestilent night 
exhalations of the earth. 

The restoration, strengthening and cleaning— -no slight 
labour — of the ameers' great fortress has also been men- 
tioned ; it was now complete, and so strong as to be nearly 
impregnable. To besiege it in summer or autumn would 

k 2 



132 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VI. be destructive to an army from malaria ; and as it was 
1844 built on a precipitous rock, fifteen feet high, it could only 
be breached above that line, which would be difficult from 
the softness of the bricks, and the opening would still be 
inaccessible. It contained seven wells of fine water, which 
had been choked during the ameers' occupation but were 
now discovered and cleared out by the British. A new 
gate was also opened, and the place furnished outside with 
a clear circuit wall, for which many buildings had to be 
removed. The road of communication between the camp 
and the fortress was likewise made, but a sanction to build 
martello towers for connecting the fortress with the camp 
was never given. 

These works had only a military object, those designed 
for the advancement of civilization were of far greater 
magnitude. They were. Firstly. The filling up many pools 
of water round the town, and constructing in place of them 
large stone tanks ; for the pools, though furnishing the 
principal supply of water for Hyderabad and annually 
replenished by the inundation, were pestiferous in the 
heat. Secondly. The formation of a road through Meer- 
poore to Omercote, a distance of ninety miles, and mvolving 
the casting of many bridges in a country intersected with 
watercourses like network. The principal structure was 
to have been over the Fullaillee, and the whole line, though 
useful as a military communication, was chiefly designed 
to open the capital of Central Scinde as a market for agri- 
cultural produce. Thirdly. A road running a hundred 
miles southwards to Cutch, having also administrative as 
well as military objects; for it was to open the Delta, the 
most fertile, the most barbarous, and most dangerous part 
of Scinde ; and to give facility for watching over and pro- 
tecting the Hindoos, who were there more numerous and 
more oppressed by the Beloochees than in other quarters. 
Fourthly. A northern road, passing the Fullaillee also by 
another great bridge at Meeanee, which would have com- 
pleted the military communications between Kurrachee 
and Sukkur. 

To strengthen this long line, loopholed houses or towers, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



133 



having a wall-piece and a garrison of two or three men, CHAP. VI. 

were projected for each wood-station on the Indus; not ^44. 

only to provide secure residences for the agents and enable 

them to protect the wood and guard the navigation of the 

river from robbers, but to give them an importance in 

the eyes of the people on the right bank, who were poor 

and barbarous. Now also, taking into consideration the 

mutability of the river, Sir C. Napier, with that foresight 

which marked his military operations even more than his 

daring, and was perhaps the cause of that daring, had a 

large model of Caesar's bridge made, that its nature might 

be perfectly known to his engineers and workmen ; for he 

anticipated the necessity of having control over the Indus 

in the event of an invasion, and chose this model from its 

intrinsic excellence, and because the capricious river might 

change its bed and leave the bridge, which could then be 

easily taken to pieces without damage and follow the 

water. 

At Sehwan, the point on the river nearest to the Hala 
range and therefore the most imposing to the mountain 
tribes for offence, and in defence well placed to take in 
flank any force descending from the hills upon Larkaana 
or Hyderabad, he was still desirous to establish a military 
station, but accidental circumstances forbade it at this time. 

At Shikarpoore, Bukkur, and Sukkur, the great bund 
or dike, for shutting out the inundation between those 
places ; the barracks ; the serais ; the river port and 
dock and the magazine, had been either commenced or 
marked out, but progress was slow, because the pestilence 
of 1843 there, as elsewhere, had struck down engineers 
and workmen. In the Affghan campaign, a military 
bridge had been thrown over the Indus above Bukkur ; 
but it had been removed, and the only passage was by a 
ferry extremely difficult from the violence of the stream ; 
wherefore Sir C. Napier, contemplating the time when 
Roree and Sukkur should rise to be cities, designed to 
cast two suspension-bridges of great span, from Bukkur 
on each side, and felt assured of succeeding, yet at this 
time contented himself with improving the ferry. Mean- 



134 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. vi. while, the general survey had been making rapid progress, 
1844 the regulation of the shikargahs or state forests was com- 
pleted, and many thousands of ryots were settled on 
government lands : numerous nullahs, great and small, 
were cleared and new ones opened to aid agriculture : a 
scientific scheme for general irrigation was perfected, and 
the construction of some prisons finished the long list of 
public works designed for 1844. 

An immense correspondence and constant application 
were necessarily attendant on these schemes, for, as before 
said, neither men nor things fell into their places of 
their own accord ; and the energy which compelled 
them to do so would have been remarkable even for a 
young man, acting in peaceable times under a temperate 
sky ; but here they were superadditions to battles of the 
most terrible nature, policy of the most intricate elabora- 
tion, and conducted amidst all manner of vexations and 
crossings, all foul revilings and calumnies from men, 
who with a spark of patriotism or honour should have 
been the foremost to support them. And those men, not 
satisfied even with the mendacity of the Indian press, 
aided by many equally foul English journals, had recourse 
to the French press to spread their libels. Thus, amongst 
other articles, evidently supplied from India, there 
appeared in the National a fabricated report from a 
committee of the House of Commons — a committee which 
never sat — pronouncing a formal condemnation of Lord 
Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier, and an approval of Colonel 
Outranks conduct ! The Siecle French newspaper also, 
denounced Sir Charles as having committed atrocities 
surpassing those French burnings at the caves of Dara ! 

At Bombay, when the fear of Lord Ellenborough was 
removed, it became difficult to say whether malignant 
ferocity or spiteful meanness were most predominant in 
the hostility displayed. Vessels which previous to that 
nobleman's recall had been regularly despatched with 
the mail for Scinde, were on his departure stopped, and 
the public correspondence, continually delayed, accumu- 
lated so as to make it nearly impossible to conduct it with 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



135 



propriety; while with respect to private correspondence, CHAP. VI. 
Sir C. Napier had to endure frequent loss of letters, and 1344< 
to find in the Bombay Times, the avowed organ of the 
faction, sneering allusions to the contents of some which 
never reached him! The enmity of the official people 
even descended to harass him by demanding forty pounds 
sterling daily for his simple food, without wine, on board 
a government steamer when going up the Indus to hold 
the great Durbar; a charge designed, not so much to 
obtain money as to impose an additional heavy corre- 
spondence on him ; and when he successfully resisted this 
attempt at extortion, worthy of a Swiss innkeeper, the 
newspapers were directed to impute avarice ! Avarice to 
a man who was at the moment proposing to the supreme 
government a reduction of his salary ; and who in a long 
life has only regarded money as enabling him to confer on 
others the ease and comfort he denied to himself ! It is 
thus they make war on me, he wrote on this occasion "It 
is thus they endeavour to prevent the success of Lord 
Ellenbor oughts policy; but that policy is good, and if 
necessary I will die sword in hand to support it — when I 
shrink let them sing their song of triumph over me and 
over their country." 

Continued tranquillity in Scinde was his consolation for 
all these vexations ; but it would be erroneous to suppose 
that was obtained without a personal superintendence and 
labour beyond the ordinary habits of government ; for the 
people, finding law and justice synonymous, took an eager 
pleasure in the first, and the number of cases, continually 
augmenting, became at last nearly overwhelming. This 
was endured however in preference to having the aid of 
lawyers, with their enormous expenses and their fixed 
rules, neither giving nor taking, which the fierce Beloo- 
chee race would not bear; for even in the commonest 
matters they could scarcely be convinced that justice was 
done if the Padishaw's autograph was not attached to the 
decision. In serious matters the nicest political discrimi- 
nation was required. Two men might be, and in the eye 
of the law would appear similar in guilt — hang one, and 



136 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VI. all would bow in submission; hang the other and the 
1844e whole country would rise in arms. Thus Wullee Chandia 
and another chief might commit the same crimes ; but the 
first was a holy man as well as a robber; to touch him 
would have aroused all the fanaticism of the neighbouring 
tribes, would have brought forty thousand men to his aid 
and produced a great war. It was by such considerations 
Sir C. Napier was governed in his internal policy, and no 
amount of personal labour would make him deviate from 
it. He was compelled also to apply the same mixture of 
force and subtilty to the surrounding independent tribes, 
for which one illustration will suffice. 

The jam of Beila, ruling beyond the Hala range on the 
south-west, allowed some of his people to make a slight 
foray in Scinde ; he was powerful, but not in a condition 
to raise a war ; wherefore the general, accepting the plun- 
dered ryots' word for the amount of their losses, sent his 
moonshee with an escort of horse and a letter, demanding 
repayment, and intimating that delay would cause the 
governor to come in person, which would be more costly. 
The money was instantly paid, though the jam was forced 
to pawn his sword to raise the sum ; he said indeed that 
the ryots 5 claim was far too large, but added, " the general 
is a king, and what the king does is good." To the 
moonshee however he complained that one of the Scindian 
commissaries had defrauded him of his just taxes; and 
that being found true, the offender was arrested and forced 
to refund the amount. It was greater than the ryots' 
claim and the jam gained by the whole transaction. The 
overplus was however paid with a subtle turn, to show that 
justice not weakness had prevailed. An officer of gigantic 
stature and daring temper, escorted by a selected body o£ 
the Scindian horsemen carried the money as an ambas- 
sador, with this message, "the jam's friendship is the 
more prized as it saves the governor the grief of being 
compelled to plunder Beila, and gives him the happiness of 
being able to attack the jam's enemies if they come into 
Scinde," thus indirectly giving him hopes of British 
protection. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE. 



137 



These negotiations furnished an opportunity to exa- CHAP. VI. 
mine the Beila conntiy and ascertain the prince's true 1844. 
position. He was the most powerful chief of Southern 
Beloochistan, and though nominally subject to the khan 
of Khelat, was in fact independent, despotic., and odious to 
his subjects. His country extended to the coast and 
contained the port of Soono-meeanee — a better one at that 
time than Kurrachee — where much smuggling was carried 
on, to the equal detriment of the jam, and of Scinde 
and Bombay. It was therefore proposed to the supreme 
government to purchase this port, which it was thought 
the jam would readily sell, as his revenue also suffered 
from the smuggling. But to put down the contraband 
trade was only a part of the general's design; he hoped 
finally to draw the trade of Central Asia down by Khelat 
and the plain of Wudd, behind the Hala mountains, to 
Soono-nieeanee, without going through the difficult and 
dangerous Bolan Pass, where it fostered the plundering 
habits of the tribes bordering Scinde. " These are castles 
in the air, he observed, but if I can fix a few good 
foundations the floating castles will settle down on theni, 
and the nations will look back on my battles as whole- 
some alteratives, which have produced freedom and compa- 
rative affluence in place of miserable slavery and a fitful 
existence by rapine/' 

Xotwithstancling the general adherence of the Belooehees 
to the new order of government, they were too fierce to 
yield implicit obedience in all matters, and their con- 
queror was too wise to exact by violence a submission 
which ought to be the result of policy and time. He well 
knew the whole race still carried arms, and he was content 
to let that pass, if they regarded his edict so far as to hide 
them in the presence of the British authorities. He knew 
also, although the slaves generally had defied their masters, 
that many rich people and chiefs still held persons, prin- 
cipally women, in slavery but treated them gently, fearing 
to lose them, liberty being a morsel greedily snatched at. 
Hence, only when complaints of ill-usage reached him did 
he directly interfere, acting indirectly however, with great 



138 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VI. perseverance and subtilty to insure their final emancipa- 
wu. tion, as shall be shown further on. 

But while engaged in these matters of civil administra- 
tion, he was continually meditating on the great and 
difficult scheme of operations necessary to reduce the 
Cutchee hill-tribes when the season would permit action, 
for the obstacles were formidable. Troops could not move 
from Sukkur and Shikarpoore until the inundation, which 
always flooded the country between those places, had sub- 
sided ; and that subsidence was generally followed by sick- 
ness, which was already discovering itself at the latter 
town in a severe form. It was therefore necessary to 
ascertain whether a general pestilence would again prevail, 
before any measures could be even taken to open the 
campaign, and then the following difficulties were to be 
overcome. 

A great desert was to be passed, a surprise effected 
and many warlike men to be encountered, who, brave 
even to madness, had an immense space of mountains 
behind them for prolonging a dangerous warfare; they 
had also to back them a multitude of other tribes, brave 
as themselves and as lawless, ready to aid, either in fight 
or in retreat, until the conflict should bring the British into 
collision with the Seikhs and Affghans. In that desert a 
heat destructive to Europeans prevailed; and in those 
mountains a cold equally destructive to sepoys ; for the 
breezes which the former would rush eagerly to meet the 
latter would shrink from as bringing death. Failure 
would cause the loss of all the troops engaged, and be 
dangerous for S chide, which would be immediately overrun 
by the victorious barbarians, and by all their kindred tribes 
of the Khelat and Hala mountains. The pestilence was 
to be dreaded therefore in Upper Scinde while prepara- 
tions were being made ; and those preparations had to be 
made with secrecy, or the surprise of the hillmen, which 
was judged essential to success, could not be effected. It 
was essential also to deceive the organs of the Bombay 
faction — ever on the watch for doing mischief — as they 
would be sure to give the enemy timely notice of prepara- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



139 



tions and projects, and give advice also as to counteraction. CHAP. VI. 
How all these obstacles were overcome shall be shown here- 1844 
after, for many serious crosses and forced changes of plans 
happened before the warfare was in activity: but the 
first general notions may be thus sketched. 

The Murrees though warlike were not ferocious, nor 
very predatory, and it was hoped to separate them from 
the others. The Kujjucks, lying beyond the Murrees 
on the west, were too distant to make incursions on 
Scinde, and being avowed subjects of the khan of Khelat Plans 1 & 2 - 
might through that prince's influence be kept neutral. 
The hostile tribes would thus be confined to the range of 
hills running from Poolagee to the Indus, if by surprise, a 
body of men sufficient to fight them when altogether 
could be thrown into the hills near that place, cutting off 
the Kujjucks on the west and uniting with, the Murrees on 
the north. In this view it was designed first to assemble 
troops, as if in defence and fear, at Khanghur and Rojan 
on the Scindian edge of the Khusmore desert; then to 
invite the khan of Khelat to a conference at Dadur near 
the mouth of the Bolan Pass, under pretext of arranging 
Khelatian affairs ; if he accepted the proposal to proceed 
there with two thousand selected men and twenty field- 
pieces, but instead of returning by the same road, to 
strike suddenly off into the Cutchee hills and sweep the 
defiles in all their length towards the Indus, while the 
forces at Rojan and Khanghur made a simultaneous march 
upon Poolagee. In this manner it would be possible to sur- 
prise and surround Beja Khan, who was now the avowed 
chief of the hill confederacy for the war ; and if, as was 
very probable, that wily warrior should detect the snare of 
meeting the khan and save himself in the western moun- 
tains, his places of Poolagee, Oolagee and Llieree could 
be destroyed, and their forts occupied, which would give a 
command of the wells and consequently of the desert. 

Though the plan and time of execution were confined to 
the general's breast, his resolution to punish the robbers, 
sooner or later, was made no secret of ; because neither the 
Bombay faction nor Beja could divine the final scheme, 



140 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VI. and in their eagerness were likely to conceive many false 
1844 notions, which would in the end perplex themselves and 
conduce to the public interest ; but the matter being thus 
noised abroad, displayed in a very remarkable manner the 
influence which as a conqueror he had acquired over 
the barbarian nations of Central Asia. For it was sup- 
posed the expedition would be the commencement of a 
career of general conquest, and there came from the 
traveller Wolfe, then at Bokara, a letter, saying the 
general's anger was dreaded there ; and at the same time 
presents and assurances of goodwill arrived from many 
other quarters ; amongst them from the Affghan chiefs of 
Candahar and Herat ; and it was at this time the khan of 
Khiva, whose dominions border the Aral and Caspian seas, 
See Conquest sent a prince of his family to negotiate an alliance with 
ofScmde. the victorious governor of Scinde. To all these mes- 
sages and ambassadors fitting answers and presents were 
given, and Sir C. Napier, ever watchful to augment his 
moral influence, caused his horse-artillery to gallop up 
some difficult rocky heights and open a fire in presence of 
the Herat and Khiva men ; well knowing the exploit, really 
remarkable and to them astonishing, would be magnified 
by eastern hyperbole into something marvellous, and as 
such spread all over Asia. 

From the chiefs of independent tribes came offers to 
join the expedition with their mounted warriors, and this 
general indication of respect for his power in arms, was 
seen by the general with pleasure, as giving moral force; but 
in the difficult enterprise projected he would not accept the 
service of men sure to turn upon him if a reverse happened. 
He preferred trusting to his own genius with fewer but 
surer men, and only drew from those offers the inference, 
that he might act with even more audacity than before in 
his intercourse with the surrounding nations. 

While revolving these matters, one of the bad effects 
of Lord Ellenborough's recall was felt in the separation of 
Cutch from his command. The secret committee in 
England, on Bombay instigation, had it restored to that 
presidency, alleging grounds in language pompous and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



141 



pretending, and disclosing a vulgar desire to give all pos- CHAP, 
sible personal offence, combined with all possible ignorance 
of the subject. The command over Cutch had been 
voluntarily given by Lord Ellenborough, and to lose it 
again, when he was almost overwhelmed with labour, was 
for Sir C. Napier personally a great relief; but for the 
public very injurious. Firstly. It deprived Scinde of the 
support of Colonel Roberts, whose influence over the Rao 
of Cutch was unbounded; and with Roberts went the 
action of the native force which that able officer had organ- 
ized to aid in controlling the Delta. Secondly. Cutch 
belonged politically and militarily to Scinde, and had no 
natural connection with Bombay. The people of Cutch — 
more especially the outlaw tribes on its border — were at 
once attached to and afraid of the Scindian government, 
whereas they despised and laughed at the Bombay govern- 
ment, probably the most oppressive and incapable of any 
under British domination ; hence the error of taking Cutch 
from Scinde would have had to be repaired at great cost 
of life and treasure if any after-commotion had happened 
in the unhealthy and intricate Delta. Nothing of that 
kind occurred indeed, because Sir C. Napier proved himself 
a conqueror in every way; subduing the Belooch fierceness 
in battle, bending their pride by just laws, and winning their 
affections by unmistakeable anxiety for their welfare ; but 
with less policy on his part the folly of the act would have 
been made manifest. His reasoning on this occasion clearly 
developed his own views, and exposed all the ignorance 
and insolence of the minute in which the change was 
advocated. 

(C Of Cutch, its local history and past government he 
might," he said, " know little, as asserted in the minute ; 
but the treaties of 1816-19-32 were enough for the pur- 
pose. The civil government of Cutch had been conferred 
on him when he was ill and only prevented by a sense of 
duty from resigning that of Scinde. It was however by 
its geographical position and features separated from, not 
connected with Bombay, as the minute averred; and it 
was, on the contrary, closely connected geographically with 



142 



sir chirles napier's 



chap. vi. Scinde. The great rhin or run of Cutch was a continu- 
1847. ation of the Gulf of Cutch, which being connected with 
the desert boundary of Scinde, cut off Bombay and Guz- 
zerat, and united Cutch to Scinde. 

" As to their ' moral positions * If two countries under 
different princes, divided also by strong natural features, 
were united by fortuitous circumstances it would be an 
anomaly, and did not exist here. Under his government 
no correspondence as to 6 social connection * between 
Cutch and Guzzerat had taken place, but a great deal as 
to disputes between them ; which, coupled with the three 
treaties, sufficiently indicated their mutual feelings of 
hostility : Cutch seemed to be as inimical to the Guicwar 
of Guzzerat as it was to the Bombay government, which 
it hated. 

( ' Why was it supposed that the Rao of Cutch had ' more 
confidence in the government of Bombay than in that of 
Scinde ? 3 It would be indeed surprising if the Bao desired 
to resume his connection with Guzzerat and Bombay — ■ 
the contrary was the fact. The Bao had full confidence in 
his tried and acknowledged friend Colonel Boberts ; and 
that excellent officer had given him entire confidence 
in the governor of Scinde, who had done nothing to 
forfeit it. 

" That some connection should have existed, previous to 
the conquest of Scinde, between Bombay and Cutch was 
natural; because Scinde had been hostile in the extreme, 
Bombay friendly ; but it was the ameers only who had 
been hostile — not the Scindees, who were connected with 
the Cutchees in social life, by mercantile and religious 
ties, and by marriage. This was proved in the trials of 
offenders where all those ties were made known, though 
not always of a moral character. 

" If a military government had its disadvantages, and it 
unquestionably had so, it had also its advantages ; one 
being, that the chief knew most of what passed, and 
acquired a general knowledge of what in civil govern- 
ments is absorbed or lost in departments. Hence he was 
enabled to say, that if the rooted hostility of the ameers 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



143 



to Cutch, had not been able to separate the two people ; CHAP. VI. 
the friendly intercourse now established and rapidly in- 1844 
creasing, would soon incorporate them as completely in 
their ( moral 3 as in their 'geographical relations 3 

" There was however an administrative view also to be 
taken. Many of the robbers of the desert bordering the 
Rhin of Cutch were Scindees, defying equally the ameers, 
the Rao and the Guicwar; but who yet found, when 
pursued by any one of those governments, an asylum with 
their social friends in each country. Lord Ellenborough, 
who thoroughly understood the whole subject, had enjoined 
a conciliatory policy with these outlaws, and that was one 
reason for employing Colonel Roberts ; because he knew 
them well, and he had persuaded numbers, driven by the 
tyranny of the ameers to become robbers, to return and 
settle as ryots in Scinde. Barbarism had however long 
ruled, and those wild tribes cared not for the Bombay 
government, nor confided in its protection, nor feared its 
anger ; but the military governor of Scinde they did fear, 
knowing he could and would be amongst them in arms if 
they offended him. They were essentially warriors and 
held civil government in contempt ; a corporal in Hydera- 
bad would have more moral influence with them than the 
governor- general in Bombay. They were all submissive 
from the day the battle of Hyderabad was won, because 
from that field they had been informed by the victor that 
he would extirpate them if they were not so. Yet before 
that action they had despised the English government at 
Bombay. 

" Colonel Roberts' influence with the governor of Scinde 
they knew, and that the latter decided all appeals by 
strict rules of justice and not by favour : — hence they, and 
the Rao himself, had great confidence in the Scindian 
ruler. The Rao personally had more than once found the 
Scindian paramount power meant only paramount justice, 
protecting alike himself and his people ; and being a just 
and good man this gave him pleasure and a confidence in 
the Scinde governor which he did not feel in that of 
Bombay : and with respect to administrative acts the 



144 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CH AP. VI. former was also closer for reference and communica- 
1844. tion. 

" 'Religious connection. 1 This had been touched upon in 
the minute without much knowledge of the matter. The 
Hindoos in Scinde, and especially in the Delta, were very 
numerous — the majority were Hindoos, and there existed 
no 'religious bar* to an intimate connection between 
Scinde and Cutch : nearly all the artificers attracted to 
Scinde since the fall of the ameers came from Cutch. 

e{ With respect to the military view, no wise man could 
in his political arrangements assume as a basis that a new 
conquest would be peaceful; no man rejoiced more at the 
tranquillity of Scinde than he did, because he was respon- 
sible for it ; no man had more confidence in its perma- 
nence ; but he was not blinded to the fact, that accident 
might at any moment disturb that tranquillity — he had 
shaken hands with the Beloochees, but they were bloody 
hands ! Scarcely a family in the land but had to deplore 
losses, and these things were not forgotten; yet they 
were, he believed, forgiven, because a Beloochee glories at 
the death of his relations in battle. Besides he had given 
the chiefs back all they possessed under the ameers, none 
had suffered in property and many had gained — the poorer 
people had done so enormously. 

c< One old man had, after making submission, grasped 
his hand and said f I am here to make my salaam to you 
as my chief ; but I fought at Meeanee and eighty of my 
own family died in that battle ! Now I am ready to die 
fighting by your side and under your flag/ Such were 
the military feelings of these men, but would not that 
old warrior in a moment draw the sword again, if he 
thought there was a chance of victory — a faithful subject 
only while it was convenient. For some years nothing 
else could be expected, and to legislate, to administer on 
the bond of such a man's loyalty would be gross folly. 
He bowed to the conqueror, to the man who returned his 
possessions. Let that conqueror be replaced by a civil 
government, and let civil servants affront him and he 
would take to arms instantly; but he would not do so 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



145 



where a victorious general was to be dealt with. Hence, CHAP. VI. 
' the tranquillity prevailing could not be a reason for J^J 
reuniting Cutch to Bombay* 

" He had recently given Bombay help, yet reluctantly ; 
not from wanting the troops, but lest their departure 
should give Dr. Buist of the Bombay Times an oppor- 
tunity of calling down the hill tribes, by saying the force 
was weak and the time favourable for destroying the 
English. In the Delta also, insalubrious and blotted with 
jungles desert tracks and sand-hills, were tribes that, 
having such fastnesses and a retreat open into the great 
desert and to Cutch, had been always wild and resolute, 
and a revolt there would be very difficult to quell. But if 
the force in Cutch were in good hands, like Colonel 
Roberts/ it could co-operate with troops from Kurrachee, 
Hyderabad and Omercote ; and the revolters thus attacked 
on all sides would lose the game. They knew that, and 
were quiet ; but if Cutch were again placed under the Bom- 
bay government, and a political agent replaced a military 
man, the hold of the Delta would at once become morally 
weakened : for the people there could not understand the 
troops being under one man the civil government under 
another. 

" Such countries could not be governed by the mere 
official arrangements of a civil governor; their ruler for 
some years must be a military man, who must have 
frequent intercourse with the chiefs to gain an insight 
to their characters ; and they also would form a tolerably 
correct one of his. In fine, unsophisticated human nature 
and military nature must both be studied in dealing with 
barbarians ; they would not bear from a civilian arrange- 
ments suited to civilization but crossing their prejudices ; 
yet to the stern behests of a soldier chief they would bow 
in submission. 

" A comparison of the last year's administration of Cutch 
under Colonel Roberts with any other political agency under 
the Bombay government, would show the superiority of the 
former ; and the wisdom of Lord Ellenborough's arrange- 
ment would be made manifest. Colonel Roberts knew 

L 



146 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VI. much more of Cutch its ' history, treaties, and peculiar 
1844 circumstances' — so emphatically and ignorantly adverted 
to in the minute — than any government could know; 
his knowledge being derived from many years' residence 
amongst them. And as to ' records/ Scinde and Bombay 
being equally under the one supreme government, no 
public advantage could accrue from their custody being 
with one or the other, seeing they were only deposits for 
rare references on unimportant matters of detail. 

" It was asserted in the minute that the ' governor of 
Scinde was necessarily and completely ignorant of what 
had been previously done, and of the peculiar circumstances 
of the country. 3 An opinion thus given as to his peculiar 
ignorance was not worth disputing; but that he was 
( necessarily ignorant ' could not be sustained ; because 
only a little energy and reading was sufficient to ascertain 
what had been done, and what ought to be done under the 
' peculiar existing circumstances/ However, whether well 
or ill acquainted with that matter, if ' he must, even though 
perfectly informed, be incapable for a long time to come, of 
acquiring the confidence of the prince and people, in a 
degree comparable to that in which it was possessed by the 
Bombay government/ he agreed that Cutch should not 
be left to his ruling. He would only remark, that recent 
events and the insurrection then going on in the presi- 
dency of Bombay, did not seem to prove that c long and 
intimate connection with the Bombay government was syno- 
nymous with confidence in it? 

" If Cutch was not annexed to Scinde the troops in the 
former should not have their commander in the latter 
province. In peace it was not necessary, and it would 
cause a useless inconvenient separation of the Bombay 
troops from their own government. But in contradiction 
to the positive and ill-founded assertions in the secret 
committee's minute, Cutch ought to be annexed to Scinde ; 
because those countries were united geographically and 
in every relation of life, civil, religious, commercial and 
military ; because Cutch was naturally severed from Bom- 
bay as regarded its internal arrangements; and because 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



147 



the Rao had not any particular desire to belong to that CHAP. VI. 
presidency." ^ 

This view of affairs, unanswerable, and unanswered save 
by the exercise of dogged power, was, at the very moment 
of its being proffered, confirmed in an unquestionable 
manner by an application from several hundred families 
in Cutch for land in Scinde, accompanied with certificates 
from a British sub-collector to say, they were not bar- 
barous, but an industrious people and skilful cultivators ! 
Nevertheless Cutch was reannexed to Bombay, because 
Lord Bipon, to whom this foolish and insulting minute 
was addressed, feared and flattered the Court of Directors 
instead of controlling it ; and that short-sighted and 
malignant body was swayed by personal feelings. It is 
thus the world is misgoverned ! 



l 2 



148 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAPTER VII. 

CHAP. VII. In October the 13th European regiment came down the 
Indus to Kurrachee, in progress for England, and accord- 
ing to custom left volunteers for other corps, some of them 
to finish their many glorious actions with deaths as heroic 
as ever graced the best soldiers of Rome. To replace the 
13th at Sukkur, the 78th were sent up the country, a 
fine body of Highlanders from whom gallant service was 
expected in the Cutchee hills, but an overruling power 
had decreed that a tgrrible calamity should frustrate 
that hope. Meanwhile a practical crushing reply to 
the calumnies of the Bombay faction, as to the unquiet 
feelings of the Scindians, was furnished by Sir C. Napier. 
Though on the point of engaging in a difficult campaign 
beyond the frontier of Scinde, he spared, at the earnest 
entreaty of the Bombay government, one European and 
one native regiment to aid in quelling an insurrection 
in that presidency ; and that no kind of reproof might be 
wanting, he supplied the loss of those regiments with the 
Belooch battalions, composed of the men said to be his 
deadly enemies ! 

In November, the annual sickness after the inundation 
being much less than was expected, and most places 
entirely healthy, the general resolved to repair to Sukkur 
in furtherance of the contemplated operations against the 
hillmen ; and as the north-western part of Scinde, which, 
as before observed, was rather conciliated than conquered, 
had never been visited by him, he resolved to take that 
line, and, making his journey one of inquiry, exploration 
and reform, to impress the full action of his administra- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



149 



tion on the people. He took with him the volunteers of CHAP. VII. 
the 13th regiment, formed as a guard, and with them a 
detachment of the Scinde irregular horsemen, called by 
the country people, as they do all irregular cavalry, 
Mogullaees — Moguls — and by that name they shall in fu- 
ture be distinguished. Steady in faith and conduct they 
were, though a congregation of adventurers from every 
country ; fierce and daring in battle also, and true in every 
way were those men ; and that was shown to all the world 
afterwards at Goojerat, where the Scinde Mogullaees sur- 
prised friend and foe alike by their surpassing discipline 
and courage. 

While preparing for this journey, a strong detachment 
was ordered from Hyderabad to Ahmed Khan, once more 
to test the salubrity of that place ; and one advantage 
was immediately discovered, namely, good water, plentiful 
and pure, a thing of great moment ; for in Scinde the soil 
was so impregnated with different salts that scarcely ever 
could good water be found. This time was chosen for 
testing Ahmed Khan, in the hope that such various 
movements of troops — those from Hyderabad going west- 
ward, while the 78th went northward up the river, and the 
general with his escort roved through the north-western 
parts — would give rise, as the same policy had done the year 
before, to exaggerations, and powerfully affect the fears 
and the imaginations of the hill tribes. The sanato- 
rium project was however finally abandoned, because the 
Clifton hills and the Munnoora point, near Kurrachee, 
were found to possess a more excellent climate close to the 
seat of government, whereas Ahmed Khan could only be 
reached through the strange region now being explored 
by the general. 

It was a series of dead levels, five, fifteen, and twenty 
miles broad and from fifteen to a hundred long; each 
flat was bounded by limestone rocks, in ranges running 
nearly north and south, and rising perpendicularly from a 
thousand to three thousand feet. The strata were of 
every inclination, horizontal, perpendicular, oblique and 
even circular ; but the faces of the ranges were like walls 



150 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. vii. crowned with huge castellated battlements ; and though 
184 4 watercourses from eighty to one hundred yards wide 
were sometimes found, the plains were otherwise as flat and 
united as a billiard-table. 

Sick men could not be safely moved across these flats 
because of the sand-storms, common enough in Scinde, 
but here of peculiar vehemence. One which assailed the 
head- quarters on this journey had no parallel in any per- 
son's previous experience. The air was calm, but suddenly 
everything, animate and inanimate, became overcharged 
with electricity, and the sand, rising violently, adhered 
to the horses* eyes, nearly blinding them ; the human hair 
stood out like quills, streaming with fire, and all persons felt 
a strange depression of mind until the evil influence passed 
away. Invalids could not have lived under the oppression. 
The people said there was no water in the rocks, and 
though this was discredited, it was certain that water 
would be difficult to find, and the making of roads expen- 
sive : moreover the reflective power of those natural walls 
was very great, and untempered by the cool monsoon 
breezes, which are found to render Clifton one of the most 
healthy stations in the East. 

In the country above Sehwan Sir C. Napier found a 
tribe of Rins, not the Belooch tribe of that name 
but Scindees, in a miserable condition. They had been 
driven from their dwellings in the Delta by the ameers 
because of their fidelity to the Kalloras, and had taken to 
a robber life in the western mountains, where, in the 
midst of Beloochees incited to attack them, they lived 
entirely by force. These poor people were transferred 
with their own consent to Jurruk on the Indus, and 
they became honest cultivators and faithful subjects* 
This was the first of the reforms which this wild quarter 
of Scinde required ; and there were many violations of 
law to be corrected and false applications of political 
economy by subordinate administrators to be suppressed. 
The task was difficult, yet, having previously caused all 
the collectors, sub-collectors, and military magistrates to 
keep minute diaries of their proceedings, which with 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



151 



enormous mental labour he had constantly perused, Sir CHAP. VII. 
C. Napier was prepared to discover what was ill judged, 1844 
and to apply checks. 

Everywhere the goodwill of the people and the im- 
mense natural resources of the country were apparent; 
but the administration had been much embarrassed and 
retarded by the absence of the chief collectors and many 
sub-collectors, who, debilitated by the fever of 1843, had 
gone to other countries for the recovery of strength. In 
their absence, errors, frauds, oppressions and irregularity 
of various kinds, had sprung up, as was to be expected in 
a country where such disorders had been so recently 
the general rule of government. Amongst other mischief 
many fishermen of the great lake in that quarter had 
been nearly ruined by having their taxation raised on the 
false principle of improving the revenue and the land-tax 
still practically amounted to half the produce. These 
follies were suppressed in spite of all remonstrances, as 
being morally wrong and fundamental errors in govern- 
ment, though not so judged generally. 

Mistakes of this kind the general was not surprised at ; 
but he was amazed and incensed to find himself sur- 
rounded by numbers of slaves praying for liberty, the edict 
against that wrong having been wholly disregarded. He 
instantly seized twelve or thirteen of the most guilty 
slaveholders, and carried them with his camp in irons. 
His subtle dealing with this matter shall be explained 
further on. Meanwhile he was surrounded by the popu- 
lation, praying protection against the robbers, and espe- 
cially against two chiefs, or rather tribes, who vexed the 
country in a terrible manner. These men he had long- 
been watching and they were at this time captured. The 
first, named Sowat Guddee, was taken by Fitzgerald, 
who hearing that the robber swordsmen were abroad for 
spoil, only forty remaining with the chief as a guard, 
made a march of seventy-five miles with the camel corps 
and surprised his mountain camp. Guddee fled, Fitz- 
gerald launched men in pursuit, and the robber with his 
son, his two nephews and some others turned at bay. 



152 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VII. Lieutenant James of the police, speaking their lan- 
guage, said to four who stood separately, Surrender and 
you are safe. One leaped forward and seized his bridle, 
James saved him, and cried out again, You see I do 
not hurt him ! Surrender. No ! exclaimed the other 
three, No ! we are Guddee's son and nephews and we 
will not surrender. They stood, and clashed their arms. 
But there was amongst the police present a lad, son of 
Ayliff Khan, the strong Patan swordsman who captured 
See Conquest the Lion's brother ; this youth, scarcely inferior in strength 
of Scmde. courage and comeliness to his father, rushed with a com- 
rade to the duel, and though the Beloochees had sword 
and shield, while young Ayliff and his companion had 
only swords, the latter slew all three. Meanwhile Ayliff, 
the father, rode up to Guddee saying Yield thee, Guddee, 
or I will slay. Are you Ayliff Khan? Yes. Guddee 
flung down his weapon ; for these eastern swordsmen are 
all well known to each other, and no man was more 
formidable than Ayliff Khan. Grieved the general was 
for the death of Guddee' s son and nephews ; but their 
resistance was rather the result of desperation than high 
feeling; they gave no quarter and expected none; even 
the man who surrendered to J ames attempted to kill him 
immediately afterwards. 

Nowbut Khan, the second robber chief, was a terrible 
savage of great personal strength, who had recently plun- 
dered a Persian cafila within the borders of Scinde, and 
murdered six poor unarmed camel-men. He had five 
hundred swordsmen, and was the terror of the upper 
plains. A thousand rupees had been offered for his 
apprehension, and Wullee Chandia, always true to his 
word, captured and brought him to the general, who paid 
the reward in the presence of all the chiefs, at a Durbar 
held in Larkaana. He also gave Wullee, Nowbut's 
sword, that robber's name being inlaid in gold letters on 
the blade ; and with subtle policy he did so ; for the 
acceptance of such a sword was the public acknowledg- 
ment of a blood-feud which must end in the death of one 
or other chief. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



153 



At this Durbar, sharply and even vehemently did he CHAP. VII. 
address the assembled chiefs, inveighing against slavery 1844 
and giving the greater men indirect intimations that the 
persons he had arrested were not the only violators of the 
law. He told them likewise that he knew of their secret 
thoughts as to plundering ; and he adduced the fates of 
Nowbut and of Guddee, who were to be put to death, as 
proof of his power and resolution to enforce his authority. 
Tighter than this he did not think fit to draw the cord, 
until the great robber tribes of the Cutchee hills were put 
down. However he so awed the chiefs present, that 
voluntarily they assured him they would in future keep 
their followers from robbing, and they fulfilled that pro- 
mise. On these occasions he regretted his ignorance of 
the Belooch tongue, a knowledge of which would he said, 
have been equal to an additional force of a thousand 
soldiers; but he endeavoured to supply this want by 
significant actions ; and in that view had, as before said, 
carried with him in chains the rich men arrested for 
having slaves. 

Many sirdars, conscious of like offences, seeing this, 
came to beg the guilty men off, and some were pardoned ; 
but others more guilty were still retained in irons as an 
example. There was here unequal justice, but he thus 
explained his policy. " It is true Wullee and Hadgee, the 
great chiefs, are just as guilty, but they treat their slaves 
gently ; and were I to make them prisoners, at least one 
battle with forty thousand mountaineers would have to be 
fought, and probably slavery would be perpetuated : now 
I shall by indirect means destroy it. This is the way to 
deal with these barbarians. Meanwhile I fortify places, 
build barracks, form police, relieve the poor and en- 
courage them to defy their own chiefs. No person knows 
my whole policy, it comes out in my public discourses, as 
if unpremeditated, and is only gradually unfolded. If it 
was known beforehand it would lose its effect. It is in- 
deed so little understood, that I have had trouble to keep 
some of my superior officers from driving Wullee Chandia 
to revolt, by expressing anger at his being a robber, as if all 



154 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VII. natives were alike in all things — but they are not alike 
1844# in dispsoition, or power, or habits. Robbery has been 
the vocation of Wnllee and others, and in their notions 
an honourable one. Hence I never justify punishment 
of any person by saying he robs — he murders — he is 
immoral. I say I punish you because you have dis- 
obeyed my orders which were that you should not rob, 
should not murder, should not hold slaves. This they 
understand, it is the Padishaw's will. They do not under- 
stand our notions of honour and morality. The chiefs 
think I am a man who is taking time by the forelock, 
making my fortune, and as I hit them hard in the battles 
they offer no opposition ; but the people find I am their 
friend ; they live well, and in a few years will be so inde- 
pendent as to defy a return to slavery and misery. Even 
now, if the ameers were restored I could drive them out 
again by the aid of the people only, without a soldier. 

The gift of Nowbut's sword rendered the Chandian 
chief a sure check on that robber's remaining band and 
friends, which, conjoined with the promises made by the 
other chiefs, gave good hope that the right bank of the 
Indus would be tranquil during the operations against the 
hill tribes. Wullee did not shrink from the dangerous 
honour of the sword, but knowing that Nowbut, if let 
loose again would seek to slay him, he, when departing, 
turned and in a low earnest tone said You will kill 
Nowbut. Yes I will kill him. Good ! and the old man 
left the tent. But this killing of Nowbut, Guddee, and 
inferior robbers, was not done without a sore mental 
struggle, which was thus described. 

" I shall hang all my prisoners, there is no help for it ; 
if I did not do so Scinde would be a sheet of blood ! 
The villagers are coming in crowds around me, com- 
plaining of devastations and murders by these robbers 
and their confederate in the Cutchee hills. Women have 
been killed; children's hands cut off; the innocent un- 
armed camel-men cruelly put to death; great tracts of 
country have been laid waste, and twenty-five villages 
destroyed. They shall have a fair trial, but if murders 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



155 



are proved they shall die. Were deliberate murderers to CHAP. VII. 
escape from weakness on my part, the consequent dis- jg44. 
orders would lie on my head and I could never quiet this 
country. All the people are rejoicing that these men 
have been captured. In fine, a man placed as I am must 
have nerve for his work ; but it is very painful and makes 
me wish I had never put a sword by my side, or used any- 
thing but a spade. However I pray God to make me 
just in my decisions, and my mind being once fixed I 
strike ! And if social laws are to exist at all, if we are not 
to hold our throats to the assassin's knife, if self-defence 
is permitted, I am justified in what I do as much as I 
should be in struggling for life with an assassin and killing 
him. 

F Some think this contrary to the Christian religion; 
perhaps it is so; but then government must cease, and 
the greatest ruffian be the greatest man. Human 
nature cannot go this length, and I am resolved as to my 
course, feeling my heart free from all motive but doing 
what the interest of society demands, namely, that the 
robber shall be put down in Scinde. I said this from the 
first, and I have done it, or will do it ere three months 
more be passed. If it be God's will that the robbers shall 
not be put down, I shall fail ; but he has, by overthrowing 
the ameers, apparently given his sanction to the course I 
pursue. I could neglect my work and get more praise, 
but if I did this I should not see Scinde prosper, and my 
conscience would be ill at ease : now I sleep well for I do 
my best. Yet I please not the Court of Directors. For 
that I care not, they are but cunning fools, and I am a 
man whose daily occupation is to deal with the lives of his 
fellow-men ; and if I do not deeply consider before I act I 
go down as a murderer ! I allow no margin for men who 
rule — they may give up. I pray night and day and every 
hour in the day to do right, and I believe I do so in the 
sight of God. If not I am criminal, for error in judg- 
ment in rulers is crime. Nations should not suffer because 
individuals are vain and self-sufficient." 

During this journey Sir C. Napier had occasion to 



156 SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 

CHAP. VII. observe with what an infelicitous derision Scinde had 
1844> been called Young Egypt, as if the comparison were a 
folly, when in fact the two countries have a striking 
similarity. In their flatness, fertility, deserts, moun- 
tains, single river and annual inundation — in their deltas, 
their scarcity of seaports, their frequent change of rulers, 
their three races — Copts, Arabs and dominant Mamelook 
swordsmen in Egypt; Hindoos, Scindees and dominant 
Belooch swordsmen in Scinde — in their former greatness, 
their decay under a bad government and their present 
chance of resuscitation. In all these things the resem- 
blance is complete : and it is not a little curious, that at 
this time was found, westward of the Indus, a river of 
Appendix VII. petrified trees like that which exists westward of the 

paragraph A. ^ 

Vast tracts of fertile but uninhabited land, and many 
anciently-peopled sites, were also discovered, showing that 
the riches and magnificence attributed to Scinde in former 
days were not exaggerated, and that the right road was 
being followed to restore them again. One of these 
ancient posts was very remarkable. Noted on the map 
as Mohun Kote, it is called by Sir Alexander Burnes a 
fortified hill ; but the country people know it only by the 
name of Rennee Kote ; and it was found to be a rampart 
of cut stone and mortar, encircling not one but many 
hills, being fifteen miles in circumference and having 
within it a strong perennial stream of the purest water 
gushing from a rock. Greek the site was supposed to be, 
yet no Greek workmanship or ruins were there, and the 
ameers having repaired the walls had the credit of building 
them. 

Of the position of Alexander the Great's towns as given 
by geographers, Sir C. Napier was sceptical, unless where 
he found rocky basements which the river could not have 
washed away; such as Sehwan, where there were con- 
siderable mounds, the work of distant ages though not 
Greek. Neither could he understand the Macedonian 
hero's march as described by the historians, unless the 
country was then much more advanced in civilization 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



157 



than those historians record. For as Scinde now is, and CHAP. VII. 
this must have been from greater cultivation still more 184 4 # 
the case in Alexander's days, not even a small army, much 
less the hundred and twenty thousand men led by the son 
of Philip, could have marched down either bank of the 
Indus within from ten to sixteen miles of the stream : the 
numerous nullahs or watercourses would have barred his 
progress, unless they had been bridged permanently, which 
would indicate even greater civilization than that noticed 
by ancient writers. These things had however only a 
passing consideration ; he was more occupied with investi- 
gating the effect of his administration upon the welfare of 
the people. • 

There was much to amend, especially with respect to the 
imposition of injurious taxes, which one collector, Captain 
Preedy, had adopted in the false hope of raising the revenue. 
These mistaken views chafed him, and when he discovered 
how the poor lake fishermen's taxes had been thus raised 
from thirteen to forty per cent, by the same collector, who 
had before sought to force the pearl-fishery, his patience 
forsook him. Jesus of Nazareth! he exclaimed, How 
far well-meaning men will go in mischief ! The absence 
of the chief collector of this district, Captain Pope, driven 
from his duties by sickness, had indeed opened a door for 
many follies, many peculations and oppressions, the more 
extensive at first, because the European collectors and their 
subordinates had been plunged suddenly and by the force 
of arms at once into a chaos of revenue affairs, of jagheers 
and different modes of taxation, in a country where all the 
minor and most of them corrupt native functionaries had 
from policy been retained in their offices. Light was 
however now breaking on all these matters, and each day 
showed that future prosperity depended entirely on the 
wisdom and vigilance of the government. 

At the commencement of the journey the spies, who 
were spread in all directions, said the robber tribes were 
assembling with the object of supporting the khan of 
Khelat in the proposed conference. The general thought 
they would fall on him, either coming or going if occa- 



158 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VII. sion offered, and therefore he resolved to appear at Dadur 
1844> with a force capable of beating them ; but though they had 
so determined, they soon fought amongst themselves, and 
the Murrees were twice defeated by the Bhoogtees, first 
singly, and then in conjunction with the Chandikas, who 
made an unsuccessful attempt on Poolagee. The stimulus 
before mentioned, of offering the land of the Doomkees, 
Bhoogtees and Jackranees to the Chandikas and Murrees 
if they would drive them back from the frontier, had 
therefore failed ; and it was evident that only by a great 
combination and the employment of British troops could 
the hill robbers be put down. The difficulty of doing this 
was indeed felt each day more strongly, but the general 
had decided on his policy, and as new obstacles arose 
nerved himself more rigidly for the enterprise. 

The fame of his march, and the wiles he used to influ- 
ence the fears of the barbarians had a great effect. Beja 
Khan became so alarmed as to send his two sons to 
General Hunter with an offer of salaam, but his recent 
incursions, the mutilation of the children, and the killing 
of the unarmed grass-cutters, were acts of unprovoked 
warfare and cruelty not to be passed over ; hence, Hunter 
was directed to give the sons reasonable time to go back, 
but to hang them if they did not depart; and Beja was 
told he also would be executed when taken. Then as- 
suming black habiliments he declared himself gazee, or 
religiously devoted to the destruction of unbelievers ; and 
these gazee fanatics were very dangerous — once declared 
there was only to kill or be killed. 

Beja was not the only enemy to be menaced. The 
Lion was amongst the tribes, urging them with gold and 
promises, and sometimes appearing on the frontier of 
Scinde with a strong body of horsemen. To him therefore 
this message was sent. " Hitherto, ameer, I have looked 
on you with respect as an open and brave enemy. I now 
find you mixed up with robbers and murderers, and if you 
continue to be their companion, as a robber and murderer 
I will treat you." Soon afterwards the Lion took refuge 
in the Punjaub. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



159 



Thus continually advancing towards the execution of CHAP. VII. 
his enterprise Sir C. Napier arrived at Sukkur the 19th 
December, exactly two years after he had quitted it to 
commence the campaign which gave Scinde to England. 
But no joyful state of affairs greeted his arrival, the pesti- 
lence was abroad, the European artillery was entirely 
disabled, two hundred of the 78th dead, and others daily 
falling into graves that seemed destined to swallow all. 
With anguish of mind their general was compelled to send 
the survivors to Hyderabad, instead of leading the whole 
as he had hoped to a glorious service — nor did even this 
save them, nearly as many more perished ere the sickness 
ceased. 

This terrible calamity was seized upon by the Bombay 
faction to declare, that it arose from Sir C. Napier's igno- 
rant wilfulness, and a desire to make a military display as 
if he really was going to assail the hill tribes — that he 
ought to have known fatal sickness would attend a move- 
ment at the time of year chosen for the march of the 78th 
— that he would not consult the medical men, and the 
consequent deaths were on his conscience ; it was a case of 
aggravated murder — he was the murderer of the sol- 
diers ! And not content with proclaiming these things 
in India, where men knew the libellers too well to regard 
their malevolence, they with detestable wickedness sent 
like statements to Scotland, to work upon the feelings of 
the deceased soldiers 5 friends and clansmen, and raise there, 
if possible, a hatred of the general. He however, at once 
showed the foulness of the accusation, and the careful 
consideration he had given to that and every question 
affecting the soldier's welfare. 

" He was, he said, attacked in the papers ; that gave 
him no pain, but the death of the soldiers grieved him to 
the heart's core. Blame could not however attach to him. 
The usual course of the fever at Sukkur had been to attack 
in September and half of October, after which few new 
cases appeared ; but the first cases were very apt to relapse, 
and those relapses were very dangerous. Superior orders 
had directed him to bring down the 13th European regiment 



160 SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 

CHAP. VII. from Sukkur to Kurrachee, and to send the 78th regiment 
1844. up. It was done with cautious care, so as that the 
13th, which had already been assailed by the epidemic, 
might get away from Sukkur before the time for relapses 
arrived, and the 78th reach that place after the same dan- 
gerous period had passed. Thus he hoped to save those 
regiments both from attacks and relapses ; for continual 
movement at that season was by the medical men judged 
good. In that view the 86th had been marched from 
Hyderabad, and he had himself moved up the country, 
at a later and worse period, with an escort equal in 
strength to the 78th. He had likewise sent troops to 
Ahmed Khan, and all had escaped fever and gained 
strength, thus confirming the medical judgment. 

ff The 13th did escape relapses, reached Kurrachee, and 
went to England in a healthy state ; and the volunteers it 
left behind, two hundred in number, formed part of his 
escort up the country, thus making this so-called dan- 
gerous march both ways, and yet remaining in perfect 
health. The 78th reached Sukkur in a good state on the 
25th of October, and remained healthy until the beginning 
of November, about which time the fever burst forth with 
unheard-of violence, and continued to the end of the 
year. 

" It was true that the marches of the 13th and of the 
78th might have been delayed until the whole of the 
sickly season had passed away; and could the calamity 
have been foreseen they would have been delayed ; but it 
was not from what afterwards happened that a judgment 
could be formed. There was at the time no prospect, but 
the contrary, of a sickly season; Kurrachee, Hyderabad, 
the intrenched camp on the edge of the river, Kotree on 
the opposite bank, the steamer stations, and lastly Sukkur 
itself were all healthy ; Shikarpoor alone had sickness, and 
that appeared to be local, accidental, and subsiding. But 
these considerations did not embrace the whole subject. 
A mutiny of the Bengal troops, in which the men had 
called aloud for their officers' blood, had just been quelled 
by General Hunter. The Lion was then stirring up the 



ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE. 



161 



hill tribes on the frontier, and fifteen Talpoor princes were CHAP. VII. 
in Ali Moorad's court close at hand. Was it proper then j^jj 
to leave Hunter in that critical state without a European 
regiment ? Suppose the Bengalees had again mutinied ? 
The 64th had twice seized their colours within the pre- 
ceding four months. Suppose they had a third time 
mutinied, had murdered their European officers, as hap- 
pened at Vellore, had seized the magazine at Bukkur, and 
the treasury, and gone over to the Lion and the hill tribes ; 
or to the Seikhs of Mooltan, among whom they had 
numerous friends and relations ? 

" These things might not have happened, but they were 
within the bounds of probability. Many of the mutineers 
of the 34th Bengal regiment, which had been just before 
disbanded, did go to the Seikh army ; and if such a train 
of evils had happened, would it not have been said, ' Sir C. 
Napier left the murdered Hunter and his unhappy comrades 
without the protection of a European, although he must have 
foreseen the catastrophe from what had passed* How could 
that have been answered ? There could be no justification, 
and he must, conscious of error, of crime, have hid his 
head in sorrow and shame the rest of his life. Hence, 
though inexpressibly grieved for the 78th he felt no sense 
of error." 

The proofs that the march of the 78th had not been the 
cause of the sickness were numerous and conclusive. The 
78th fell sick, but so did all the troops which had remained 
quietly in Upper Scinde; the European artillery were 
attacked more fatally even than the 78th ; and of the 
towns, Sukkur and Shikarpoore alone suffered, the other 
places in their neighbourhood escaped, and the crews of 
the steamers which brought the 78th up from Hyderabad 
also remained at Sukkur and had no sick ! In fine the 
imputations cast by the Bombay faction were but the out- 
pourings of weak brains disordered by the working of 
peculiarly malignant dispositions. 

This pestilence, by some attributed to a neglect of the 
canals, was generally supposed to be caused by an un- 
usually high and anomalous inundation, and an equally 

M 



162 



sir charles napier's 



CHAP. VII. anomalous fall, which brought on an extraordinarily fertile 
1844. hut premature vegetation. The early and entire sub- 
sidence of the waters left this vegetation to be withered 
up by the sun, which produced, as it always does in Scinde, 
malaria ; and it was particularly active at Shikarpoore and 
Sukkur, because the basin between those towns was still 
open to the overflow, the great dike being only nascent. 
This was clearly shown — for while the wind blew towards 
Shikarpoore the pestilence was there most virulent; but 
when it blew towards Sukkur, sickness commenced at that 
place and ceased at Shikarpoore. 

Dr. Kirk of the Bengal service, who bestowed great 
attention upon the subject, attributed the sickness to ex- 
halations from the limestone rocks on which the barracks 
were built, and it is probable that both causes were com- 
bined. It may also be, that this and other epidemics 
which prevail at irregular periods in Scinde, arise from 
exhalations produced by volcanic action ; for the country, 
though alluvial, is so subject to sudden and extensive 
changes from earthquakes, that in 1819 nearly the whole 
surface of Cutch was changed. Minor imperceptible shocks, 
opening fissures in the surface of Scinde, may therefore 
give vent to the escape of deleterious gases, producing 
sporadic pestilence, or epidemics according to the extent of 
the subterranean disturbance. But to whatever cause, in- 
scrutable or otherwise, the sickness itself may be attributed, 
there was little difficulty in accounting for its extensively 
fatal ravages amongst European regiments. The habit of 
officers and soldiers in India is to drink copiously of beer, 
wine and brandy, of the first especially. The soldiers' ra- 
tion is a vile potation, falsely supposed to be distilled from 
rice, but really obtained from other substances, chiefly 
from a liquor procured by incising the date-tree. Four 
soldiers' rations make a bottle of this deleterious drink, 
few are the soldiers who content themselves with their 
Appendix V. rations, and though this general use of strong drinks 
does not produce the pestilence, it predisposes the con- 
stitution to receive infection and always renders it more 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



163 



fatal. Doctor Robertson of the 13th reputed as one of CHAP, vii. 

the best informed practitioners for Indian maladies, said, 

that during the siege of Jellalabad he had no sickness, 

and attributed it entirely to the impossibility of obtaining 

liquor. 

As Sir C. Napier had now returned to Sukkur after 
making as it were the round of Scinde in conquest, a re- 
capitulation of his labours will not be misplaced. Short it 
shall be, yet thick with great actions. Two years only had 
elapsed since he had quitted Sukkur to war on the ameers, 
and in that time he had made the march to Emaumghur 
in the great desert, gained two great battles, reduced four 
large and many smaller fortresses, captured six sovereign 
princes, and subdued a great kingdom. He had created and 
put in activity a permanent civil administration in all its 
branches, had conciliated the affections of the different 
races inhabiting Scinde, had seized all the points of an 
intricate foreign policy, commenced a number of mili- 
tary and other well-considered public works, and planned 
still greater ones, not only suited to the exigencies of 
the moment but having also a prospective utility of 
aim. In the execution of these things he had travelled 
on camels or on horseback, at the head of troops, more 
than two thousand miles, had written, received, studied and 
decided on between four and five thousand official des- 
patches and reports — many very elaborate — besides his 
private correspondence, which was extensive, because he 
never failed to answer all persons who addressed him 
however humble or however unreasonable. He had besides, 
read, not hastily, but attentively, all the diaries of the 
collectors and sub -collectors, and had most anxiously 
considered the evidence in all capital trials. And these 
immense labours were superadded to the usual duties 
imposed by the command of a large army belonging to 
different governments, namely, of England, Calcutta, Bom- • 
bay and Madras. They were sustained without abatement 
under severe attacks of illness, at the age of sixty-three, 
by a man covered with wounds, and in a climate where 

m 2 



164 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. VII. the mercury rises to 132° in artificially-cooled tents. They 
1844 were sustained also amidst every mortification, every viru- 
lence of abuse, every form of intrigue which disappointed 
cupidity could suggest to low-minded men, sure of support 
from power, to him ungrateful but to their baseness 
indulgent and rewarding. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



165 



CHAPTER VIII. 

To chastise the robbers of the hills was now become CHAP. VIII. 
imperatiye ; for their successful incursions had so raised lQU 
Beja Khan's reputation that the ultimate consequences were 
to be dreaded. The confederates could, without reckoning 
the western mountain tribes, bring down twenty thousand 
of the most daring meu of Asia ; and behind them were 
races of the same blood and temper in greater numbers. 
Scinde contained many tribes, who could not be expected 
to remain submissive if continued incursions gave the hill 
robbers a promising position ; and a short impunity would 
have rendered the latter* s warfare as formidable as that of 
the celebrated Pindaree freebooters, who were only stronger 
by twelve thousand men when the marquis of Hastings 
thought it necessary to assemble eighty thousand troops 
to quell them. Yet they were but isolated rovers, having 
no mountain fastnesses to retreat to, no great Seikh 
army to look to for support ; nor were they held to- 
gether by any sentiment but the love of plunder, being 
men of different nations and tongues. The hillmen had a 
common language, a race, a gallant pride of ancestry, and 
a country which for ruggedness in defence is not surpassed 
in all Asia. 

It was then boast that for six hundred years no king 
had ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though 
some had tried with a hundred thousand men ; and in 
those fearful passes the British arms had also been fatally 
unsuccessful. There Clibborne had been defeated, there 
the heroic Clark and others had fallen, and there the un- 
shaken firmness of Brown but just sufficed to preserve 



166 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VIII. the lives of his men, in a chivalric defence of a fort, against 
1844 the Murrees alone. To allow snch a people to gain a 
head, and by degrees raise the hopes and warlike spirit of 
the Khelat and Scindian mountain tribes, until a hundred 
thousand uncontrollable warriors should rage over the 
plains, when the Seikh army was menacing a formidable 
warfare, would have been madness. And yet the putting 
of them down was fraught with risks which might startle 
the boldest general, while a failure would be sure to 
accelerate the danger sought to be averted. For though 
called robbers, these hillmen were not such in the European 
acceptation of the term. It was with them no ignoble 
title, and like the Greek " klepte" they thought them- 
selves, and were by others thought, to be a race of 
courageous haughty men who would not let the world 
pass without paying them toll. Their peculiar customs 
and warfare shall now be described. 

The desert of Khusmore extends from near the Chan- 
dian's capital at the foot of the Hala mountains, in a 
north-eastern direction towards the Indus, and with its 
northern edge binds in the Cutchee rocks. This desert, 

Plans l & 2. about eighty miles broad, has a hard surface, sprinkled 
here and there with tamarisk-bushes but for the most 
part destitute of water. Where water did appear it was 
at this time surrounded by a few mat huts, and in 
some places commanded by clay forts with round towers. 
These forts, seemingly despicable, were formidable from 
circumstances. In summer, the unendurable heat of 
the desert rendered it difficult to attack them, as the 
troops would have to carry water with them, to fight 
for more. In winter they could not be stormed without 
loss, because barbarians and half-disciplined warriors are 
always excellent in defence, brave as any soldiers, and 
more expert with fire-arms, being always practising. The 
matchlock also, though very inferior to the musket, fur- 
nishes means for steady aim, requiring no disturbing force 
for the discharge like a musket. Perilous therefore it is to 
assail those desert forts of clay, and the more difficult that 
the clay when hardened by the sim is elastic, and, without 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



167 



being shaken, lets a cannon-ball pass through. — there is a CHAP. VIII. 
round hole of less dimension than the shot and no more. 13 44 # 

As soldiers, the robbers were, like their forts, strong 
and terrible to deal with from circumstances. Robust 
and adroit with their weapons, and having the desperate 
courage of fatalists, they perfectly comprehended all the 
advantages of their position, and trained their animals as 
well as themselves with unceasing pains to their mode of 
warfare. On horseback or on foot, the Belooch robbers 
of the hills were men able and willing to encounter any 
foe; but like the Scots in Bruce' s time, they generally 
moved as cavalry, being mounted on small but high- 
blooded fiery mares, swift and enduring to a marvel. These 
little animals were so trained for the desert service as to 
surpass the British cavalry, regular or irregular, in retreat 
or pursuit : the latter could not get near them save by 
stratagem. The mares were taught to drink only at long 
intervals, and were at times fed with raw meat, which is said 
to increase their vigour for the time, and create less thirst. 

TvTien an expedition across the desert was to be under- 
taken, the mare's food was tied under her belly ; the man's, 
consisting of a coarse cake and sometimes a little arrack, 
was slung across his shoulders, and was generally suffi- 
cient for ten or twelve days' scanty fare ; but it was used 
only in necessity, for to the spoil the robber looked for 
subsistence. Every warrior carried one sword, many 
carried two, and so sharp they would mend a pen, for 
professional sword-whetters attended all their forays. 
These swords, broad, short, not much curved and heavy, 
were either of fine Damascus steel, or of the ditch manu- 
facture which is much esteemed. Each man carried a 
matchlock, of a small bore but long in the barrel and 
heavy, a weapon so inferior to the musket that it is Sir 
C. Napier's opinion it must soon be discarded in the East 
as in the West, and that very serious consequences will 
result from the change. The matchlock in common use 
cannot be judged of by the fine specimens sent to Eng- 
land ; there is as much difference as between a common 
musket and the sporting rifle of London. 



168 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. viii. Powder the robbers carried in flasks slung over the 
1844> shoulders,, some of them bore a long spear, and all carried 
large embossed ornamented shields, a knife, a dagger, 
flint and steel. Thus equipped, and strong in the prin- 
ciple of fatalism, to which they impute all events all 
crimes, they sallied forth resolved neither to spare nor to 
yield. " Wug" is their name for plundered cattle, but they 
call themselves Lootoos, which might be more properly 
translated spoilers than robbers ; and with all their ferocity 
they had noble qualities and customs. It was seldom they 
hurt women or children, and the recent instances had 
been generally reprobated. Nationality in the European 
sense they did not possess, but their attachment to their 
religion — the Mahometan — to their families, and to their 
tribe, was strong; blood-feuds were common, yet if two 
tribes were at war and an irresistible foreign power 
assailed either, the one so pressed would send their wives 
and children to their kindred foes as a mark of despair : 
then the feudal war ceased, and the families thus sent were 
honoured as guests. When beaten by strangers, their 
customs were terrible. Going to battle with design to 
die sword in hand, they, acting as barbarians have always 
acted from the earliest records, left trusty agents to kill 
the women and children if the fight was likely to be lost — 
a fearful custom which had a powerful influence upon Sir 
C. Napier's operations. 

When a foray was designed, the hillmen assembled at 
some watering-place, filled their leather bottles called 
" chaguls" crossed the desert, plundered a village and 
returned with such celerity, that before the frontier 
cavalry-posts could hear of the inroad the robbers were in 
full retreat. If pursued, so extreme is the reflected heat 
of the desert, from April to October, that no Europeans 
could sustain it : even the sepoys and camel-men sunk 
under its deadly influence; no effective protection could 
therefore be given during those months, although acci- 
dental surprises, such as, Captain McKenzie had effected, 
might happen. 

After the campaign it was ascertained that the tribes 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



169 



could bring altogether to the field eighteen thousand eight CHAP. VIII. 
hundred warriors, besides their armed servants ; and if J~ 
those behind, and those on the western frontier, including 
the two great jams of the Beila and Jokea countries, 
had joined in one confederacy, which impunity would 
surely have caused, more than a hundred thousand men 
would have been in arms, whose mode of fighting was 
thus described by their conqueror. — " Every man has his 
weapon ready, and every man is expert in the use of it. 
They cannot go through the manual and platoon like her 
majesty's guards, but they shoot with unerring aim ; they 
occupy a position well, strengthen it artificially with inge- 
nuity, and their rush on a foe with sword and shield is very 
determined. They crouch as they run, cover themselves 
admirably with their protruded shields, thrust them in 
their adversary's faces, and with a sword like a razor give 
a cut that goes through everything."" 

In the Cutchee hills, every discontented Asiatic could 
at this time find employment, if he had money or could 
wield a sword, and the last were not a few ; for in all those 
countries, besides the regular tribes, which may be consi- 
dered as municipal bodies, there was a very numerous class 
of gentlemen, having a following of from four to a hun- 
dred armed men, roving condottieri, who offered their 
services in every feud and every war, for food and leave to 
plunder all persons save those in whose momentary service 
they engaged. Beja Khan's renown was great, it rose 
each day of«impunity that he enjoyed, and in another year 
he would have been able to collect many thousands of 
these wandering swordsmen ; and then he would, because 
he could, if an epidemic happened to rage at Shikarpoor, 
massacre the garrison there. Lastly in those hills were 
four pieces of captured British artillery a trophy stimu- 
lating to the pride and arrogance of the barbarians. 

To the young khan of Khelat most of the robbers 
acknowledged a nominal allegiance, which they would 
readily have made real if he would have aided their war- 
fare ; and though he was personally inclined to the British 
alliance, it was against the wishes of his nobles. He was 



170 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. VIII. therefore only such a friend as a boy prince could be to 
1844, those who had killed Ins father, stormed his capital, and 
plundered his treasure — for so had the British done to 
him in the Affghan war. When restored he was governed 
by men attached to his family, who thought that during 
his minority the English were the safer support; but 
those men, secretly detesting the ally thus chosen for their 
prince, longed to revenge the death of Merab his father. 
Like the ameers, these Khelat sirdars had, before Sir C. 
Napier's arrival in Scinde, deceived the discarded political 
agent Outram, playing with his vanity, but they only 
awaited a reverse to the British arms to display their real 
feelings. 

Reflecting long and deeply on all these matters, the 
English general had proceeded very cautiously from the 
first with respect to the enterprise in hand ; and with his 
wonted prudence had combined all the subtle policy, and 
all the military force he could command to effect his 
object, counting on discipline and his own skill for the 
rest. In this view he had kept a heavy hand on Ali 
Moorad; had treated the recently submitted western 
chiefs with generosity; had awed the jams of Jokea and 
Beila ; had both aided and menaced the khan of Khelat's 
court, and had admonished the chiefs of Candahar. For 
this he had endeavoured to spread through Central Asia 
an exaggerated notion of his military power, had made so 
many complicated movements in Scinde, and used the 
camel corps to convince the western tribes that he was 
able and ready to avenge any hostility on their part. For 
this also he had publicly given Nowbutt's sword to Wullee 
Chandia, and taken some of the latter^s followers into 
pay ; giving the money to the chief as a retaining fee, 
and offering to him and the Murrees, the Doomkee and 
Bhoogtee lands. 

It was this subtle policy, coupled with the growing 
attachment of the whole Scindian population, which had 
brought the hundred and fifteen western chiefs to make 
salaam at Kurrachee, and the display of force there had 
acted powerfully on their after conduct ; but their previous 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



171 



recusancy had been principally caused by the falsehoods CHAP. VIII. 

of the Bombay faction published in the Bombay Times. 1844t 

Continually announcing the restoration of the ameers, that 

faction had disquieted all the chiefs and sirdars, and had 

actually prevented Nowbutt and Guddee from accepting 

the frequent invitations made to them for becoming good 

subjects. Those chiefs therefore died, the first in prison 

the second on the gallows, criminals indeed, but also 

miserable victims to the infamous arts of Dr. Buist and 

his employers. Nowbutt and Guddee corda 1 have been 

captured at an earlier period ; but that event was purposely 

delayed ; partly in the hope they might submit, partly that 

their sudden seizure, when the general was in their country, 

might produce a greater effect on the surrounding tribes, 

which would conduce to tranquillity while the army was 

beyond the frontier. 

During the march up the country the spies had brought 
varying intelligence of what was passing with the robber 
tribes, and with the' khan of Khelat. That prince was 
vacillating. Afraid to hold the conference at Dadur and 
equally afraid to refuse, he took a middle course, avoiding 
the meeting, while, to deprecate anger, he assembled troops 
and pretended to drive Beja Khan from Poolagee. This 
was easily seen through, and therefore the general's march 
was delayed under various pretences until the khan should 
be compelled to abandon Poolagee again from want of 
water; it being judged that Beja would then, if the whole 
were not a concerted fraud, harass him in his retreat. 
These proceedings were very embarrassing, because the 
plan for a surprise required that Beja should be at Poo- 
lagee, and nothing could be undertaken until he returned ; 
but from Fitzgerald at Larkaana, such information was 
finally obtainec^as produced a modification of the original 
scheme, and gave rise to new combinations, which cannot 
be understood until some strange and some unexpected 
obstacles have been noticed. 

Both Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Hardinge ap- 
proved of the projected campaign, and both had given dis- 
cretionary power for the execution ; but when Lord Ripon 



172 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. VIII. was informed of the matter, a scene of odious arrogance 
1844 was opened. Sir C. Napier had told him of the great loss 
of human life and property caused by the incursions of 
hillmen — had told him of the disgraces and losses which 
befel the troops, of whom and of their followers more than 
three hundred had been slain — had told him of villages in 
ashes, of whole districts abandoned by the wretched inha- 
bitants — of hundreds of murdered women and mutilated 
children I IJe had pointed out the evils to be apprehended 
from a continuance of this state of affairs, not only to 
Scinde but to all India, and shown him, that ultimately 
those robbers, then above eighteen thousand strong, besides 
their armed servants, would infallibly increase to a power- 
ful army, and force the supreme government, either to 
abandon Scinde, and with it the navigation of the Indus 
and all its prospective commercial and military advantages, 
or to keep up a great force in Scinde at an enormous 
expense, and yet still be subject to continual losses from 
the same cause. To all these representations Lord Ripon' s 
answer was, " You make too much of these trifling outpost 
affairs, which are insignificant 1 '!" 

. Such arrogant imbecility impels history beyond the 
bounds of passionless narrative. What to Lord Ripon, 
satiate with luxurious ease, were the unceasing labours of 
officers and soldiers under a sun which shrivelled up brain 
and marrow as a roll of paper is scorched up by fire? 
What to him was their devotion, what their loss of life ? 
What to him were devastated districts, ruined villages, the 
cries and sufferings of thousands driven from their homes 
by those remorseless robbers ? What to him were outraged 
women, and the screams of mutilated children, holding 
up their bleeding stumps for help to their maddened 
mothers? They were trifling, were insignificant ! For 
a moment indignation was excited in the lofty mind thus 
insulted, but it soon subsided to contempt. Lord Ripon 
was disregarded as a man devoid of sense and right feeling, 
and the expedition went on without his concurrence. 

At Bombay the reduction of the hill tribes was treated 
with ridicule. " Sir Charles was talking big — was angry — 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



173 



would destroy Poolagee when he could get there — would CHAP. VIII. 
catch Beja as children are taught to catch birds. " But 1844> 
when it became certain the attempt would be made, not 
only the Bombay Times but nearly all the other news- 
papers of India, especially the Delhi Gazette, announced 
it as a folly, a chimera, and to the utmost of their power 
endeavoured to make it so. The Agra Uckbar indeed, and 
the Bombay Gentleman's Gazette were mindful of truth and 
decency on this occasion, and it is due to the last to say 
it always was so, justifying its title ; but the other papers 
made India echo with their folly and falsehoods. Sir 
C. Napier was ignorant, he did not know how utterly 
unfit his army was to contend with the tribes in their moun- 
tains — and this trash was forced on the public in England 
also by the parasites of the Court of Directors. Even 
Indian officers of experience thought the enterprise one 
not to be effected. "Sir C. Napier was too confident 
from his previous successes — he did not know how terrible 
those mountaineers were in their fastnesses." 

So universal was this notion as to pervade even the 
army with which trial was to be made ; for though full of 
courage and willing to make every effort, there was scarcely 
an officer, high or low, who did not anticipate failure, 
and the general forbore even to mention the subject, save 
to those of his staff to whom certain preparations were 
necessarily confided. This state of feeling disquieted him ; 
for though entirely possessed with an overbearing will 
to make all things bend or break before his energy, he 
secretly trembled at the danger to the public interests 
which must ensue if he died during the campaign, seeing 
that he had no successor who viewed the enterprise as he 
did, or thought it feasible. The troops also were sure to 
have many severe trials, and the previous notion that the 
enterprise was hopeless might produce despondency at 
small failures ; but on the other hand, as the robbers had 
vast herds of cattle, which could not stand hard pursuit, 
the soldiers were as sure to make frequent prizes, and he 
trusted that stimulus, conjoined with their innate desire to 
fight, would carry them on. 



174 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. Viii. Another serious embarrassment was felt in the still 
lg 44> smouldering insubordination among the Bengal troops in 
Upper Scinde. The mutiny had been caused by injustice 
and bad management in the first instance, and neither 
Colonel Moseley's dismissal from the service, nor the exe- 
cution of so many men, had entirely suppressed it ; hence 
the experiment of marching with disaffected soldiers 
against an enemy required deep reflection. The Ben- 
galees could be sent indeed to Lower Scinde, and Bom- 
bay regiments brought up; but that involved a great 
delay ; and a disgrace which the English leader, who had 
been so well served in his battles by other Bengal troops, 
shrunk from inflicting upon men whom he knew to have 
been misled and ill treated : he preferred danger to him- 
self, and decided to employ them : but this was one of the 
reasons for bringing up the 78th, that a strong Euro- 
pean regiment might be ready to sustain accidents. His 
generous resolution proved the advantage of a good name 
with soldiers. The 64th Bengalee regiment, so recently in 
mutiny, whose leaders had been executed, and whose 
colours had been taken away, were now so ready to serve 
under Sir C. Napier that even their sick men petitioned 
from the hospital to be allowed to join the ranks, saying 
they would find strength to fight when he led them ! 

The unceasing efforts of the Bombay faction to excite 
insurrections in Scinde — efforts sure to be redoubled if 
a large force went beyond the frontiers — was another 
cause of embarrassment, because partial commotions 
might be created if any minor failures in the hills gave 
weight to the treasonable exhortations. For counteraction, 
the general trusted to his previous policy and the good- 
will of the population ; and however great these difficulties 
and obstacles were, they sunk in comparison with those 
caused by the fever, which left him not only without 
power to move against his enemies, but exposed him to 
imminent danger of being attacked and overwhelmed by 
them. His strength of mind in bearing up under so 
many and such dire impediments, always resolute to fulfil 
his mission, was not the least indication he gave of an 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



175 



overbearing energy ; for not the 78th only had been over- CHAP. VIII. 

whelmed, the sepoys and the artillery were in a similar 1844 ^ 

condition, and he was forced to keep his volunteers of the 

13th at Larkaana, lest they also should be assailed by the 

sickness. To that place likewise he sent the European Appendix V. 

artillery, without horses or guns, the men being too weak 

to take them. In fine he had only two hundred of his 

army able to stand up under arms at Sukkur, and those 

were but convalescents ! Nevertheless, firm to his purpose, 

and having obtained from the upper Sutlej the Company's 

2nd European regiment and the Bundlecund legion of all 

arms as a reinforcement, he made his final arrangements, 

as follows. 

The troops sent from the Sutlej were halted aboveBukkur 
on the left of the Indus, to form his right wing. 

The camel corps, the volunteers of the 13th and theScinde 
horsemen, stayed at Larkaana, to form his left wing. 

The irregular cavalry, artillery, engineers, sappers and 
commissariat, the reserved men of the 4th, 64th, and a 
detachment of the 69th native regiments, stationed at 
Sukkur, Shikarpoor and Khangur, composed his centre. 

\Yullee Chandia, and Ahmed Khan Mugzee who though 
a subject of Khelat offered to serve in conjunction with the 
Chandikas, were engaged to fight against all the hillmen 
save the Murrees, for with that tribe they had amicable 
relations, and the general meant to deal with it in a friendly 
manner. Wullee Chandia was thus secured as an auxiliary 
on the extreme left ; but he had no intimation of the plan 
of operations, and was led even to suppose none would 
take place that year. 

On the extreme right, Ali Moorad was to assemble his 
contingent force ; being called upon, not so much as an 
auxiliary as to keep him from mischief during the expe- 
dition; and in that view, Captain Malet, stationed as 
political agent at his court, was to accompany him in the 
field, to which he promised to move with five thousand 
men but did not bring more than two thousand. 

The cavalry of the British army was composed of the 
Scinde Moguls, the 6th and 9th irregulars, and the horse- 



176 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S 



CHAP. VIII. men of the Bundlecund legion, about two thousand 

m inaU * . 

The infantry was furnished by the Company's second 
European regiment, two weak native battalions, the foot 
of the Bundlecund legion ; and the camel corps, altogether 
two thousand five hundred. Eleven hundred convalescent 
infantry and the ordinary cavalry posts remained for the 
defence of Shikarpoore and the frontier towards the desert, 
in the event of the robbers passing between the columns 
of invasion to make a counter war. 

The siege artillery was composed of twenty-one pieces, 
of which thirteen were mortars or howitzers; the field 
artillery consisted of sixteen pieces, nine being howitzers, 
three mountain guns, and the rest six-pounders. 

During the Affghan war the tribes had been unsuccess- 
fully attacked, although they were then surrounded by 
the British armies and the allies of the British. Now they 
were sure to find towards Khelat, Afghanistan and the 
Punjaub, supporters, not enemies, and there was little 
hope to attain complete success, unless by surprise, for the 
danger of stirring up a great war would prevent pursuit 
into those countries. These obstacles were great, but ex- 
aggerated by the objectors and libellers, and the following 
extracts from the English leader's journal of operations 
show how profoundly he had considered the subject while 
those who pretended to a thorough knowledge of the 
tribes and their resources, assumed that he was ignorant, 
and predicted that his troops must be starved if they 
were not cut to pieces. 

" These barbarians must be attacked on a principle the 
reverse of that which prescribes the keeping your own 
force in masses and dividing your enemies. To drive the 
hillmen together must here be our object — their warfare 
will be to evade attacks and to surprise. They must, in 
opposition, be driven to concentration and defence ; for all 
history points out that neither barbarians nor civilized 
warriors of different tribes, or nations, agree when com- 
pressed together; and these Cutchee hillmen are pecu- 
liarly incapable of doing so, because the tribes adopt 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



177 



the personal quarrels of each member. Another rea- CHAP. VIIJ. 

son for thus operating is that they possess great herds isu. 

of cattle,, which will thus be driven together in a country 

where water is very scarce, and food for the animals still 

scarcer. These herds must then perish or fall into our 

hands at the watering-places, and the hillmen will starve 

instead of starving us, while we shall be encouraged by 

constantly recurring spoil, which will give us food ; and at 

the same time we shall get water, which, though not to be 

found in abundance, will probably be sufficient to sustain 

life during the operations. These tribes are however a 

people as well as an army, and their families and furniture 

must move with them. They cannot, as when making 

incursions into Scinde, fly about like demons on their little 

blood mares, but, pushed into masses, will feel all the 

wants and difficulties of regular troops, without having the 

same supplies and redeeming arrangements or force." 

Thus reasoning, he felt sure that with vigilance caution 
and perseverance, he could turn the difficulties of the hills, 
which the tribes trusted to, against them, and render their 
hardy habits and quickness of no avail. There was how- 
ever still a difficulty, before alluded to, and which will 
be found continually embarrassing his operations ; these 
desperate men, capable of any terrible action, might 
when pressed, cut the throats of their wives and children, 
and falling sword in hand upon the divided troops defeat 
them. To this could only be opposed great caution. The 
columns were to be strongly constituted with all arms, and 
forbid when advancing to send out detachments, but to 
employ in preference, patrols occasionally, and spies always, 
to ascertain where the masses of the enemy were. A few 
robbers might then indeed steal at night, or even by day, 
between the lines of march and be troublesome, but no 
great body could do so in such a rugged country ; where- 
fore, after due consideration of all the difficulties to be 
apprehended, General Napier thus summed up his plan of 
action. 

"To drive men, women and children, baggage and 
herds together in masses ; to use their tracks as guides ; 

N 



178 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER ? S 



CHAP. VIII. to cut off their food and water. That will make them 
1844 quarrel amongst themselves, and compel them either to 
fight a general action or surrender. On open ground they 
cannot stand before the British troops, for not more than 
eighteen or twenty thousand can appear in arms, and not 
above five or six thousand need be expected at any point. 
The result of a battle cannot therefore be doubtful, but 
I will never press a fight when the women and children 
are gathered near the armies lest they should perish." 

It was not with reference to the chances of a battle, 
but to the extensive range of hills which were to be 
assailed at all their passes simultaneously, that the number 
of troops for the campaign was fixed. Those passes were 
however of stupendous strength, and it was to be expected 
the barbarians would defend them now as they always had 
done before. Hence it was, that the artillery had been 
organized with so many mortars and howitzers, for the 
design was to dislodge matchlock-men by firing on a 
range beyond their reach, and by this distant fighting, 
at once save the troops and avoid driving these ferocious 
people to kill their wives and children. In fine the enter- 
prise was one sure to have terrible concomitants if any 
mistake was made, and therefore every resource was 
employed that a subtle genius and an overbearing will 
could bring into activity. 

In the middle of December the scheme of operation 
was ripened; but the khan of Khelat still remained at 
Poolagee with his army, and thus two native princes were, 
the one on the right the other on the left flank of the 
British force, and each sure in case of reverse to aid in 
destroying it : it might be that they would not wait for, 
but cause that reverse. To counteract mischief on the 
right the general trusted much to Captain Malet, who 
was political agent with Ali Moorad ; but still more to 
Mr. Curling, a very bold man and a distant connection of 
his own by marriage, who being in that prince's pay, was 
commander of his troops, and had great influence with 
them. Security in that quarter was however of so much 
importance, that Sir C. Napier proposed a hunting of Wild 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



179 



boars to the aineer, expecting that in the familiarity of CHAP. VIII. 
the chase he should be able to gain more insight into his 1844< 
true character than he had yet obtained. The result was 
a conviction that his good-nature and frankness were 
greater, his abilities and energy less than previously 
supposed, and no treason lurked beneath. Ali had indeed, 
when Sir H. Hardinge first arrived in India, sent a secret 
vakeel with complaints, thinking a new power would, 
according to eastern habits, overthrow all that Lord Ellen- 
borough had approved ; but he was terrified to find his 
accusations were transmitted to the general, and his vakeel 
sent back. Sir Charles, remarking that this was only 
barbarian nature, made it a subject for raillery when 
he met Ali at the chase, and the effect convinced him 
that the ameer was only weak, not treacherous or ma- 
lignant. 

To obviate mischief on the left of the army, more subtle 
measures were resorted to. The khan's movement to 
Poolagee being, as before noticed, judged a concerted 
affair with Beja, the general was desirous to draw him so 
far to the south, that he should not be able easily to com- 
municate with the robber chief, or embarrass the contem- 
plated operations. In this view, pretending to think the 
prince meant still to hold the appointed conference^ a 
letter was written to entreat that the place might be 
changed from Dadur to Gundava, because the general was 
old and feeble, and wished to be spared the fatigue of a 
long journey ; his troops also were very sickly, and dying 
so fast he could not with them undertake the enterprise 
against the hill tribes that year, but would send the Chan- 
dikas and Ali Moorad in his stead. 

This letter, delivered by the moonshee Ali Acbar, was 
calculated either to draw the khan to the south, or force 
him to disclose his real intentions ; and as it was certain 
to be made known to Beja by the Khelat sirdars, that 
robber chief would conclude that the English leader was 
really too feeble of body for such a warfare, and so be 
misled. But to insure this last object, a duplicate was 
transmitted by a channel which Beja was certain to inter- 

n 2 



180 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. VIII. cept, and thus have the same story from the intercepted 
1844. letter and from his friends in the khan's court ; and to 
give greater weight to this wile no visible preparations for 
war were made at Sukkur. 

Ali Acbar, was, if the conference was still refused, 
publicly to demand reasons, but secretly to ascertain, if 
possible the designs of the sirdars by whom the prince was 
held in pupillage. Of their enmity there could be no 
doubt, for they had recently induced the khan to excite 
Wullee Chandia to rebellion, and the stout old chieftain 
answered " I have sworn fealty and will not draw sword 
against the English sirdar." Very soon the clever and 
bold moonshee contrived to gain a private interview with 
the khan, and thus discovered that there were two factions, 
each headed by a great sirdar. The most powerful was 
openly inimical to the British ; the other had the prince's 
confidence and was not disposed to break the alliance at 
that time, but was too weak to display its real policy. 
It had therefore consented to the simulated attack on 
Beja, which the stronger party had, as suspected by the 
general, concerted with that formidable robber, of whom 
all were afraid. Indeed his implacable ferocity was so 
well known, that dread of him overbore for the moment 
even the fear of the " Sheitan-ka-Bhaee" the title now given 
to the general — in English " The Devil's Brother" But 
at this period, British and natives alike, thought Beja 
could not be subdued, and the spies and Scindian people 
were therefore very reluctant to give intelligence as to the 
nature of his country or his movements. 

The reasons assigned in private by the khan for avoiding 
the conference were conclusive. Partly founded on the 
state of his Durbar, partly on the hostile disposition of 
the Canclahar chiefs, they taught the English leader that 
if he failed at any point of his operations all the men of 
Cutchee, the Kujjucks and Khelat tribes, those of Seebee 
and the Bolan Pass, and the Affghans of Candahar, would 
be down on him like a whirlwind. The latter indeed only 
waited for an excuse, which a friendly conference with a 
Feringhee would give them, to plunder the khan's territory 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



181 



of Shawl on the west, and Beja had already virtually CHAP. VIII. 
deprived him of Cutch Gundava by laying it waste. 18 44. 

Want of water soon caused the khan to retire to Bagh, 
and Beja returned to Poolagee; whereupon, as the troops 
were then nearly ready to act, it was judged advisable to 
send another negotiator to persuade the khan to go still 
further back to the heart of his dominions, and place 
himself beyond the reach of those wild tribes who it was to 
be feared might force him to some act involving hostility 
to the British government. This advice was enforced to 
his highness by pointing out that he would thus be ready 
to make head against the Affghans who were menacing 
him, and be more sure of support from the British army. 
The principal object however was to remove him so far 
from Ah Moor ad's line of operations, that no combination 
for uniting and falling on the British rear could be easily 
effected. Such an event was indeed unlikely, but always 
Sir C. Napier extended his precautions in war beyond the 
immediate and probable. He designed also by this and 
Ah Achats mission, to give a mysterious character to his 
proceedings which might embarrass Beja and his friends 
in the Khelat court ; and with these views, and that all 
forms might be observed, he sent on the 27th of December 
the government secretary Brown, who was an intimate 
friend of the khan, with a public mission to demand his 
assent in writing to the British army entering his domi- 
nions for the punishment of Beja and his confederates. 
This assent was given, but Brown on his return narrowly 
escaped a band of robbers sent by Beja to intercept him : 
they had come eighty miles without a halt, and he owed 
his safety principally to the intelligence of Aliff Khan, the 
strong swordsman, who was with the escort. 

In January 1845, all things being ready for the cam- 
paign, Sir C. Napier issued a manifesto embodying a de- 
claration of war against the Jackranees, Doomkees, and 
Bhoogtees. It stated their offences and their disregard of 
their own prince's alliance ; then announcing the measures 
taken to obtain an interview with the khan, it declared 
the reasons given by that prince for declining it were 



182 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. viii. satisfactory. It announced that the young khan, avowedly 
1845. unable to coerce his subjects, had consented that the 
English should repay their inroads on Scinde, and an army 
was going to chastise them in their hills. The causes 
of war, the means taken to avoid it, their failure and the 
justice of a recourse to arms, were then set forth with a 
force and clearness which left Beja and his confederates 
nothing but their fierce courage and their strong fast- 
nesses to rest on. It was also announced that the 
Beloochees, opponents at Meeanee, were now fighting on 
the British side : and lest the Seikhs and the distant tribes 
should take alarm, as thinking he was commencing a new 
scheme of conquest, the manifesto finished by declaring 
that when the robbers were suppressed the British army 
would return to Scinde. 

Previous to issuing this document, the Bundlecund 
legion and the other Bengal troops sent from Feroze- 
poore, had been directed to form a camp at Subzulcote, 
where General Simpson, and Colonel Geddes, commandant 
of artillery, went privately to ascertain their condition; 
because Sir C. Napier, carefully avoiding all military 
show, sought by all means to mislead the enemy's spies 
and induce them to believe he was, as his double letter had 
said, disposed to defer the campaign. Meanwhile he des- 
patched a letter to Major Broadfoot, political resident 
with the Seikhs, desiring him to demand a strict neu- 
trality, and that the hillmen should be debarred entrance 
to the Punjaub, unless the dewan of Mooltan would allow 
the British troops to pass through that country to Deyra. 
This condition was made because the Bengal troops were 
in very fine condition, and he designed that Simpson 
should take the command and pass the Indus at Subzul- 
cote, with a view to cross the Mooltan country and enter the 
Cutchee hills from the east, in combination with the main 
attack from the south. But just then became known 
Heera Sing's death at Lahore, and that the Punjaub was 
all in commotion ; wherefore, vexing as it was to change 
a well-considered plan at the moment of starting, Sir 
C. Napier felt that in such a state of affairs to pass 



ADMINISTRATION OP SC1NDE. 



183 



through the Seikh territory, even with leave, might pro- chap. viii. 
duce a collision embarrassing to the governor-general, and 
possibly produce a war. He foresaw indeed that a war Appendix x. 
must soon happen, but resolved not to be a cause of 
it, and calling Simpson down, fixed the point of concen- 
tration for the whole army on the edge of the desert. 

A short time before this, the Murrees and Bhoogtees 
had fought again, and the Murrees, declaring themselves 
victors, agreed to aid the British expedition, an event 
which now determined the new mode of attack. 

The hills to be invaded, approached the Indus on the 
east, but on the north-west joined the great Soleyman SeePiansi&2. 
and Khelat mountains. Northward they touched the 
Mooltan country, and between them and the river was 
thrust the narrow Mazaree district belonging to Mooltan. 
On the south was the desert of Kusmore, and from that 
side they could only be entered by terrible denies. But 
these hills, or rather rocky ranges were narrow though of 
great length, and if an army could pass the desert by sur- 
prise, seize the denies, and throw its left across the ranges so 
as to command all the gorges of the long ravines between 
the ridges, the hillmen would be cut off from the western 
mountains and must either fight, retreat into Mooltan, or 
be driven on to the Indus. For the Murrees would hem 
them in on the north, and it was only necessary for the 
left of the army to connect itself with that tribe to render 
a subsequent advance between the long ridges towards the 
Indus effectual. 

In this view, Wullee Chandia and Ahmed Khan Mugzee 
were suddenly ordered to cross the desert on a given day, 
so as to reach Poolagee at dusk; and it was calculated, 
that so arriving, Beja, who was known to have intercepted 
the letter to the khan of Khelat, seeing in accordance 
with its contents only Chandikas and Mugzees, would be 
little disturbed and await the dawn to go out and attack 
them. But three hours' march behind Wullee, who had 
orders to sweep all spies and scouts before him, Fitzgerald, 
moving from Larkaana, was to approach with the camels, 
carrying his own men and two hundred volunteers of the 



184 



SIR CHARLES NAPTER 5 S 



CHAP. VIII. 13th regiment. From the same place also, at a fixed time, 
1845 Jacob's Moguls, five hundred strong, were to follow Fitz- 
gerald; and it was thought these British troops might 
perhaps, in the night, file unobserved, so as to place Beja 
between two fires when he came out in the morning to 
fall on the Chandikas. Head-quarters, with an advanced 
guard, were to precede the main body, which from Sukkur 
was to move the same day that Jacob quitted Larkaana ; 
and both were to reach the frontier simultaneously, at the 
moment when all communication between Beja and his 
spies would be cut off by the advance of Wullee and 
Fitzgerald. All the supplies of food and spare ammu- 
nition, and camels to carry water in case the enemy 
poisoned the wells in the desert, had been previously pre- 
pared to attend the troops as closely as possible; and a 
corps of artificers, pioneers and well -sinkers, had been 
organized to mend broken gun-carriages, open roads and 
seek for water. They carried with them an abundant 
supply of iron punchers, steel rods to repair them, and 
quick lime, which in blasting rocks saves powder ; and the 
army was also attended by the Kaherees, a small tribe 
driven from Poolagee, their own country, some ten years 
before by Beja: they were now serving as guides, and it 
was intended to restore them to their lands. The prepara- 
tions for opening the campaign were however necessarily 
contracted, having been made very secretly to confirm 
Beja in the belief that no general movement would be 
undertaken; but to counteract this defect the general 
trusted to moral influences and was not deceived. And 
here also, as on his first assuming command, he accepted 
omens of success ; for like many great captains his ten- 
dency was to augur good or ill from natural events. 

On the 16th of January 1809, he had been desperately 
wounded and taken prisoner in Spain. On the 16th of 
January 1843, he had crossed the Scindian frontier to 
war with the ameers ; Wullee Chandia was then menacing 
his rear, and a brilliant comet was streaming in the sky. 
Now, on the 16th of January 1845, being again crossing 
the Scindian frontier in a contrary direction for another 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



185 



contest, Wullee Chandia was leading his advanced guard CHAP. VIII. 
instead of menacing his rear, and the effulgence of 1845> 
another comet was widely spread on high ! " How these 
things affect the minds of men" he observed "at least 
they do mine. They have not indeed much influence 
with me, but they have some and it is useful. Well ! 
God's will be done, whether evinced by signs or not. All 
I have to think of is my duty." And with that feeling, 
conscious of having a just cause, he commenced the war. 



186 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAPTER IX. 

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HILLMEN. 

CHAP. IX. Towards the desert, the Cutchee hills presented in 
1Mb. their length several points of entrance, five of which 
were immediately within the scope of the operations, 
namely, Poolagee, Tonge, Zurekooshta or Zuranee, Gon- 
dooee, and Sebree, reckoning from left to right of the 

Plans l & 2. British front. Beyond Tullar was the defile of Tonge ; 

beyond Zurekooshta the double defiles of Lnllee and 
Jnmmuck. 

Fronting these entrances and nearly in a parallel line, 
were the watering-places of the desert. Chuttur on the 
west leading to Poolagee ; Ooch more eastward leading to 
Zurekooshta ; Shahpoor, between them, a walled village 
from whence either Poolagee or Tullar might be assailed. 

Bojan and Khangur on the Scindian side of the desert 
were the permanent English cavalry posts; they faced 
Poolagee, Shahpoor and Ooch, but had the waste between 
them and those places. 

Behind Rojan were Larkaana and Jull, from whence 
Fitzgerald, Jacob, the Chandikas and the Mugzees, were 
to start for the surprising of Poolagee. 

Behind Khangur, were Shikarpoore and Sukkur, from 
whence the head- quarter column and AH Moorad's con- 
tingent were to move against the hills. 

The frontier was not crossed before the 16th of January, 
but the campaign was opened the 13th by an advanced 
guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the 
general from Sukkur to Shikarpoore, a distance of twenty- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



187 



six miles. Colonel Geddes had previously organized the CHAP. IX. 
artillery park and a corps of artificers at the former 1845 
place, whence a detachment of sappers, miners, and 
well-diggers pushed forward the same day to Khangur, 
under the indefatigable Lieutenant Maxwell of the Bengal 
Engineers, an officer of extraordinary hardihood, mental 
and bodily. The infantry the artillery and the com- 
missariat remained under the Brigadiers Hunter and 
Simpson, but with instructions to march at a stated time, 
* and to be followed at a later period by Ali Moorad. 
Meanwhile Jacob and Fitzgerald, the Chandikas and the 
Mugzees, had orders to commence their march also on the 
13th to surprise Poolagee: thus the troops were put in 
sudden and rapid movement to the front, simultaneously 
from the right and left of the long line of frontier. 

On the 14th a march of thirteen miles brought the 
general with his advanced guard of cavalry and a battery 
of horse-artillery to Jaghur, and on the 15th he reached 
Khangur after a march of sixteen miles. Jacob had that 
clay reached Rojan, fourteen miles west of Khangur, but 
by a terrible march through the desert, men and horses 
sinking from fatigue and thirst, because the camel corps, 
which preceded them, had exhausted all the wells in the 
desert, and many horses had died. 

, At Khangur the spies came in with news that Beja 
Khan, deceived by the intercepted letter, knew nothing 
of the British movement, and had forces at Shahpoor 
thirty-five miles in advance. This unexpected informa- 
tion, and Jacob's distress, rendered the first plan of sur- 
prising Poolagee inapplicable; and Sir C. Napier like a 
great captain instantly changed his whole scheme of 
operations — arguing thus. U If Wullee Chandia be true, 
he will this night attack Poolagee, and though Jacob's 
horsemen are too distressed to reach that place for the 
morning combination, they can reach Shahpoor; and an 
attack there, coupled with that of the Chandikas at Poo- 
lagee, will still drive the hillmen eastward and cut them 
off from the western mountains, which is the first great 



188 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. IX. object of the campaign. Ooch is the next watering-place 
1845. eas t °f Shahpoor, and only sixteen miles from it : to Ooch 
then, the enemy will naturally retire unless he defeats 
Jacob at Shahpoor, and Beja may still be intercepted." 

The head-quarter troops had then marched sixteen 
miles, and the distance to Ooch was forty, through heavy 
sand, where a single shower of rain would wash out all 
traces and bewilder the most skilful guides. This distance 
and difficulty seemed to forbid the effort ; but the perma- 
nent irregular cavalry post of Khangur under Captain 
Salter, and two mountain-guns under Lieutenant Pulman, 
being fresh, were forthwith despatched against Ooch, and 
Jacob received orders to move against Shahpoor. Scarcely 
had Salter been lost to the sight, when fresh intelligence 
arrived ; many chiefs with a strong force were already in 
possession of Ooch, and Shahpoor was still occupied as 
before. This news alarmed the general for Salter, whose 
ability he had not proved in action ; he feared he might 
be beaten, and notwithstanding his own previous march, 
the great distance to Ooch, and the chance of losing his 
way, having as guides only two Kaheree chiefs whose skill 
was doubtful, he followed with two hundred of the 6th 
irregular cavalry and two pieces of horse-artillery under 
Captain Mowat. And these high-spirited soldiers, excited 
to enthusiasm by the energy of their leader, actually, 
added those forty miles over heavy sand to their previous 
march, within the twenty-four hours ! 

At daybreak on the 18th the vicinity of Ooch was 
attained, but the general, who had then been above 
twenty-six hours on horseback and oppressed with con- 
stant thought, had fallen asleep in his saddle. A sudden 
halt of the advanced guard, with which he was moving, 
awakened him; lights had been perceived not far off 
and the enemy must be close at hand. Although un- 
easy not to have found traces of Salter, he resolved to 
wait only for his own main body, form a column of 
attack, and gallop at daylight headlong into the midst of 
the enemy supposed to be in front. But during his very 
short slumber, the column and guns had gone astray, and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



189 



he was left with, only fifty tired horsemen close, as he CHAP. IX. 
imagined, to a numerous and formidable enemy. 18 45. 

At daybreak Captain McMurdo, who had ascended a 
sand-hill in front, returned hastily with intelligence that 
he had seen Beloochees firing in the plain beyond ; this 
was embarrassing, for the general somewhat doubted 
the firmness of the native horsemen with him in such a 
perilous crisis ; yet he would not retire, but merely moving 
out of matchlock-range from the sand-hill ascended by 
McMurdo, awaited the coming event, and at that critical 
moment his lost troops and guns suddenly emerged from 
behind another sand-hill ! This happy accident having 
rendered him again master of his movements, he sent 
scouts towards the firing, which was dropping not con- 
tinuous, and found that not the enemy but Salter was 
in front. He had engaged and defeated seven hundred 
hillmen in the night, and the shots were from his videttes 
to keep off prowling parties, seeking to steal back some of 
the spoil. He had found the robbers, under Deyrah Khan 
Jackranee, in a position covered on three sides by the 
rocks but open on the fourth, and had vigorously charged 
them. At first, from the darkness, he missed their line, 
sweeping along the front instead of plunging into it, but 
soon recovering he rode straight upon them and they 
dispersed, leaving many dead. Some prisoners were taken, 
with above three thousand head of cattle, and twice that 
number of cattle would have been captured but for the 
extreme fatigue of men and horses, for the hills in front 
were covered with scattered herds. 

When the second camp was pitched, a knowledge of the 
prowling warfare and ferocity of the robber warriors 
induced Sir C. Napier to order that no man should go 
beyond certain precincts. But always a certain thought- 
less negligence where personal danger is involved, cha- 
racterizes young British officers and soldiers. Captain 
John Napier, the general's nephew, McMurdo his son-in- 
law, and Lieutenant Byng his aide-de-camp, seeing small 
bands of the hillmen assembling on a rocky height in 
front, as if to save the distant herds, went towards them. 



190 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IX. As they approached, fearing an ambuscade, Byng was 
sent back for some cavalry, but the two others soon had 
occasion to acknowledge the prudence of their general; 
for round a rocky knoll came galloping a gallant robber 
mounted on a small mare of great activity, himself of a 
fine presence, clothed in a wadded armour, and bearing a 
matchlock and two swords : he had a fine courage also, 
or he would not have hovered so close to the camp 
with such a pageantry of weapons immediately after a 
defeat. 

McMurdo fell upon him sword in hand, and some time 
they fought, wheeling in circles and closing without ad- 
vantage on either side, save that the mare was wounded. 
Napier looked on, too chivalric to interfere in so fair a 
fight, but at last McMurdo, who had already ridden the 
same horse sixty miles, said, John, I am tired, you may 
try him. The other, of a slight make, but with as bright 
and clear a courage as ever animated a true English youth, 
advanced, and all three were soon at fall speed — the 
Beloochee making a running fight. Suddenly the latter 
turned in his saddle and aimed with his matchlock, 
being then only a horse's length in front ; it missed fire, 
and as Napier rapidly discharged his pistol, McMurdo, a 
man of ungovernable fierceness in combat, thinking the 
report was from the matchlock unfairly used, dashed 
pistol in hand past his comrade — who in vain called out 
not to kill — and shot the daring fellow as he was drawing 
his second sword. Then ensued a scene singularly cha- 
racteristic. The young men alighted, McMurdo reproach- 
ing himself for using a pistol when they were two to one, 
and both with great emotion tried to stop the blood flowing 
from their dying antagonist, while he, indomitable, clufeched 
at his weapon to give a last blow : he was unable to do so 
and soon after expired. 

From the camp now came succour, for the two officers were 
in danger from the vicinity of the dead man's prowling 
comrades, but to view the body of the fallen Beloochee was 
all that remained to be done. The general's first impulse had 
been to gallop out hinself, but the recollection of his high 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



191 



calling checked him, and he left the result to fortune — CHAP. IX. 
expressing afterwards his displeasure at the whole pro- 1845. 
ceeding as contrary to discipline, contrary to prudence, 
and in his mind contrary to a just principle, which forbade 
even in war the shedding of any blood not absolutely ne- 
cessary for the general success. He had however another 
scene of more painful interest to endure. Having found 
a native officer of the 6th irregular cavalry, named Azeem 
Beg, lying on the ground mortally hurt, he alighted and 
endeavoured to alleviate his suffering and give him hope 
of recovery. " General, replied the dying hero, "lam 
easy, I have done my duty. I am a soldier, and if fate 
demands my life I cannot die better- — your visit to me is a 
great honour" So he died ! " These are the things," 
Sir C. Napier wrote in his journal just after this touching 
event, "these are the things which try the heart of a 
commander ; and accursed, he adds — alluding to the slan- 
derous assertions of Lord Howick and his coadjutors — See Conquest 
" accursed be those who in the House of Commons accused of Scmde - 
me of seeking war in wantonness." They were not worth 
this passing invective, their miserable calumny was scorn- 
fully rejected and crushed at its birth by the English feeling 
of their auditors. 

About midday, when the camp had been pitched, came 
a horseman from Jacob to say he also had surprised and 
defeated the hillmen under Wuzzeer Khan, Beja's son ; 
whereupon the general, notwithstanding his previous 
fatigue rode to Shahpoor and found that the enemy had 
been, as at Ooch, completely deceived by the letters written 
to the khan of Khelat. At both places, supposing the 
troops attacking them in the night were Chandikas and 
Mugzees, they had resisted until the vigour and skill of 
the fighting convinced them of their error ; then they fled; 
and Jacob had so disciplined his wild Moguls that not a 
hillman who surrendered was hurt, although the Moguls 
had been forced to storm one house defended by sixty rob- 
bers, who after killing or wounding six assailants threw 
down their arms when the door was broken. It was a 
fine example of generous discipline. 



192 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. IX. Two chiefs and eighty men had been captured, a new 
1845 phase in Scindian warfare, for hitherto remorseless slaugh- 
ter on both sides had marked every fight. Six chiefs and 
above a hundred men had been killed or wounded in the 
two attacks, which cost the British only eighteen men ; 
and it was reported that while battling at Ooch the 
robbers, until then firm, on hearing Salter's artillery cried 
out " The Sheitan-ka-Bhaee himself is there," and instantly 
fled — so great a dread had his actions created. Thus the 
desert was overcome by a finely-conceived and masterly 
change in the operations, suddenly adopted, enforced with 
astonishing energy, and wonderfully sustained by the 
troops, whose enduring strength may be compared with 
that of any soldiers ancient or modern. For the men with 
the general had marched without halting, fifty-six miles ; 
those with Jacob fifty miles; those with Salter forty 
miles, through deep sand. For forty miles also Jacob's 
cavalry had been followed in the waste by a body of 
police infantry under Lieutenant Smallpage ! And while 
all these hardy soldiers thus broke through the desert, 
their general was in the saddle for thirty hours, riding over 
seventy-two miles of ground — the last sixteen during a 
violent sand-storm, very oppressive to exhausted men 
and horses. It was only in Shahpoor, after writing 
his despatches and issuing orders for concentrating the 
infantry and artillery, which were now to close up, that 
he first took rest ! 

Tins triple success — for the true and valiant Chandian 
had at the same time taken Poolagee — again induced a 
change in the plan of operations. The enemy had volun- 
tarily thrown himself into the eastern hills, and the 
original design of moving direct upon Poolagee and con- 
necting the left of the army with the Murrees, was entirely 
relinquished. The principle of cutting off the hillmen 
from the west, and driving them up their long ravines 
remained indeed the same, but they had themselves short- 
ened the operation by abandoning the western ranges. 
Salter therefore remained at Ooch and Jacob's cavalry was 
detached to Poolagee and Lheree, to hold those places, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



193 



and in concert with the Chandikas to awe the Khelat CHAP. IX. 
tribes. The infantry, the artillery, and all the supplies i 8 4 5 . 
were directed upon Shahpoor, where a magazine for 
fourteen days' consumption was formed, which would have 
been twice as large, if the necessity of keeping Beja and 
his confederates deceived as to the movements had not 
restricted the previous preparations. 

Jacob's cavalry and the Chandikas being thus thrown 
across the hills towards the Murrees, the army occupied 
two sides of a square, one of which menaced the passes 
from the desert on the south ; the other was in posses- 
sion of the western mouths of the long parallel valleys, 
or rather ravines, which split the hills in their length 
towards the Indus. 

Looking from Poolagee, to the east, those ravines were Plans l & 2. 
as follows : — 

On the right hand, the ravine of Tonge was prolonged 
eastward, until it was lost in the crags of the Mazaree 
district near the Indus. It could only be entered from the 
south by the cross denies of Zuranee, Gondooee and Sebree, 
leading through an almost perpendicular wall of rocks. 

Next to and parallel with Tonge, was the ravine of the 
Illiassee river ; into which the only cross entrance was the 
defile of Jummuck leading over a rocky range, impassable 
save at that point. 

From the Illiassee ravine several defiles gave entrance to 
the parallel ravine of the Teyaga stream, which, in the 
centre, was called the Valley of the Tomb, and more east- 
ward the Valley of Deyrah. Into this ravine a shorter 
one opened, down which the Sungseela torrent came from 
the north-eastward, to fall into the Teyaga, flowing west- 
ward. These rivers are however mere beds of torrents, 
dry except in heavy rain : the Teyaga, the only continu- 
ally-flowing stream, was but a yard wide at Deyrah, and 
the whole region is horribly arid. 

Northward of all these ravines was a rocky range, sepa- 
rating the Murrees from the other tribes but pierced by 
the defiles of Sartoof and Nufoosk. 

With the desert behind, and this arid region, these 

o 



194 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER ? S 



CHAP. IX. craggy passes before him, the desolate nature of which 
1845* can on ty ^ e com P renen( ied by reference to the plans and 
views, the English general, while impatiently awaiting the 
arrival of his infantry, his guns and stores, thus described 
his position on the 18th of January. 

" To-morrow all the gorges will be plugged up by the 
cavalry, and Beja Khan is, I am sure, on this south side of 
the rocks, between a low ridge which hides him from us 
and a higher range on the north. I have examined Yarroo 
Khosa, the guide, this morning, and he says there is plenty 
of water at Tullar and very little at Tonge, but at Zuranee 
it is excellent and plentiful. I think it scarcely possible 
that water should abound at Tullar and Zuranee, and yet 
be scarce and bad at Tonge, wherefore I believe Yarroo is 
in Beja's hands, and that chief is at Tonge : however Yarroo 
and I have agreed that we cannot go there." 

This double-dealer being thus blinded, Jacob was directed 
to block the gorges of the ravines opening on Lheree and 
Poolagee, with six hundred horsemen and two guns, while 
Ahmed Khan Mugzee moved up the Teyaga into the 
Tomb ravine. Wullee Chandia was to scour that of Tonge, 
the Chandikas being, as the general observed, good feelers. 
He designed to move himself by Ooch upon the Zuranee 
pass, he directed AH Moorad on the Gondooee, there to 
wait until the enemy was pushed upwards. By these 
dispositions he secured the western entrances of the hills, 
and could block the cross defiles from the south, while 
the Chandikas and Mugzees explored two of the ravines 
in their length and ascertained the real positions of the 
hillmen ; and always he expected to capture cattle at the 
watering-places and so deprive the enemy by degrees of 
subsistence. Nor did he judge it dangerous to push for- 
ward the Chandikas and Mugzees in this isolated manner, 
because the recent surprises would inevitably lead the 
enemy to think they only masked the approach of the 
British forces as before. 

From some negligence or error, the infantry, the artil- 
lery park, and the commissariat stores, did not come up 
in due time, and nothing could be done in the hills without 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



195 



the first. Nevertheless,, on the 20th, having first permitted CHAP. IX. 

the families of the prisoners to join them, making arrange- 1845 

ments for their support with a liberal regard to humanity, 

he began his movement on Ooch, his intention being to 

force all the rocky passes on the south front immediately. 

But never did a campaign more entirely depend upon the 

prompt genius of a commander than this. There were no 

maps, the country was inexpressibly intricate and austere, 

the movements were governed by the finding of water, the 

spies all dreaded Beja and the guides were from fear, 

rendered his agents. Each day brought a new difficulty, 

or new information to cause a change in the plan of 

operations — and to all this was added an embarrassment, 

before alluded to, which seldom troubles generals in war, 

namely, the dread of forcing the robbers to a decisive 

battle near their families, lest they should butcher them 

when the day was going hard. This indeed he dreaded 

so much, that between the 20th and the 22nd, stoically 

humane, he twice rejected opportunities of destroying Beja 

while moving across the British front, because his family, 

and the families of his sons and chiefs, were with him. 

At Ooch, the spies said that Tonge, into which the 
Doomkee chief had first thrown himself, was a place of 
singular formation ; being an immense basin, formed by 
rocks whose summits were inaccessible on the outside but 
easy of ascent from the inside. The only inlet was a small 
tunnel, made by a streamlet of pure water, which fell 
from the higher part of the rocks on the opposite part of 
the basin inside ; in former wars it had been turned tempo- 
rarily by the hillmen so as to fall fourteen miles from the 
tunnel by the outward circuit, and the assailants, having 
the desert at their backs, were thus forced to retire from 
thirst : the more provident English leader was furnished 
with water-skins and well-diggers for such an occasion, 
and designed to block the tunnel and starve the defenders. 
Meanwhile Wullee Chandia, having swept the outer valley 
leading up towards Tonge, killed several Bhoogtees and 
captured a large flock of goats, so alarmed Beja by these 
movements, that he abandoned his fastness and fled across 

o 2 



196 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



3AP - IX - the front of the troops at Ooch towards Zuranee ; escaping 
1845. capture, as noticed above, because bis enemy was more com- 
passionate for the women and children than he would him- 
self have been. During this flight however, his followers 
left him in great numbers, and went to Belooch Khan of 
Lheree, who pretended to be friendly with the British ; but 
the general, thinking this reception of the Doomkees no 
proof of friendship, suspected a concerted scheme to or- 
ganize a force on his flank, and therefore directed Jacob 
to treat Belooch Khan roughly, and even, if necessary, 
arrest and send him to head-quarters. 

The Chandikas, reinforced with a squadron of cavalry, 
were now placed at Tullar in observation of the Tonge 
defile, because the latter was a good watering-place not- 
withstanding Yarroo's tale; and though more correct 
information had stripped it of the marvellous strength at 
first reported, it was a fastness great and difficult to assail. 
Colonel Geddes was then sent with a column of all arms 
to Zuree-Kooshta, opposite the Zuranee defile, and the 
troops were becoming eager for battle ; yet the march of 
head-quarters was deferred, because hourly varying circum- 
stances presented new combinations—" There is no need 
for haste," observed the general on the 21st in his journal 
of operations — " A check at any point might force me to 
retrograde ; that would be dishonouring, and weaken the 
effect of the first surprise. My army hems the enemy in 
on the south and west — the Murrees hem him in on the 
north — Ali Moorad ought to be now marching on the Gon- 
dooee defiles, and the hillmen's provisions are decreasing, 
while mine are increasing by the arrival of supplies and the 
captures of cattle. All the young men are eager for 
fighting, but I will not indulge them unless Beja goes to 
the Zuranee defile, — for I must force the passes there — 
meanwhile every man's life ought to be as dear to me as 
my own, and I will not lose any by provoking fights with 
small detachments, to hasten results when my measures 
are, it appears to me, sufficient to insure final success." 

In this mood he remained at Ooch until the 25th of 
January, intent to spare life as much as possible, and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



197 



always dreading that a premature advance should bring CHAP. ix. 

the robbers to action while their families were with them, ~~T 

an event the contemplation of which filled him with 

horror, His movements were thus clogged, and many 

advantages designedly let slip ; for nothing could shake 

his resolution not to have the blood of women and children 

swelling the red stream which the terrible actions of the 

robbers had forced him to set flowing. Nor did he spare 

moral means to avoid so horrible a catastrophe. After 

Salter's action, eleven men and sixteen women, amongst 

them the mother of Deyrah Khan J ackranee and the wife 

of Toork Ali, were found in a cave, and transferred with 

marked respect to the care of a Syud or holy man, who 

held a jagheer on the tenure of applying its revenue to 

the succour of the poor — and such obligations of charity 

are seldom violated amongst the Mahometans. By this 

Syud the humanity of the English leader was made known, 

and, coupled with the previous good treatment of the 

prisoners' families at Shahpoor, not only abated the horror 

felt by the hillmen at having their women fall into the 

power of Caflir enemies, but finally influenced Toork Ali 

and Deyrah Khan to surrender. 

On the 18th Ali Moor ad should have been in front of 
the Gondooee defile, but he had halted for the feast of 
the Moharem and did not arrive until the 31st — a very 
serious failure, as will be seen further on. 

On the 23rd rain fell, which was useful for filling the 
wells, but otherwise inconvenient ; on that day however, 
Hunter reached Ooch with a sepoy battalion and the 2nd 
Bengal Europeans, the latter, strong well-set men, " not 
biff, but with a big spirit " was the remark of their chief 
whom they now saw for the first time. Simpson about the 
same period got to Shahpoor with the other sepoy bat- 
talion, and the Bundlecund legion : thus the whole army 
was assembled on the north side of the desert, and the 
magazines were now filled for two months. 

On the 25th the general, unable to ascertain either the 
real numbers or the positions of the enemy, but supposing 
them to be assembled for the defence of the Zuranee and 



198 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. ix. Gondooee defiles, marched on the first point, but with 
1845 design closely to examine the positions before he assailed 
them. Meanwhile he directed Simpson to march with a 
column of all arms combined, from Shahpoor upon Poolagee, 
and from thence push up the Tomb valley upon Deyrah, a 
distance of seven marches. Scouring that valley in its 
length, he was to turn the cross defiles of Lullee and 
Jummuck while the main body assailed them in front. 
The army was thus disseminated in many columns, on 
the principle of warfare originally designed; but each 
column was so strongly constituted, and the hillmen were 
still so dispirited by the first surprises at Ooch and Shah- 
poor that no counter attack was to be dreaded: it was 
expected also that rumour would exaggerate Simpson's 
numbers, and the movements were not made without a 
military connection calculated to secure the army against 
any great disaster. Simpson, while moving up the Teyaga, 
had Jacob's cavalry and guns behind him in support, and 
the places of Lheree and Poolagee to fall back upon. 
The Chandikas and the squadron of cavalry, when at 
Tullar, were supported by Shahpoor, where a garrison of 
all arms under Captain Jamieson remained to guard the 
magazines : Shahpoor indeed, from its central position, 
gave equal support to Simpson and to the Chandikas, and 
was the place of arms for the whole movement. 

No longer counting on Ali Moorad, the general now 
resolved to assemble at Zuree Kooshta a powerful force for 
offensive operations, and he effected this on the 26th ; but 
only by forced and distressing marches, which nearly 
destroyed the sumpter camels; the nights also were so 
cold that the shivering sepoys could scarcely endure the 
change — three died — but the Europeans became more 
vigorous. 

At Zuree Kooshta, it was ascertained that Beja had gone 
through the Lullee defile, that he had been joined by the 
Bhoogtees and Jackranees, that he was prepared to fight, 
and his ground was surprisingly strong. Wherefore, 
thinking sufficient time had been given for the women 
and children to gain distant fastnesses, the English leader 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



199 



resolved to attack. He designed however, following his CHAP. IX. 
original notion, to dislodge his foes by powerful mortar 1345. 
and howitzer batteries if possible, and thus spare an in- 
fantry fight which could not fail to prove murderous for 
his own army. 

On the 28th the troops advanced, but found no enemy 
to deal with. Simpson's movement had been, as foreseen, 
magnified into the approach of a great army, and the 
defiles of Lullee and Jummuck had been abandoned 
when he had only made three marches, one of which, 
from the extreme ruggedness of the ground was but of 
four miles. The English camp was now pitched between 
the Lullee and Jummuck passes, the space between them 
being about five miles. Good water was found, though 
not enough for a large force ; but afterwards, near the 
summit of the Jummuck range, or ghaut, an abundance 
was discovered ; and as these passes were points of great 
importance, a redoubt and other works were immediately 
traced for securing them. The defiles being thus gained, 
a trusty cossid was despatched to Simpson with orders to 
continue his march to Deyrah, by which his column was 
again linked to the main body, and thus the general 
movement was as successful in all its parts as the first had 
been ; for the rocky region had been penetrated without 
loss, and an irregular transverse front was thrown across the 
parallel ravines, so as to block up all the western gorges 
and connect the left of the army with the Murrees. But 
though the tribes had abandoned these almost impregna- 
ble passes, showing their ignorance of scientific warfare, 
their prowling murderous bands infested the camp, and 
soldiers and followers who strayed beyond the sentries 
were killed without mercy. It was in vain to order that 
no man should go beyond the lines, the orders were dis- 
obeyed and daily losses ensued. 

To ascertain the enemy's course was now the object 
to attain. His strongest hold was said to be amongst 
the desolate crags of Trukkee, but though celebrated all 
over Asia their real situation was at this time a mystery 
which neither guide nor spy cared to disclose ; so fearful 



200 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. ix. were they of Beja's after-vengeance, and so sure that he 
1845. would be finally victorious : Trukkee was however at no 
great distance from the Jummuck pass, being ensconced 
in the ridge which separates the Deyrah valley from the 
Sungseela ravine. In this state the following questions 
were to be considered. Would the robbers throw them- 
selves into Trukkee and fight their last desperate battle 
amongst its terrible rocks ? Or would they make a push 
to break or evade Jacob's and Simpson's forces, and so 
getting through the western gorges gain the Khelat 
mountains, whither they could not be followed? This 
last was not much to be feared; the hillmen were too 
numerous, too much encumbered with their families, bag- 
gage and herds, to slip between the columns ; moreover, 
issuing from Tonge they would be met by the Chandikas 
and Mugzees ; and issuing from the Illiassee they would 
be met by Jacob ; in the Teyaga ravine Simpson would 
oppose them, and at Sartoof they would have the Murrees 
to fight. They were indeed more numerous than any of 
these separated divisions, but the country was so strong 
for defence there could be no fear. 

Trukkee remained, but it was soon ascertained that 
Simpson's column, which had frightened them from Jum- 
muck, had also deterred them from going across the 
ravine of the Tomb, which, as it approached Deyrah, 
spread out into a spacious valley. Trukkee therefore was 
not their object then. There was a third course open, 
namely, to make eastward for the Mazaree hills, which 
abounded with fastnesses even more inaccessible and aus- 
tere than the rocks they had just abandoned ; and there 
the general desired to drive them, for the following rea- 
sons. — Barbarian communities, having less to spare of the 
necessities of life and less confidence in each others' faith, 
are more sensitive to intrusions than civilized communi- 
ties ; and here the Jackranees and Doomkees would be 
driven refluent upon the Bhoogtees, who were already 
suffering from a dearth, and were more likely to quarrel 
with than receive them amicably. They could then be all 
pressed closely until they surrendered, or were compelled 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



201 



to break, half-starved and desperate, into the Mooltan or CHAP. IX. 
Keytrian countries, the last an eastern continuation of the \si5. 
Murree hills. 

To discover the true direction of their retreat, the 
narrow ravine in which the army was then encamped, 
was on the 29th explored eastward by a strong column of 
troops ; and soon a recent camp was discovered, where the 
fires were still burning, and where women's camel-litters 
called cujavds, being left on the ground, showed that both 
chiefs and their families had been there. This sufficed, 
and the column returned. 

Very remarkable and desolate was the rocky solitude 
into which the operations had now brought the troops. 
The ravine, up which the exploring column had gone, was 
formed by two ridges running east and westward, the 
ground between being fertile though uncultivated; the 
northern ridge, pierced by the defile of Jummuck, was 
highest, broadest, and extremely rugged ; yet of less as- 
perity than the southern ridge, through which the defile 
of Lullee had given entrance ; for this last, extending from 
Tonge to the Mazaree hills, got mingled and lost amongst 
the prodigious rocks of the last-named region, and in its 
whole length presented, as it were, a battlemented wall 
some hundred feet high. It offered several narrow defiles 
or rather fissures, none more than thirty yards wide and 
with perpendicular sides eighty or ninety yards high; 
and it was impossible to employ flanking parties above, 
from the difficulty of gaining access to the summit and 
because their progress would have been stopped by 
transverse fissures of great depth, so narrow as to be in 
darkness and choked with bushes : but so terribly wild, so 
rugged" so desolate is the face of nature there, that a 
soldier, sublime in his homely force of language, exclaimed 
on seeing it " When God made the world he threw the rub- 
bish here" 

Between Lullee and Jummuck the camp was of neces- 
sity pitched, although a dangerous place ; but the enemy 
had no guns, the field-works traced out would command 
both the defiles, securing a communication with the 



202 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IX. plains behind, where the cavalry was stationed to oppose 
1845> and give notice of any outbreak from the other passes. 

Moreover the reports of spies, and a calculation of 
probabilities, soon showed that the confederate chiefs, 
when deterred by Simpson's march from passing the 
Jummuck range, had moved eastward until the austerity of 
the ravine barred progress ; and then issuing by the Gon- 
dooee defile into the plain of Muth, had skirted the desert, 
until they could enter the hills again at Dooshkooshta the 
most eastern defile. This they could not have done if 
Ali Moorad had been true to his time and place, and his 
failure was a serious mishap ; it rendered nugatory all the 
previous able and finely-calculated combinations to finish 
the war at this point, the campaign was indefinitely pro- 
longed, and suspicion was excited as to his fidelity. 

While Beja was thus making for the Mazaree hills by 
the plain of Muth, Captain McMurdo was detached with 
a squadron and two guns to find Simpson, and ascertain 
if the Bhoogtee town and fort of Deyrah were defended ; 
they were empty, and Simpson, an officer peculiarly exact 
in following his instructions, was at hand to take posses- 
sion ; hence McMurdo returned to camp, Salter's cavalry 
were charged with the advanced communication between 
the main body and Simpson, and the rear communication, 
between Shahpoor and the Lullee pass, was delivered to 
Smallpage and his policemen: still the lurking robbers 
grievously infested both the camp and the rear of the 
army, murdering all stragglers and carrying off many 
camels. 

Reflecting on this state of affairs, the general thought 
some bands and herds must have been overpassed in the 
previous operations ; and as the vital principle of the 
campaign was to seize all the cattle and drive the people 
in heaps upon the most sterile fastnesses, he sent Captain 
John Napier with the camel corps and volunteers of the 
13th regiment, to scour the ravine of Tonge, while a 
squadron of cavalry from Zuree Kooshta skirted the 
rocks outside in concert. Doing this, he said, that herds 
would certainly be found near the watering-places, and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



203 



he was right — John Napier, who united zeal and intelli- CHAP. IX. 
gence to great resolution and enterprise, returned on the j.845. 
31st, without having seen an enemy indeed, but with two 
thousand cattle. The voice of the camp had foretold 
entire failure, for notwithstanding the previous successes 
light opinions were still expressed as to the ultimate 
result of the war, and the English leader was continually- 
chafed by predictions of failure, anticipations of difficulties, 
and calculations too ill founded to have any influence on 
his convictions. " Hitherto, he jocosely said, he had proved 
himself at least a better robber than Beja, having taken 
six thousand of his cattle and a great deal of grain, killed 
many of his men, and forced the remainder to seek safety 
in sterile fastnesses where they must suffer want." 
Meanwhile Ali Moorad arrived at Zuree Kooshta with 
two thousand men and ten guns, being then twenty-seven 
miles in rear of the camp, whereas he should have been 
ten days before at Gondooee, barring that defile against the 
confederates, who would thus have been entirely enclosed 
and compelled to surrender. 

All the forces designed for the campaign were now in 
hand, yet the camp remained stationary, for the counter war 
of the hillmen had commenced and precluded movement. 
Their emissaries in rear of the army had diligently con- 
firmed the notion inculcated by the. Delhi Gazette and 
the Bombay Times, as to the folly and danger of the expe- 
dition, and panic was widely spread. " Beja could not 
be subdued — he laughed at the English leader, who 
with his army would be starved — would be cut to pieces 
— the hillmen were invincible." To this the emissaries 
added, that " Sir C. Napier's successor would shrink from 
defending Shikarpoore" — a lesson they had learned from 
Buist, who was continually objecting to its retention — » 
"that the confederates would come down and plunder 
that town and wreak Beja's vengeance on all men who 
had aided in the invasion of their hills." 

Terrified at this prospect, the camel-men, first refused 
to pass Shahpoor with the supplies, and the next night 
deserted with their animals, five hundred in number. 



204 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER J S 



CHAP. IX. The contractors and owners of camels in Scinde also 
18 45. refused to complete their contracts, hid their beasts from 
the government agents, and in every way evinced their 
belief in the coming destruction of the army, and their 
profound sense of the Beja's ferocity. The troops were 
thus suddenly stripped of carriage, as sumpter camels are 
called in India; for the commissariat animals had been 
overworked by the previous rapid marches and the camel 
does not quickly recover. The idle talk of the army also 
became louder — Beja could not be hunted down, the 
thing was impossible — and at the same time the warfare 
on the communications became more active. The dawk 
was twice intercepted, the bearers were killed, and sixteen 
commissariat camels were taken. The camp was still more 
vexatiously tormented. Sixty baggage-camels were car- 
ried off at once, and many followers were murdered. 

This loss of carriage entirely precluded movement, and 
the apparent check thus given to the operations might, it 
was to be feared, induce neighbouring tribes and nations to 
think the expedition had failed — a conclusion more likely 
to be adopted, because five times before within four years 
British troops had been cut to pieces in those hills, and 
the robbers, hitherto unconquered, were judged uncon- 
querable. The Murrees and the Brahooe Belooch tribes 
of Khelat were most likely to be thus influenced to mis- 
chief, and though such a defection had been contemplated, 
and means to meet it prepared, much spilling of blood 
would have necessarily occurred, which the general strained 
every nerve to avert, by still greater exertions and giving 
vent to a more determined expression of his will. 

The government camels, he observed, had plenty of a 
shrub on which they loved to feed; the cavalry horses 
throve on a kind of grass found in tufts at the edge of the 
desert; and common grass had been discovered in abundance 
at the foot of the Jummuck ghaut. Water could be had 
along the waste for digging. Two months' provisions had 
been stored in Shahpoor before the hired camel-men 
deserted, and twelve days' supply was in the camp ; where- 
fore, when complaints came that there was no water, he 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



205 



sent well-diggers to search for it ; and when told the yield CHAP. IX. 
was sulphureous, he desired the murmurers to boil it. If 
he was assailed with anticipations of famine he answered, 
that to sustain want was a soldier's duty. In nothing 
would he yield. " Sooner than flinch before this robber 
Beja, he exclaimed, I will eat my horse, I will starve, 
and I will not be put from my enterprise by the talk of 
men who have not considered the subject so deeply as 
myself. Nor am I without resources. The government 
camels are still capable of some work ; the cavalry can 
be dismounted to supply sumpter animals, and so can the 
fighting camel corps : patiently therefore, but unrelent- 
ingly, I will go on, and these murmurs only make my 
feet go deeper into the ground. Why should I give 
way? Deyrah with its fort is in my hands, furnishing a 
fixed pivot, round which the army can move, contracting 
by degrees the space occupied by the enemy. The Mur- 
rees confine the robbers on the north, while the cavalry 
and Ali Moorad watch them from the plain south of the 
rocks. The Seikhs are influenced by my menacing lan- 
guage towards the Mooltan man, and by Major Broadfoot's 
diplomacy on one hand ; on the other by a natural dislike 
to have three starving ferocious tribes boring in upon 
their territories, bringing after them a victorious British 
army in pursuit. They will therefore probably hold by 
their neutrality. On the Keytrian side also there will 
be a bar ; for the spies say, Hadgee the khan of that tribe 
has told his son-in-law, Islam Bhoogtee, he will receive 
him if pressed, but not his followers : he will not there- 
fore receive Doomkees and Jackranees." 

But this want of carriage, a perplexing embarrassment 
in itself, involved the chance of very serious consequences. 
It rendered the army powerless when success was almost 
certain, for a hot pursuit at this time would have inflicted 
great loss on Beja if it did not entirely destroy him ; only 
twelve days' supply of food was in the camp ; and if at the 
end of that time the army was compelled to retrograde to 
Shahpoor, a shout of victory would peal from tribe to tribe 
through the hills, even to the Bolan pass ; that would be 



206 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. IX. echoed along the crests of the Hala mountains as far as 
1845f Sehwan, and then shield and sword and matchlock would 
pour down on the Scindian plains with a wild and merci- 
less storm ! The Keytrian man's resolution, which was 
only known through spies, might alter ; and thus the line 
of operations would be dangerously extended, even though 
fresh carriage should be obtained ; for beyond the month 
of March the troops could not keep the field under the 
extreme heat of the desert. At that moment all the troops 
were eager to fight, though convinced that ultimate success 
could not be obtained ; but they were not all British ; and 
would those young soldiers sustain half-rations in a halting- 
place ? would not sickness be induced, and despondency 
also, from inaction, when assassins and thieves vexed their 
camp, murdered their servants and stole their baggage 
animals? Before them were inaccessible rocks, around 
them a solitude, and all their own discourses turned upon 
the impossibility of warring down Beja ! 

Such were the reflections made at the time, and the 
prospect was not bright. One evil however had already 
been avoided by prudence. Had a rash pursuit of the 
hill chiefs over the Jummuck pass been adopted when the 
army first entered the ravine in which it was now en- 
camped, the convoys could not, when the camel-men 
deserted, have followed over that ghaut ; the troops must 
then have come back for food, and would have found Beja 
and his confederates again in possession of the twin defiles. 
For it was afterwards ascertained that they had gone up the 
ravine towards Gondooee, persuaded that the British leader 
would cross the Jummuck Ghaut and leave them to seize 
the passes behind him ; an able and shrewd combination 
but baffled by superior prudence. The campaign was 
indeed one of the utmost danger and difficulty, for, 
amidst arid deserts and stupendous rocks, Sir C. Napier 
had to war down a powerful people, ghding around him in 
craft like serpents and fighting like lions when beset. 
Fortune however, that great arbiter in war, was not adverse. 
At this critical time a vakeel from the khan of Khelat's 
Durbar reached the camp, charged with submissive and 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



207 



friendly messages. The surprises at Ooch and Shahpoor, CHAP. IX. 
at the opening of the campaign, had alarmed that court ; 1845> 
and the chief minister had a personal cause to plead ; his 
brother's treacherous correspondence with Deyrah Khan, 
had been taken at Ooch ; it proved his own complicity, and 
he had been told that if such hostility was continued the 
English leader would destroy both of them, even if they 
fled to Bokhara for safety. This vakeel, whose secret in- 
structions were to plead the minister's cause, was merely 
made to remark the fortifications in the pass, with charge 
to assure the khan the English would remain in the hills 
for six months, and were raising these works for permanent 
possession. But the moonshee, Ali Acbar, was sent to 
Khelat, ostensibly and really to demand aid in procuring 
fresh camels; privately to assure the minister, that his 
brother and himself would be pardoned and obtain the 
friendship of the English government for ever, if they 
behaved well; and that a jagheer in Scinde would immedi- 
ately be given to him if he provided camels, and held true 
to the alliance. This policy, good to obtain animals, was 
also designed to restrain the Khelat tribes from commotion 
during the actual crisis. 

Ali Moorad was now directed to move to the Gondooee 
pass, for at Zuree Kooshta he was on the line of communi- 
cation with Shahpoor, and his men were likely enough to 
act hostilely and lay their deeds on the outlying roving 
bands of hillmen. The ameer obeyed, to the great 
content of the general, who would have sent the English 
cavalry to occupy all the watering-places after him, as a 
further security, if the desertion of the camel-drivers had 
not precluded even this movement. Meanwhile to fix the 
Murree chief, whose faith he thought wavering, and whose 
enmity would be dangerous, he offered five thousand rupees 
for the capture of Beja; and at the same time, to free his 
force from all doubtful friends, he desired Jacob to send 
back to their own countries the Chandikas and Mugzees, 
as having fulfilled their mission; for he wished to have 
in this crisis as few tribes about his army as possible. 
Resorting likewise again to the stratagem which had before 



208 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. IX. deceived Beja, he directed Jacob to write a letter to a 
1845 friend, and cause it to fall into the hands of the Bhoog- 
tees, the contents being, " that fresh forces were coming 
up, that the fortifications at Jummuck were to be very- 
powerful, that the intention was to stay in the hills until 
Beja was killed, but the genera? s benevolence made him 
desire rather to have him a prisoner, and he would richly 
reward any chief or tribe who delivered him up." 

Having thus employed all moral means at his command, 
the English leader, desirous to clear the vicinity of the 
camp and keep the troops in full activity, sent a column 
under General Hunter to scour all the adjacent ravines 
and rocks; for so daring were the lurking robbers that 
five of them, passing the pickets in the night, cut down 
two men not far from the head-quarter tent. Hunter's 
soldiers killed these men, but they fought desperately, and 
one of them, when pierced by a bayonet, continued to cut 
at his antagonist until the latter discharged his musket, 
the bayonet being still in the robber's body ! About the 
same time the police under Smallpage captured cattle 
south of the rocks, and a despatch from Ali Moorad an- 
nounced, that at Gondooee he also had taken six camels 
and three hundred head of cattle after a skirmish. 

In this state of affairs a Kyharee spy arrived with intel- 
ligence, that the confederate chieftains, having ensconced 
themselves in a fastness only twenty miles distant, were 
starving: and next day Captain Malet came from Ali 
Moorad, to say that Beja wished to surrender. Here was 
an opening to emerge from a critical and dangerous 
position with apparent honour ; but the unbending will of 
the English leader was then manifested. Instead of 
snatching at this occasion to terminate a war becoming 
hourly more difficult and dangerous, he answered thus. 
u Let the khan lay his arms at my feet, and be prepared 
to emigrate with his followers to a district which I will 
point out on the left bank of the Indus, and he shall be 
pardoned. If he refuses these terms he shall be pursued 
to the death, and the hundred Doomkees who are my 
prisoners shall be hanged." 



ADMINISTRATION 0~F SCINDE. 



209 



There was a right, but no intention to hurt those pri- CHAP. IX, 
soners, the threat was merely to strike terror; but the 18 4 5> 
emigration condition was real, being founded on a policy- 
resembling that of Pompey when he removed the Sicilian 
pirates from the sea-coasts ; for like that great man, Sir 
C. Napier thought the robbers, if removed from the scene 
of their depredations and settled as cultivators, would 
relinquish their lawless habits. He saw they were fero- 
cious, yet chivalric and capable of just reflection, being 
spoilers as much from necessity and ignorance as from 
liking, and he earnestly desired to reclaim not to slaughter 
them. 

On the 5th of February a patrol again discovered and 
killed several armed hillmen between the passes, and three 
hundred horsemen were brought up from the rear to 
enable Simpson to scour the plain about Deyrah. But 
famine was now menacing the army, for though the cap- 
tured cattle, always sold by auction in the camp, furnished 
a considerable resource, this was an Indian army, with at 
least three followers to every fighting man, and conse- 
quently that supply soon disappeared. No sumpter camels 
had yet been procured, and the general, thus pushed to 
the wall, detached Fitzgerald's fighting camel corps to 
fetch food from Shahpoor, with orders to scour the ravine 
of Tonge once more during his march, and even to attack 
that place if it contained enemies. The military excellence 
and power of this anomalous corps, was then strikingly 
shown. With hired sumpter camels the marches alone 
would have occupied six days and nights; and a strong 
escort must have been employed to protect the convoy. 
Fitzgerald's men, self-supported as a military body, not 
only scoured the ravine and reached Shahpoor in one 
night, after a march of fifty miles, but loaded their camels 
with forty-five thousand pounds of flour, and regained the 
camp on the morning of the 8th, having employed but 
three days and two nights in the whole expedition ! 

On the very day this supply came, another message was 
received from Ali Moorad, to say, not Beja only, but all 
the chiefs were ready to surrender. To this slight cre- 

p 



210 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. IX. dence was given by the English leader when he considered 
1845. the state of affairs ; but prompt to seize every opportu- 
nity, he marched a few hours after Fitzgerald's return 
towards the defile of Sebree, eastward of Ali Moorad's 
camp; leaving General Hunter with a small force at 
Jummuck to hold that and the Lullee defile. By this 
movement he designed to contract the pressure on the 
confederates and increase their disposition for yielding; 
but when passing Ah Moorad's camp the ameer entreated 
that no advance beyond Sebree should be made, saying it 
would alarm the chiefs and prevent their surrender. At his 
desire, the general, anxious to avoid bloodshed, agreed to 
halt at Sebree until the 4th, yet with a misgiving that the 
matter was a concerted design to gain time for mischief — 
I cannot, he said, trust these serpents of the desert. And 
the next day his dawk, though guarded by twelve troopers, 
was surprised and many of the men slain by a band of 
Jackranees two hundred strong. Pretending to belong to 
another irregular cavalry regiment, some of these robbers 
had entered into friendly conversation with the escort, but 
suddenly each man cut down the soldier he was talking 
to, and among the victims was a son of the soubadar who 
had died so nobly at Ooch. 

Alarmed by this event for the safety of Captain 
McMurdo, who had been sent a few hours before with 
twelve troopers to examine the country beyond the defile 
of Sebree, the general rode hastily to his succour, but 
met him returning with a herd of cattle. A matchlock- 
fire had been opened on him in the pass, but instead of 
abandoning the cattle and galloping through, he had skil- 
fully drawn back and enticed the enemy into low ground, 
where he was going to charge when a new band came 
upon his rear. His troopers, though Moguellaees, had 
been for a moment panic-stricken when the fire was 
first opened on them, but now, stimulated by the bold 
demeanour of their leader, they charged and sent the 
robbers to their rocks, where several fell under the fire of 
their carabines : McMurdo with able contrivance then 
passed the defile in safety. It was a gallant and well- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCJNDE. 



211 



managed affair, and the troopers were rewarded with the CHAP. IX. 
price obtained for the cattle in camp. lg45 

This happened on the 9th; on the 10th Salter's cavalry 
was detached to communicate with Simpson ; on the 
11th the adjutant -general Major Green moved with a 
column to scour the hills towards Deyrah, in concert with 
a detachment which marched from Hunter's camp, and 
they killed some robbers and brought back eight hundred . 
cattle. On that day also, certain expert men, called 
" Puggees" were employed to pug or track the robbers 
who had seized the dawk, it being suspected that the 
Boordees of Ali Moorad's force, who were at feud with the 
6th irregular cavalry, because of McKenzie's action in 
which some of their tribe had been killed, were the perpe- 
trators of the murder and robbery. The trail however 
went into the hills, fortunately for the ameer, as the 
general, chafed by his previous misconduct, declared his 
intention, if treachery had been detected, to take Captain 
Malet and Mr. Curling out of the prince's camp, and 
send in exchange a shower of grape from ten pieces of 
artillery. 

On the 12th, hearing nothing more of the chiefs' coming 
in, Sir C. Napier began more strongly to doubt the faith 
of Ali Mo or ad, and thought the offer of surrender was 
only to gain time for a Seikh force to join the hillmen. 
Yet, when he considered that he had thirteen hundred 
good infantry, ten guns, and six hundred cavalry in hand, 
and that his reserves towards Shahpoor would give him 
two thousand more troops, he judged that Ah dared not 
be treacherous : and for any force Beja and his new allies, 
if the Seikhs were really coming, could bring to the fight, 
he cared little. However, always prudent, he brought 
Hunter's column up from Jummuck, leaving the defiles 
there to the care of Fitzgerald's camel corps. Then 
writing to the Mazarees on the Indus a menacing letter, 
to deter them from giving the tribes any aid, he chose 
a position of battle where he could defy twenty thousand 
enemies and awaited events. 

The 13th Hunter joined the camp, and that day also 
r 2 



212 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. IX. the confederate robber chiefs sent their near relations to 
1845. Ali Moorad, saying, As they were treated so would be 
the conduct of the khans, the English leader might put 
their relations to death, but then the war would 
continue : and it was intimated that Mohamed the 
Lion might come to aid the tribes with five thousand 
men. 

Inflexible as steel the general replied, that he would 
have all prisoners, or none — they might choose. On 
the 14th, they demanded another day for reference — 
Not an hour, was the answer ; " and if the whole do 
not come in, the British army will march to-morrow 
embattled into your hills, but mercy will go back with 
the heavy baggage to Shahpoor. With respect to Shere 
Mohamed, his highness will be welcome, I have as many 
men here as fought at Dubba and shall be sorry if the 
Lion comes with fewer numbers than he had there." 

This sternness induced the relations of the chiefs to 
quit Ali Moorad and come to the English camp on the 
15th. They came however as ambassadors, pleading dis- 
tance and customs and the recent death of Beja Khan's 
wife for delaying the surrender until the 19th, which they 
affirmed was the earliest day possible. Sir C. Napier 
would not alter his terms as to Beja, but to the others he 
offered new conditions. Islam Khan Bhoogtee might, if 
he was content to do so, take an oath never to invade the 
British territory, but he must make his salaam to the 
khan of Khelat, his lawful sovereign. Deyrah Khan 
Jackranee was desired to settle in Scinde, but he might 
take Islam's oath instead, if he would be surety for all 
his tribe. If he could not do that, Deyrah himself should 
be received in Scinde, endowed and protected, but his 
tribe should be warred down : these also were the terms 
for the minor chiefs. 

Had he known at that time where the confederates 
were, he would have marched against them notwith- 
standing these negotiations; observing, that the loss of 
his camels and fear of the tribes finding a refuge in 
Mooltan, were the two great fountains of his generosity. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



218 



But it was with hini a fixed principle never to hesi- CHAP. IX. 
tate or appear to hesitate, much less go back, with bar- 1845< 
barians, whether in the field or in negotiations ; hence he 
repeated his declaration that he would, God loilling, march 
the 16th to Dooz Kooshta, yet in consideration of Beja's 
domestic affliction would wait there until the 19th. In 
the night of the 15th however, so much rain fell the 
camels could not carry the tents, and he was not dis- 
pleased to be thus forced to give a longer day ; yet true 
to his policy, he made the ambassadors remark this 
natural impediment as a divine restriction, and not any 
wavering on his part. God was not willing. Their eastern 
imaginations would have otherwise found many imperti- 
nent causes to encourage them in further resistance, such 
as want of food, orders from the governor-general, or 
a fear of Ali Moorad's power. This last notion the 
vain- glorious ameer was diligently inculcating amongst 
his followers, and through them amongst the hillmen, 
assuming an appearance of superiority upon every favour- 
able occasion; he even declared that he would march 
on Dooz Kooshta though ordered to move to Heeran on 
the border of the desert. His first delay had enabled the 
enemy to escape at Gondooee when the war might have been 
terminated ; now he was pretending great personal anger 
at receiving orders, and was assuming an independence of 
command which might produce disaster ; but he was quickly 
taught another lesson. A peremptory order not to go 
near Dooz Kooshta was transmitted, with this message ; 
that if he were found in possession of that watering-place 
a cannon-shot should go through his pavilion as a signal 
to decamp. 

At Sebree, on the evening of the 16th, notwithstanding 
the rain of the evening before, the wells were dried up, 
and the troops all gasping for water, when suddenly 
from the rocky hills in front came down a torrent sixty 
yards wide and two feet deep, pouring through the middle 
of the camp. Most of the soldiers, astonished and rejoicing 
at this unexpected relief, looked on it as a special provi- 
dence, and the general, who had from his knowledge 



2 



214 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. IX. of hilly districts foreseen this event, thus noticed it in 
his journal. " How many phenomena there are in these 
countries which admit of being turned with a little fore- 
cast and ingenuity into seeming miracles ! This torrent 
was one which I could have foretold and employed to 
advantage. And on the march from Shahpoor, when 
manna was found in the desert, the soldier who first 
brought it to me said, ' Sir, this is a miracle — it is on 
the bushes — it is food — it comes from God, it comes 
down from heaven — it is a miracle ! } He was right it 
was a miracle — What is not V 3 

None of the hillmen opposed him in the defiles of the 
rocky wall which, from Lullee, extended as before observed 
to this point, where it was beginning to mix with the 
Mazaree hills ; Dooz Kooshta was therefore attained after 
many hours' marching without opposition on the 17th of 
February. Ali Moorad had not dared to come there, and 
when the camp was pitched the general, who had been 
in the saddle for ten hours, entered his tent and thus 
recorded the strong feelings which the date of the day 
had called up. 

" This is the second anniversary of the battle of Meeanee, 
and I am again in the field ! Am I doomed to constant 
war and bloodshedding ? Well ! This is a righteous war, 
and so was that against the infamous ameers. But this 
day two years ! What heaps of dead were around me — 
what numbers of friends were dying — what shrieks from 
the hospital-tent of men undergoing amputation ! Peace be 
with them, they behaved nobly, those who died and those 
who survived that terrible conflict. And I am here now 
waiting for the surrender of the robber chiefs at Dooz 
Kooshta, which, translated, means The Thief 's Death. 
Singular coincidence ! " 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



215 



CHAPTER X. 

At Dooz Kooshta the camp remained until the 19th, in CHAP. X. 
pursuance of the promise to Beja Khan; but it was appa- 1845i 
rent that Ali Moorad had been deceived by the chiefs 
and their secret allies amongst the ameer* s councillors, and 
that the negotiations were only to gain time. The robbers 
had spies and emissaries in all places and were perfectly 
well informed, when no tidings of their positions or designs 
could be obtained by the British leader. Even his personal 
attendant, a Hindoo, who had been with him for years, 
transmitted all that his master uttered in his presence to 
some employer, who was not detected : yet passages in the 
Bombay libels indicated a connection with this treachery. 

On the 19th the campaign recommenced, but ere the 
events are related, the positions and their military bearings 
must be laid down, for a new front of battle had been 
adopted, and the line instead of facing northwards looked 
eastward. 

Simpson being now at Deyrah, near which he had captured 
a string of camels, formed the extreme left ; behind him, 
to the westward, was a cavalry post at the Tomb ; a good 
watering-place, from whence the patrols could communi- 
cate with the Murrees by the defile of Sartoof, and scour 
the Sungseela ravine. 

South of the Tomb, and connected with it by patrols, 
Fitzgerald's camel corps was at the Jummuck pass; and 
both those posts were in communication with Jacob at 
Poolagee : thus the ravines of Tonge, of the Illiassee, and 
the Teyaga were commanded, and that of Sungseela 
watched. 



216 



SIR CHARLES NAPlER^S 



CHAP. X. Shahpoor, always strongly garrisoned, contained the 
f 845 magazines. 

Head- quarters were in centre of the first line ; Ali 
Moorad formed the right wing at Heeran, touching on 
the frontier of the Mazaree country ; and between these 
principal posts the cavalry and police maintained the com- 
munications by patrols. 

This disposition of the army restricted the hillmen to 
half their original occupation of those desolate regions, 
cooping them up in the north-eastern corner ; and though 
their fastnesses there were the most rugged, and they could 
from thence descend finally into the Mooltan territory if 
the Dewan was faithless, the English leader had employed 
moral means to prevent that, and the foHowmg^skilful 
combinations debarred them of any successful counter 
attack. 

J acob, holding the forts of Poolagee, Oolagee, and Lheree, 
on the west, could not be easily hurt ; and his cavalry and 
guns entirely awed the Khelat tribes in the Bolan hills, 
who being secretly inimical would otherwise on the first 
opportunity have extended the war along the Hala moun- 
tains down to Sehwan. 

Simpson having the Deyrah fort, impregnable to any 
attack from the Beloochees, formed a pivot on which the 
main body could securely turn for offensive operations ; he 
also commanded the principal valley and was connected by 
the cavalry post at Tomb with the camel corps at Jum- 
muck, and with Jacob at Poolagee. 

Ali Moorad watched from Heeran the Mazarees, and was 
within call from head-quarters if wanted for a battle; 
meanwhile, excised from the operations and exposed in an 
open country to the action of the British cavalry, he was 
debarred opportunity for treachery. The principal force 
under the general was thus free to act offensively in any 
quarter. 

In this state of affairs the troops lived hardly from hand 
to mouth, and as the captured herds furnished much of the 
subsistence, the campaign was one of great privation as 
well as fatigue. However the hillmen fared worse. Their 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



217 



stores of grain had all been taken at Poolagee, Shahpoor CHAP. X. 
and Ooch, which forced them to feed on flesh, an unusual 1845> 
diet producing disease, and numbers died. Some supplies 
indeed they got from the Mazarees of Rojan on the Indus, 
but they paid exorbitantly for them ; and here it may be 
explained that there were two Mazaree tribes — a river 
tribe subjects to the Seikhs, and a hill tribe. From both 
of them the robbers expected aid, but Sir C. Napier's 
letters to the dewan of Mooltan had not been fruit- 
less. The river tribe, the Dewan said, had been strictly 
forbidden to receive any of the robbers, and had been 
directed to send supplies to the British ; but for the hill 
Mazarees, they were enemies to the Seikhs and he hoped 
for their destruction — they were not only robbers like 
Beja, but half of the depredations attributed to that chief 
were perpetrated by them. 

These hill Mazarees were however those the general 
most desired for friends, because their country was known, 
and to enter it would dangerously extend his hue of opera- 
tions. Fortune again befriended him. The Bhoogtees, 
just before the commencement of the campaign, had plun- 
dered some hill Mazarees, and that offence coupled with 
the general's personal menaces, induced the latter to send 
several chiefs with three hundred followers as voluntary 
hostages. But they went first to Ali Moorad, and he 
from a desire to appear great induced them to remain in 
his camp. This insolence, the English leader, having 
other means of evincing his paramount authority, took no 
notice of at the time, justly observing, that the greater 
AH pretended to be, the more powerful would his superior 
appear in the eyes of the hillmen when his dependence 
became known ; and the Mazarees indeed, soon finding who 
was master, hastened to do homage to real power. 

On the 18th Captain Salter brought advice from Deyrah, 
that the hillmen's camp was at Groojroo, or Shore, twenty- 
four and twenty-one miles in front of Dooz Kooshta; that Plan 2. 
they were about eight thousand strong, and lying close on 
the hill Mazarees' frontier, which they were now forbidden 
to pass ; but whether they designed to fight the British or 



218 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER ? S 



CHAP. X. to surrender was not known. This intelligence involved 
1845. new considerations. Would the robbers, if pressed in their 
actual position, go into the Seikh territory ? Would it be 
right to follow them ? The conclusion was in the affirma- 
tive for the last. They could only go there with secret 
permission, or in violation of the neutrality avowed by the 
dewan of Mooltan: moreover, the frontier being rocky 
could not be well defined, and pursuit of a flying enemy 
would not admit of nice distinctions. Ali Moorad's credu- 
lity and falsehoods had already caused the loss of six days, 
at the most important crisis, and the whole object of the 
war was not to be further endangered by delicate respect 
for national rights which were totally disregarded by the 
enemy. The Seikhs said they had not admitted, and 
would not admit the tribes; the latter might then be 
pursued ; because, either the assurance was false or they 
would not be within the Seikh boundary. 

These reflections made, and the term of delay promised 
to Beja having terminated, on the 19th. the troops were 
secretly put in motion to surprise the enemy. The camel 
corps had been previously called up, and orders were sent 
to Ali Moorad to bring forward his forces, because a great 
and decisive stroke was contemplated. The road to Shore, 
running through the defiles of Lotee, was long, rugged and 
difficult — in the night-time peculiarly so — but the march 
was so well combined that the confederates would have 
been surprised in their camp, but for one of those minor 
insubordinations which no commander can guard against, 
which so often mar the finest combinations, and render 
war the property of fortune. The movement was to have 
been in darkness and silence, the orders to that effect were 
peremptory; but some camp-followers lighted afire, Beja's 
videttes saw it, and that chief instantly fled from his posi- 
tion. Hence, after being twenty-two hours on horseback 
without taking food, Sir C. Napier pitched his camp in the 
afternoon of the 20th at Shore, a baffled general for the 
moment ; but a quantity of grain and a hundred and fifty 
camel-loads of baggage were captured at Shore, and the 
last was given as a prize to the soldiers. Hindoo merchants 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



219 



had come from the Mazarees of Rojan with this grain, on CHAP. X. 
speculation, hut they lost life and goods together, for they 1845> 
and their followers fought bravely and were killed. These 
captures showed that the tribes were moving as a people, 
not as warriors, and that finally the English operations 
would inevitably circumvent and destroy them. 

On the 21st Ali Moorad arrived with his wild warriors, 
stout and brave men ; and the same day a hill chief, Ali 
Shere Khosa, came in and made salaam. He was quite a 
youth and disliked the robber life; but his lands being 
surrounded by those of the other chiefs, he had no free 
action until that moment. Sir C. Napier gave him a 
government employment, observing, that to punish the 
robbers was only half his object, to reclaim them was his 
aim; and despite of the universal impression to the con- 
trary he judged that he could do so, and was resolved to 
try, founding his hopes upon his extensive experience of 
mankind. He had dealt, in peace and war, with many 
nations, British, Irish, Americans, Italians, French, Ger- 
mans, Greeks, Turks, red Indians, Hindoos and Beloo- 
chees ; and he thought military persons, having principally 
to do with the soldiers and peasantry of each country, had 
the natural characters of men in those countries, most 
openly exposed to their observation. By the peasantry 
because they are unsophisticated and have no motive for 
concealment with soldiers who are not enemies ; and there 
is a curious similarity of military law and usage in all na- 
tions, indicating a distinctive general character, exclusive 
of what is imposed by customs and religion, and very per- 
ceptible to an observant officer. The military life forces 
observation of character upon the mind. All soldiers, 
men and officers, must study the temper and character of 
those above as well as of those below them ; they are more 
or less in the position of courtiers with Eastern despots, 
and none are more shrewd in detecting character, though 
none are more skilful in hiding it, than Asiatic court-men 
— the one quality generating the other. 

It is pretended, said Sir C. Napier, by men who 
assume to themselves all knowledge and competency for 



220 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. X. governing in India, that something occnlt exists in the 
1845> Indian character ; but the distinctive general character of 
man is as pronounced with them as with others, when 
clothed in uniform. There are indeed modifications to be 
remarked, yet easily to be traced to conventional causes, 
the general character remaining the same. The sepoy for 
example, is sober, and cleanly as far as ablutions go, the 
European not so — that can be traced to religion and 
climate, the last being father to the first. But as a 
recruit, the sepoy is vaunting and eager to fight, so is the 
European; as a veteran he is cool and daring like the 
European; and like him he is fond of being smart in 
dress, of having a military bearing, and is proud of being 
a soldier. If undisciplined he is easily panic-stricken, so 
are Europeans, but when well drilled both are fierce and 
intrepid. The Indian, having been a slave for ages, is a 
liar — so is the European slave — but, like the European, 
the Indian as he grows in civilization and freedom adopts 
truth as the better policy. This is proved by the existing 
character. The old and respected soldier is more truthful 
than the recruit, and a native officer of low rank in the 
British service can be believed when an officer of Ah 
Moorad's cannot, however high his rank. 

Finding fear, pride, vanity, courage, honourable ambi- 
tion, ostentation and self-respect, common to both races, 
Sir C. Napier judged that in their avarice and generosity, 
and in their susceptibility to the impressions of skilful 
leaders, the eastern men in no way differed from their 
western brethren ; wherefore with hope and resolution he 
looked forward not only to subdue but to reclaim and 
civilize the wild tribes now opposing him in arms — feel- 
ing assured that a life of murdering and robbing, with 
continual danger, could not be really one of choice. 

As the march against Shore and Goojroo had been 
made in the expectation of fighting a great battle or 
receiving the tribes in surrender, General Simpson had 
also been called in, and he arrived in camp on the evening 
of the 20th, having left a garrison in the fort of Deyrah. 
Thus nearly the whole army was concentrated, and the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



221 



first thought was to push on in pursuit ; but the extreme CHAP. X. 
fatigue of the troops prevented this; those of the main 1845 ^ 
column had been twenty- two hours under arms, and 
Simpson's column nineteen hours, seven of which were 
employed to descend one ghaut. It was absolutely 
necessary therefore to rest ; but next day a strong detach- 
ment being led out to examine the pass of Goojroo in 
front, the enemy was both seen and felt at no great 
distance, and some of his men were killed. Fame had not 
exaggerated the extraordinary ruggedness of the country. 
With infinite difficulty the precipitous rocks on each side 
the entrance of the Goojroo pass were scaled, but all 
beyond was desolate, and impracticable from the transverse 
chasms. The defile itself being penetrated for about a 
mile was found absolutely stupendous ; there was no mode 
of passing it save by the cavalry galloping through ; a des- 
perate expedient ; for the guides said it was in length four 
leagues and without change, being only fifty feet wide, 
strewed with large loose stones and having perpendicular 
sides several hundred feet high : it was also without a drop 
of water after the entrance was passed. The flanking 
parties therefore came down again, not without danger 
and difficulty. While above, they had discerned the smoke 
of the confederates' camp twelve miles off, and the 
hillmen were evidently waiting until the British should 
enter the terrible defile ; they would then have barred all 
egress, and using their knowledge of the bye-ways have 
closed round and destroyed the entrapped soldiers. 

This state of affairs demanded new combinations uniting 
the utmost caution and vigour. The enemy had been at 
last found, and though his position was unattackable it 
could be turned ; his back was to the Seikh territory and 
he could not retreat further if neutrality was observed ; 
nor could he for want of provisions remain long where he 
was. But the question as to where he would go had to 
be revolved with more care than ever, for on the next 
movement the success of the war was likely to depend. 
It was probable indeed that Beja would push suddenly 
upon Deyrah and from thence throw himself into Trukkee; 



222 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. X. yet, though the name and strength of that celebrated 
~: fastness were familiar in the British camp, no man, guide 
or spy, could or would tell exactly where it was situated. 
In this doubt the English leader formed new combina- 
tions with a sagacity marking his mastery in war. 

The Bundlecund Legion was ordered to remain at Shore, 
under the command of Major Beatson, a stern determined 
soldier ; Ali Moorad was sent back to the Lotee pass ; 
Hunter went to the J ummuck defiles again, and the general 
marched with Simpson's troops to Deyrah. These dis- 
positions brought him nearer to the magazines without 
seeming to retreat ; but they could not have been made if 
the Mazaree merchants' wheat had not been captured, and 
it was no small part of the difficulty of this campaign, that 
the army had to win its food from the enemy and dig 
for water day by day ; it was no slight proof of genius 
either, thus continually to change the whole scheme of 
operations in such a country, and on such accidental 
circumstances. 

There were two courses in the enemy's choice especially 
necessary to guard against. First he could turn the 
British left by a defile which led down towards Lotee, and 
Plans 1& 2. then moving by Deyrah break through the Jummuck 
defile and regain Tonge. Second he might avoid the 
Jummuck, after passing Deyrah, and moving by Marwar 
to the ravine of the Tomb, break through Jacob's posts, 
and make for the Kujjuck and Bolan country. Both of 
these movements would indeed be desperate efforts, but 
the hillmen were in a desperate situation, and any wild 
and furious effort might be expected from them. 

If they did not adopt one of these courses, four opera- 
tions remained for them, namely, to fight in the narrow 
plain, which being behind their actual camp could be 
reached by the British from Deyrah — to descend into the 
Seikh territory — to surrender when their food, of which 
they could not have much, was expended — to throw them- 
selves into Trukkee. Any of these operations would be 
their ruin; but it was possible there might be minor 
defiles about Groojroo unexplored, and at this time unex- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



223 



plorable, through which they could pour upon Beatson at CHAP. X. 
Shore. In fine the war had now reached a crisis and the 1845 
problem to be solved was become very complicated. 

1°. The British line of communication with Shahpoor 
was more than a hundred miles long, and passed through 
many dangerous defiles. 

2°. To the supplies of food, it might be, that supplies of 
water were to be added ; for the habit of poisoning wells 
and pools was an understood practice amongst thehillmen. 

3°. Strong escorts were required to guard the convoys, 
because roving isolated bands of well-mounted robbers 
were still lying in most of the nullahs and smaller ravines 
behind the army, watching for spoil. 

4°. Provisions were already scarce, and the government 
camels had again failed from overwork ; the troops were 
on half-rations, and at Shore only two days' supply was in 
the field magazine. Hence the principal reason for sending 
Hunter back to Jummuck, was to protect and shorten the 
line of communication with Shahpoor, by turning the 
convoys through that pass instead of continuing their 
movements by Sebree and Dooz Kooshta. 

Grass and water for the exhausted camels could be 
obtained at Deyrah, and from thence new offensive opera- 
tions could be undertaken, but as it was essential to parry 
counter blows during the movements the following combi- 
nations were arranged. 

If the enemy, who knew very exactly from his emissaries 
everything that was passing, should, when the main 
column marched upon Deyrah, find means to overpower 
Beatson, that officer was to fall back on Ali Moorad at 
Lotee, and Hunter's column, though in march, was to 
turn in support. 

If the hillmen were deterred from pursuing Beatson by 
this accumulation of forces at Lotee, and should from 
Shore follow the head-quarters to Deyrah, Beatson and 
Ali Moorad had orders to close in on their rear, and place 
them between two fires ; Hunter was then to change his 
direction and move on Dusht- Goran by which the enemy Plan 2. 
would be entirely enclosed. 



224 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. X. • Having arranged these combinations, the general marched 
1845# from Groojroo towards Deyrah on the 22nd. He had little 
fear for Beatson, and was anxious that Hunter should 
arrive at Jummuck on the 25th, not only to secure the 
shorter line of communication with Shahpoor and have the 
convoys turned, but that he might be in a position to sup- 
port the cavalry at the Tomb — an object of importance, as 
the enemy could from the Murrow plain descend on Deyrah, 
or by the Sungseela ravine pour down on the Tomb. In 
the former case the general's column could, moving by 
Tussoo, reach Deyrah first, as it would march faster 
than a heterogeneous mass of warriors, women, children 
and herds. The rugged defile leading from the Murrow 
plain on Deyrah would thus be barred ; or, if the hillmen 
were first, they would in the plain of Deyrah fall an easy 
prey to a compact army assailing them while still confused 
and issuing from the defiles. But in the second case 
Hunter's aid would be required at the Tomb. That officer, 
however, halted a day at Dooz Kooshta, and so far the 
nicety of the combination was marred; yet with no ill 
effects, because the enemy did not adopt the operation to 
be guarded against. 

Head- quarters reached Deyrah the 23rd, having marched 
through a country of astonishing asperity, where the troops 
were dangerously embarrassed by the multitude of camp- 
followers and quantity of baggage. Deyrah itself was 
however in a fertile, though at this time uncultivated 
plain, having a fine stream of water flowing through it. 
Here rest was obtained, and after a time, vakeels from the 
Murrees arrived to make salaam, induced thereto by a 
previous menacing communication — their recent conduct 
having become suspicious. 

On the 26th Hunter reached Jummuck and the whole 
army was thus re-established under the new combinations. 
Beatson, if driven from Shore, could, as shown, retire on 
Ali Moorad at Lotee, where their united forces could hold 
the robbers in check until the main body from Deyrah, 
having only a march of fifteen miles, fell on their flank — 
and from Jummuck Hunter could also move to the support 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



225 



of Lotee, in case of disaster. But if Beja attempted to CHAP. X. 
enter the plain of Deyrah instead of assailing Lotee, after 1345. 
driving back Beat son, he would be met in front by the 
general's column, while the passes in his rear would be 
closed by Beatson and Ali Moorad. Nor could he gain 
any advantage by moving across the Murrow plain, north- 
wards, and so pouring down the Sungseela ravine, because 
the cavalry post would oppose him at Tomb, being sure of 
support from Jummuck which was only twelve miles dis- 
tant, and from Deyrah which was not much more. 

The great difficulty remained : Sir C. Napier had twice 
let Beja and his tribe pass before his army without attack- 
ing him, because the women and children of the tribe 
being present he feared for their lives. This feeling still 
governed his operations, and with more power, because of 
a painfully interesting experience he had on entering 
Deyrah, where some poor deserted children were found 
starving. They were taken care of, but for a long time, 
demanded each day when they were to be killed, having 
no other expectation : thus indicating too plainly the fero- 
cious habits of their tribes. Hence with more than his 
usual resolution the English leader sought to avoid battles, 
and keep the masses shut up in the rocks, where want of 
food and water might compel them to yield without fight- 
ing. Still he could not forego final success, and had now 
to decide on what would most conduce towards it. 

The confederates had, during the recent marches, retired 
from the Goojroo defiles to Partur, north of the MurroAv Plan 2, 
plain and touching on the Key trian frontier ; but this was 
judged a wile to draw the army from Trukkee, of which, 
though then close at hand, no information had yet been 
obtained, save that it was not very far off and was amongst 
rocks through which a narrow fissure led northwards 
from Deyrah to the Murrow plain. It appeared certain 
however that the chiefs had been refused an asylum in the 
Key trian and Seikh territories, and were thus delivered 
over to the British operations; hence, changing as it were 
the fixed point of his compasses, the general now resolved 
to make Beatson's position on the right his pivot, and 

Q 



226 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. X. sweeping round with his left and centre, as he had before 
1845i swept with his right, to hem in the robbers and finally 
attack them if warranted by circumstances. To effect this 
he only waited for his convoys, which were now being 
brought up, though slowly, because the loss of the hired 
camels had been as yet but partially restored, and the 
troops had been for many days on half-rations. 

On the 28th, while preparing for the new movement, 
Sir C. Napier secretly heard that Trukkee was really close 
to him, on the north-west and not amongst the rocks before 
indicated. Wherefore, hoping that sooner or later he 
should find the tribes in that fastness, he forbade all strag- 
gling or explorations . towards the mysterious quarter, lest 
the hillmen should be thus deterred from going there ; for 
he was well assured that, once in Trukkee, he could by 
famine, drought, or force of arms, or all three combined, re- 
duce the robbers to submission. While ruminating on these 
things a trooper galloped into camp, saying that a convoy, 
which after depositing a supply was on its return, had been 
attacked only three miles off and was defending itself. 
Instantly the general made for the scene of action with 
his Mogul escort, leaving orders for a regiment of irregular 
cavalry to follow ; for that such a daring attack, so close 
to his camp, would not have happened unless a refuge was 
at hand he felt assured, and that refuge could only be 
Trukkee. 

In this conviction, when he reached the ground, he 
wished to keep the enemy in play, but his staff seeing 
only fifty mounted robbers in the field galloped against 
them and caused a retreat. This unmilitary procedure 
was very displeasing, but his judgment was quickly con- 
firmed ; the retiring horsemen suddenly rode into a chasm 
amongst the rocks, and a guide at his side involuntarily 
exclaimed as they disappeared, Trukkee ! having only the 
evening before declared it was two marches distant ! This 
exclamation, coupled with the confident retreat of the 
robbers, gave warrant that the long-hidden fortress was 
found, and the confederates brought to bay ; wherefore the 
irregular cavalry were instantly posted opposite the chasm 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 227 

through which the horsemen had disappeared, and the CHAP. X. 
English leader went back to camp exultant. It was then 1845 * 
dark and the troops were merely warned to support the 
cavalry, if any alarm was given, but at daylight both 
infantry and guns marched, and the discovered southern 
entrance to Trukkee was blocked up. 

In his tent the general had found a spy, come to report, 
that all the confederate chiefs, with four thousand fighting 
men, had gone into Trukkee by the northern entrance 
two days before, having quitted their camp at Partur for 
that purpose, and there were no other entrances save those 
now watched by the cavalry. This advice, agreeing with 
what had just occurred, was confirmed by the ambassadors 
from the Murrees, and Sir C. Napier, seeing he had 
the game at last in his hands, instantly detached the 
camel corps and the volunteers of the 13th regiment, 
also mounted on camels, to reinforce Beatson at Shore; 
carrying orders for that officer and Ali Moorad to move — 
Beatson by the Goojroo defiles, Ali by a route leading 
westward of that pass on to the Murrow plain, whence pj an 2 . 
they were to track the hillmen, and seize the northern 
entrance to Trukkee. 

This reinforcement was sent to enable Beatson to act 
alone, for Ali was habitually neglectful of orders, and his 
camp was full of traitors ; but he was not perfidious, and 
his services were thus described. " He was faithful and 
useful, but too vainglorious, and his people were so many 
spies for the enemy. I had some trouble to keep them 
clear of us and carry on the operations independently, yet 
apparently in unison.-" Ali did not now obey promptly, 
but finally he and Beatson blocked the northern entrance 
on the morning of the oth, and thus the renowned fortress 
of Trukkee, hitherto hidden as it were by enchantment 
from the search of the British leader, was suddenly found, 
and as suddenly sealed up; and all the robber tribes, a few 
roving bands infesting the communications of the army 
excepted, were imprisoned like the Afreets of their eastern 
tales under the signet of Soliman. It was a masterly 
stroke of generalship, an astonishing physical effort and a 

q 2 



228 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. X. fitting climax to the cautious and calculated though 
1845. vigorous operations which had preceded and enforced 
such a termination. The chiefs were amazed. They had 
imagined that Trukkee itself, involved and blended with 
the other rocks of that desolate and savage region, would 
remain a mystery, baffling the search of their antagonist ; 
and that from its wild intricacies they could emerge from 
time to time on their murderous excursions, until the 
invading army, dwindling under starvation and a partisan 
warfare, could no longer keep the field. With these hopes, 
like hawks as they called themselves, they had gathered 
on their rocks, ruffling their wings and peering for their 
quarry, but the fowler's net was thrown, and like hawks 
they were taken to be reclaimed. 

Thus shut up, the robbers were without the means of 
lengthened existence. Their herds were reduced in 
numbers, their stores of grain, no longer to be replenished, 
were scanty, and famine awaited them, to vindicate Sir 
C. Napier's prescient scheme of operations against the loud 
idiot cry raised in derision of the expedition. Nor was 
the execution unworthy of the conception. The marches 

App.xix. had been efforts of no ordinary kind. Beatson and Ali 
Mooracl had threaded terrible defiles, had moved along 
tracks covered with huge rocks and loose sharp stones, 
for nearly sixty miles almost without a halt, and on half- 
rations ; the men therefore arrived nearly naked and 
barefooted, and the animals unshod : a horse-shoe was sold 
for thirty shilhngs, and their progress was truly described 
by the general as climbing not marching ! This also had 
been the character of all the movements, without a 
murmur being heard. 

While awaiting news of the arrival of Beatson and the 
ameer, the infantry had encamped opposite the southern 
entrance, and the cavalry were moved further to the west for 
the watching of another entrance which was now heard of. 
Then the general after examining with great labour and 
fatigue all the approaches, scaled a high rock from whence 
he looked into the interior of Trukkee and formed a plan of 
attack — to be executed however only in the last extremity, 



i 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



229 



for the place was indeed worthy of its reputation. Resem- CHAP, 
bling an extinct crater, it was twelve miles long, by five or 1845j 
six broad, and nature had most curiously contrived it alike 
for secrecy and strength. For strength, because exter- 
nally it presented a belt of rocks many hundred feet high 
and nearly impracticable of ascent on the south side ; and 
though it was less austere on the north, the inside there 
was precipitous while on the southern side it was compara- 
tively easy of descent. Thus the whole circuit was equally 
impervious to assault ; and the interior was a vast collec- 
tion of rocky hillocks with chasms of different depths, yet 
all precipitous. 

For secrecy, because on the south was a second wall, or 
screen of perpendicular rocks some hundred feet high, form- 
ing with the actual belt of Trukkee a restricted valley, or 
rather lane, which was to be entered by narrow fissures before 
the passes into the crater could be approached ; and all the 
country for miles around, beyond that screen, and adjoin- 
ing the true wall, was a chaos of huge loose stones which 
it was hardly possible to cross. The entrances to this 
hidden fastness, which seemed like some ruined colossal 
amphitheatre, were mere cracks in a wall of rock, so 
suddenly opened that the upper parts seemed still to touch 
and refused to let in the light. There was abundance of 
water inside ; and just outside the fissure by which the 
robbers retired after their attack on the convoy, there was 
a copious hot spring, wholesome to drink yet forbidden to 
the troops by matchlock-men, perched on landing-places 
in the side of the precipitous crags. 

It was impossible to discover exactly what stores of 
grain and cattle the tribes had introduced, or had pre- 
viously laid up ; and as there might be more entrances 
and many of their warriors must still be abroad, the length 
of their resistance to a blockade could not be calculated. 
Wherefore at first the cavalry were merely spread to the 
west until they were connected with the horsemen at 
Tomb, and the latter, patrolling round the western point 
of Trukkee, communicated with Beatson and the ameer ; 
but when all the entrances were thus ascertained and 



230 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. x. secured, and the investment completed, the general pro- 
J^jT ceeded to arrange a plan for forcing a way in and fighting 
the human hornets in the midst of their stony cells ; 
a terrible prospect of slaughter on both sides and uncer- 
tain of success, for the interior was as formidable as the 
exterior. This had been ascertained at the northern 
entrance, where the exterior belt of rocks being more 
accessible than the southern, was scaled and some progress 
made in the defile itself; but the interior precipices were 
then found impracticable, and from the heights thus 
attained, the hillmen were seen moving from one place 
to another, with such labour and difficulty as plainly 
showed what the ground was; for they had to draw up 
and let down their camels and cattle by ropes, and in 
places even to swing them across gloomy chasms, offering 
defensive positions at every hundred yards, and of 
infinite intricacy, spreading like a network over sixty 
square miles ! 

The scheme of attack, though not finally executed, was 
planned with such subtilty and caution, and was yet so 
daring, that being afterwards laid before the duke of 
Wellington it drew from him strong expressions of appro- 
bation. It was as follows. The lane between the southern 
screen and exterior belt of Trukkee was only three hundred 
yards wide, but nearly forty miles in length, extending 
from beyond the Tomb on the west to the eastward of 
Deyrah. Being widest opposite the main entrance to 
Trukkee, it was proposed to establish there all the field- 
batteries and mortars, to fire directly at short range upon 
the entrance, and to throw shells on to the ledges, where 
the enemy's men were perched with levers to cast down 
rocks when the assailants should enter the fissure. These 
projectiles, it was hoped, would not only dislodge the lever- 
men, but also bring away masses of the rock ; which in 
conjunction with those shells that rolled off the ledges 
and exploded below, would help to clear the defile of its 
defenders. The infantry meanwhile, formed on the left of 
the batteries, were to open a brisk sustained musketry 
against the matchlock -men lining the crest of the rocks 



SOUTHERN ENTRANCE FROM EXTERIOR. 



ADMINISTRATION OFSCINDE. 



231 



on the robbers' right of the entrance ; but no person CHAP. X. 
was to go or be seen on the enemy's left of the defile. 18 4 5< 

A detachment, ostentatiously moving westward, was 
to offer a false attack, the commander having a discretion 
to turn it into a real one if he could find any practicable 
ascent. But during these demonstrations, a selected body 
of men under the command of Fitzgerald, were to lie in 
ambush near the rocky heights on the enemy's left of the 
defile, with orders to scramble up in a direction previously 
examined, and — correctly as it afterwards proved — judged 
accessible to active and resolute men. For this dangerous 
service the whole of the Company's 2nd European regi- 
ment volunteered, and three hundred had been accepted ; 
but to them were added a hundred volunteers from the 
64th native regiment, to whom the general wished to give 
an opportunity of regaining their colours, having found 
them on trial very gallant soldiers. These volunteers 
were sworn to silence even under wounds, and with the 
strong and daring Fitzgerald at their head, would have 
encountered anything. The ascent would have taken 
about two hours, and very subtle arrangements were made 
to prevent the enemy from either seeing the troops or 
hearing the noise of the loose rocks rolled down by 
them as they scrambled upwards. 

Previous to the time being fixed for this attack, Sir 
C. Napier and General Simpson, and their staff-officers 
had anxiously watched the hill for several nights in succes- 
sion. At first they saw a large fire burning through the 
night, and many hillmen about it ; but the third night it 
was allowed to go out about ten o'clock ; indicating that 
the undisciplined warriors had become tired of sending up 
pickets to such a height, where the cold was at this time 
very severe for eastern constitutions. At last the fire was 
not seen at all, it was evident the hill was no longer 
guarded in force, and then the attack was fixed to take 
place with the following accessories. All the great guns 
and musketry were to open at once, in the expectation of 
filling the narrow valley with smoke, and causing such 
an uproar by the reverberation of sound from the perpen- 



232 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. x. dicular rocks, that the robbers' attention would be entirely 
1845. drawn to the entrance-fissure being thus menaced, and 
they would also be prevented from seeing Fitzgerald's 
storming party or hearing the noise of stones rolled down 
in its ascent. His attack would be too far off to be disclosed 
by the transient flashes from the guns, but, if discovered, 
his men were to rush on and endeavour to obtain a footing 
above — if undiscovered, they were, on reaching the summit, 
to light a fire as a signal and then attack whatever was 
before them. 

The entrance-fissure was meanwhile to be stormed 
or not, as circumstances dictated, that is, if Fitzgerald 
made his footing good above, the whole of the infantry 
were to file up after him ; but if he was beaten, the en- 
trance was to be stormed before the disaster could become 
known along the enemy's line. This desperate sanguinary 
operation it was desirable to avoid if possible; yet the 
men were so confident and eager, that the general, always 
mindful of moral force, designed to give no positive order 
for the storm, but merely keeping a reserve in hand, to 
push the troops by degrees towards the entrance ; trusting 
to their natural fierceness and bravery, excited by the 
astounding noise and smoke, for plunging them voluntarily 
into the defile with such vehemence that nothing could 
stand before them. And what his troops were capable 
of attempting had been already evinced at the northern 
entrance, where Beatson and the ameer were to second the 
main attack by a simultaneous assault. 

Those commanders had, as before related, entered a short 
way into the defile, but from some error, a sergeant and 
sixteen privates of the 13th volunteers got on the wrong 
side of what appeared a small chasm and went against a 
height crowned by the enemy, where the chasm suddenly 
deepened so as to be impassable. The company from 
which the sergeant had separated was on the other side, and 
his officer, seeing how strong the hillmen were on the rock, 
made signs to retire, which the sergeant mistook for ges- 
tures to attack, and with inexpressible intrepidity scaled the 
precipitous height. The robbers waited concealed behind 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



233 



a breastwork on a landing-place until eleven of the party CHAP. X. 

came up, and then, being seventy in number, closed on 1845. 

them. All the eleven had medals, some had three, and Appendix XI. 

in that dire moment proved that their courage at Jellala- 

bad had not been exaggerated by fame. Six of them fell 

stark, and the others being wounded, were shoved back 

over the edge and rolled down the almost perpendicular 

side of the hill ; but this did not happen until seventeen 

of the robbers and their commander were laid dead 

above. 

There is a custom with the hillmen, that when a great 
champion dies in battle, his comrades, after stripping his 
body, tie a red or green thread round his right or left wrist 
according to the greatness of his exploit — the red being 
most honourable. Here those brave warriors stripped the 
British dead, and cast the bodies over; but with this 
testimony of their own chivalric sense of honour and the 
greatness of the fallen soldiers' courage — each body had a 
red thread on both wrists ! They had done the same 
before to the heroic Clark whose personal prowess and 
intrepidity had been remarkable. Thus fell Sale's veterans, 
and he, as if ashamed of having yielded them prece- 
dence on the road to death, soon took his glorious place 
beside them in the grave. Honoured be Iris and their 
names ! 

Although Sir C. Napier was resolute to storm Trukkee 
in the manner described, if no other resource remained, he 
loved his soldiers too well to risk such slaughter until 
every minor influence had been tried on their brave but 
ferocious enemies ; and much he trusted that want of food, 
and the despondency which the failure of all Beja's well- 
devised operations and negotiations must have produced, 
would bring them to terms. Yet beyond a certain time 
he could not persevere in the blockade ; he had to bring 
up water as well as provisions to those barren regions ; 
and the troops, thirsty and hungry, were almost naked and 
quite barefooted ; for long marches over sharp loose stones 
and through low bushes, had torn their clothes and en- 
tirely destroyed their shoes : short of those terrible visita- 



234 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. X. tions which have swept away whole armies from existence 
1845. at once, they were suffering as much as soldiers ever did. 

Yet not a murmur was heard, their general' s skill was 
apparent, and they were content to die by fatigue, by 
starvation, or by steel as he commanded. "When I see 
that old man incessantly on his horse, how can I who am 
young and strong be idle? By G-od I would go to a 
cannon's mouth if he ordered me/' was the high-souled 
expression of a youthful officer in this campaign. 

Gallant officers, generous hardy soldiers, they were, and 
now their day of power was come, with this consolation 
for past national mishaps, that from their tent doors they 
could see the very places where former expeditions had 
failed, and could even mark the wild crags where the 
skeletons of Clark and his brave comrades seemed to wait 
in grim expectation of this avenging hour. And sternly 
they would have been avenged had the hillmen awaited 
the assault, for the murder of the camp-followers in the 
previous operations had rendered the soldiers gloomily 
resolved to give no quarter ; yet such is the influence of a 
great leader, that while they swore to be as merciless to 
men as the robbers had been to them, they were avowedly 
fixed to save women and children, even from the knives of 
their own remorseless kindred. 

Happily all slaughter was avoided. It was on the 
28th of February that Trukkee had been discovered, 
and on the 4th of March Beja Khan Doomkee — Islam 
Khan Bhoogtee— Deyrah Khan Jackranee— Houssein Khan 
Mundooanee, and two smaller chiefs of dependent tribes, 
having with them Beja's brother Mundoo, who appeared 
the master-spirit although till then unknown, entered the 
English general's tent under truce, but with the Khoran on 
their heads and submissive accents on their lips, at the very 
moment he was giving orders to storm their rocky hold. 
Tall and strong men they were, and of warlike aspects 
and proportions, bigger men could scarcely be found, with 
exception of Deyrah, who was of moderate size and gentle 
look, and much beloved by his tribe for his honour and 
mildness. Yet this chief, not undeservedly respected, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



235 



according to their notions, was prone to murder and CHAP. X. 
spoliation, being only more ready when passion subsided to 1845> 
make reparation. Beja, aged, but of Herculean dimensions, 
had a pre-eminently imposing appearance, answerable to 
his reputation as the most powerful and daring robber 
of the hills : but his spirit, though fierce, was scarcely 
answerable to his appearance and reputation. 

They demanded terms. Submission, emigration, and a 
quiet settlement on the plains, far from your wild crags. 
We wish for time to consult our tribes. Take it. 

Next day came Mundoo to demand modifications. The 
general was inflexible. Then Deyrah Jackranee — Toork 
Ali — Denana Mundooee — Suleyman Randanee and J umal 
Khan Doomkee, brother of Beja, came with most of their 
followers and laid down their swords in submission — the 
first and second induced thereto, as they said, by the 
honourable treatment of their women at Ooch. These 
men were protected from plunder, and retaining all their 
property moved with the army as a caravan. The others 
held aloof. Beja they said, had been so perfidiously treated 
by Captain Postans the political agent that they could 
not trust English honour ; and when told by General 
Simpson — who was sent into Trukkee as a hostage for 
Beja — that Sir C. Napier's faith was undoubted, they 
pointed to their ancles and wrists and cried out, Postans ! 
Postans ! Thus forced to reneAred action the general 
ordered a column of three hundred infantry to open the 
communication with Ah Moorad and Beatson, by the 
western end of Trukkee; and at the same time, as the 
submission of so many chiefs had put him in possession of 
the southern entrances, he sent a number of smaller 
columns through them with orders to scour all the in- 
terior of the fastness and pursue with fire and sword 
whatever they came across, always sparing women and 
children. This was on the 7th, and soon two more of 
Beja's brothers and their families were captured without 
opposition, and consequently without bloodshed; but Beja 
himself was nowhere to be found, whereupon the scouring 
columns, the camel corps, and the cavalry and even the 



236 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER J S 



CHAP. X. head-quarters escort of Moguls, were launched in pursuit, 
1845. with orders to bring him in dead or alive. 

Thus hunted, the recalcitrant chief, his brother Mun- 
doo, a nephew, his son Wuzeer and a minor Bhoogtee 
chief, with all the followers still adhering to them, sur- 
rendered on the 9th. As a punishment the soldiers were 
allowed to plunder their goods, and they did plunder the 
men ; but true to their honourable compact, molested no 
woman or child either in person or property; where a 
woman's dress was seen, or a child's voice heard, all was 
safe. Islam Khan escaped with his Bhoogtees, but his 
father-in-law, the Keytrian, whose tribe was one of culti- 
vators not robbers, would not receive his followers. Driven 
to desperation by hunger he then plundered the Mazarees, 
but they retook the booty and killed a hundred and twenty 
of his men. With the remainder he fell on the Murrees 
who killed a hundred more, and the poor remnant became 
miserable wanderers — for with those tribes there was no 
charity. Thus the war ended after fifty-four days of 
incessant exertions. 

" I have had great anxiety during this difficult cam- 
paign was the observation of the successful leader. I 
know not if I shall get credit for it ; but I think I have 
done well. However the play is over." 

No credit did he get from any person save Sir H. Har- 
dinge, who behaved as a brother soldier and a public man 
should behave ; but no thanks came from power in Eng- 
land, and strenuous efforts were made and successfully to 
prevent this great campaign becoming known in all its 
worth to his countrymen. The skill of the general, the 
devotion, the hardihood of the officers and men, the heroic 
deaths of the veterans on the rock were all withheld from 
public approbation : and the persons who sought to stifle 
the fame of such actions were those who should have been 
foremost to proclaim and reward them. History however 
cannot be stifled, though from natural baseness its post- 
humous vengeance may be disregarded. None of his staff 
received any promotion. Lord BApon long withheld his 
despatch from the public, and when asked why he did so ? 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



237 



answered He had forgotten it ! A day, an hour of the CHAP. X. 
dangers and fatigues of that campaign would have ren- 1845> 
dered his memory less treacherous, his luxurious existence 
more noble ; it would have furnished at least one passage 
in his public life unmarked by public derision or public 
indignation. 

During the operations to reduce Beja, the Murree 
vakeels had remained in camp, and in fear, because the 
conduct of the tribe had been so suspicious that the 
English general, as before noticed, had menaced them. 
And he could now easily reach them, because the sur- 
render of Beja left him free action, and there was a 
cannon -road within his power, which, turning the defiles 
of S art oof and Nufoosk, led upon their town of Kahun. 
It was that danger which had brought the vakeels to 
camp, and meanwhile the tribes removed their families 
and herds forty miles northwards. The general however, 
finding them so submissive, renewed the alliance, and 
offered them the Bhoogtee fort of Deyrah, with the 
fertile plain around it; but they refused, influenced by 
the fear of after-feuds if the British should give up 
Scinde. — An event which the Bombay faction continually 
assured them was inevitable. 

Short as this campaign had been, the greatness of the 
enterprise considered, it would have been terminated much 
sooner, if the fear of a collision with the Seikhs had not 
precluded the execution of the first design, namely, passing 
through the Rhojan Mazaree's country and invading the 
hills from the east and west at the same time : the con- 
federates would thus have been early debarred retreat to 
the defiles of Goojroo, and have been thrown at once into 
Trukkee. Nor could they have so long baffled the actual 
operations, if Ali Moorad had been true to time when 
Beja abandoned ihe Lullee and Jummuck passes to make 
for Gondooee; for wily and clever as the hillmen were 
in their warfare, the superiority of the Englishman's 
generalship over barbarian art was pre-eminent — illus- 
trating a passage in Plutarch's life of Philopoemen, where 
he says that great man " adopting the Cretan customs and 



238 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. X. using their artifices and sleights, their stratagems and am- 
1845> bushes against themselves, soon showed that their devices 
were like the short-sighted schemes of children when com- 
pared with the long reach of an experienced general" 

With less than five thousand men Sir C. Napier had 
crossed a desert of more than eighty miles, had surprised 
the enemy's first line of forts and watering-places, had 
seized their strongest passes without a stroke, had baffled 
all their counter schemes, and in fifty-four days subdued 
tribes having four times his number of fighting men, 
without giving them even an opportunity of delivering 
battle in an advantageous post. He had starved them 
where they thought to starve him ; and by fine combina- 
tions and unexampled rapidity overreached them in their 
own peculiar warfare, in a country more than a hundred 
and forty miles long, from eighty to one hundred and 
twenty broad, and of such desolate strength and intricacy 
as can scarcely be equalled in the world — chasing them 
amidst crags and defiles, where a single error would have 
caused the total destruction of his army merely by the 
casting of stones down on the columns. All other in- 
vaders had ever met with destruction amongst those wild 
rocks and terrible passes, whose impregnable nature had 
become proverbial throughout Central Asia; and hence, 
the sudden conquest of warriors, honoured as unconquer- 
able by all surrounding nations, spread wonder and awe. 
The conqueror was by his own Bengal sepoys called a 
Deota or spirit ; and tribes hitherto dreading and obeying 
the Cutchee hillmen as demons, now earnestly desired to be 
accepted as subjects of Scinde; while the wildest Scindian 
tribes became more contentedly submissive to a govern- 
ment thus proved to be equally powerful and protective. 

These results were not easily obtained. " War in these 
deserts, said the successful leader, is very embarrassing. 
To get up supplies is difficult; to move is difficult ; to find 
a road is difficult ; in fine it is a chain of difficulties such 
as I believe no other country presents — rocks, mountains, 
wastes ! — all barren, wild, and full of frightful defiles, every 
step through which was over sharp stones, that lamed half 



ADMINISTRATION OY SCINDE. 



239 



our animals — horses bullocks asses camels — all were crip- CHAP. X. 
pled, and the soldiers went barefoot. It was very severe 1345. 
work for man and beast. Napoleon said that war in 
deserts was of all wars the most difficult, and my experi- 
ence leads me to the same conclusion." 

Nor was the courage of the hillmen unsuited to their 
rugged country. In the hand-to-hand fight, where the 
volunteers of the 13th fell so heroically, one of the robbers 
being pierced with a bayonet, tore the musket from the 
soldier's hands, drew the bayonet from his own body, 
repaid the stroke with a desperate wound and fell dead ! 
In another action twenty-five robbers, meeting with twenty 
of the Moguls in the desert at dusk, instantly attacked ; the 
horsemen had the advantage and offered quarter after a 
sharp fight, but the gallant barbarians refused it, and died 
side by side, fighting to the last ! 

To have warred down such men in their own desolate 
hills, without a single reverse, by the mere force of genius 
and hardihood was a noble exploit ; and factiously to hide its 
lustre from public admiration was essentially base and 
un-English ! For if the surmounting extraordinary diffi- 
culties by a union of extreme caution with extreme daring 
and firmness be looked to, rather than the number of troops 
employed, as the test of generalship, there are few re- 
corded exploits in war more remarkable than this cam- 
paign. And perhaps nothing in it was more remarkable 
than the resolution with which it was undertaken, and 
persevered in despite of the universal cry of derision 
raised by a faction but responded to with an incredulous 
feeling as to success in the army employed — despite also 
of the terrible loss of the 78th regiment, the arrogant 
imbecility of Lord Bipon, and the certainty of personal 
ruin if it failed of success. 

Regarding the execution it is unnecessary to point out 
the subtilty with which the robbers, the khan of Khelat, 
and even the friendly Chandian chief were misled as to 
the opening of the campaign ; or how Ali Moorad and his 
ill-disposed Beloochees, were at once debarred of opportu- 
nity for mischief and forced to push a war against their 



240 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. X. own race ; but when was ever a surprise effected under 
1845* greater difficulties, with greater physical exertion, or more 
prompt and able combinations than that by which Ooch, 
Shahpoor and Poolagee fell, and the robbers were cut off 
from the western mountains ere they knew even that the 
war was begun ? Can the skill be denied, with which the 
terrible passes of Lullee and Jummuck were rendered 
nullities for the confederates, by the vigorous march of 
Simpson's column, combined with that of the head- 
quarters ? Was it ordinary resolution under adverse 
circumstances that maintained the camp between those 
passes, until the surprising expedition of the camel corps, 
relieving the distress for provisions, facilitated the third 
great movement of the campaign, namely the taking of 
new positions at Sebree and Doosh Kooshta, and from 
thence attempting a second surprise at Shore, which only 
failed from an accident that no human foresight could have 
prevented. And was he a common general who with 
one stroke then changed the plan of operations, extricated 
his army from the embarrassment caused by that failure, 
and at the same time placed his enemy in difficulties from 
which he could never escape ? 

Let the intricacy and military accuracy of the combina- 
tions there made, be examined. The confederates had been 
by the previous operations forced into a corner of their 
hills ; but they had escaped the surprise designed, and had 
taken refuge behind a defile through which it was impos- 
sible to penetrate ; it was equally impossible to remain in 
observation because the troops were nearly starving and 
the magazines distant. Meanwhile the confederates could 
break out by denies in their own rear, to regain the country 
they had been before driven from and renew the war; 
thus rendering all the previous able operations null. To 
have turned such difficulties to the entire disadvantage of 
the enemy, to resign the offensive for a moment, and by 
seemingly retrograde marches, illustrating the saying, 
' ' draw back to, make the better leap," force the confede- 
rates to receive battle in a bad position, or abandon their 
impregnable one altogether and take the offensive on a bad 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



241 



line which could only lead to their ruin, was surely the chap. x. 
mark of a great general. 184 5. 

Ali Moorad, Hunter, and the commander-in-chief seemed Plan 2. 
to be retreating when marching on Lotee, Jummuck and 
Deyrah ; but no part of the country previously gained was 
thereby relinquished. Beatson still blocked the southern 
end of the Goojroo defile, living on the grain captured 
from the enemy, while the rest of the army got nearer to 
the magazines. Thus the supplies were assured, and the 
head-quarter column, without losing its connection with 
Hunter's detachment for more than two days, was placed 
where it could by a new road turn the terrible Goojroo 
defile, and assail the confederate chieis at its northern end, 
while Beatson and Ali Moorad still blocked the southern 
end. If the hillmen had waited for that attack, the war 
would have been brought to the decision of a battle on 
ground favourable to the British ; and there was no escape 
from defeat by the confederates, because the neutral terri- 
tory of Mooltan was behind them and on their left flank ; 
and if they had come down the defile it has been shown 
they would have got between two fires. It was then they 
felt all their opponent's generalship and took refuge in 
Trukkee, where he shut them up with potential skill. 
Surprisingly rapid also were his movements, for though 
his fighting men were few, his was an Indian army and 
the whole mass was heavy. Not less than twenty thou- 
sand persons and their innumerable animals were to be 
provided for, and handled amidst those barren rocks. 



R 



242 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAPTER XI. 

CHAP. xi. During the campaign Sir C. Napier had not neglected 
1845 the Scindian administration. " This negotiation with the 
chiefs in Trukkee,"*he writes in his journal, "has only 
kept me from the business of civil government for a few 
days, and already the pile of trials is two feet high on my 
table ; I dare say not less than thirty are there, several 
from fifty to ninety sheets of foolscap — and life or death 
depend on some \" Yet with all tins unceasing mental 
labour he had found time and thought early in the opera- 
tions, to give an elaborate opinion for the government upon 

Appendix vi. the reformation of the Indian Articles of War; and while 
propounding terms of capitulation to the robber chiefs, he 
was treating with the jam of Beila for the purchase of 
some choice fruit-trees to plant in the public garden at 
Kurrachee. Attentive also to the claims of science he 
had placed carriage at the disposal of Captain Vickery — a 
qualified person of the Company's service — for the collec- 
tion of geological and mineralogical specimens, which were 
transmitted with a memoir to the London Society and 

Appendix xil. acknowledged as valuable contributions. He would have 
extended these researches if the army had remained in the 
hills ; but to avoid that public expense, the moment Beja 
was captured, the fort of Deyrah was destroyed, Oolagee 
and Poolagee were restored to their former owners the 
Keyharees, Lheree was given to Belooch Khan, and the 
army was put in motion for Scinde. The general then re- 
paired with an escort to Shahpoor to meet the khan of 
Khelat, whose leave he designed to obtain for putting a 
garrison in that place to watch those outlying robbers who 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



243 



had not entered, or had escaped from Trukkee; and well CHAP. XI. 
content he was to have finished the war so soon, for 1845. 
already the heat of the desert had become nearly unendu- 
rable by Europeans. 

At Shahpoor the khan was found, for like all the sur- 
rounding powers he was so awed by this sudden reduction 
of the hitherto invincible hill tribes, as earnestly to seek 
that conference which he had before carefully evaded. The 
campaign had however been entirely to his profit ; his re- 
bellious subjects were effaced as tribes, his unruly sirdars 
humbled and alarmed, and his desolated but fertile plains 
of Cutch Gundava could now be repeopled and cultivated 
in safety. He still complained of the hostility of the 
Candahar chiefs, and on that ground asked for a subsidy ; 
but the general, though anxious to give him political 
weight to press down the loose materials for commotion 
which abounded around, thought a subsidy would only 
tend to enrich his scheming sirdars, and substituted for it 
an austere warning to the Candahar men not to molest an 
ally of the British. He also proposed to the governor- 
general that a Khelat force should be raised, officered and 
paid by England for a time, as a means of awing the 
Affghans and discontented nobles, and strengthening the 
alliance. This suggestion was not attended to, but the 
Candahar chiefs gave an earnest assurance — for they were 
in great fear — that they had no hostile designs, and the 
khan readily assented to the occupation of Shahpoor. 

The Englishman now adopted a singular expedient for 
protecting the frontier of Scinde against the outstanding 
robbers. Planting the captive Jackranees and a minor 
tribe of Doomkees on fertile government land, near the 
southern edge of the Kusmore desert, he made Deyrah 
Khan their chief, allowing him to reject the violent spirits 
whose quietude he could not warrant; but those were 
immediately taken into pay as policemen, and removed to 
the south where they served well and willingly. The 
people under Deyrah were compelled to build houses and 
cultivate lands, being fed by the government until their 
first harvest was reaped ; then house and land were be- 
lt 2 



244 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



chap. XT. stowed on the military tenure of opposing the incursions 
1845. °f tne i r kindred robbers still in arms — yet with this stern 
admonition, that if they themselves robbed any one, or 
failed to oppose the incursions of others, their lands would 
be taken away, the chiefs hanged, and the followers set 
to labour in chains. Deyrah Khan was selected for this 
settlement because he had always been averse to the 
robber life, and amongst the first to surrender ; under him 
therefore it was hoped, if the experiment failed to reclaim 
the fathers, that the children would have better customs. It 
failed with neither, only Houssein Bhoogtee and his brother, 
fierce violent men, who had betrayed the heroic Clark and 
his comrades to death, refused work, and they were in- 
stantly put to labour on the public roads in irons, without 
a murmur from the rest. Civilization triumphed ! 

It was designed to hang Beja Khan for the murder of 
McKenzie's grass-cutters, but Ali Moorad prayed for his 
pardon, and Beja's barbarian nature and customs, joined 
to 'the fact that he had been admitted to negotiation 
during a campaign which had annihilated his power for 
mischief, gave weight to the ameer's intercession. The 
old chieftain and his immediate followers, were therefore 
placed under Ali Moorad' s guard as settlers eastward of 
the Indus, on the conditions given to the Jackranees. Sir 
C. Napier was also moved to clemency by hearing that 
when the confederates expected their last fight at Trukkee, 
and had left servants to kill their wives and children, they 
thus modified the bloody injunction. " Unless you see 
the English chief in person, for as he saved the honour of 
the ameers' women so will he do with ours — yield to 
him ! " Neither was Beja's complaint of perfidy without 
weight; for though Captain Postans afterwards made a 
long defence, said to have satisfied the governor-general, 
he certainly had not satisfied the men who accused him, 
as their conduct at Trukkee proved. 

These matters being arranged, the general reached 
Kurrachee after five months of incessant marching and 
fighting, added to laborious administrative duties, the 
pressure of which he thus laconically described. " Climate 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



245 



and work have weakened me, but one cannot live for CHAP. XI. 
ever." He returned however to encounter anew the 1345 
enmity of the thankless oligarchs he was so efficiently 
serving. His astonishing campaign, derided at first as im- 
practicable, had been during the operations assailed with 
a ridiculous fury; the death of every camp-follower had 
been announced as the forerunner of a direful termi- 
nating calamity, which the organs of the Bombay faction 
strove hard to produce. Their cry had always been that 
"Sir C. Napier knew nothing of government — that the 
people abhorred him — that they were only kept down 
by an overwhelming army." Yet here he had carried 
away his main force, attended by auxiliary Beloochee 
tribes, one hundred and fifty miles beyond the frontiers of 
Scinde, and six hundred miles from Kurrachee the seat of 
government, to war down a kindred population. Public 
opinion and even the feelings of his own army had been 
against the enterprise, yet he pursued it for two months, 
and during that time no movement of insurrection had 
taken place in Scinde, no conspiracy was formed, no 
discontent was shown, no murmur was heard ! 

This successful campaign cut away the foul hopes of 
disaster cherished by the Bombay calumniators ; but 
then, with inexpressible effrontery, they declared that 
nothing had been done and that a large force had been 
employed at enormous cost without the slightest gain : 
they even described Beja Khan as still ravaging the fron- 
tier at the head of his victorious tribes, when he was 
actually in prison trembling for his life. Such were the 
factious ravings in the Bombay Times. 

History appears degraded while recording the practices of 
these hirelings ; but it is because they were hirelings, the 
organs of power, that they must be noticed. Buist boasted 
of the support of official men ; and persons of his stamp 
cannot be neglected in history when peace and war have 
been influenced by their publications. He announced at 
this time that Sir C. Napier was urging the governor- 
general to a war in the Punjaub, and had publicly detailed 
the plan of operations ! And Major Carmichael Smith, 



246 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. XI. in his work upon the reigning family at Lahore, expressly 
1845 asserts that a speech — a forged one — published in the 
Delhi Gazette as spoken by Sir C. Napier, was the prin- 
cipal cause of the Punjaub war. For the general being 
there made to say his army would immediately invade the 
Seikhs they resolved to be first in the field, and crossed 
the Sutlej ! This statement has been corroborated by 
another writer, Captain Cunningham, and verbally by the 
French Colonel Mouton, who was a general in the Seikh 
service — wherefore the baffling of the governor-general's 
peaceful policy, and the terrible battles on the Sutlej, with 
their train of consequences involving a second war, may 
be traced directly to the flagitious forgeries of two con- 
temptible editors. The following extracts from a letter to 
the governor-general, written two months before the 
breaking out of the first Punjaub war will show with what 
indifference even to probability these forgeries were 
promulgated. 

" It is very hard upon professional men, that it is 
always put down as a settled thing that they want to 
make war, though history proves that is not the case. 
They make it indeed better and govern better than the 
civil servants of the public ; but nothing in history proves 
that they are more, or even so desirous of war as civil 
servants are. Nothing can make me believe that any man 
who has ever been in one battle can wish to be in a second 
from personal feelings, if he has those of a man or a 
Christian. If a battle must be fought we like to be side 
by side with our companions — reptiles only try to get 
away — but no man loves danger, except as producing 
honour. Woe to the ruffian who fights a battle that 
can be avoided, he is a wholesale murderer for his own 
private selfishness. Two of the most miserable days I ever 
spent, were those after Meeanee and Hyderabad — not 
from the slightest doubt of my own conduct being right, 
but because of the loss of my companions. I venture to 
say that no man ever more rigidly questioned himself as 
to the need of risking those battles than I did, or more 
entirely felt convinced; and subsequent events bore me 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



247 



out, as I believed they would. No man of common sense, CHAP. XI. 
or knowledge of mankind, can suppose that another would 1345. 
fight with an enemy so immensely superior in numbers, 
except from necessity. 

"These reflections come up on reading your letter, 
saying you had to prove to your employers, that a mili- 
tary man can honestly resist professional temptation, the 
indulgence of which without an absolute necessity would 
be criminal, in which I cordially agree with you. But 
the proper military precautions are deemed to spring from 
a resolution for war, though originating in a resolution 
for peace! And what is more, the only way of main- 
taining it. Lord Ellenborough was forced by an insen- 
sate, I should rather say an unprincipled clamour got up 
by the Whigs, to leave Gwalior independent, the result 
will be another war probably. Peaceful Hume ! One 
would think peace was sold by the yard and Hume had a 
monopoly of the article/' 

" My brother thinks the Indus ought to be our frontier 
in its whole course now. I do not think we are ripe for 
that. I agree with you that the Sutlej is our wisest 
boundary just now. I would go on to the Indus when 
we have gotten rid of our foolish system of keeping native 
princes on their thrones, within our territory ; until then 
it is impossible to trust to internal safety. But while 
I am decidedly of opinion that the Sutlej is our proper 
boundary-line now, I am equally certain that to keep 
within it is impossible. The revenue will not allow of 
such a line of defence in existing circumstances, and you 
will be the conqueror of the Punjaub before 1847 if you are 
alive and governor-general. Solomon was a wise man and 
a peaceful prince, but he had a very full treasury, and 
such credit with the merchants of Egypt and Tyre that 
to make war on him would have been dangerous — his 
frontier was safe. Had he been governor-general with a 
Seikh army prowling like a wild beast along his frontier, 
and requiring thirty thousand men to watch it, he must 
speedily have made war, or postponed the building of his 
temple'/' 



248 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



chap. XI. Such were the sentiments of the man represented as 
thirsting for war ; but he, unshaken in his course of right, 
was only seeking the prosperity of Scinde, and expressing 
his contempt for the factious folly, and the folly exclusive 
of faction, which tainted the minds of men in power, who 
could not, or would not, form any just or even sane idea 
of the resources of the country, or of the measures re- 
quired to work them beneficially. Because the land had 
not sprung up into a garden by magic — because the Indus 
was not at once covered with merchant-boats jostling for 
want of room in the pursuit of enormous profits — because 
all the wild Beloochees, and all the degraded Scindees, had 
not suddenly changed their nakedness and ignorance of 
everything but robbery and oppression, for a scientific 
knowledge of the earth's products and a persevering en- 
lightened industry in the manufacture of them, Scinde 
was called a desert and thought to be irreclaimable ! 
" How V 3 he exclaimed " can rational beings, if such per- 
sons can be called rational, expect miracles ? Because we 
have succeeded in keeping the heterogeneous population in 
peace and tranquillity, these men expect a high state of 
civilization to spring up on the instant \" With a master 
mind however he laboured to realize their first dreamy 
expectations. 

Prominent amongst the moral obstacles were the wile 
ferocity of the Beloochees, the Mahometan religion, and 
the want of a language to communicate with the multi- 
tude, for there were many dialects, but neither Persian 
nor Hindostanee was known. He meddled not with 
man's faith or religious rites, save where the Hindoo 
would burn women, and hence the Mahometans had no 
fear of conversion ; but they dreaded contamination, and 
would not mix with unbelievers ; he could not therefore 
conciliate them by the gentleness and honours of society 
as he wished to do. Yet one faith he proclaimed, one 
social comfort he administered, one language, by him 
accentuated with peculiar force and clearness, he used, 
and the multitude understood him. They required no 
priest to expound his general beneficence, his protection 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



249 



of life and property, his prompt unadulterated justice. CHAP. XI. 

The rich needed no interpreter to explain the generosity 1845> 

which assured to them their possessions and dignities. 

The poor were content, that without speaking their 

dialects he should break down the ameers ' cruel system 

of government farming, in all its branches, whether of 

taxes or rent. 

At this time he gave to every person, natives or immi- 
grants, who would cultivate land, leases for fourteen or 
twenty-one years with exemption from rent or taxes for 
the two first, the holders being responsible only to the 
government collectors without the intervention of zemin- 
dars or kardars. This was his appropriation of the land 
retained when the jagheers were regranted, and of the 
greater part of the ameers' accursed shikargahs : and to 
give the stimulus to industry more effect he made small 
government loans to the poorest to enable them to start 
in the course of cultivation. Infinite pains also he be- 
stowed on the general irrigation, observing that health, 
revenue, food and civilization depended upon controlling 
the waters. 

His minor measures for improving the public condi- 
tion and awakening men to advantages before unknown, 
or unheeded, were many and judicious. He formed a 
breeding establishment at Larkaana with the female 
camels taken from the hill tribes ; he endeavoured to 
set up windmills at Kurrachee, and with the profits of the 
government garden, which now supplied several thousand 
persons with vegetables, he stimulated industry in various 
branches ; the mills indeed failed ; for being made at 
Bombay under the superintendence of Dr. Buist who as 
secretary of the agricultural society there was charged 
with their construction, they were very costly, and so 
defective they could never be set up, 

Through the collector of customs Mr. McLeod, and 
Major Blenkyns, a sheep and grass farm was established 
for which merinos were obtained,, and it soon produced 
Guinea grass and lucerne in such abundance, as to give 
promise of entirely providing forage, which had hitherto 



250 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XI. been obtained for the army from Cutcb at enormous cost. 
18 45. Through Mr. Curling, who had been long in Egypt, tutor 
to one of the pacha's sons, he also sent for fine West 
India sugar-cane plants, and they arrived in a thriving 
condition at Bombay; but official people detained them 
there until they died, for any improvement of Scinde was 
to them as wormwood. However, cereal agriculture was 
in Sir C. Napier's judgment the only sure foundation on 
which to rest Scindian prosperity, and there was no real 
knowledge of it possessed by the people, even the most 
industrious ; yet the Beloochee and Scindee were alike so 
eager to acquire knowledge of any kind, that he saw their 
civilization would be certain if means of teaching were 
provided, the regimental schools were besieged by them 
praying to have their children instructed. To satisfy this 
craving for knowledge he proposed to Lord BApon the in- 
stitution of agricultural schools on a plan first established 
by Captain John Pitt Kennedy, at Loch- Ash in Ireland. 
It had been entirely successful there, and was afterwards 
pressed by that gentleman upon the Irish government. 
And it is no hyperbole to say, that had his plan been sup- 
ported against the intrigues of pretended patriots, the 
famine and misery which has desolated that unhappy 
country would have been very much abated if not entirely 
averted. That great and useful project was stifled to 
satisfy corrupt influence in Ireland, and in like manner 
this proposition for Scinde was set aside : it did not con- 
duce to factious interests ! 

While the regeneration of the poorer classes was thus 
urged forward, the just claims of the high-born people of 
the land were not overlooked. Though a conquered race, 
Sir C. Napier regarded them only as English subjects, 
and resolved to open for all places of trust and dignity 
without objection to colour or religion, demanding only 
qualification. Mohamed Tora, one of the greatest sirdars 
who fought at Meeanee, was made a magistrate, at his 
own request, the appointment being thus justified. " The 
nobles of Scinde must have the road of ambition opened to 
them, or they will not have their rights in the honourable 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



251 



sense of my proclamation — that is, if they qualify them- CHAP. XI. 

selves for the offices demanded. But in questions of 18 45. 

general interest like this, even qualification should not be 

required before enjoyment — we must give first, we can 

turn out afterwards for incapacity. The class-right will 

be thus acknowledged while the man is removed ; and if 

one Beloochee gentleman becomes a magistrate many will 

qualify themselves. I want to go beyond this, if the 

Indian system will allow me ; but that system, a rotten 

fabric of expedients for the supporting of robbery, is 

equally destitute of humanity and knowledge of human 

nature, and will I suppose certainly debar the Scindian 

gentlemen of the rights possessed by Englishmen. I will 

however give them all I can. The Beloochee gentleman 

may likely enough abuse his power for ten years to come ; 

but we who have conquered the country can surely keep 

half a dozen of such persons in order ; and the great men 

of the land must have a door open for their ambition, their 

virtues and their industry, or they will become rebellious 

or vile : I know not which is worst, but the government 

which produces either is a detestable tyranny." 

In virtue of powers granted by Lord Ellenborough, 
Sir C. Napier now negotiated with Ali Moorad a treaty, 
which that prince ardently desired, though he objected to 
one article, which gave a right to all persons to settle in 
either state, and provided that none who fled from one to 
the other should be given up, save for treason or murder, 
when the proof of guilt was to be satisfactory to the pro- 
tecting state. Against these provisions the ameer cla- 
moured — "They would ruin him, his people would all 
depart, his country be rendered desolate ! " — " Truly have 
you spoken ameer if your design is to be a tyrant." This 
silenced Moorad, yet his fears were not unfounded. Not 
only his subjects, but the cultivators of Khelat and those of 
Candahar, and traders from all the surrounding nations, 
even from the north-west provinces of British India, were 
crowding to Scinde as to an asylum against oppression. 
Kurrachee had swelled too big for its walls, and new streets 
were rapidly springing up beyond the gates. Many people 



252 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XT. of Cutcli Gundava liad come across the frontier, more were 
18 45. coming ; and two independent tribes of the Gedrosian 
desert, the Hedgees and Punjeurees, who could bring 
eight thousand swordsmen to the field, entreated to be 
accepted as subjects, and were strangely disconcerted 
when denied. 

Meanwhile the rejoicing for the fall of the robber tribes 
spread for hundreds of miles beyond the immediate neigh- 
bourhood of their stony fastnesses, indicating the extent 
of Beja's depredations and of his ferocity. Nor were the 
robbers themselves the last to proclaim their conqueror's 
prowess. " The Emperor Aekbar, the great Ahmet Shah, 
and other kings, had, they said, failed at the head of armies 
to penetrate beyond Tonge — and though at times British 
detachments had got through the first passes, they were 
invariably cut off in the end ; and no large force had ever 
before been able even to approach Trukkee : they had now 
been subdued, but by a man no one could resist." The 
fame of the exploit was thus spread even to Toorkistan, 
where the traveller Wolfe found the wild warriors of 
Central Asia expectant of Sir C. Napier's coming and 
hoping for the spoil of kingdoms under his leading, being 
all willing to join him in arms. And strange to say the 
town of Bunpore, on the confines of Persia, being besieged, 
actually surrendered on receipt of a forged letter of com- 
mand, having his name affixed ! But so vivid is the 
Eastern imagination, especially in warlike matters, that 
had he been master of his own actions he could at this 
time have overrun all Asia as a conqueror, and arrived on 
the Mediterranean with half a million of wild horsemen. 
Little did those fierce plundering Asiatics think, that the 
chief whose military prowess had thus excited their admi- 
ration, was then bringing into activity a new, a simple and 
a beautiful principle of contention totally opposed to their 
notions — the contention of rulers, competing for power 
and riches and grandeur indeed, yet not by war, not by 
negotiation, nor by commerce — but by a benign sway, 
attracting the oppressed of all nations to come under his 
government. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



253 



Amongst the essential means to attain that noble object, CHAP. XL 
was the reduction of imposts, that comfort might soothe 1845> 
the poor man's industry. Yet a strange difficulty attended 
this amelioration. The Beloochees would often prefer an 
onerous tax, if it was one of custom, to a lighter one which 
disturbed their habits ; and being men of violent impulses 
there was always danger of their resenting changes 
however beneficial. Cautiously therefore were financial 
reforms introduced, for the general desired more to make 
the people understand his desire to benefit them than to 
obtain the fame of a rapid regenerator ; holding the first 
to be the vital principle of permanent legislation ; the last 
an ephemeral distinction suitable only to a reforming 
tyrant — a Mehemet Ah of Egypt. But while seeking in 
all ways to amend the moral condition of the people, and 
to forward their national prosperity, he considered the 
repression of Belooch ferocity to be a holy work, and pur- 
sued it with stern resolution though he writhed under the 
means necessary to effect it ; for having to combine the 
lawgiver with the judge, and the executive office with both, 
there was no salve for a wounded conscience if error were 
committed. 

" I put men to death/* he said, " for murder only, and 
generally it is for the murder of helpless women or 
children : and having deeply considered the justice and 
necessity of doing so my conscience is clear as an adminis- 
trator, since no labour or pains, no care or reflection, have 
been spared by me to arrive at a just conclusion in each 
case. I do not flinch from this painful duty, but I do not 
like to be a judge. I would rather be a private person. 
Yet being here in authority I must do what should be 
done, and the cruelty of those ferocious men can only be 
stopped by force. Even Deyrah Khan whose countenance 
bespeaks his natural goodness — he who for years expressed 
his abhorrence of the robbers' habits and at once closed 
with my offers — even he is capable of fraud and murder. 
Bred in a bad school, the tendency of all the Beloochees is 
to starve from idleness and rob and murder from habit — 
but that habit I will break." 



254 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. XI. A few months after this was written, Deyrah beat one 
1845. of his followers to death, and though he was from some 
accidental cause only sentenced for manslaughter by the 
military commission, the trial gave infinite disgust to the 
Beloochees. — " Who ever before heard of a chief being 
blamed for killing a follower? Well ! God is great and 
will in time remedy what cannot be now accounted for ! " 
Such was the language of this fierce race of blood-spillers. 
Nevertheless their propensity to murder sensibly abated, 
and the good-will of the labouring classes towards the 
government as sensibly advanced. 

With the general prosperity the revenue also improved 
so rapidly, that after defraying the whole expense of the 
civil government, a surplus of one hundred thousand 
pounds sterling was paid into the treasury of India : subject 
only to the cost of constructing the new barracks which 
did not much exceed one-third of that sum, was not 
a permanent charge, and was sure to repay tenfold in 
the saving of soldiers' lives. Meanwhile so assured was 
the tranquillity of Scinde, that Sir C. Napier proposed to 
hold it with five thousand men ; a proposal not adopted 
by the supreme government, because the Seikh troubles 
were so menacing. Scinde did not require an army, the 
general interest of India did; but so far was Sir C. Napier 
from desiring war at this time in the Punjaub, or anywhere, 
that he expressed his dread of it, saying, age had incapa- 
citated him for the labour — that in the hills, he had been 
indeed several times more than twenty hours on horseback, 
and once twenty- six hours with only the support of a crust 
of bread and some tea carried in a soda-water bottle — such 
was his simplicity of living — yet old men do not recover 
rapidly from fatigue, and to do well in war a general 
should be always in the saddle — that his will was strong, 
but his worn-out body dragged it down, like a stone tied 
to the tail of a kite. That with the duke of Wellington 
body and mind seemed to have made a compact; with 
him they were as cat and dog. 

These expressions as to his bodily powers were but indi- 
cations of momentary lassitude after extreme exertions in 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



255 



a debilitating climate, for his continued labours evinced CHAP. XI. 

his iron hardihood. However at this time he was compelled 1345. 

by the great augmentation of juridical business to alter his 

system of revision, and permit the judge-advocate-general 

to decide finally on the trials for certain specified offences, 

still allowing the accused an appeal to himself. It was 

full time, for between January and June he had studied, 

written notes upon, and passed sentence in four hundred 

criminal trials, some of ninety folio sheets ! in addition to 

the military trials ! 

This relief enabled him to devote more time to other 
branches of administration, especially the system of taxa- 
tion; and he had 8 ample proofs that his recent campaign 
had been effectual and beneficial. Before the hill expe- 
dition the protection of the frontier had required three 
regiments of cavalry, and they could scarcely hold their 
ground. " We can do nothing against the robbers, they 
come and go and our men are exhausted." Such was the 
substance of all previous reports. Now a single regiment 
of cavalry and some horsemen of the Bundlecund legion 
more than sufficed for the duty. The presence of any 
cavalry was even declared unnecessary, and the officers 
complained of having nothing to do. There were no 
incursions to drive the Scindian cultivators from their 
lands, and those of the Cutch Gundava plains had again 
rendered that fertile district a sheet of grain — an unusual 
but truly glorious result of war, and the more glorious 
that those very people, driven to desperation before the 
campaign, had at one time actually resolved to join the 
robbers in a mass as the only mode of avoiding utter 
destruction. The khan of Khelat's revenue was thus aug- 
mented by two lacs and a half, which gave him a personal 
interest in the preservation of tranquillity. 

While this peaceful scene was exhibited beyond the 
frontier of Scinde, the captured tribes within it had joy- 
fully taken to agricultural labour, and even Beja only 
complained that Ali Moorad watched him too closely ; 
but the ameer sarcastically replied — alluding to his own 
expenses in the recent campaign — that it had cost him 



256 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. xi. two lacs to capture so great a chief, and it might cost him 
1845. more to let him loose. In truth the general's policy had 
been rather to put Ali Moorad to charges than to have 
his aid, thinking it a good means to keep him from enter- 
taining Patan adventurers who always desired war and 
disturbance. Beja was however now allowed more liberty 
which he did not abuse, and afterwards paid a visit in 
friendship to his conqueror at Kurrachee. 

In the course of the summer the Murrees announced 
that they had again defeated the wandering Bhoogtees 
under Islam Khan, and had killed so many of them and 
taken so many arms, and so much cattle, that the tribe 
was nearly extinguished. This seemed to be confirmed by 
the arrival of a number of isolated Bhoogtees seeking a 
home amongst the settled tribes in Scinde, and by an offer 
of submission from Islam himself ; but when the former 
terms were again proposed he rejected them with great 
insolence, and continued to haunt the hills with a con- 
siderable force : yet only as a bandit, his power of raising 
commotions was gone. The Murrees complained that the 
Kyharees had from Poolagee aided the Bhoogtees, and the 
general menaced the Kyharees so sternly that they were 
heedful not to provoke his wrath ; for being a tribe odious 
to all around them, the simple withdrawal of British pro- 
tection would have been their destruction. These minor 
troubles were not unexpected. While any robbers 
remained in the Cutchee hills, want would compel them 
to make incursions, and it was to bridle them that Shah- 
poor had been occupied; but no pains were spared to 
bring them to a peaceable disposition, and it was hoped 
the flourishing condition of the tribes, under Deyrah Khan, 
would finally prevail over the predatory habits and pride 
of those who still roved for spoil — for very clearly did the 
contentment of those settled tribes prove, that the robber 
life was not one of choice. 

That he had saved the subdued and reclaimed ones from 
slaughter, was a constant source of satisfaction to Sir 
C. Napier, and could he have had his own way, he would 
at once and for always have ended the robber system, by 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



257 



planting sepoy regiments at Deyrah as a military colony. CHAP. XI. 
The Bhoogtee fort there was ready for occupation, and the 1845> 
air remarkably pure, the water good and copious, the land 
fertile, the hills around full of mineral riches. Trukkee 
was a vast quarry of fine white marble, the transmission 
of which to the Indus for exportation would have been 
easy. This was a noble scheme, but necessarily relin- 
quished, because no disposition existed with the high au- 
thorities to adopt useful projects, and Sir Charles Napier 
had to struggle for every public amelioration, against the 
folly and enmity of the oligarchs in whose ungrateful 
service he was wasting strength "and life. From Sir 
H. Hardinge indeed, when applied to personally, he 
received a just support against his secret enemies — and he 
needed it; their hostility being as unceasing as it was 
unscrupulous — but from the councils and superior boards 
of India he experienced opposition, official delays, thwart- 
ings, and denials, little according with the requirements 
of a new government, which had to create the means 
of regenerating as well as to administer to a conquered 
nation. 

From the robbers nothing serious was now to be dreaded, 
and even the Lion asked leave to reside with Ali Moorad, 
but the reply was " Surrender." This he was too high- 
spirited to do, and went to the Punjaub ; but his tried 
friend, Ahmed Khan, the Lhugaree chief, seeing all hope 
gone, yielded, pleading truly that he had only obeyed the 
prince's orders in his previous career : the plea was ad- 
mitted by the general, who obtained pardon, and restored 
his possessions. This terminated all Scindian enmity; 
but in June the frontier touching the Mazaree district 
was molested by a Seikh band, which under pretence of 
pursuing robbers had crossed the boundary. Sir C. Napier, 
to avoid embarrassing the governor-general's policy to- 
wards the Lahore Durbar, refrained from punishing this 
invasion, but he sent four hundred men and two guns 
under Major Corsellis in steamers from Hyderabad to 
Khusmore, with orders to fall upon any armed foreign 
body within the frontier-line if they did not instantly 

s 



258 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XI. retire, yet to abstain from any violation of the Seikh 
18 4 5> territory even in pursuit. At the same time the Mazaree 
chiefs were admonished with reproachful sternness to 
beware of further offence. This promptitude, and the 
prudent conduct of Corsellis, put an end to a dangerous 
affair, which might otherwise have precipitated the Pun- 
jaub war. 

Meanwhile the public works of Scinde were pushed as 
fast as adverse circumstances would admit, and amongst 
the most adverse was the dearth of good engineers. How- 
ever the dike designed to keep out the inundation between 
Sukkur and Shikarpdore, was now finished by Captain 
Scott ; it had given way to the violence of the flood at one 
time, and there was some doubt as to the final success ; 
but it was restored on a new plan of execution supplied by 
the general, and thus completed in despite of these serious 
obstacles : then the yearly epidemic which had before 
ravaged those places ceased. 

To obtain this result Sir C. Napier willingly endured a 
temporary loss of revenue ; for with him the people's wel- 
fare always had precedence of state opulence ; but many 
rich proprietors were discontented, for being fatalists they 
laughed at the notion of sickness averted by human 
efforts; and they would not take the trouble to sink 
wells, though a very few, in addition to the sluice-gates 
practised in the work for partial irrigation, would have 
compensated the loss of water from the checked inunda- 
tion. They even menaced to cut the dike, but a distri- 
bution of cavalry met that threat, and meanwhile the 
labouring population obtained full employment, and high 
wages from government without pestilence or oppression 
— the high wages being perhaps the chief cause of the rich 
men's discontent. This sanitary state of Sukkur became 
permanent, and as to the annual pestilence, this year, it 
was not very prevalent in any part; but in July and 
August cholera appeared at Shikarpoore, Sukkur and 
Larkaana, and then descended to Hyderabad. To meet 
this visitation hakims — native physicians — and in their 
default, intelligent men were appointed with salaries in 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



259 



every district, and they were furnished with medicines, CHAP. XI. 
and instructions for the relief of the poor : they had power ^7 
also to enforce sanitary precautions. 

Thus ceaselessly Sir C. Napier watched and laboured in 
all directions, yet the course of his administration was 
rendered slow from the impediments continually created 
by official men and boards ; and so artfully were those 
managed that he could make no specific complaint, save of 
delay, though the public service languished under the 
effects. He had now been for nearly two years soliciting Appendix III. 
a sanction for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee 
and was still without even an answer ; though the want of 
pure water was so grievously felt in that place, and the 
cost of conducting the river, only twelve thousand pounds, 
would have been quickly repaid by a small water-tax. 
Still more vexatious was the delay in sanctioning the 
formation of a camel baggage-corps, to the organization of 
which he had early attached the greatest importance; and Appendix VII I. 
he was especially earnest to have it ready for service before 
a Punjaub war should break out. It was a great mili- 
tary creation, which had been suggested by observing that 
in India armies were appendages to their baggage, instead 
of the reverse. He resolved therefore to reduce the latter 
to its proper rank as an accessory, to render it capable of 
regular and timely movements, to correct its tumultuous 
character by a military organization, and no longer per- 
mit it to be a confused host of men and animals — rolling 
about in misery, wasting the country through which it 
passed, and by its disorder helplessness and weight break- 
ing down the finest combinations, and menacing nun at 
every movement to the troops it was designed to sustain. 

During his first campaign in Scinde the multitude of 
men and animals gathered under the name of baggage, 
weighed as a millstone on his movements. In the Cutchee 
hills the safety of the army was more than once endangered 
by it ; for the camels being all hired, their drivers natu- 
rally sought to avoid danger, not in the military meaning 
but according to their personal interpretation of the term ; 
and when then rude generalship was at fault, they con- 

s 2 



260 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. xi. eluded all must go wrong and deserted. No order was 
1845 or could be maintained in the hills, where the narrow 
ways crowded with baggage forbade the corrective action 
of cavalry ; and no rigour of punishment could restrain 
the camp-followers and camel-men from straying beyond 
the lines for forage or plunder, generally the last. At 
Jummuck the loss of life from this cause was considerable, 
and on the march from Goojroo, the troops having gone 
Plan 2. forward to secure the head of the defile of Toosoo, the 
baggage choked up the road for ten consecutive hours, 
liable the whole time to attack; and yet beyond aid, 
because for three miles the pass was so wedged with men 
and loaded animals that the general could scarcely pass 
himself or send orders to the troops, and he was finally 
compelled to move his artillery and cavalry, which were 
in the rear under General Simpson, by another way and 
with great fatigue. 

To make the baggage of his army fulfil the conditions 
of its existence — a help instead of a burthen — was now 
Sir C. Napier's object, when after two years' constant 
solicitation he obtained a tardy sanction to form a bag- 
gage-corps. The pervading principle was, that the carriage 
of baggage should be a government matter, and organized 
with as much care and order as a regiment. On this basis, 
he formed divisions, giving to each six hundred govern- 
ment camels, and uniforms to the drivers. Each division 
had a directing animal, which was to carry a flag by day 
and a lantern by night — the flag, the light, the trap- 
pings of the camels, and the uniforms of the drivers corre- 
sponding in all points. Remembering the Israelites' march 
in the wilderness, he also placed an elephant at the head 
of all, carrying a larger flag by day and a larger lantern 
by night, a star to lead, and a sign of command which 
none were to disregard. 

The camel-drivers were enlisted, disciplined armed and 
paid as soldiers, and commanded by regular officers ; and 
the general knew human nature too well not to invest 
them with every title to respect and honour which the 
bravest soldiers could claim. Their animals, classed as 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



261 



strong and weak, bore round their necks tablets, engraved CHAP. XI. 

with the maximum load of their class, as a protection from 1845> 

oppression in overloading, an injustice to which the poor 

beasts are very sensitive. One man was appointed to each 

camel instead of three camels to one man, as the practice 

was, a change saving baggage guards ; for one man still 

led three animals while two flanked the march as soldiers, 

and were yet at all times skilled and ready to help in 

loading and unloading. 

To aid the passage of baggage and guns in difficult 
places, five spare elephants were attached to the corps, and 
the whole mass was placed under the command of a supe- 
rior officer, who had power to enforce all regulations, and 
move his cumbrous masses as a second army in conformity 
with the operations of the fighting men. If the enemy's 
horsemen, sweeping, as was their wont, like a whirlwind 
round the flank, should fall on the baggage corps, the latter 
instead of fettering the action of the troops, or flying 
confusedly towards them for aid, was practised to cast 
itself by command into orbs or squares, the camels kneeling 
down with their heads inwards and pinned together, while 
from behind that living rampart the drivers defended 
themselves with the carbines they carried. 

Minor regulations completed the system, and the result 
was superiority of movement, saving of animals and 
expense, with increased comfort for the troops and conse- 
quent diminution of sickness ; and withal so great a relief 
to the field operations as to make the creation of the corps 
a signal epoch in military organization. It was in truth 
an enlarged and perfecting application of that principle of 
order which first dictated the substitution of disciplined 
forces for feudal levies and armed mobs. Its creator well 
observed at the time. "That it was the way to obtain 
rapidity in war, which did not result from bugling, double 
quick marching, and galloping of horse-artillery, but from 
incessant care, the raising and supporting the moral feeling 
and physical strength of the soldier, the rendering the 
baggage conducive to his wants, and as little of an impedi- 
ment as possible." 



262 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XI. When this corps was organized Sir C. Napier may be 
1845. said to have given wings to his army ; for he had before so 
horsed his batteries that they were capable of any exertion 
— had created the fighting camel corps with its surprising 
power for sudden and distant expeditions — and had in a 
manner also created the Scinde horsemen, the Moguelaees, 
whose matchless ability for irregular warfare did not keep 
them* from being foremost in the field charge when solid 
hosts were to be broken. They had indeed existed nomi- 
nally previous to his arrival, yet, neglected and undisci- 
plined were falling to pieces and an order for disbanding 
them had been issued, but he interfered ; reforming 
their organization he increased their numbers and placed 
them under Captain Jacob, an artillery officer, but selected 
with a sure judgment for this service. The army of 
Scinde was therefore emphatically an army of movement ; 
swift to assail, terrible to strike ; and if the formation of 
the Belooch battalions, now well organized and fit for 
service, be added to the institutions mentioned above, 
the military creations will be found to have kept pace with 
those of the civil administration in Scinde. 

By the Bombay faction the baggage corps was neces- 
sarily decried — "It was an expensive folly — a complete 
failure — so had the conquest of Scinde been — so had the 
administration been — so had the hill campaign been/'' 
Colonel Burlton, a Bengal commissary-general, also pub- 
lished a work against the baggage corps, striving to 
prove that waste, disorder, extravagance and oppression of 
the native population, are as profitable to armies in the 
field, as they are by some supposed to be for persons in 
his situation. But every advantage gained by Sir C. 
Napier in war, every stroke of successful policy, every 
undeniable proof of enlightened government, naturally 
produced a storm of passionate calumny from men whose 
incessant predictions of failure were as incessantly belied 
by results. India was well described by Chief Justice 
Roper at this period, as a press-ridden community; and 
yet with a few exceptions, such as the Gentleman's Gazette, 
which did justice to its title, there was not, and there is 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



263 



not, a free press for the many. There is only a licentious CHAP. XI. 
press for certain factious persons having wickedness 1345. 
enough to protect the editors from legal consequences : 
a few instances of this immunity for libel enjoyed at 
Bombay will suffice for illustration. 

Dr. Buist published, as a regular official document, a 
reprimand to a naval officer, which had indeed been written 
by Sir C. Napier, but for reasons affecting the public 
interest had been cancelled and locked up in his desk, 
from whence it could only have been obtained by infamous 
means! He also published a forged letter from Sir C. AppendixXin. 
Napier to the governor-general, in which the former was 
made to return Sir Henry Hardinge's personal kindness 
with foul abuse ; and though the Bombay government was 
officially called upon to prosecute for these two offences, 
Buist committed both with impunity, and boasted of having 
information and support from men in power, in such a way 
as to indicate very plainly that members of the government 
council itself were intimately connected with his libels. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram likewise, published in the 
newspapers such slanders against Sir C. Napier that the 
governor-general desired the latter to leave the correction 
of them in his hands, but with an overstrained delicacy 
he referred them to the home authorities. His motive 
was that as the slanders were also directed against Lord 
Ellenborough, Sir Henry Hardinge in dealing with them 
might be embarrassed by his family connection with that 
nobleman. It was an error of which he was soon made 
sensible. The secret committee in England passed indeed 
a severe censure privately on Outram, but with a miserable 
cunning, falsely assuming that Sir C. Napier had entered 
into a public controversy with that person, instead of 
having, as the fact was, sent in a formal demand for justice 
to the government, condemned such controversies gene- 
rally and refused to notice the official appeal. But Outram, 
thus privately reprimanded, was immediately appointed to 
a lucrative civil office, in the view no doubt of giving 
weight and currency to his vituperation. That error was 
however in time corrected by the public voice, which forced 



264 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XI. the Court of Directors to bend with abject submission to 
the general whose reputation it had thus basely sought to 
lower. 

There was yet another authority — Lord Bipon — who 
declared that Outranks proceeding was right, that it was 
what men in power must expect, and should excite Sir C. 
Napier to greater zeal ! ! In fine he plainly disclosed his 
own connection with the assailants of the man he was 
bound to protect. There is however a moral as well as an 
official standard of right, and Lord Ripon's authority is 
not of force to establish the one or to efface the other. It 
was not right that a violation of the Articles of War, and 
all just authority, should be, not only left unpunished but 
encouraged; that truth should be outraged and public 
decency outraged, by loathsome calumnies — that soldiers 
in the field should be told their general was entirely igno- 
rant of his duty, and the murderer of their comrades — 
and it could not be right that a minister of the crown 
should countenance such insults to real greatness, at the 
dishonest behests of a body he was appointed to control ! 

Dr. Buist in support of his libels boasted that his 
informants were men high in office, a boast never con- 
tradicted, and of weight when coupled with these facts 
that secretary Willoughby was, as men say, one of the 
proprietors of his journal; and when reeking from the 
acknowledged slander about the ameers' women having 
been dishonoured by the officers of the army, Buist was 
received as a guest in houses whence he should have 
been especially spurned for that foul falsehood. Those 
official informants therefore told him " That nothing had 
been effected in the hill campaign, and that the robber 
tribes were more formidable than ever, though the 
greater portion were then settled as quiet cultivators in 
Scinde — that Beja, when actually in prison, was a victo- 
rious chief and ravaging the frontier at the head of his 
Doomkees — that Sir H. Hardinge, though he had given 
his express consent to the expedition, and warmly ap- 
plauded the successful execution in public orders, entirely 
disapproved of it — that Scinde was a wasting drain upon 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



265 



the resources of India, when it was paying a large surplus CHAP. XL 
to the general treasury — that Sir C. Napier had refused to 1845# 
hold the country with less than sixteen thousand troops, 
when he had actually only twelve thousand — that he had 
applied for a reinforcement of a thousand men to meet 
the sickly season, when he had in fact sent away three 
regiments to enable those ' sovereign authorities ' to 
quell a rebellion caused by oppression in the Bombay 
presidency ; and instead of demanding reinforcements 
had proposed to spare seven thousand of the twelve thou- 
sand under his command, and hold Scinde with five 
thousand \" 

Such was the hostility evinced towards a man who was 
wasting life in exertions to serve the government that thus 
encouraged and protected his assailants ; and that nothing 
of baseness or absurdity might be wanting, the Bombay 
faction endeavoured to confer the character of a martyr 
on the savage filthy criminal Ameer Shadad, fawning on 
and licking his hands, red with the blood of the murdered 
officer Ennis. They concocted also a petition to the 
Queen from the Ameer Nusseer, which Sir Henry Pot- 
tinger undertook to present. Every line of it contained 
some notorious falsehood forged by the faction. The 
attempt was however too gross to succeed in England 
though Nusseer' s cause was adopted by Lord Ashley, whose 
profound and deplorable ignorance of everything relating 
to Scinde affairs did not prevent him from meddling and 
countenancing to the utmost of his power, the efforts of 
these conspirators against the interests of England and the 
fame of Sir C. Napier. 

But while Buist's high official authorities were so ready 
to give this kind of information to injure the governor of 
Scinde, they were totally insensible to the just pride and 
welfare of the gallant troops who conquered that country ; 
and so also were the authorities in England ; each seeming 
to strive for pre-eminence in heartless scorn of the soldiers' 
claims, rights and honour. 

Lord Ripon took more than two years for striking off 
the Meeanee medals, and it was believed they would never 



266 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XI. have been struck but for the strenuous interference of 
1845. Lord Ellenborough ; thus numbers of gallant men died 
without the consolation of having those honourable marks 
of merit attached to the manly breasts they had so bravely 
presented to the sharp swords of the enemy. When struck 
the medals were sent to Bombay without riband s, and the 
government there, with a like scorn of honourable feeling, 
transmitted them, as bales of common goods amongst 
commissariat stores to Scinde, with such contemptuous 
irregularity that the commander-in-chief received his from 
the hands of a lieutenant -colonel, whose subaltern officers 
had obtained theirs long before ! 

When the 25th native regiment, whose courage had 
been so conspicuous in the battles, was recalled to Bombay 
— against the general' s wish, and apparently because 
against his wish — it was, after five years of foreign service 
treated on landing with insulting neglect ; as if it had 
come back stained with dishonour instead of beaming with 
the lustre of heroism. 

Sir C. Napier's representations to the Bombay autho- 
rities that the widows and children of the Scinde horsemen 
who fell at Meeanee in 1843, were still in 1845 without 
any provision, were treated with indifference, though he 
stated that those poor claimants were living on the charity 
of their fallen protectors' comrades! Even the sacred duty 
Appendix vii. f forwarding the living sepoys' remittances to their fami- 
paragraphA. hes was so shamefully neglected, that he was compelled 
to represent the matter to the governor-general. 

Sensitive enough however they were upon other points ; 
for a memorial was framed by some civil servants, avowedly 
under an official stimulus, praying the interposition of 
the directors to make the governor of Scinde declare 
why he called some of their body jackals ! And this 
singular folly was clamorously pressed until he, admitting 
wrong to the jackals, intimated an intention to call for a 
statement of work and salaries, and institute a comparison 
between those of the memorialists and his soldier civilians. 
The cry then ceased. But in truth he had not assailed 
the civil servants as a body at all, he had only said in a 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



267 



private letter, with the publication of which he had no CHAP. XI. 
concern "The general opinion was that c certain civil ggT 
servants' were corrupt." And it is not a little singular 
that this "general opinion," thus quoted, had come to him 
from some of those very persons at Bombay, when speaking 
of their brethren at Calcutta, who were now rendering 
themselves subjects for derision by a simulated indig- 
nation. 

But by a singular coincidence, always some proof of the 
superior government of Scinde was publicly furnished 
when its maligners were most boisterous in condem- 
nation. 

Thus it was predicted that a ten years' partisan warfare 
would be established on the right of the Indus, and im- 
mediately after more than a hundred chiefs on that side 
of the river voluntarily proffered their salaams. 

When it was clamorously asserted that the whole 
Belooch race abhorred their conqueror, all their chiefs 
and sirdars eagerly came to the great Durbar at Hyderabad 
in sign of submission and good will. 

It was proclaimed that Scinde was tranquil only because 
it was kept down by a large force ; and a portion of that 
force was immediately sent to aid in quelling an insur- 
rection in the Bombay presidency, leaving Scinde tranquil. 

When it was announced that the population of Scinde 
only awaited a favourable occasion to restore the de- 
throned ameers, the general marched to war beyond the 
frontier of Scinde ; and this favourable occasion could not 
induce a man to stir in aid of the Lion, or of the forty- 
eight Talpoor princes who were still at large and actually 
in Scinde, calling on their former subjects. 

Striking as these facts were, none were more so than a 
partisan warfare undertaken in the autumn of this year by 
Deyrah Khau, against Islam and his roving Bhoogtees. The 
general had foreseen, when he planted his captives near 
the frontier, that the outlying rovers would soon be forced 
to make forays for food, and he judged their first attempt 
would be on the settled Jackranees ; because from them 
less resistance was to be expected \ and they could be thus 



268 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XI. sounded as to resuming the robber life. So it happened. 
1845> The Jackranees were plundered. But instead of hankering 
for their former vocation, fiercely they rose and demanded 
leave to retaliate. Nothing could be more in accord with 
the general's policy, and he directed some cavalry to 
support them while crossing the desert, yet to leave them 
to their feud when within the rocks. 

He had no doubt of their return to the plains, for being 
now industrious cultivators, he had the double hold on 
them, of their interests as proprietors, and their vengeful 
passions as warriors ; nor was he without hostages, having 
previously taken the most energetic and influential of the 
tribe into government pay. Deyrah Khan's warfare was 
therefore the consummation of a profound scheme of policy, 
which had in nine months subdued and reclaimed the 
spirit of men previously regarded by the world as more 
akin in ferocity to wild beasts than human beings — a policy 
which had so changed their habits, that being peaceful 
agriculturists when not injured, they were now marching 
against their former confederates in the interest of civili- 
zation; and invading those very fastnesses from which 
they had been so recently torn themselves by force as 
robbers ! 

This was a result the greatest of men might be proud 
of; but it was carefully hidden from the English public, 
and he who had achieved it was more foully and voci- 
ferously vilified and calumniated than before. Indeed 
the secret practices of his official enemies had become 
so dangerously unscrupulous, that he was now compelled 
in self-defence, to avoid all financial responsibility, and 
decline all public works until superior sanction could be 
obtained — and that was always delayed by official forms — 
for he well knew that men and boards were on the watch 
to effect his ruin. The Bombay council had already pri- 
vately sent letters to the governor-general insinuating 
charges against him, and though they were returned with 
great indignation, and an intimation that such accusations 
should be made publicly and sustained, or not made at 
all ; the council continued its hostility in secret, and in a 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



269 



mode so flagitious, that the wronged man's own words CHAP. XI. 
must be used in exposition. The necessity of frequent 1845 
references to libellous publications will then be compre- 
hended, and Buist's boast, that he had eminent and unques- 
tionable authority close to the sovereign power in Bombay 
will be understood. Sir Charles Napier speaks. 

"The Bombay Times has asserted, and entered into 
details, that I was driving the people of Scinde mad with 
excessive taxation, and that I had even dared to re-esta- 
blish the impost called the transit-duty. These assertions 
were accompanied with abusive epithets such as the sordid 
and shameless leader of Scinde — The autocrat of Scinde 
— The Scinde czar — The unscrupulous murderer of the 
soldiers — The liar at the head of the Scinde government 
and so forth. India was kept ringing for several months 
with accounts of my infamous attempts to make up a sham 
revenue. 

"As I never put on a tax and never laid the value of a 
mite upon any article in the way of impost ; and as I have 
taken off a number of taxes, I laughed at what I knew 
must in time he found an invention as pure as that of the 
people said to have been seen by Sir John Herschel in 
the moon. But how could I laugh, when, after India had 
resounded with these charges, I found, by the mistake of 
a clerk at Calcutta who sent to me what was designed to 
be kept from me, that the Bombay government had sent a 
secret note of council to be registered at Calcutta — contain- 
ing accusations against me of making up a false revenue, 
not only by levying excessive taxes, which they only hinted 
at, but by a monopoly of grain ; the price of which the 
minute said I had raised by my command of the produce 
and sold dear to the troops, and made the loss fall on the 
Bombay government ! In fine that my conduct had been 
so infamous, that, one iota of it being true, hanging would 
be too good for me ! 

" Had the clerk not made this mistake — if mistake it 
was and not a generous disgust at such villany — there 
would have been in the Bombay and Calcutta archives 
heinous crimes secretly but officially registered against me 



270 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XI. by my bitter enemies. And when I was no more they 
1845 would have been given to the world as irrefragable proofs 
of my flagitious government of Scinde ! And these accu- 
sations were so ingeniously concocted by two members of 
the Bombay council, Reid and Crawford, who are old 
practical accountants, that it cost me a week's hard work 
to prove the villany of the men ; and that so far from 
increasing the expense of feeding the troops, if there was 
one point more than another to which I had devoted 
myself during the three years of my ruling in Scinde, it 
had been that of reducing the price of grain to all, by 
destroying monopolies and lessening the pressure on public 
revenue. 

" But this was not all, the secret minute was recorded, 
and the authors of it chuckled at having thus shot their 
assassins' bolt, but not content, they manufactured their 
minute anew for an article in Doctor Buist's publication — 
the words only slightly changed to suit a newspaper. Not 
knowing its source I only laughed at it as one of his usual 
attempts to make me out a scoundrel ; but when I received 
the minute from the Calcutta clerk I answered it, and 
gave my opinion to the council freely; disproving by 
document after document every he they had advanced. 
Was that all ? No ! Enough in conscience, but not all. 
I got a letter from Lord Ripon, saying, 1 he had heard of 
the accusation but hoped it was not true ! ' And then he 
gave me all sorts of reasons to prove that I ought not 
to reimpose the transit-duty — thus showing that he 
believed I had done so, notwithstanding his hope ! To do 
Lord Ripon justice, he gave me but little trouble to answer 
him, for he discovered such entire ignorance of the sub- 
ject, that I saw he did not know what a transit-duty was. 
Yet again a day was lost to me in answering him, and my 
real work thrown into arrear — and what work ! Long 
trials to read and to decide upon, putting five men to 
death. Horrid work ! requiring calm thought, great and 
concentrated thought and resolution not to err. At such a 
time, with my mind stretched on the rack to attain right 
in the sight of God, I was to force myself to examine, to 



ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE. 



271 



write, and to dwell upon villany past all belief, and beyond CHAP. XI. 
my power to chastise ! Fortunate that I bave escaped from 1845> 
tbe snares of those who, while profiting from my ebbing 
life, are seeking my destruction! 

" No sooner had I answered Lord Ripon, thinking I 
had been sufficiently tormented, than there came from 
Calcutta a letter written by the secret committee, Lord 
Kipon's colleagues, to demand why I had restored the 
transit-duty ? which from ' various sources ' they heard I 
had done. I have asked why they did not name their 
( various sources 9 or any one of them, that I might 
expose their secret informer. This they won't do, but 
were we of Venice in the days of the Ten, these men 
would soon put me out of the way : and things of this 
nature happen weekly." 

To expatiate upon this almost incredible proceeding, 
not indeed of a council, for the governor Sir G-. Arthur 
opposed it and was outvoted by the others, that is to say 
by Reid, Crawford, and the secretary Willoughby — a man 
who upon every occasion stimulated the hostility shown to 
Sir C. Napier — to expatiate upon such a proceeding would 
be an insult to the honour and sense of the English people 
to whom this work is dedicated. Nevertheless it is 
fitting to observe that when this secret minute was being 
concocted, the price of grain was in Scinde absolutely more 
dependent on demand and supply than in England, all 
taxes on its importation being abolished in Scinde and not 
in England, and Sir C. Napier's real views on the subject 
may be judged by the following instructions to his 
collectors. 

" There is but one sound way to make grain cheap, viz. 
encouraging cultivation and not taxing importation. I 
took off the importation-tax last year, and I have been 
liberal to cultivators ; these are the only radical cures for 
want of grain — expedients there may be besides, but these 
are the foundations for having cheap food. As to the 
effect produced by monopolists, the correction is to make 
grain so plentiful they cannot forestall ; if they attempt it 
they will be ruined, or at least lose greatly where they 



272 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER J S 



CHAP. XI. seek to gain greatly. I at first thought it might, in this 
1845 case, be good to fix a maximum, but reflection renders me 
sure that government had better not interfere, except by 
providing plenty of grain. I dread direct interference of 
government with men's private affairs, and it seems to me 
government must be to blame, directly or indirectly, where 
a whole people suffer want of food. Slavery indeed jus- 
tifies the summary interference of government ; for if a 
man deals in human flesh, human flesh has a right to deal 
with him ; but cheap food, good wages and plenty of 
labour ; these are the three essentials of good government 
and they produce each other if the taxes are light ; with- 
out that the machine will not ply freely. 

" As to the occupiers of ground, government ought to 
take a fair share of the produce of land and no more. If 
we legislate for bad land, taxing good land to make grain 
rise to a remunerating price for that bad land, we pull 
down the good land to the level of bad land ; that is to 
say, we raise the cost of food to the poor, to enable 
zemindars to cultivate bad land. That was done by the 
ameers, and look at the result ! Half Scinde lies waste, 
and good land too ; for why should any one seek for good 
land so heavily taxed that it could only make the profit of 
bad land. My reduction of imposts on land is an equal 
benefit to all, and is proportionate to produce ; hence if 
bad land could pay when the impost was high it can do so 
now when lower, and the sale of its produce is secure 
while Scinde imports grain — when it exports, the demand 
will raise the value of bad land, if it is worth cultivating at 
all. Nor must it be forgotten that the great difficulty of 
cultivation in this country is to get water, and the 
wider cultivation is spread the more readily will water be 
obtained." 

Grain was however high-priced in 1845, and the causes 
were amongst the extraordinary difficulties through which 
Sir C. Napier dragged Scinde to prosperity. 

1°. The war of conquest had continued in different 
parts until August 1843, which was nearly too late a period 
to commence cultivation for that year, and plundering of 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



273 



grain just previous to and during the military operations CHAP. XI. 
was general ; for the people seeing a strange army descend 
on the land knew not what might happen, but fearing 
the worst stole and concealed all they could, neglecting 
agriculture. 

2°. The sudden conquest cast the whole administration 
of an unknown country and people at once into the hands 
of the British authorities; and before light could be 
thrown on the system of imposts and collection, govern- 
ment was easily defrauded; law also was so little regarded 
that most men were occupied with pillage instead of 
agriculture. 

3°. The canals were that year left uncleared, the 
ameers being only intent on war ; and when the canals 
are choked neither health nor harvests are to be expected 
in Scinde. 

4°. A dreadful epidemic raged from August 1843 to 
January 1844 destroying thousands and leaving the 
survivors, for nearly everybody had been attacked, too 
debilitated to labour. Thus agriculture was nearly aban- 
doned in 1844 ; men had not strength to work ; and 
though the troops were less fatally affected than the 
people, only two thousand feeble tottering convalescents 
were at one time capable of bearing arms. And as this 
terrible calamity was rendered more oppressive by a 
wide-spread visitation of locusts, scarcely any produce 
remained in Scinde. 

5°. The Indus fell suddenly that year in an unusual 
manner and did not again flood, thus the poor remnants 
of vegetation which had escaped the locusts perished for 
want of water. 

It was under these frightful visitations, these terrible 
calamities Sir C. Napier's energy and ability lifted and 
shielded Scinde from famine and commotion, and placed her 
on a solid social basis in the end of 1845. And it was with a 
knowledge of these dreadful miseries that the Bombay 
councillors complained of grain being high-priced — that 
they secretly accused the governor of causing that high 
price by infamous arts, and at the same time themselves 

T 



274 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XI. endeavoured to make it higher by imposing an export 
Jgjr duty on all grain leaving the port of Bombay — thus 
putting the finishing touch to their intolerable baseness by 
doing themselves what they were falsely accusing him of 
doing! Scinde was however in the latter part of 1845 
unmistakably prosperous even to eyes ofFuscated by these 
vile arts. The population had been increased by immi- 
grant cultivators, besides the forcibly- settled tribes ; and 
a very large accession of inhabitants had swelled Kurrachee 
and Shikarpoore to cities, thus augmenting trade both 
ways, by the sea-board and by the river. Wealthy mer- 
chants were now also seeking to open new commercial 
channels in a country considered by them as that one of 
all the East where justice was most surely and cheaply to 
be had. 

Meanwhile the revenue had so increased that in De- 
cember another ten lacs were paid into the general 
treasury, making a gross surplus of two hundred thousand 
pounds ; and it was the opinion of the collectors that the 
same system would in ten years produce one million 
sterling without pressure on the people, or very sensible 
increase of administrative expenses. But the most re- 
markable proof of good government and personal reputa- 
tion was, that the whole people of Cutch Gundava in the 
north, and the tribes of the Gedrosian desert on the west, 
now asked to be received as subjects ; while on the east 
the nawab of Bhawulpoor, who did not disguise his dis- 
like of the political agents with whom he had hitherto 
dealt in his political relations, demanded to be placed 
entirely under the control of the Scindian conqueror, 
whose government had been so suddenly thrown by the 
shock of war into the midst of these wide-spread popula- 
tions. Like a rock cast from a volcano into a lake, it had 
come, and like the waters they had receded tumultuously, 
like them to return and tranquilly subside. 

But none of his great administrative services, nor all of 
them combined with his surprising exploits in war, were 
of any avail to cool the malignant heat of enmity in the 
Court of Directors, nor warm Lord Bipon to a momentary 



ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE. 275 

sense of what was due to a great man from a minister CHAP. XI. 
of the Crown. Vexatiously he had delayed the soldiers 5 1845 
medals, had insulted the general, and endeavoured to 
stifle the despatches announcing success in the hill cam- 
paign — had applauded Outram/s slanders — had adopted 
the secret accusations of the Bombay councillors, without 
daring to name them as accusers, and had refused, or at 
least neglected, to expose the false official statements foisted 
on the public as to the expenses ; thus without inquiry — 
to which he was invited — countenancing the industriously 
inculcated notion that it was a worse than useless con- 
quest. Scinde is nevertheless a great and beneficial 
acquisition which has opened a high-way for commerce 
with Central Asia ; and if governed on Sir C. Napier's 
principles will become an opulent province and a power- 
ful bulwark on the south-west for India. If governed on 
the usual system of the Company it will become one of 
those lasting shames for the directors, which made Lord 
Wellesley call them the "Ignominous Tyrants of the 
East." 



-a. 



t 2 



276 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAPTER XII. 

CHAP. XII. While Scinde was thus happily ruled, the state of 
Indian affairs beyond her frontier was perplexing and 
menacing. An embarrassing and costly insurrection had 
long tormented the Bombay presidency, and in the north- 
west a war with the Seikhs was hourly impending ; yet the 
prevalent opinion in India was adverse to the occurrence 
of this last event ; and joined to that incredulity was the 
arrogant assumption, that if it did happen, an easy 
triumph awaited the British arms. Judging very dif- 
ferently on both those points, Sir C. Napier reflected care- 
fully upon every possible phase of such a contest, the 
danger and difficulty of which he foresaw and foretold 
from a distance, with a surer military and political compre- 
hension than others who were closer. He had, under the 
governor-general's orders, equipped, and in September 
sent to the upper Sutlej, pontoons for bridges, and he was 
vigilant to keep his own military administration so organ- 
ized that no sudden call, however onerous, could cause 
confusion though its extent might embarrass his resources. 
He had therefore unceasingly pressed the progress of the 
camel baggage-corps, as the most powerful spring to insure 
regular and rapid movement in that great and complicated 
machine, an army in the field. Constantly also he medi- 
tated on the force to be employed, and the operations to 
be adopted when required — as he foresaw he would be — 
to act as an auxiliary to the main army on the upper 
Sutlej. 

His speculations, transmitted to the governor-general, 
were found to coincide in a remarkable manner with the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



277 



transmitted opinions of the duke of Wellington on the CHAP. XII. 
same subject, and thus mentally fortified, he awaited 1845> 
the course of events. It was not long before his sagacity 
was vindicated. The governor-general, trusting too con- 
fidently to his own strenuous efforts to preserve peace, had 
certainly adopted — it might be caused — the public opinion 
as to an amicable termination of the Punjaub difficulty, 
and the Seikhs commenced the contest before the British 
forces were prepared ; so unexpectedly they did so, that 
only a fortnight before the battle of Moodkee was fought 
Sir H. Hardinge assured Sir C. Napier he would give him 
six weeks' notice of hostilities. The war was therefore an 
unlooked-for event which made India tremble ; the veil 
of falsehood, woven at Bombay to cover Scinde from 
public estimation, was thereby rent asunder; and the 
great importance of that acquisition was comprehended 
when the announcement of the battle of Moodkee was 
accompanied by an order to assemble at Roree, with all 
possible speed, an army of fifteen thousand men equipped 
for the field, and with a siege-train. To do this was im- 
possible from the resources of Scinde ; but reinforcements 
were to come from Bombay, and soon ten thousand men 
of all arms, with guns, waggons, horses, camp-equipage 
and camp-followers were marched from the interior of 
that presidency to the coast, and embarked at all the sea- 
ports of Western India. From Mandavie, Surat, Bombay 
and Yingorla, on every description of floating craft, from 
the steam-frigate to the open country boat, men and 
materials were poured into Scinde with a promptitude 
showing, that Sir George Arthur, and Sir Robert Oliver 
the commander of the Indian navy, had no sympathy 
with the factious sentiments of the Willoughbys, Reids 
and Crawfords. 

Had the policy of the supreme government permitted 
Sir C. Napier to obey the dictates of his perception that 
the war was inevitable, a Scindian army could and would 
have been equipped for the field three months before, and 
cautiously quartered from Hyderabad upwards, ready at a 
moment's notice to concentrate at Roree and move into 



278 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. xii. the Mooltaxi country. This could have been effected 
1845. without attracting the attention of the Seikhs ; but it had 
been forbidden to move a soldier, to purchase a camel, or 
in any manner to prepare for a contest; and when the 
order for war came, only the eighteen hundred camels, of 
his newly-organized baggage-corps, that is to say, carriage 
for a column of three thousand persons was available, when 
carriage for nearly fifty thousand was required; and when 
the general spread agents abroad to purchase, the jam of 
the Jokeas endeavoured to thwart them. Sir C. Napier's 
vigour of command to meet the campaign thus violently 
thrust upon him was not to be so impeded. He arrested 
the jam in the midst of his tribe, awed all insidious ene- 
mies, redoubled his own efforts, and soon obtained twelve 
thousand camels; meanwhile he equipped and pushed 
men and guns up the Indus with incredible rapidity; 
for his battering-train was advanced a hundred miles 
two days after he had received the governor-general's 
orders ! 

Then he met the influx of the multitude from Bombay 
with a power of order and resources never surpassed. 
Every department worked day and night and on the right 
road, without jostling or confusion. The artillery in addi- 
tion to their numerous field-batteries formed a siege- 
train complete of thirty-two pieces, with a thousand rounds 
a gun; the engineers under Captain Peat, an officer of 
unbounded talent, organized a park, said to have been a 
model — so complete was it in arrangement and all things 
essential for war — although collected under great diffi- 
culties, and where genius was taxed to supply the absence 
of regular arsenals and the resources of civilization. The 
commissariat carried up two months' provisions; the 
medical department was amply furnished; and though 
the Bombay reinforcements had to be marched to the 
coast and embarked with their equipage and followers, in 
all not less than thirty thousand persons; though their 
voyages were of five hundred and eight hundred miles, 
and the troops when disembarked again had to march 
nearly four hundred miles, the whole army was concen- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



279 



trated at Roree on the forty-second day after receiving CHAP. XII. 
the order ! 

On the 6th of February more than fifty thousand men, 
if the camp-followers be included, were assembled at 
Roree with every department well ordered, well combined 
and completed. Eighty pieces of artillery were gathered 
with all materials and ammunition for a campaign in 
abundance. A powerful armed flotilla was on the Indus 
freighted with stores and three months' provisions, and 
having on board three hundred yards of flying bridge. A 
zealous body of officers worked like men anticipating and 
resolved to merit success, and an almost frantic enthu- 
siasm pervaded the soldiers — they fought with the air and 
could hardly be restrained from shouting to the charge as 
they marched — yet a careful discipline was everywhere 
apparent. 

This rapidity, unexampled if the scanty resources of 
Scinde, the suddenness of the order and the completeness 
of the equipment be considered, could not have been 
attained if the camel baggage-corps had not been previ- 
ously organized; nor could this powerful, war-breathing 
army, when assembled, have dared to move in advance but 
for the previous campaign in the hills — that campaign 
which Lord Ripon with official imbecility stigmatized as 
an insignificant affair of outposts. Had it been neglected 
the army would now have had as many enemies on its 
flank and rear as it had in front, and could not have moved 
a step in advance — fortunate if it had not a separate war- 
fare to sustain for the defence of Scinde ! 

About five thousand men remained for the protection of 
that country. 

Three thousand with six field-pieces and fifteen heavy 
guns were appropriated to Kurrachee as the principal 
place of arms, and key of the whole system. 

At Hyderabad the fortress and intrenched camp, the 
latter armed with six twelve-pounders, were furnished 
with three months' provisions and garrisoned by a sepoy 
regiment and eight hundred police. 

The steamer arsenal at Khotree on the Indus, had its 



280 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. xil. own fort with two guns and a hundred marines,, aided by 



the armed workmen and some policemen for garrison; 
this was however a small force to secure so extensive a 
district, wherefore troops were brought from Cutch to 
Wangar Bazaar, on the borders of the Delta. Detachments 
from Deesa were also directed to garrison Omercote in the 
desert, but Meerpoor and Aliar-ka-Tanda were guarded by 
policemen only. Larkaana and Sehwan were likewise left 
entirely to the native police, and the five thousand regular 
troops presented but two formidable masses. 

Shahpoor, Kanghur, Sukkur, Shikarpoore and Bukkur, 
were guarded by a regiment of regular cavalry and one of 
infantry, with six field-pieces ; Sukkur had also its arma- 
ment of heavy guns, and all these places were to be aided 
by the northern policemen who were now as formidable as 
the sepoys, and so resolute that Ayliff Khan, the swords- 
man, had recently with only six men defeated a predatory 
band of Seikhs, and ignorant of the general's order not to 
pass the frontier, had crossed and pursued his enemies for 
twenty miles. 

To resign the whole country, during war, to the keeping 
of so few troops was in itself an answer to all malevolent 
libels on his government, but Sir C. Napier had other 
and surer warrant for tranquillity. Belooch Khan, the 
independent hill-chief near Lheree, whose suspicious 
dealings during the campaign against the confederates 
have been mentioned, now offered to join the army with 
a hundred horsemen. Khan Mohamed made a like offer, 
and to serve at his own expense, adding, that for a small 
pay he would bring five thousand of his " tenantry 33 to 
the field ! Now Mohamed was the most powerful sirdar 
in Scinde, and a Talpoor, being nephew to the Lion, at 
whose side he had fought bravely up to the latter' s defeat 
by Jacob ; yet was he earnest to march with the man 
who had dethroned his kindred ; and he had so entirely 
adopted the new order of things as to talk of his warriors 
as his tenantry ! To him Sir Charles spoke frankly, 
saying how willingly he would have given to the world 



this proof of the contentment 




ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



281 



Scmdians; but as the Beloochees and Bkawulpoores were CHAP. XXL 
enemies of old, the nawab would have just cause of com- lg46 ^ 
plaint if the British brought foes into his territory. He 
would think some sinister design to deprive him of his 
possessions was entertained, and would become a suspicious 
ally, perhaps a secret enemy. Mohamed acknowledged 
the force of the argument, and so the matter ended. 
Secretly the general' s policy was to quell, not to stimulate 
the warlike habits of the Beloochee race; but this offer 
from a man so resolute and powerful, and of such lineage, 
coupled with the sentiment of fear which the strongly- 
organized army now assembled was calculated to produce, 
left him without fear of commotion in Scinde. He had 
therefore only to consider his plan of military operations, 
and the disposition of the neighbouring powers in Khelat 
and Afghanistan, both of which he treated with cautious 
sagacity. 

The Khelat sirdars, thinking to make a stroke of policy 
demanded money in the khan's name, to resist the 
Affghans, who were, they said, prepared to invade Khelat 
and even Scinde when the general entered the Punjaub — 
adding, that the money would enable them not only to 
hold the Candaharees in check, but even to win them over 
as auxiliaries in the war. Thus artfully they sounded his 
fears as to that contest, but the reply was sternly explicit. 
" I will not give a rupee. I want no aid against the 
Seikhs, and if the Affghans give offence an English army 
can go again to Cabool, and perhaps remain there j if the 
khan is molested the troops at Hyderabad and Shahpoor 
shall march to his assistance." This sufficed for the 
sirdars; and the Candahar chiefs, instead of menacing 
Khelat offered to join the British army — an offer received 
with thanks, but declined as being likely to embarrass the 
operations with wild plundering warriors, who troublesome 
in success would become enemies if a reverse occurred; 
indeed at this period Sir C. Napier could, if so inclined, 
have led half Beloochistan and Affghanistan into the 
Punjaub. 

Now also AH Moorad tendered his services thinking to 



282 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. XII. get back some territory formerly taken from him by Run- 
1846. j ee t Sing; and his offer was accepted, on the condition 
that he moved np the right bank of the Indus, and supplied 
a garrison for Mittenkote when it should fall, an arrange- 
ment which promised the following advantages. 

1°. The ameer would sweep away the bands of match- 
lock-men that were sure to infest the right bank of the 
river, and interrupt the communications. 

2°. There would be an appearance of two armies, one on 
each side of the Indus, the fame of which would be exag- 
gerated by the Asiatic imagination, and spread even to 
Constantinople ! 

3°. Mittentoke would be held by an ally, whose aid in 
the field of battle was not required, whereby the British 
line of operations would be shortened by the distance from 
that place to Roree. 

4°. If the ameer proved treacherous, which was scarcely 
to be expected, he could do no serious mischief, because 
the left bank of the Indus and the river itself would still 
be commanded by the British army and flotilla ; and 
Mittenkote would be under the control of Captain Malet 
and Mr. Curling, whose influence with Ali Moorad's hired 
Patau s was sufficient, with an offer of higher pay, to draw 
those adventurers altogether away from that prince's 
service. 

The general's plan of operations was framed with sin- 
gular care and foresight. Mittenkote was the first place 
of importance capable of resistance, the Seikhs were busily 
strengthening the works, and its situation within the 
confluence of the Punjaub rivers, adapted it for a place of 
arms to sustain an invasion from Scinde, and to facilitate 
the sieges of Soojuabad and Mooltan, the fortresses next 
in succession. The design was therefore to make a rapid 
movement on Mittenkote in two columns, throw a flying 
bridge over the river, and crush it at once by the concen- 
trated fire of eighty pieces of ordnance. This the general 
observed was like "killing a gnat with a sledge-hammer," 
but, besides the value of time he knew how dangerous 
irregular warriors like the Seikhs were behind stone walls, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



283 



and his policy was to terrify Soojuabad and Mooltan by CHAP. XII. 

this sudden overwhelming of Mittenkote. The movement 1846< 

against Mittenkote was to be up both banks of the river 

with the flotilla between, because, after passing Kusmore, 

the right bank belonged to the Mazarees — enemies — and 

as some of the troops were already on that side and the 

whole would have to be there at Mittenkote, two passages 

and time would be saved by the double movement which 

would also awe the Seikh Mazarees. 

Ali Moorad was then to be launched with all of his 
men, not required to garrison Mittenkote, against Deyrah 
Ishmael, a rich town to the westward. For with a nice 
appreciation of character the general judged that the 
ameer's desire for plunder would lead him to advance 
several marches, that his fears would then make him halt, 
and thus, without misfortune to the town of Deyrah, a 
powerful diversion would be effected, which would draw 
off troops from the right bank of the Sutlej, Meanwhile 
the army, moving up the left bank upon Ooch, was to form 
a field depot there, fortify the place, and prepare to force 
the passage of that river; an operation judged of easy 
accomplishment, if Ali Moorad's diversion was effectual ; 
but always mindful of that great principle of war, that as 
an enemy is never to be despised all available strength 
should be applied to every effort, the English leader 
resolved not only to place the whole of his siege-guns and 
field-artillery in battery on the bank, but to transfer the 
guns from the steamers to small boats to insure a prepon- 
derance of fire. When the passage was effected, he 
designed to construct a double bridge-head, armed with 4 
steamer guns, and by intrusting it to the Bhawulpoor 
auxiliaries, keep his own force and battering-train entire 
to move against Soojuabad or Mooltan. 

He had fifty-four field-guns admirably horsed, and on 
these he chiefly depended for defeating the Seikhs, ex- 
pecting by rapid movements to put their heavier artillery 
sooner or later into a difficulty, and then with his active 
army to break their cavalry and infantry without being 
crippled, for his intention was to go far, yet not wildly. 



284 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. xii. He knew his ground. He had prepared means to raise all 
1846 ^ the population along the Indus as far as Deyrah Ishmael 
Gazee against the Seikhs ; and had he been permitted to 
assemble his army as he desired, at an early period of the 
eool season, he would have shown the world a great game 
in war, and burst upon Lahore at the head of fifty 
thousand fighting men long before the battle of Sobraon 
was fought. The siege of Mooltan in the second Punjaub 
war, perhaps that war itself, would thus have been spared. 
It was otherwise ordained. 

While the Scindian British army was being assembled, 
the battle of Ferozashur was fought on the upper Sutlej, 
with so little advantage that the contending forces re- 
mained in observation on the English side of the river, 
and a powerful corps was necessarily detached under Sir 
Harry Smith to protect the communications, then menaced 
near Loodiana by an auxiliary Seikh force. In this state 
of affairs the governor-general suddenly ordered Sir 
C. Napier to direct his army on Bhawulpoor, and repair 
himself to the great camp on the upper Sutlej ; a journey 
not to be safely made without an escort for several days, 
which would have been slow for the occasion ; but the 
fighting camel corps was here again made available and the 
speed was as a courier's. He reached the camp at Lahore 
on the 3rd of March, yet only to find that the battle of 
Sobraon had been gained, that a treaty was in progress, 
that his well-devised campaign was nullified, and his life 
endangered by the combined action of mental and bodily 
fatigue, for no object ! Anticipated fame, health and 
independent command had been snatched away at once ; 
and, worse than all to his spirit, he found that when the 
Punjaub was actually lying bound at the feet of England 
if he had been allowed to conduct the operations as he 
had projected, the war was not to be continued by the 
main army — peace with the certain contingent of another 
war was to be substituted for complete conquest. He was 
received by the governor-general with honour and very great 
kindness ; by the soldiers with enthusiasm ; and in Durbar 
he was treated by Goolab Sing, then going to be raised to the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



285 



sovereignty of Cashmere, with such a marked respectful- CHAP. XII. 
ness of demeanour, as to indicate that he had adopted the 1846> 
general opinion as to the " nusseeb " or fortune of the 
Scindian conqueror, which the Beloochees rudely expressed 
by saying it was " a cubit longer than that of any other 
man." But his mission was naught, and after a few days' 
stay he had to return to Kurrachee, where he arrived in 
April, suffering in health from this useless continuous 
journey of eighteen hundred miles under an Indian sun. 

While at Lahore, he saw and reflected on the difficulties 
arising from the advanced season, and the absolutely 
denuded state of the British army, and as his own pro- 
jected auxiliary invasion of the Punjaub, which would 
have insured entire conquest without imposing further 
operations on the main army was set aside, he judged 
negotiation advisable ; but his opinion was adverse to the 
general policy pursued. He had before hostilities com- 
menced, declared his belief that the British empire in 
India was not ripe for a frontier on the upper Indus ; yet 
as circumstances had forced on this war and the Punjaub 
was virtually subdued, he thought the conquest should 
and might have been consolidated without further blood- 
shed ; whereas — " if a puppet king like Duleep Sing, and a 
real monarch like Goolab were established, the battle would 
have to be fought again, rivers of blood would flow, and the 
result might be doubtful" He said so, and in two years 
Mooltan, Eamnuggur, Chillianwallah and Goojerat, bore 
red-handed testimony to the truth of the prediction. 

It has been said, with sufficient authority to assume the 
fact as historical, that his projected campaign was thus 
stifled, to have his aid on the upper Sutlej, where, previous 
to the victory of Sobraon, the war bore a dark aspect. 
This was a flattering recognition of merit, but having been 
productive only of mortification and evil to the object of 
it, gives the right of examination as to the possible public 
benefit. 

Sir C. Napier with fifteen thousand men, so well 
organized, disciplined and provided, and wrought to such 
frenzied eagerness for battle, was, his great reputation 



286 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. XII. with the nations around considered, worth another man 
l 846 ^ with thirty thousand; and his line of operation was, 
politically and militarily the true one for an auxiliary 
force. He had a sure base and retreat on well-furnished 
fortresses, his power would have been magnified extrava- 
gantly when he had crushed Mittenkote and invested 
Mooltan, and as nearly the whole of the warlike population 
on the left bank of the Indus were in secret communication 
with him and ready to join him in arms, he would have 
decisively influenced the operations on the upper Sutlej. 
Indeed the mere appearance of his army at Roree had so 
terrified the southern Seikhs, that the Dewan had secretly 
treated for the surrender of Mooltan ; and an influential 
native in another quarter being ready to obey his secret 
orders, he was very justly confident, of reaching Lahore 
without a check, and with the Dewan and Mooltan Seikhs 
as auxiliaries. In fine the campaign was in his hands, 
that is, using his own words, " as far as man could know 
of war, for if fortune take offence she can make a straw 
ruin an armyP 

Was it wise to cast away such moral and material 
advantages, to call such a general from a country and a 
people so perfectly known to him, and, no slight consider- 
ation, knowing and fearing him as though he were a 
demon in battle — to call him at a critical moment to a 
country and people of whom he knew nothing. And for 
what ? To have one man more in a council, where per- 
haps there was already one too many; and where unless 
some very unusual arrangement was contemplated, he 
must naturally be regarded with jealousy. Ignorant of 
the resources on either side, he could only have advised 
hesitatingly, and could not act at all. Meanwhile his own 
army was thrown entirely out of the scheme of operations 
by being moved to Bhawulpoor, where it was palsied and 
without sure communications ; for the river was thus 
rendered useless as a communication, and an invasion of 
Scinde was invited, which would have thrown all the 
incumbrances of the force upon the grand army. This is 
not conjectural. It was subsequently ascertained that a 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



287 



Seikh force was actually prepared for such a counter inva- CHAP. xil. 
sion, and was only stopped by the negotiations after the \s46. 
battle of Sobraon. 

To overrule all these considerations, simply to have a 
third general in council, would seem to argue a state of 
much greater peril and nakedness on the Sutlej than has 
yet been made known to the public; and without pre- 
suming to censure or even to analyze the plan of campaign 
followed, it may be permitted to indicate another scheme 
of operations, which might possibly have been as effectual 
with less bloodshed; and would certainly have obviated 
the necessity — if there was a necessity — for blotting Sir 
C. Napier and his army out of the campaign. 

For two years the state of the Punjaub had indicated 
a coming war ; and though the governor-general might 
hope by policy to avoid that extremity, there was always 
sufficient danger to warrant preparation up to the verge 
of action. To say such preparation would have provoked 
that event, is a conclusion to be reasonably denied; and 
it is certain a contrary system did not avert the cata- 
strophe, though it did deprive the army of the resources 
required to give human confidence in the result. Taking 
then as a basis, that hostilities should from the first have 
been deemed inevitable, it follows, that the most powerful 
military means to sustain a war should have been com- 
bined with judicious policy to prevent one ; and the time 
required for warlike preparation, could certainly have 
been most easily gained by negotiations to stave off a 
conflict altogether. A war and peace policy would thus 
have marched together for a certain time, and the following 
dispositions would have placed the army in a better con- 
dition as to its communications, than it was previous to 
the victory of Sobraon ; they would also have enabled it 
to decide the war by one great action, instead of fighting 
five times ere its own safety was insured. 

Lahore was the Seikhs* base of operations, and they had 
several lines of invasion open. 

First. To pass the Sutlej near Ferozepoore, or at 
Hureekee, as really happened. 



288 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XII. Second, To pass the Beas, and the upper Sutlej near 
1846. Loodiana, as the force defeated at Aliwal did do. 

Third. To pass the Sutlej below Ferozepoore, and, 
crossing the desert by Seersa, menace Delhi. 

In the first and second cases, the Seikhs might have 
marched forward in mass, or, intrenching themselves, 
have detached their numerous cavalry to ravage the 
country up to Delhi. The problem to be solved was 
therefore how to dispose the British army, that, while 
remaining on the defensive, it could yet baffle those three 
courses of invasion without losing command of the initia- 
tory impulse if circumstances gave it the right to strike 
first. To effect this solution, Ferozepoore should have 
been considered, not as the key and pivot of the operations 
upon which the army was to gather, but as an isolated 
point to be thrown on its own resources. It should have 
been furnished with stores as a place of arms, and with 
the means of bridging the Sutlej ; it should have been 
strengthened with an intrenched camp to be occupied 
with a moveable corps of all arms, ten thousand strong at 
the lowest, and so have been left to itself. 

This arrangement would have obviated the necessity of 
the flank march from Loodiana down the left bank of the 
Sutlej to succour it, such as occurred. Certainly an un- 
military march, for that river did not cover the British 
army, being fordable in many places, and it was actually 
passed by the enemy during the movement ; in fine it was 
a line of march which could not have been adopted before 
a skilful enemy. The Seikh general showed no ability, 
and yet that flank march enabled him to fight the danger- 
ous and indecisive battles of Moodkee and Ferozashur, 
and involved an after-necessity on the British side for 
Smith's operations to clear the communications. But if 
Ferozepoore had been originally shaken off as a detached 
point, the main army could have been assembled in masses 
at and about Loodiana and Sirhind ; using those towns 
and Umballah as secondary places of arms and communi- 
cating with Delhi. In this position, having the cavalry 
thrown out on the wings to protect the country on each 



faceFageZ8S. 




ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



289 



flank against any sudden action of the Seikh irregular CHAP. Xlf. 
horsemen,, the army, provided with means for throwing a 184Gi 
pennanent bridge over the Sutlej and having a flying bridge 
for further operations, might have calmly awaited the de- 
velopment of the Punjaub troubles after giving notice to 
the Lahore Durbar, that any Seikh movement towards the 
Sutlej, or even the tunaishing of their troops with means to 
take the field, would be considered a declaration of war. 

Thus prepared with a declared policy and a powerful 
army, the British chief, when the Seikhs, as really hap- 
pened, issued pay and ammunition to their troops and 
consulted astrologers as to the fortunate hour for action, 
could have called in his cavalry, laid his permanent bridge 
over the Sutlej, avoided the left bank altogether, and 
taking post on the Beas, have thrown his pontoon bridge 
and fortified a head on the further side of that river. This 
movement would have inevitably stopped the Seikh army, 
and yet have permitted further negotiations, not unlikely 
to succeed when thus vigorously supported. 

If those negotiations failed, the command of all the 
movements offensive or defensive would have remained 
with the British army. For if the Seikhs attempted to 
pass the Sutlej below the confluence of the Beas, they 
could be opposed in front by the corps at Ferozepoore, 
while the main army, crossing the Beas, fell on their flank 
and cut them off from Lahore. If they attempted to 
force the Beas itself, the main army could receive the 
attack with every advantage ; while the corps from Feroze- 
poore, by means of their bridge and the fords, either passed 
the Sutlej at Hureekee to menace the enemy's flank, or 
at Erareese to support the defence of the Beas. 

But the Seikhs would never have attempted such diffi- 
cult operations, and must have remained passive in defence 
while Sir C. Napier's army was operating from the side of 
Mooltan on their flank and rear ; and if, as is most pro- 
btible, the Seikh general intrenched a position to cover 
Lahore and Umritzer, the British army on the Beas and 
the auxiliary force at Ferozepoore, passing the Sutlej and 
the Beas simultaneously by means of their respective 

u 



290 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. XII. bridges and at the fords, could have united to deliver a 
1846# decisive battle which would have given them the capital, 
possibly the whole country, and would certainly have 
brought them to the Chenaub, or the Jelum, where Sir 
C. Napier's force could, if necessary, have joined. 

If the battle was adverse to the British, their retreat 
over the Beas and Sutlej was secure ; and if driven from 
those lines, Ferozepoore offered a refuge for its own corps 
while the main body took a new line behind the upper 
Sutlej as at the opening of the campaign : meanwhile Sir 
C. Napier's operations would prevent the Seikhs from 
vigorously following up their victory. Now quitting this 
hypothetical campaign to resume the story of the adminis- 
tration of Scinde, it shall be shown that the field of battle 
is not the only place where heroic conduct can be dis- 
played by an officer. 

At Kurrachee Sir C. Napier, although suffering from ill- 
ness, resumed his unceasing cares for the people committed 
to his charge. He could not indeed help seeing that he was 
a man looked to in danger and difficulty, but overlooked in 
the distribution of honours and treated with contumely 
when fear did not enforce respect ; but with a noble scorn 
he pushed base usage aside in his pursuit of the real great- 
ness belonging to a discharge of his duty to a whole people. 
" I do not pretend " he said " that I am not chagrined at 
being a man marked by the government. This has been 
made evident in many ways. Nothing has been done for 
my staff in the hill campaign ; which would not have been 
the case I imagine under any other general, and I receive 
no redress or even answers to my complaints of injuries. 
As to rewards I can only act as I have always professed — - 
namely that those who are to receive them are not the 
men to dictate. Hardinge and Gough are both my seniors, 
Smith however is only a colonel, and is made a baronet — 
that is very marked, why I know not nor do I care — I 
have worked and do work from motives of honour and 
right feeling, and because I love work, and if the minis- 
ters have not the same right feeling I cannot help it." 

It was his fortune that while thus personally maltreated, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



291 



nearly every possible natural ill should be accumulated to CHAP. XII. 
bar the progress of Scinde under his government, as if to 1846 
prove the unyielding energy of spirit which could sus- 
tain both burthens and still work through to good. It 
has been shown how war, pestilence, locusts, anomalous 
overflowing of the Indus, scarcity, predatory invasions, 
and the previous tyranny of the ameers, were combined 
with the hostility of the Court of Directors and the foul 
practices of the factious Bombay authorities to produce 
disasters, thus tormenting his administration during the 
first three years — and how the fourth year was opened by 
the mortification of being called away from that gallant 
army, which with such unexampled pains and surprising 
rapidity he and his officers had organized for the field, at 
the moment when with a natural ambition he looked for 
increase of reputation. 

There was still a crowning ill in store. In June the 
cholera came to Kurrachee with more than its usual 
terrors and havoc. It had appeared amongst the natives 
in May, not severely, but gradually acquiring intensity 
until the night of the 14th of June, when it struck all 
people, soldiers, Europeans and sepoys, with such a sudden 
fearful mortality, that to feel it was to drop, and to drop 
was death. Fear seized every breast, the cooks, butchers 
and bakers died or fled with the panic-stricken mass of the 
population to the open country, where without food, water, 
help, or cover from the sun, then in its raging season, 
nearly all perished and the land was covered with carcases. 

The soldiers rushing, some to the hospitals others from 
them, were very much excited, and in one place some 
commissariat carts laden with spirits, which were imagined 
to be an antidote, were on the point of being seized when 
the town and cantonments would have been overwhelmed 
with madness as well as death. Soon the general appeared 
with his staff, issuing the necessary directions for re-esta- 
blishing order and system, and recalling men to their senses 
and duties ; for seeing that some panic prevailed in a 
quarter where the utmost devotion was necessary, and 
some drunkenness amongst the hospital attendants, he 

u 2 



292 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



chap. XII. infused new vigour by aiding the sufferers himself, helping 
*° carrv ^ ne dying to the wards, rubbing their convulsed 
limbs, and encouraging all to bear up as they would on a 
battle-field. 

This terrible visitation continued to scourge the place 
from the 14th to the 18th unceasingly, and if it had not 
then abated the whole station would have been destroyed ; 
for in its mitigated form, the deaths on the 30th of June 
were one hundred and twenty of the people besides 
soldiers ! Every twenty-four hours the general and his 
staff, twice visited every ward and every man in the 
hospitals, besides taking measures for reassuring the popu- 
lation — a fearful duty, because of the horrible agonies of 
the sufferers. The labour was also great. The different 
hospitals were far asunder, the nearest more than a mile 
from his house, and in that dreadful heat and on that 
dreadful duty, they must have passed over twenty to 
twenty-five miles each day besides the exertions of person- 
ally aiding the patients. The dying men with look and 
voice expressed satisfaction at having their general near 
them in their pains, and he, seeing that moral influences 
would be at least as efficacious as medicines, though he 
was debilitated by previous sickness, nerved body and soul 
for the task without any shrinking of either, even when 
the plague smote his own home — heavily smote it. 

The child of his nephew, John Napier, first died and 
was buried, its mother being then on the eve of giving 
birth to another ; and the next evening the young father, 
whose affliction had not lessened his efforts to help others, 
was laid in the same grave ! His years were few, and he 
had no opportunity of gaining that distinction in arms 
which with a chafed spirit he constantly sought, for he was 
a lion's cub ! He found instead a death of agony, and 
obscure for such an ardent soldier; yet it was on the 
straight path of honourable duty, which he followed with- 
out faltering when danger was more rife and intrepidity 
more needful than on the field of battle. 

It was computed that seven thousand persons, more 
than a third of the population of the town and canton- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



293 



ments, died in the few days the horrible pestilence lasted ; CHAP. XII. 
and the deaths in the country around being added not 
less than sixty thousand persons perished. The Angel of 
Death had passed over the land with sounding pinions and 
all were dismayed. 

" This mysterious disease," said Sir C. Napier, writing 
at the time, "principally attacks the finest and the 
strongest men. I separated the regiments as quickly as my 
deficiency of carriage enabled me, but nothing would stop 
the vehement progress of the sickness for the first three 
days. Afterwards, that is to say from the night of the 
17th, its virulence seemed mitigated, and on the 18th it 
became infinitely milder. This day, the 19th not more 
than fifteen soldiers have died, and the medical men 
expect that to-morrow it will pass away. It is a strange 
and mysterious sickness and defies reflection to account 
for it. In some it appeared with violent convulsions, 
dreadful to behold ; in others all was calmness, they came 
into hospital placid and silent. Not one of these quiet 
ones lived many hours, but the cries of the others were 
prolonged and very painful to hear. 

" I believe many medical men hold that water is bad in 
cholera ; this seems a great error ; some of the most violent 
cases appeared to give way to repeated draughts of cold 
water. At first it was thrown up, but after two or three 
rejections remained on the stomach, and the patient reco- 
vered. All were continually calling for water, and 
especially for soda-water, which happily was manufactured 
at Kurrachee, and thousands and thousands of bottles 
have been drunk. I greatly encouraged the surgeons to 
give water, because, seeing death was inevitable, I thought 
it cruel to add the pains of intense thirst ; and I happened 
by a strange accident to have seen in the newspaper, the 
morning of the day cholera broke out, an advertisement 
by a medical man, asserting the' beneficial effects of cold 
water in cholera ; his description tallied exactly with what 
I observed in the hospitals, and I am persuaded it is 
correct to give water. I endure great anxiety from this 
sickness, and from fear of the station being destroyed by 



294 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. XII. famine, and the sun is hot beyond anything we have yet 
1846 experienced in Scinde ; however, generally speaking, until 
this blow fell we had been remarkably healthy 

Notwithstanding the great diminution of the population 
by death and by flight, food became very scarce, because 
distant people, dreading infection, would not come in with 
supplies, and every horror menaced the station. Shocking 
also was the reflection that the disease had been exacer- 
bated — and would have been more so but for the accidental 
presence of the soda-water manufactory — because sanction 
for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee had been 
neglected. The Kurrachee water, holding many delete- 
rious substances in solution, predisposed the viscera to 
accept the disease, and aggravated its development. Sir 
C. Napier, as already shown, had been for two years pre- 
pared to supply good water, but never could he get even 
an answer to his solicitations on the subject — " and for the 
king's offence the people died ! " 

This official procrastination clogged or retarded almost 
every measure of importance. The formation of the 
baggage corps had been delayed for two years, and the 
names of the officers of the irregular corps which had been 
formed were long withheld from the Gazette, so they 
could only draw their pay on account, to their discontent 
and public inconvenience. Above seventy thousand pounds 
also had been disbursed under the supreme government's 
orders for various objects, yet the regular official sanctions 
were retarded, and thus the public accounts were thrown 
into confusion, the accountants into difliculties. 

It was so likewise with respect to Ah* Moorad's treaty, 
which he was impatient to have concluded ; and it was 
very essential that it should be arranged, because the 
rumour of restoring the ameers, sounding like his death- 
knell, urged him to look for alliances and support inde- 
pendent of the British. ' Yet no effort could extract any 
decision or any intimation on the subject, the treaty was 
neither confirmed nor abrogated, a profound silence was 
maintained on the subject. 

Sir C. Napier attributed this state of things to a 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



295 



malicious feeling in official persons, civil and military, who CHAP. XII. 

having thwarted Lord Ellenborough for reasons before 1846 

mentioned, now transferred their hostility to him as one 

of that nobleman's successful generals. Sir Henry Har- 

dinge, new to Indian affairs, and having a great war and 

negotiation on his hands, naturally referred such matters 

to the subordinate authorities, secretaries and boards, with 

whom to embarrass the governor of Scinde was a maxim 

of state. " Oh let Scinde wait " was the official password, 

and hence all measures of a beneficial tendency depending 

on such persons, were held in abeyance or entirely abated, 

and the action of the Scinde administrative policy had no 

adequate scope. 

" It is thus," he observed, " that I am lamed in my course, 
for if I make fight, both I and Sir Henry Hardinge will be 
overwhelmed with an enormous correspondence from every 
department to prove that they are quite right; and after 
two or three years of this work it will be settled that I am 
a very zealous but entirely wrong-judging person, and ill 
informed of what is required in government. The game 
is not worth the candle, when that candle is my life, which 
must sink under such additional vexatious work. Where- 
fore, when justice to individuals or to bodies is involved I 
am stiff, but where the evil only affects the government I 
let things go their own gait ; the public suffers indeed, but 
I cannot help that when every remedial effort only makes 
matters worse. I will not sacrifice the primary considera- 
tion of forwarding the civilization and prosperity of Scinde, 
to waste my time and my bodily strength in useless con- 
tests with factious official people ; I am content, if they so 
please, to do nothing, but I will not do mischief ! " 

Though cribbed and constrained by such arts, all that 
depended on his own authority made rapid progress, for it 
was well said of him at the time of the cholera, " That Rem * rl g ° n { 
neither age, nor exhausting toil, nor gathering dangers, Outram's work, 
nor broken health, nor the greatness of the public calamity, ^ a ^ b gg q 
nor the stings of private sorrow could make his heart published by 
falter, or shake his spirit in the performance of his duty." Rld s wa y- 
The advancement of agriculture, of commerce, of popu- 



296 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. Xll. lation and of revenue was astonishing. The most expe- 
1846< rieneed men had judged it hopeless for many years to 
make the country pay even its own civil expenses, and in 
1843-4 the revenue had been only nine lacs; yet such was 
the power of his formula of government,, that in 1844-5 
it was twenty-seven lacs — in 1845-6 the financial year 
ending in April, it was forty lacs, of which thirty-one, or 
three hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling were 
surplus paid into the general treasury, after defraying the 
whole cost of civil administration including more than two 
thousand policemen horse and foot, all excellent soldiers ! 
Yet the ameers' taxes had been reduced one-half, and no 
new ones imposed, while the cost of the civil government 
by vigilance and economy was kept stationary. 

This steady augmentation of surplus revenue was sure 
to increase under the powerful administrative machinery 
developed, which was attaining every day more regularity 
and precision and was attended by an increasing commerce 
and agriculture. Each half-year also cancelled some 
current expenses, which had been required for the first 
establishment of government, but which were not to be 
permanent, such as the construction of barracks and for- 
tifications. A thorough clearing out of the canals was 
another enforced outlay of a temporary nature, because 
that duty had hitherto of necessity been trusted to the 
kardars to whom it belonged under the ameers ; and who 
had taken advantage of the times to redouble their usual 
frauds ; but now the organization of a canal department 
under Major Scott being completed, a general survey 
made, and the water-levels all over Scinde ascertained with 
great cost and labour, a scientific system was laid down, 
and the whole of the canal and water system was taken 
out of the kardars* hands. 

On the new system a far greater extent of country would 
have been irrigated, and at a diminished cost, augmenting 
the revenue both ways; but the principal improvement 
would have been the establishing of sluice-gates, so com- 
bined that the waters of the Indus were entirely con- 
trolled, whether in flood or in recession, whereas previously 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



297 



they had rioted capriciously both for production and CHAP. XII. 
destruction. Thus in June and July the country was 1846 
always an expanse of water in which grain shot up mar- 
vellously ; but often the water would recede anomalously, 
leaving the plants to the raging sun, which they could, 
from the moisture left, sustain for a time, and if a second 
inundation came quickly the harvest was sure to be rich 
and heavy ; but if the refreshing flood did not return, as 
often happened, or was not high enough to fill the canals, 
the crops perished, and in conjunction with the lower 
levels which were always swampy, produced promiscuous 
crops of grain, weeds and fever ! These evil changes and 
results would have been corrected by the sluice-gates, 
and yet at first, the ignorant people thought this control- 
ling of the waters was designed to withhold it and starve 
them ! The Bombay faction greedily recorded those 
foolish apprehensions as proofs of general disaffection; but 
soon the cloud passed away, and the conquered would 
have rejoiced in this new benefit from the conquest. 

The conqueror did rejoice at having established a 
system which in a few years would have been thoroughly 
understood, and which by controlling the action of sun 
and moisture on an alluvial soil, was sure to render 
Scinde one vast farm for cotton, indigo, sugar, wheat 
and all minor grains. He had now also the satisfaction 
to find that the merchant cafilas, which had previously 
gone from Khelat by Beila to the Gedrosian port of Plan 1. 
Soonomeeanee, the rival of Kurrachee, had, from the 
secimty of Scinde under his government, changed their 
route, descending by Sehwan to Kurrachee ; which thus 
by the mere force of justice, with an inferior harbour, 
had usurped the whole trade. Soonomeeanee was then 
deprived of its mercantile value, and Sir C. Napier dropped 
the negotiations for its purchase. He had however already 
raised the revenue of Bombay very largely by stopping 
the smuggling of opium from Scinde; and had good 
reason to say the conquest was a most profitable one ^hbam<^ 
for the Company and for England. For the Company so J^^j^jf" 
enormously profitable, that in the suppression of opium App.xvi. 



298 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XII. smuggling only, it must be reckoned by millions, and 
would be almost incredible if the proofs were not so clear 
and irrefragable. The facts are indeed still perverted in 
parliament, or withheld from the public, but from this 
source alone the Company have by the conquest of Scinde 
derived millions of pounds sterling ! 

Notwithstanding all these facts, false statements of the 
expense, and equally false returns of the number of troops 
employed, were palmed on the parliament with the object 
of discrediting Sir C. Napier's labours — but while loud 
cries were raised against the number of troops quartered 
in Scinde there was really a strong aversion on the part 
of the Bombay faction and its unworthy abettors in 
England to have them reduced, because that would have 
publicly demolished all their libels as to the feelings of 
the people towards their conqueror. Those feelings were 
not as was said, hatred and discontent ; they were of 
reverence of attachment and of admiration, which grew 
stronger and were more unequivocally shown as the re- 
sult of his protecting and encouraging legislation became 
more developed ; and those results, however great, would 
have been much greater but for the two interrupting wars 
which had occurred — that against the hillmen in the 
beginning of 1845 and that of the Punjaub in the begin- 
ning of 1846 — which engrossed all the mental and bodily 
energies of the general and his officers, day and night, 
leaving no margin for thought or intervention as to civil 
improvements. Many months' action of the energy which 
had marked every day by some measure of peaceful utility, 
were thus forcibly abstracted from the three years which 
the civil administration of Scinde had now lasted; and 
it has been before shown how vexed and tormented those 
years were by natural visitations, by the foulness of 
factions, and the negligence and enmity of power. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



299 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Wearied of exile, or believing the Talpoor dynasties CHAP. xill. 
would be finally restored, the Lion sent vakeels in the j^T 
summer of 1846 to treat for his return to Scinde, but 
being referred to the governor- general, broke off the ne- 
gotiation and remained in the Punjaub. This notion of 
restoring the ameers had been, as already shown, industri- 
ously promulgated by the Bombay faction. In England 
also Lord Ashley had moved parliament in their behalf ; 
and without any accurate knowledge of affairs to warrant 
interference, he so stirred himself, as to merit being classed 
with the persons described by Napoleon as " Brave blun- 
derers who with all possible good intentions, do all possible 
mischief." The ameers therefore, thinking him a sure 
support, had through their Bombay confederates an- 
nounced, that a paper given by Lord Ashley to their 
vakeels in London, contained an assurance to themselves, 
that they were to live as private gentlemen close to the 
frontiers of Scinde. That paper indeed said, they would 
not be allowed to do so, but it suited the faction to leave 
out the negative, and hence the story ran, that they were 
to be conveniently planted for raising commotions in their 
lost dominions. 

This prospect produced consternation all over Scinde, 
and the sirdars of the Talpoor family were most alarmed. 
The ameers, they said, could not live quietly, they must 
conspire. Belooch honour would compel the Talpooree 
nobles to join them, and thus ruin would fall on all, for 
their power would be naught against Sir C. Napier, and 
their treason would give him the right to destroy them. 



300 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XIII. They earnestly deprecated the return of the ameers and 
wished for no change. The Scindee population was less 
concerned. Believing equally in the power of the British 
general,, and feeling only hatred for their former tyrants, 
they were able and willing to defend their newly-acquired 
independence; but the Hindoos were so frighted that 
some of the richest merchants instantly transferred their 
money to other countries, and prepared to follow it with 
their families. Thus commerce was seriously checked, 
and doubt and dread pervaded the whole community, as 
the concocters of the falsehood designed: nor was the 
distrust entirely removed by a proclamation which was 
immediately issued by the general to contradict the report. 

Over these shameless artifices Sir C. Napier grieved, as 
they were injurious to the public and hurtful to private 
persons ; but as they affected himself he treated them with 
contempt. " I wish," he said, ' ' plenary success to them. 
I wish they may restore the ameers, and withdraw all our 
troops — in one year anarchy would be at its height. The 
poor indeed, of all countries bear much before they resist ; 
but the poor of Scinde have now justice, work and high 
wages ; and the rich have all they had before and more, for 
now they can keep their riches. The merchants have 
security, all classes have the benefit of a vast reduction of 
taxation, and twenty thousand soldiers with their followers 
spend money. Let the ameers be restored and the poor 
will get plenty of work, but no wages, justice will dis- 
appear, the rich will be plundered to form a new treasury, 
and will hold their jagheers at the caprice of despots, 
instead of fixed law ; the merchants will again be 
squeezed, the old pernicious taxation will be renewed, and 
the cutting of throats will be resumed as a virtue." 

Whether there was any intention of restoring the ameers, 
is not publicly known, but a change of government at 
home happened at this time, and Lord Bipon, on quitting 
the Board of Control, wrote to assure Sir C. Napier that 
he approved of all he had done, acknowledged the difficul- 
ties overcome, and thanked him for his exertions in the 
public service ! This unendurable provocation from the 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



301 



man who had encouraged and supported his enemies, and CHAP. X 
condemned what he now acknowledged to be meritorious, 1846< 
proved the abject submission with which that man had 
obeyed the Court of Directors. He was thus answered. 

" I have the honour to thank you for your letter of the 
7th of July, which however places me in a position dis- 
tressing to any man of proper feelings. I mean that of 
obligation for expressions of private kindness, while as 
president of the Board of Control you have refused me 
justice. Your lordship refers to the difficulties which I 
have had to encounter in Scinde. The greatest, and the 
only painful one, has arisen from your lordship's conduct 
relative to Major Outram. While I have strictly obeyed, 
though with mental uneasiness, the orders to be silent, 
issued by the governor- general to myself and to Major 
Outram, that officer has been not only allowed, but by 
your lordship's silence, encouraged to assail me in the 
public prints and in a book ! I now find also, from Lord 
Hardinge, that your lordship had long ago resolved that I 
should not receive support from government. 

" My lord, you must excuse me for saying, that if my 
conduct in Scinde deserved the approbation which it 
received from her Majesty, from Parliament, from the 
Court of Directors, and from yourself, it also deserved a 
better return than the injustice I have received from your 
lordship." 

Having given this merited rebuke to Lord Kipon Sir C. 
Napier, hearing that Scinde was to be placed under civil 
authorities from Bombay, and knowing how much error 
was afloat in England as to his government, thought it 
proper to instruct Lord Bipon's successor, Sir John Hob- 
house, as to the true state of affairs and the probable 
results of such an arrangement. In that view, he sent him 
the following memoir which, though composed in a few 
hours amidst pressing public business, displays the true 
aspect of the government and evinces the writer's power of 
generalization. 

State of the People. — The people of Scinde are wild, 
uneducated, warlike, and a noble nation, if the word 



302 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



chap. xill. nation can be applied to men who have no national 
1846. feelings, no union whatever. They are divided into tribes, 
some stationary, some nomadic. All are addicted to rob- 
bery and murder if we can call their acts by those names ; 
but that would not be strictly just, because no law existed 
under the ameers against such crimes, in which those 
princes largely participated. A few general rules did 
exist, but they were so open to every species of corrupt 
influence that it is an abuse of terms to call them laws. 
They only applied, if applied at all, to the first of the three 
races inhabiting Scinde, namely Beloochees, Scindees, and 
Hindoos. The Beloochees are Mahomedans and, until the 
conquest, were the masters; — the other two were their 
slaves. The Scindees were serfs, over whom every petty 
Belooch chief held the power of life and death, and used 
that power freely. In reality there was no law, and each 
tribe protected itself in the following curious way. 

Tribe A being in want robbed tribe B, which remained 
passive for a longer or shorter period according to circum- 
stances. When the proper time came, B, having perhaps 
a quarrel with tribe C, proposes pardon to A if it will help 
B to rob C ; which aid and a small compensation for the 
original robbery made up the quarrel between A and B. 
This rotatory system of plunder was general, and thus 
pressing necessity was relieved by what may be called 
forced loans ; and between these attacks on each other, the 
plunder of travellers, and the levying of " black mail " on 
caravans, intervened. The black mail and a limited but 
existing commerce, enabled the tribes to live in a country 
where neither lodging, nor clothing nor firing are needed ; 
and where the greatest chief lives under a mat stretched 
on poles cut from the jungle. It is true that the richer 
Hindoos had houses in towns ; but built of mud, and 
purposely made wretched in appearance, or the ameers 
would have squeezed from their owners large sums of 
money. This system to us is robbery ; for them a conven- 
tional arrangement, understood, and producing no very 
bitter feelings amongst the tribes. At the same time it 
prevented in a great measure (except amongst chiefs) 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



303 



intermarriages; for evident reasons each tribe kept itself CHAP. XIII. 
pure and distinct. 1846> 

With regard to murder, it is still a sort of rude natural 
law, understood and rigidly maintained. If a man of tribe 
A seduces a woman of tribe B, her friends kill both, 
a blood-feud arises, and the two tribes become deadly 
enemies unless they have joined to slay both culprits. 
But if a man of A seduces a woman of B, and her relations 
kill her, while the man escapes, there will be a blood-feud, 
because a man of A has caused the death of a woman of B, 
and the first man of A that can be caught is slain ; but 
then the feud would cease. 

I have said the first man of A caught, is slain, but the 
man so sacrificed is unconnected with the criminal, and 
his family make no remonstrances ; they admit the justice 
of the act yet secretly vow a private feud against the man 
of B who actually slew their relation, and they will watch 
for years and finally slay him or some of his family in 
revenge — thus the public balance of murder is again uneven 
and both tribes take arms. These private feuds are not 
blamed, it would be dishonouring to neglect them. I have 
traced this running account of blood through several 
generations, on several occasions, and one recently between 
the " Bull-foot Noomrees " and the " Choola Noomrees " — 
the first our subjects, the last our neighbours. They knew 
I would not let them fight, and so made me umpire. 
Originally of one family they split about a hundred years 
ago, and their feud comes down to this day. They 
embraced in my presence with a peculiar ceremony, the 
Choola making the first advance to the Bull-foot chief as 
the head of all the Noomree tribes. Their expression, 
when I recommended reconciliation, was, " That my sword 
was stronger than their swords, and what I ordered must 
be obeyed." When reconciliation takes place it is not 
unusual for the murderer to give a sister or daughter in 
marriage to the next of kin of the slain ; and I have known 
the daughter of the murdered man given to the murderer. 
Educated to expect this, it is not such a hardship on the 
girl as it would be with us. 



304 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XIII. From the time a blood-feud begins, an exact account is 
kept, and until an equal number are slain on each side no 
peace can be — sometimes not even then. So accurately is 
this account kept, that wounds which do not prove fatal 
are set down. All this we call murder, with them it is 
only fatal duelling, and not so bad as our duelling, for we 
have law protection if we choose to seek it. But in the 
ameers' time, these men had no law, and no other protec- 
tion; wherefore robber and murderer does not justly apply 
to them. 

As to petty thieving it is scarcely known — a little in the 
large towns ; and in our cantonments which are infested 
with the lowest blackguards from Bombay. 

These divisions amongst the tribes prevented their 
having any national feeling or any attachment whatever 
to their late rulers the ex-ameers. I saw this when I first 
arrived, and when the conquest happened I turned it to 
account by giving each chief all he possessed before the 
battle of Meeanee, and with it a secure title which he had 
not before ; for under the ameers no man who was not 
very strong was sure of his jagheer. The nobles were 
thus attached to an order of things which confers advan- 
tages they never before possessed ; and I acquire knowledge 
of their feelings as to government from the collectors — 
especially Captain Rathborne the collector of Hyderabad, 
who lives on intimate terms with the most powerful, and 
is an officer of great ability. 

System of Government. — I shall now state my mode of 
governing such rude tribes. Having secured the confi- 
dence of the chiefs as to their possessions, my next object 
was gradually to subvert their power over their Scindee 
and Hindoo slaves — not called so, but so in fact. The 
abolition of slavery by order of the supreme government 
gave the first blow to this, as far as their purchased African 
slaves were concerned. The second step was to hear all 
complaints made by the poor of ill-treatment perpetrated 
by Englishmen or Beloochees. This produced a feeling 
that justice and protection to all would be found under 
the British rule. The third step was to deprive the chiefs 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 305 

of the power of inflicting death, torture, or any other CHAP. XIII. 
punishment; and force them to refer to our magistrates 
for justice against offenders. This in some measure 
lowered the chiefs in the estimation of their retainers; 
hut it raised the latter in their own estimation. The 
fourth step was to abolish the abominable old Indian 
system of regulating labour by a tariff. I threw open the 
market for labour, and wages rose, to 3^. and 4d. a day, 
having been before forced, unpaid labour, or nearly so. 
This met with opposition from Englishmen, and, strange 
to say, I have hardly been able entirely to enforce the rule 
yet ! I have heard that a tariff on labour prevails very 
much in India at this moment. I do not know this from 
personal experience, and can hardly believe in the existence 
of such foul injustice and tyranny towards the labouring 
class. However by this measure I have so improved the 
condition and feelings of the poor, that I doubt, if govern- 
ment were so unwise as to restore the ameers, that the 
latter could hold their position for six months : all would 
be confusion and bloodshed. 

I deprived all persons of the right of bearing arms in 
public except the chiefs ; for them it would have been an 
indignity; and I doubt if they would have borne it so 
patiently as they have other rules more fatal to their 
supremacy as feudal chiefs. Had I suppressed their arms 
discontent would have united them in a common cause 
and healed their feuds, whereas by leaving them their 
swords and shields I added to their consequence and 
flattered their vanity. Their followers would care little 
for the deprivation unless worked up to anger by their 
chiefs ; but if so worked, they would have been fierce and 
ready to use their arms instead of relinquishing them. 
All was received with good feeling. Meanwhile the Scin- 
dees and Hindoos, who were never allowed to wear arms, 
acquired importance, and were pleased to find themselves 
on a level with their former tyrants — the latter being 
pulled down while they were raised — and were no longer 
awed by the Belooch scimitar which had before been 
drawn and fatally applied upon the slightest provocation. 

x 



306 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. XIII. It is now man to man, and the Scindee is as good as the 
j^T Beloochee, allowing for the habitual fear of the slave. 

Emancipation cannot at once remove that, and I see it 
still to prevail, especially when the reports are spread by 
some of the infamous Indian newspapers that the ameers 
are to be restored. 

A letter arrived last Christmas from the ameers, stating, 
that Lord Ashley had written to say, they were to live on 
the frontier as private gentlemen ! I am unable to say 
what truth there was in this, but the Hindoo merchants 
believed it, and in consequence sent their money to 
Muscat and Bombay and prepared to abandon Scinde. 
The first notice we had of it was from a great chief, the 
nephew of the ameers, who stood by them to the last 
against us. He possesses a principality which I restored 
to him to honour his faith towards his family; for he 
fought at Meeanee at Hyderabad and in the desert ; but 
when Shere Mohamed (the Lion) fled from Scinde this 
man laid his sword at my feet. He is very clever and has 
heartily entered into the English habits, improving his 
land, and adopting civilization. He said "I am ruined, 
and so are numbers of others if this news be true ; for we 
must join the ameers in a conspiracy to overthrow the 
English government, and shall be overthrown. For God's 
sake tell your government to let us alone, we are happy and 
getting rich ; but all of Talpoor blood must join our chiefs 
if you let them come near us, and as to their living quiet 
as private gentlemen that is nonsense." 

And if the ameers do come assuredly blood will be 
spilled ; not by the people, but the great chiefs who will be 
influenced by family honour, and as this chief said, ruined. 
His words were emphatic. ' ' The first time I was received 
by the general as a brave and faithful soldier, and I have 
received from him all and more than all I had before ; but 
if I fight him again I shall be a traitor and can have no 
claim on his mercy." Speaking thus to Captain Rath- 
borne, this prince became very animated, and taking a jug 
of water that stood near filled a glass, saying, u You Eng- 
lish are a very odd people, you have conquered Scinde, 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



307 



you have done us good, all is full like this glass, but CHAP. XIII. 
instead of drinking you throw all away thus" — and he 1846< 
poured the water on the floor, alluding to the return of 
the ameers. 

The prohibition to appear armed has tended more than 
most things to keep the people orderly and prevent mur- 
ders and feuds arising from the sudden wrath peculiar to 
men of hot climates. 

Collection of Revenue. — I divided Scinde into three great 
collectorates, placing at the head of each a collector with 
deputies under him, English officers. They are all magis- 
trates, but with restricted powers as to punishment. To 
them I gave the whole establishment employed by the 
ameers for collecting money and inflicting vengeance ; as 
to punishing moral crimes those princes never interfered ; 
the only crime in their eyes was disobedience of their 
orders, and those orders had but two objects — amassing 
money and administering to their debaucheries. The last 
was only painful to certain individuals. The first opened 
a door to great and general calamities— injustice, torture, 
and ruin to the country at large. Their machines for extor- 
tion were the kardars, the head men in each village who 
collected the taxes ; the umbardars who took charge of the 
grain when collected for the ameers. Both kardars and 
umbardars had their familiars to execute their orders; 
and what those orders were depended generally on what 
the kardar himself was, but not always, as the following 
facts show. If grain was high the ameers ordered the 
kardars to sell it at a certain price beyond the highest in 
the market, and to send the amount received at once to 
the treasury. The kardar assembled the richest people of 
his district, compelling each to take a portion of the grain 
and pay instantly the ameers' price, perhaps more for their 
own profit. If any refused he was hanged by the thumbs 
to a beam and a hot ramrod was placed between his thighs. 
The money being thus collected — God help the kardar if 
it was not — each zemindar, or farmer, took his forced 
purchase away and divided it in like manner, and with 
like persuasion, amongst his ryots or labourers, who, being 

x 2 



308 



sir chaules napier's 



CHAP. XIII. poorer, had a larger allowance of hot ramrods and other 
1846> tortures. The kardar in such cases could not help himself 
if he would; but it generally gave him opportunity to 
extort money for his own profit. 

All these kardars and umbardars I made over to the 
new magistrates to work with, and thus enlisted a large 
body of influential men in favour of the conquest. They 
of course robbed us at first as the English officers were 
ignorant of what ought to be paid ; but now the collectors 
know their work well, and from their systematic military 
habits and experience of men they quickly got the whole 
machinery into high order, working hard, and the revenue 
rapidly improved and will yet improve. The collectors and 
their deputies keep diaries, which are sent to me weekly 
and I thus learn what goes on in each district. They are 
read to me by the secretary to the government, Captain 
Brown, an officer from whom I have received such able 
assistance that I ought in justice to call him my colleague 
rather than secretary. 

Police. — To secure the peace of the country and avoid 
disseminating the troops, which would render them too 
familiar with the people and possibly diminish the whole- 
some fear of our power, I established a police of two thou- 
sand four hundred men, well armed, drilled, and divided 
into three classes — one for the towns, two for the country. 
The first all infantry, the two last infantry and cavalry, 
called the rural police. They assist the collectors, but 
form a distinct body under their own officers. The police 
never agree with the kardars, and while the police inform 
us of the cheating of the kardars, umbardars and zemin- 
dars, these people complain of the usual faults of police- 
men — namely overbearing insolence. In this manner they 
keep each other in check, and both take the part of the 
poor, not out of humanity but spite : the motive signifies 
little, the government profits by the results, for the poor 
now look on both as protectors. Thus if a policeman ill- 
treats a ryot the latter applies to the kardar for protection ; 
and if a kardar robs the ryot, the latter goes to the police- 
man. All this gives much trouble at times to the collec- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



309 



tors and myself, for some sub-collectors have been weak CHAP. xm. 

enough to enter into the disputes of their followers ; but J^T 

that is ephemeral, and we have a sufficient number of men 

of sense and temper. The whole works well and the police 

not only seize thieves but are good troops : they had on 

their first establishment sundry battles with robber bands 

whom they generally defeated, and now no such bands exist. 

Control of the Administration of Justice. — An officer has 
been made judge-advocate-general, who from experience 
and study has acquired much knowledge of his work and 
of military law ; he was sent by Lord Ellenborough, and 
his calm dispassionate good sense and amiable disposition 
and his great industry and uprightness singularly qualify 
Captain Keith Young for the post he so worthily fills. 
To this officer I have given two deputies who officiate at 
Hyderabad and Shikarpoore. To this judge-advocate- 
general all the magistrates send reports of trials which 
they are competent to enter upon. Crimes of a deeper 
hue, such as murder, robbery with violence, are first 
examined into on the spot by the magistrates, and the 
preliminary depositions on oath are sent to the judge- 
advocate; he submits them to the governor, who orders 
thereon, if he thinks fit, a trial by a military commission 
consisting of a field officer and two captains ; or in case of 
a paucity of officers a subaltern of not less than seven 
years' service : a deputy judge-advocate conducts the pro- 
ceedings, but has no voice in the finding or sentence. 
The minutes are sent by the president to the judge-advo- 
cate-general, who makes a short report upon the sen- 
tence and submits the whole to the governor. If the 
court, the judge-advocate-general and the governor all 
concur, the latter confirms the sentence and orders execu- 
tion : if the court and judge-advocate-general differ the 
governor's opinion decides. By this mode justice is ren- 
dered as quickly as I can insure it, though not so quick 
as I could wish, and the prisoner has in fact the advantage 
of three courts. 

I read all the trials on which I have to decide, with the 
greatest attention, frequently twice or thrice over, especially 



310 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XIII. when the punishment is capital — never ordering an execu- 
1846> tion until I have given at least two and often several days 
to the full consideration of the sentence. In smaller 
matters the deputy- collectors at once try the cases and 
submit the proceedings to the collector, who either confirms 
the award or objects, but in either case forwards the pro- 
ceedings to the judge-advocate-general, who has a casting 
voice in some cases; in others appeals to the governor. 
In addition to the above, there are for civil cases, what are 
termed Punchayets. I have made a slight change in these ; 
they were formerly assembled without remuneration and 
I give them a small daily pay to cover their loss of time. 
They are something like our juries, or rather courts of 
arbitration, and hitherto their functions have been re- 
stricted by me to civil cases ; for I keep all criminal cases 
in the hands of Europeans ; but I wish much to increase 
the powers of these tribunals, which I found under another 
name existing in Greece. They exist I believe in all 
eastern countries and the English jury is but one form of 
them. In Greece they call it the court of Veechiarde, or 
Ancients, in India Punchayet, and their powers vary at 
different periods and in different countries according to 
circumstances. In India and in Scinde they are limited ; 
in the Punjaub lately the Punchayet assumed supreme 
power ! I am sure this subject demands much considera- 
tion, as a cautious mode of gradually introducing the people 
to take part in the government of their own country : but 
it is possible the directors do not think that so advisable 
and wise as it appears to me. 

Such is the simple process by which justice is admi- 
nistered in Scinde, and the frequent disagreement in 
opinion between magistrates, military commissions, judge- 
advocate-general and governor, proves in my opinion the 
independence of the judges, and that the system works 
well and is merciful rather than harsh ; especially as the 
judge-advocate-general and myself endeavour, as far as we 
can with justice, to modify the sentences so as to go with 
the feelings of the people and avoid giving disgust. But 
this is a large field, so I will conclude by saying that I 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



311 



have long applied for leave to transport culprits to Aden, CHAP. XIII. 
but have not yet had any reply. If this were permitted [g^T 
much of the capital punishments would be avoided, and 
the government would gain cheap labour for the fortifica- 
tions there ; the culprits would come back at the end of 
their sentence and the great evil, so justly reprobated by 
the archbishop of Dublin, of forming a condemned popu- 
lation would be avoided. 

Revenue. — The revenue of the ameers averaged from 
thirty-five to forty lacs. The revenue under my govern- 
ment has gradually increased from nine to thirty-one lacs; 
but there seems no reason to doubt that it will reach thirty •- 
five lacs next April, ending the financial year of 1846-7. 
The general opinion of the collectors is that it will in i n the ameers' 
1848 amount to forty lacs and gradually increase, because jj^^j; Ali 
commerce is increasing, and cultivation has this last year sessions and S 
been greatly extended. However this letter is to state facts {^fi 
not conjectures. I am given to understand that the con- cote and 
quest of Scinde has added very much to the Bombay revenue n^w transferred 
by preventing smuggling through the Portuguese colony t0 Bhawulpore 
at Demaun. I have also to call to your notice, that in 
the ameers' revenue one of the most productive of their 
taxes was the transit-duty or rahdari. This has been 
abolished by us, and yet there is every probability that 
our revenue will exceed theirs. I have also abolished 
many other taxes — hence the amount of all these abolished 
taxes should be added to my revenue, and it will appear 
that less taxation has raised greater revenue. 

Commerce. — Our imports of European goods have in- 
creased since 1843, from four and a half to nine lacs in 
1845 ; and to ten lacs in the first six months of 1846 ! 
The merchants of Kurrachee cry out for steamers to convey 
their goods up to the sources of the Indus and the Sutlej ! 
I have received memorials from them to this effect, and 
have begged of the governor- general to make over four of 
the war-steamers on the Indus to the Scinde government 
for mercantile purposes. Thus the steamers will repay 
their keep, be equally available for war, and give facility 
for general commerce by their rapid and safe transmission 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER*S 



CHAP. XIIT. of goods. For now the calculation is, that of every seven 
^6. vessels coming down the Indus at certain periods of the 
year, six are lost altogether or their goods destroyed, 
owing to the badness of the country boats and the igno- 
rance of the boatmen. This amounts to a prohibition of 
commerce. No steamer has ever been lost on the Indus, 
and if four are given up to the Scinde government they 
will be continually and fully laden, and I understand from 
merchants here that trading companies to the interior 
would be instantly formed. 

Merchants are not altogether to be trusted in this 
country on such points, as the desire of lucre deceives 
them. But the demand for steamers has without doubt 
arisen, and I think it ought to be complied with, and 
the more readily as we have just discovered an inland 
passage for steamers from Kurrachee to the mouths of 
the Indus. I have had it surveyed, and a steamer has 
passed through. It runs parallel to and very near the 
shore, which shelters it from the furious monsoon sea, 
one impassable for five months in the year. The only 
doubt is whether this passage will be affected by the inun- 
dations. This will be decided when the waters have subsided, 
and a steamer is then to make the passage. The officers 
of the flotilla are confident of success, and if so, Kurrachee 
becomes the real fixed mouth of the Indus, not varying 
like the other mouths with every inundation, so as to be 

It did not fail, useless for commerce. If this passage fails us, the 
merchants will still equally require steamers to convey 
their goods from Tattah to the sources of the Five Waters. 

Agriculture. — Cultivation and revenue are on the 
increase, because taxation has been lowered ; and during 
the short time we have ruled, considerable immigrations 
have taken place. I am now endeavouring to ameliorate 
still more the condition of the ryots. You must know, Sir, 
that the system of farming the revenue has generally pre- 
vailed in Scinde, the ameers farmed every branch of their 
revenue. I have abolished this detestable practice ; but 
still the zemindar, the farmer, exists ; he hires large tracts 
of land from government or from jagheerdars, and while 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



313 



he cheats his landlord he starves the ryot — as far as men chap. XIII. 

can be starved who live in a country fall of game and 

wild fruits — who can rear fowls without cost, and who 

have abundance of firing for the trouble of collecting fuel : 

men who go naked, who require no houses and who make 

no difficulty of stealing a sheep when pressed. A man 

here first steals a camel, which he rides a hundred miles 

to steal a sheep, returns next night with his mutton and 

turns the camel loose into the jungle from whence he took 

him. No one is the wiser, unless he who loses the sheep 

misses his animal in time — that is to say, while the camel's 

foot-prints are fresh ; but then he hires a puggee or 

tracker who pugs the camel's steps and the thief is caught. 

These pug-gees are unerring. They follow a track for eight 

or ten days and nights, unless a storm of wind overlays 

the foot-prints, human or quadrupeds, with sand; or a 

fall of rain washes them away. No ingenuity seems able 

to elude a good puggee. 

The zemindar oppresses the ryot, driving him to idleness 
and robbery. And I am granting small farms to ryots to 
take them out of the zemindars' hands, giving them only 
so much land as they can cultivate by their own labour 
without sub-letting. They pay their rent to the collectors 
direct without the intervention of kardar or zemindar. 
I hope thus not only to raise the character of the poorer 
ryot, but greatly to increase our reputation in surrounding 
countries, and so add to the population of Scinde, its 
happiness and its revenue. I have also adopted a measure 
which I know succeeds in England, viz. making small 
loans to the industrious poor when they are distressed by 
unforeseen accidents. These loans are made with caution 
by the district collectors and sub -collectors : the repay- 
ment is by instalments and rigidly enforced, yet under 
certain rules which cannot be detailed in a letter. 

I consider that taxation may be still more diminished 
and yet the revenue be increased. In time I will prove 
this, and I expect next April will show more clearly what 
my system will finally produce. Last year realized thirty- 
one lacs — and I shall be disappointed if this year does not 



314 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S 



CHAP. XIII. produce thirty-five lacs. Our crops this year are good, 
j[jjJT but in great danger from locusts, which have destroyed 
the grain in the adjacent countries. Scinde has not had 
time to settle since the conquest. People fancy that trade 
and agriculture spring up at once like Aladdin's palace. 
But it will, I reckon, require ten years to recover from 
the effects of the ameers' tyranny and such a great revo- 
lution as Scinde has undergone; and it appears to me no 
ordinary matter, that already she is perfectly tranquil and 
rapidly improving. At the time of the battle of Hyder- 
abad I thought that if we kept Scinde it would take ten 
years to put it in the state it is now in. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Outram publicly asserted, that I would have a 
guerilla war for ten years ! So much for his knowledge 
of the people of Scinde ! 

This is our present financial position : — 

Total revenue from 24th March, 1843, the 
date of the battle of Hyderabad, to 30th 
April, 1846 £659,393 

Total expense of civil government for three 

years including police force . . . £336,526 

Balance in favour of general government, 

April 30th, 1846 £322,869 

I shall make a full statement on this head in another 
paper, because the papers laid before Parliament and 
ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 30th of 
April 1846, I do not think correct. Meanwhile I have to 
say the large force in Scinde has not been for Scinde but 
for the Punjaub. I have for two years constantly said, 
that 5,000 men are sufficient, and more than sufficient, for 
the defence and for the maintenance of tranquillity in 
Scinde. This has been contradicted by an ignorant and fac- 
tious party at Bombay ; but I can prove this force is more 
than sufficient. Have I not quitted Scinde with nearly 
my whole force, even when the Seikhs were up and might 
have been looked to for help against us — as they always 
were by the ameers ? And has there ever been the least 
doubt of the tranquillity of Scinde ? Never ! And there 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



315 



never will be while I am here,, because that tranquillity CHAP. XIII. 
has been based, not on the force of arms after the battles, 18 4 G# 
but the justice and kindness of government towards all 
ranks. Not an Englishman has been murdered since the 
ameers quitted the country — not an Englishman has been 
even insulted ! These are facts of no small weight, and 
not usual in these eastern countries, nor in any country 
recently conquered. 

The extraordinary military expenses are of two kinds ; 
the one relating to supplies, the other to the building of 
barracks. The first will diminish as the force diminishes, 
and three-fourths of it must be charged to the Punjaub 
account ; the other fourth to the occupation of Scinde — 
not one penny to the conquest of Scinde, except the 
expense of barracks at Hyderabad, which has been already 
much more than covered by the surplus revenue stated 
above. The conquest of Scinde has not cost a single 
shilling to the East-India Company, on the contrary it has 
saved money ; for I defy any politician, or soldier to say 
that, had the ameers still ruled in Scinde we could have 
occupied Kurrachee and Sukkur with a smaller force than 
was kept here during the events of the last two years at 
Gwalior and on the Sutlej. I will say more — and I can 
prove it — that had the ameers remained, bloody scenes 
would have been enacted here when Gwalior was in arms, 
and when the Seikhs crossed the Sutlej. 

Had the governor-general been so rash as to reduce the 
garrison of Scinde to 5,000 men in 1842-3, the ameers 
remaining in power and our small force divided between 
Kurrachee and Sukkur, he would have lost the army. 
The delusion of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, who could not 
perceive the hostility of the ameers till he was attacked in 
the residency, would, had he been left in the position I 
succeeded to, have lost the whole army in 1844 or in 
1845 ; for all would have been apparently tranquil in the 
first year until Gwalior was ready; and in the second 
till the Seikh army crossed the Sutlej, which would have 
been accompanied by a simultaneous and equally unex- 
pected attack by the ameers on Kurrachee and Sukkur. 



316 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. XIII. No succour could have been sent to our weak divided and 
every way unprovided force. Lord Keane's army was 
scarcely able to bold the ameers in cbeck even before the 
disasters in Affgbanistan. The result would have been a 
cost of blood and treasure, far exceeding what the conquest 
required : I therefore assume that conquest must be ac- 
counted, except in the opinion of an obstinate faction, a 
great saving of blood and treasure, without reference to 
the honour of our arms, which has certainly not been 
stained in Scinde since the end of 1842. 

Mine may be called an impartial opinion as regards 
the policy of the conquest; for I cannot recollect ever 
having presumed to offer a single suggestion to Lord 
Ellenborough on the subject ; so far from it, I did, until I 
was appointed governor, expect that the ameers would be 
subsidized. I admired Lord Ellenb or oughts policy, but I 
must have equally executed my orders had I disapproved. 
/ believe I am a singular instance of a successful general 
having been run down by his own government, for having 
obeyed the superior authority set over him by that government 
— and receiving no support in his command from home when 
all he did was approved of by successive governors-general. 
Yet this is what Lord Ripon and the Court of Directors 
have done by me. However I am prepared to prove that the 
conquest of Scinde has been less expensive in blood and 
money than an occupation would have been, according to 
what is generally understood as being originally intended 
after the destruction of our army at Cabool. If to occupy 
Scinde with a diminished force was not the original inten- 
tion, it is evident that the only result of the conquest is 
the addition of its revenue to the public treasury, without 
additional outlay. This will be seen when passion, 
prejudice, and a very insidious, very virulent, but not 
very honourable war, made upon me, by individuals shall 
subside — a moment that I wait for with patience because 
I feel confident in the result. 

Climate. — That the climate of Scinde is very hot is 
unquestionable, but that it is more unhealthy than any 
other part of India I know to be untrue. Many soldiers 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



317 



have died, so they have in every new conquest made by CHAP. XIII. 
the Company, and for these simple reasons. Want of 1846> 
good barracks — ivant of comfort — want of local experience. 
All three were felt by the army in Scinde — a country so 
entirely ruined, so miserable and deprived of everything 
by tyrannical government, that we are really more like a 
colony planted in a desert than an army occupying an 
inhabited country. We have lost but few officers, even 
including those who died of cholera and other diseases 
unconnected with the locality, because they have been 
better lodged and have had more comforts. Now we are 
gradually getting good barracks erected, and Scinde will 
not be unhealthy beyond what all parts of India must ever 
be to European constitutions. Twice since the conquest 
has an epidemic fallen on the troops, and the European 
private soldiers have also suffered, because they drink 
ardent spirits, bad ardent spirits, and because their consti- 
tution is not congenial to a hot climate. We have also 
twice had cholera. All this frightens weak timid people 
and they unjustly condemn the climate. 

Natural Riches of the Country. — Scinde is capable of 
producing an immense revenue ; the soil is rich beyond 
description. I am endeavouring to control the waters of 
the Indus ; this will I hope ere long be effected, and then 
the produce will be very great. The present want is 
that of sufficient population to cultivate the great quantity 
of waste land. The mines are supposed to be rich, and 
the fields of salt inexhaustible. 

Surrounding States. — The newspapers talk of our being 
constantly embroiled with neighbouring tribes. This 
shows great ignorance. Not a single tribe has the least 
desire to quarrel with us — on the contrary they are 
gradually coming to settle in Scinde ! All who love 
peace and desire to cultivate and enjoy the fruits of their 
labour wish to settle here, and numbers do so. 

Such is the general state of Scinde since I have 
governed it, and I do not think I have misstated anything. 
I could not enter into details without having more time 
than I can command, and to have done so would have 



318 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. xiil. made this memoir a book ; still I feel how very slight 
1846# and general is the view I have given. But under this 
system the revenue has increased and is increasing; the 
people are contented and happy, and there have been no 
conspiracies or insurrections, though the hill campaign 
and Seikh campaign both offered tempting opportunities. 
Here also I will give an opinion, I think a correct one — 
not formed by an old Indian (which frequently means 
a man who has been living twenty years in India eating, 
drinking, and in profound ignorance dogmatizing ; as if he 
possessed a thorough acquaintance with the people), but 
by one who has for five years studied the character of the 
Scindian people and successfully governed them for four 
years. It is then my opinion that if a civil government is 
formed in Scinde, the revenue will be swamped by large 
salaries to civil servants, immense establishments and little 
work : for as civil servants of experience and real know- 
ledge will not quit their good positions in India to come 
here, the province will be overrun with young and 
ignorant men who have been initiated into all that is 
luxurious and idle without experience or perhaps ability to 
have acquired the good. They may be very good fellows ; 
they smoke, hunt hogs, race, drink beer and issue their 
orders in bad Hindostanee, to a subservient set of native 
clerks, who consequently soon get the real power into 
their hands, and turn it to account by all sorts of 
venality and oppression. The result of this will be, or 
rather may be, bloodshed and expense. The people 
here have no respect for civil servants. Soldiers them- 
selves, they look to being governed by soldiers, a feeling 
that would make them ready to draw the sword if 
affronted by civilians. 

In proportion as the civil establishment is increased, 
expense will increase, and the military will decrease, and 
the control will become weaker ; so that if a civil govern- 
ment produced insurrection it would not be well able to 
put it down. I am aware of the inconvenience which 
arises to the army by the extensive employment of 
military men in civil branches of government, and I have 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



319 



introduced four or five uncovenanted civil servants into the CHAP. XIII. 
Scinde government, with good effect; they, with one "j^T 
exception, have conducted themselves with diligence and 
modesty. But three covenanted servants, sent by Lord 
Ellenborough in the first moment of conquest, were quite 
useless. I had no prejudice against them, but the con- 
trary ; for one was the relative of an old comrade of mine, 
who fell in Spain, and for any one belonging to him I 
would have done anything in my power ; but their ideas 
were so grand as to establishments, and they were them- 
selves reported to me as being so idle, that I could only send 
Lord Ellenborough the statement made by the collector 
Captain Pope, under whom I had placed them, and with 
it their own explanation. He ordered them back to India. 
They were, I have no doubt, clever and gentleman-like 
young men, but a dozen of them would have paralyzed my 
government, and thrown it into the hands of clerks and 
natives. I indeed should have no objection to these clerks 
who are very clever men generally, and so are natives ; 
but then let them have the pay and responsibility and get 
rid of the gentlemen with their high salaries, their clerks, 
their pigs, and their beer-barrels. Let the men who do 
the work have the offices ! If men have any other 
pleasure than their business they are good for nothing in 
that business. 

I will now conclude by saying that though the officers 
with me, and myself might have done more and better, 
no one will deny that we have had many and great diffi- 
culties to struggle with — war, and pestilence in its utmost 
virulence, the destruction of a whole harvest by locusts, 
and the greatest part of another by a sudden and unpre- 
cedented fall of the inundation before the grain was mature 
have been amongst the evils afflicting Scinde since 1843. 
In the midst of an extensive military command I have had 
to construct the entire machinery of a civil government, 
assisted by young officers who had at first starting little or 
no experience, but whose zeal and abilities have enabled 
them to serve me well; and by diligence they have over- 
come the great obstacle of total want of local experience, 



320 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XIII. which was at first almost insuperable in the collection of 
-[g^g revenue. How we have succeeded we must leave the 
world to decide. But we have done our best ; and if, as 
I see stated in the public papers, it is intended to change 
the system of rule here to one more analogous to that of 
India, I am ready, if called upon, to give a full account of 
my mode of conducting the government since it was 
confided to me by Lord Ellenborough in 1843, and to 
deliver it over to my successor, who I hope may feel the 
same interest in it that I do. But if the home government 
approve of what I have done and wish me to remain in 
my present position, I am prepared to continue my exer- 
tions as long as my health will permit me to do with 
justice to the public service. 

Since writing the above I have received orders from the 
governor-general to send away a large portion of the force 
in Scinde. This is to take place next January, and 
greatly pleases me, as it will be another proof of the 
tranquillity of this country and relieve the province from 
the absurd charge made against it of being ruinous to the 
finances of India. 



It was understood that this able memoir arrested the 
transfer of Scinde at the time, but it in no manner abated 
the falsehoods promulgated, or softened the hostility of the 
Court of Directors. Nor did it procure justice or protec- 
tion from the cabinet — Lord Howick's despicable enmity 
prevailed there too strongly. Meanwhile Sir C. Napier 
in pursuance of his convictions renewed his proposition 
for reducing the number of troops, offering to send away 
eleven regiments and all the European artillery ! The 
governor-general actuated no doubt, by an inward sense 
that the Punjaub conquest was unsettled, would only call 
off four regiments, and the Scindian governor thus re- 
mained under the accusation of retaining troops when he 
was anxious to get rid of them ; and the Scindian people 
were called disaffected, when the most touching proofs of 
their profound attachment were being given, and when 
foreigners were eagerly demanding to be allowed to become 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



321 



their fellow-subjects ! For in the autumn of this year, an CHAP. XTII. 

independent chief formerly driven from Scinde by the lg46 

tyranny of the ameers, offered, and his offer was accepted, 

to abandon his mountain refuge and settle with eighteen 

hundred families for cultivation if lands were assigned to 

them. At the same time the collector of customs, having 

business to transact at Beila, was on his return surrounded 

by a multitude of miserable slaves entreating him to take 

them to Scinde, " where all men were free." Their masters 

came up, and, being afraid to coerce them lest the " great 

English sahib should be angry," besought the collector to 

put them back officially. He refused, saying, he hoped 

they would break their bonds, but he could not interfere 

either way. Then the masters forced them back, two 

excepted, who were armed with axes and keeping close to 

the collector's horse forced a way across the frontier. 

There was still much distrust abroad as to the probable 
restoration of the ameers. Ali Moorad, foreseeing ruin 
to himself if that should happen, became so uneasy at the 
non-confirmation of his treaty, that it was to be feared he 
would seek other alliances if fresh troubles arose in the 
Punj aub ; and meanwhile the reasons assigned by the govern- 
ment for having so many troops in Scinde contrary to the 
general's wish was, that fear of him alone kept the people 
submissive ! This assumption he proudly and peremptorily 
rejected. " They were at first submissive from such fear, 
and he had taken advantage of it to establish his adminis- 
tration vigorously, but that influence had long passed 
away and been replaced by self-love — they were quiet 
because they were getting rich and enjoying the fruits of 
their industry. Their quietude was not the result of force, 
but of justice and its attendant happiness : they were 
quiet because they knew their own interests." 

But Sir C. Napier had now acquired the certainty that 
official men in England were, equally with the Bombay 
council, the instigators and protectors of the libellers 
who so constantly assailed him, and whose virulence was 
hourly augmenting. He had honestly strived to serve, 
and had most efficiently served governments which were 

Y 



322 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XIII, bent on his ruin while they profited from his devotion to 
_^jr their interests ; he had been successful in war and peace, 
had won battles, subdued kingdoms, tranquillized and 
governed nations, legislating happily, administrating justly ; 
and he had made English power an object of love and 
reverence where before it had been abhorred and at times 
despised. He had been repaid with foul enmity, malignant 
and scurrilous abuse, and his virtues had been denied. He 
had been denounced as a man stained with cruelty and 
rapacity, and the slanderers who thus assailed him were 
rewarded by those who owed kingdoms, aye and safety to 
his genius, his courage, energy and incorruptible character. 
He alone of those officers who had been distinguished in 
Indian warfare had been neglected in the distribution of 
honours. Even the thanks of Parliament had been with- 
held for a year — an unexampled slight to a victorious 
commander — and they were not finally voted without the 
accompaniment of personal insult from a knot of calum- 
niators, the chief of whom was now a cabinet minister. 
Attempts had been made to stifle his despatches that his 
exploits might be lessened to the public ; and sinister 
measures were taken, vainly indeed, but taken, to render 
him unpopular with his troops. His name had been stu- 
diously withheld at public banquets when Indian victories 
were toasted, as if he were an outlaw from glory ; though to 
nearly unexampled success in the field he had added unusual 
sagacity and unusual economy in civil government — the 
last perhaps an inexpiable offence, for he was so vigilant 
that corruption could not thrive in his neighbourhood. 

These things made him reflect seriously on the inutility 
of wasting his life to serve men who had marked him for 
every injustice and insult ; and with this sense of ill-usage 
he resolved to retire into private life. Yet remembering 
what he owed to the people he had subdued and under- 
taken to civilize, he determined not to resign until he 
had completed what was necessary to consolidate his work, 
and for that another year of power was required. 
His principal objects were, 

1°. A reduction of the troops to the number formerly 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



323 



fixed by Lord Auckland for the garrisons of Sukkur and CHAP. XIII. 
Roree, namely, five thousand ; at that time certainly in- i846. 
sufficient against the ameers, but now more than enough 
to hold all Scinde ; and even this number was adopted in 
deference to the views of the supreme government, and 
with reference to the appointment of a civilian, or some 
obscure military man, to the government, more than to 
the necessity of the case. 

2°. The complete development of the ameliorated sys- 
tem of taxation, whereby all vexatious town- duties were 
abolished, and all export duties collected at fixed posts on 
the frontier. This was a matter involving the future 
interests of commerce and the immediate comfort of the 
towns, and a vigilant superintendence of the early working 
of this system was all-important. 

3°. To obtain Mittenkote from the supreme government 
as an appurtenance of Scinde ; and to have Deyrah in the 
Cutchee hills occupied either as an outpost, or as a mili- 
tary colony ; an arrangement which would give the Cutchee 
hills as a frontier from the Indus to Dadur near the 
mouth of the Bolan pass, and debar their being again filled 
with robber tribes, who he knew by experience could not 
be again put down without much bloodshed. 

In the hope of attaining these objects he remained in 
Scinde. But his recent trying journey to Lahore and 
back while suffering under a painful wearing bodily ail- 
ment, his great mortification of spirit, his extraordinary 
exertions during the cholera, and his grief for domestic 
losses, nearly deprived him of life. It was not until the 
end of autumn that his strength returned. Fortunately 
his administration now worked easily and happily, and 
with exception of a not very fatal visitation of cholera at 
Sukkur, the country was remarkably free from disease. 
Crime was very much diminished, and the comparatively 
fewer murders of women, and of homicides in feuds, proved 
that the social habits were being improved. The public 
works were also well advanced. The great mole at Kurra- 
chee had got into such deep water that steamers took in 
cargoes alongside it ; and these cargoes were for Sukkur, 

y 2 



324 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. XIII. an important step in the river commerce, enhanced by the 
184$. discovery of the chain of salt creeks mentioned in the 
memoir addressed to Sir J. Hobhouse. They run parallel 
with the coast to the nearest great mouth of the Indus, 
offering a natural canal, intricate indeed, but always full 
and unaffected by the inundations, or the monsoons. 

As this gave direct water communication with the 
Indus and made Kurrachee the permanent port of that 
great artery of commerce, the general immediately appro- 
priated the only two river steamers at his disposal for the 
transport of merchandize by this communication to the 
Indus ; thus opening a new commercial road to Central 
Asia, the effect of which must, sooner or later, render 
Scinde a great and prosperous country. Some slight dif- 
ficulties attending the first effort, were thus described. 

" The Kurrachee merchants are a little timid, or rather 
I believe cunning, and mean to frighten me into low fares ; 
but they will not succeed. I have made my calculations 
as low as we can afford, and if they don't like my charges, 
they may buy steamers for themselves — there is no force 
for pigs that won't eat grains. Or they may continue to 
send their goods by camels, which cannot reach Shikar- 
poore under five weeks, while my steamers get there in 
sixteen days. Each camel must be guarded, and may be 
robbed notwithstanding. A steamer is safe, and one man 
guards the whole cargo, whereas each camel requires two 
men — one to lead another to guard — making twenty or 
thirty men for every cafila, some of which take three 
months for the journey. Yes ! the merchants will come 
to my terms : their shyness is subtilty, but Cocker's 
arithmetic beats barbarian arts. 

" The merchants of Shikarpoore take larger views. 
They see that the freight charge must cover the cost of 
fuel, and they are all ready. I have refused passages to 
my officers, at which they are discontented, but, ' know 
thyself/ said the oracle ; and next to that it is good to 
know your countrymen. I will give passages to officers in 
the war steamers, but not in these merchant steamers ; they 
would lord it too much over the merchant and the super- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



325 



cargo. When my experiment can go alone, it shall cease CHAP. XIII. 

to be a government venture, and I will turn it over to the 1846> 

merchants ; who will not then be able, if willing, to return 

to the cafilas, for business will have become too brisk, the 

demand will cover the cost, and yield a profit to draw 

private steamers into the trade — meanwhile the child 

must be nursed." 

This happy state of affairs was supported by a vast 
increase of production. 1846 was the only year since the 
conquest in which agriculture had not been distressed by 
wars, locusts, pestilence, and anomalous inundations, hence 
the price of grain fell one half; and for the first time 
since the accession of the Talpoor dynasty Scinde became 
a wheat-exporting country instead of an importing one. 
Scindian wheat was actually exported in 1846 and 1847, 
through Bombay to England, with good profit ; for being 
much harder, drier, and heavier than Canadian wheat it 
fetched twenty shillings a ton more in the market. Sir 
C. Napier offered eleven thousand tons, received as re- 
venue, for the use of famishing Ireland, at one-third of 
the market price of wheat in England, and Lord Ellen- 
borough pointed out to the ministers a cheap mode of 
conveying it — the bargain would have been most advan- 
tageous, alleviating the misery of the Irish and improving 
the Scindian revenue ; but a measure reasonably beneficial 
to Ireland, and useful to Scinde, was a cup of double bit- 
terness and instantly rejected. 

This excess of production exceedingly lowered the 
revenue, which was chiefly paid in kind, yet left it 
sufficient to defray all civil expenses ; and it would have 
paid all the military expenses likewise, if the proposition 
to reduce the troops had been acceded to. Revenue was 
however with Sir C. Napier always secondary to the wel- 
fare of the people ; he rejoiced in the abundance and 
would not increase the imposts ; for to raise more money 
by taxation than the absolute expenses of administration 
and protection required he thought a crime in govern- 
ment ; and vigilantly to economize these expenses a sacred 
duty ; not however in a pitiful spirit, for he judged it no 



325 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. XIII. economy to starve useful institutions. A great vexation 
184& to the Bombay libellers however was this abundance,, and 
they displayed it with an effrontery of falsehood scarcely 
credible ; for while the Scindian population was thus, as it 
were gorged with food, they asserted that it was scourged 
with famine, the result of Sir C. Napier's ignorance ! 
And this astounding falsehood was republished in England 
and believed ! 

Unheeding their fury he continued his administrative 
labours. His canal system was in fall progress ; and the 
chief engineer, Captain Peat, an officer too soon lost to 
his country, conducted all the works of his department 
with such singular ability, that the general felt he could, 
so assisted, open the road to prosperity in a marvellous 
manner if supported by the supreme government. With 
this feeling he formed great schemes, and made arrange- 
ments to send an exploring steamer to Attock, hoping 
thus to establish trading communications along the great 
river and all its confluents. But official procrastination 
baffled all plans, all hopes ; he could not even obtain an 
answer to any proposition ; and while fretting under this 
injurious restraint he had to break up and disperse the 
model army he had organized for the Punjaub war. It 
was a good occasion, and he took it, to make an exposition 
of the real condition and value of Scinde in the following 
general order issued January 1847. 

" The army of Scinde is ordered to be broken up, and 
the number of troops reduced so as, in future, to form the 
ordinary garrison of a frontier province. This, as regards 
the interior tranquillity of Scinde might have been done 
two years ago. But the character of the Lahore govern- 
ment and of its troops made it necessary for the govern- 
ment of India to keep an army in Scinde. 

The danger apprehended from the Punjaub subsided after 
the victories gained on the Sutlej, and the concentration 
of a large force on the Indus ceased to be necessary. 

To the army of Scinde is due the tranquillity of this 
noble province. To the discipline and orderly conduct of 
all, and the support which the officers of this army have 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



327 



given to me by their just and conciliating conduct CHAP. XIII. 
towards the people, England is indebted for the tranquil 
possession of a country which the valour of the troops 
had conquered. 

To the abilities of those officers who have from the first 
conducted the civil branches of this government, and to 
their unremitting exertions in the administration of 
justice, is, more especially to be attributed the successful 
administration of the province, that attachment to the 
British rule, and that confidence which has been so 
strongly evinced by the inhabitants of* Scinde on two 
signal occasions, the campaign in the Bhoogtee hills, and 
the march of the Scinde force to Bhawulpoor. 

But to the glory of freeing an enslaved country by a 
necessary conquest, and the consequent tranquillity of an 
apparently satisfied people, this army has added an in- 
crease of revenue to the Company. 

The last financial year showed, that the united ordinary 
and extraordinary expenses of the civil government of 
Scinde (including the expense of a police of two thousand 
four hundred horse and foot) amounted to only fifteen 
lacs one thousand seven hundred and fifty-four rupees. 
That the revenue, for that year, was forty-one lacs 
forty-two thousand nine hundred and twelve rupees, 
and consequently, that twenty-five lacs were paid last 
year towards defraying the military expense incurred, not 
by the conquest of Scinde in 1843, but by the previous 
occupation of Scinde, and by the disturbed state of the 
Punjaub. 

Previous to the conquest, the army of Scinde was an 
unmitigated expense to the. East-India Company. 

Since the conquest, that expense has been reduced by 
the aggregate sum of forty-two lacs thirty-seven thousand 
four hundred and thirty-five rupees, which has been 
collected in excess of the expenses of civil government 
and police force, calculating both from the battle of 
Hyderabad to the present day. 

Thus, whatever the previous occupation may have pro- 
duced, the conquest of Scinde has not cost the East-India 



328 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. xiii. Company a single rupee : for had the ameers continued 
1846> to rule the land not a soldier could have been with- 
drawn from the force which occupied Scinde in 1842 — 
on the contrary, strong reinforcements must have been 
added to it, divided, as it would have been, between 
Kurrachee and Sukkur, with the aggregated forces of the 
courts of Hyderabad and Khyrpoor assembled, in a central 
position, between the weak wings of the army of occupa- 
tion — wings separated by four hundred miles of difficult 
country, and incapable of assisting each other, or of 
receiving any reinforcements during five months of every 
year ! Such a position must have been untenable, or 
tenable only in consequence of egregious folly on the 
part of an enemy who commanded one hundred thousand 
men in a central position. 

An army divided as I have stated, would probably have 
been cut to pieces, for apparently there could not have 
been any retreat ! 

The prompt military operations ordered by Lord Ellen- 
borough in 1843, not only saved the army of Scinde from 
the fate which befel that of Cabool, but secured the north- 
west frontier of the Indian empire, speaking of Scinde 
in a military point of view — while in a commercial one, as 
commanding the navigation of the Indus, it is the key 
to the Punjaub. 

Not a man has been added to the army of occupation in 
consequence of the conquest. Scinde was conquered by the 
troops which previously occupied Sukkur. 

This is a fact which cannot be too often repeated. But 
this is not all. The advanced frontier has a right to the 
troops that occupied the former retired frontier, extending 
from Bhooj to Balmeer. The latter no longer require 
garrisons, and consequently the conquest of Scinde has 
not entailed the necessity for having additional troops, or 
throwing greater duties on the Bombay army — whereas, 
but for the conquest, not a soldier could now be with- 
drawn, or the Indus would be closed to commerce even 
though the Punjaub were opened ! 

No troops, beyond the police, are now required to pre- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



329 



XVIII. 



serve the interior tranquillity of Scinde. The increasing CHAP. XIII. 
revenues are thrown into the Indian treasury, and the isi6. 
military charges belong to India generally, not to Scinde 
more than to any other province of the empire. 

An immense increase of revenue has taken place in 
Bombay in consequence of the conquest of Scinde, which 
prevents the smuggling trade in opium, formerly carried See Appendix 
on. What may be the amount of this increase I have no 
means of knowing ; but it is said to be very great. Com- 
merce is already actively commencing between Kurrachee 
and Sukkur, ready to branch forth into the Punjaub when 
the results following the victories on the Sutlej shall open 
up the Five Rivers to the enterprising spirit of British 
merchants. Sukkur, ordered by Lord Ellenborough to 
be called Victoria on the Indus, has become the depot 
for goods passing into Central Asia. 

Such, soldiers of the Scinde army, have been the ser- 
vices of those regiments which conquered, and of those 
which have occupied Scinde since the conquest. During 
this period of four years, there has not been a single 
political crime, conspiracy, or act of hostility of any kind, 
public or private, committed by the people of Scinde 
against the government, or against the troops, or against 
any individual. Nor am I aware that any body of officers, 
any officer/ or any private soldier, has given cause of com- 
plaint to the inhabitants. There has been perfect har- 
mony between the conquerors and the conquered, if the 
term, conquered, can be applied to a people who have 
been freed from a degrading and ruinous tyranny, which 
sixty years ago was established by traitors over the country 
of their murdered sovereign ! 

This adds more glory to our arms and to the British 
name than even the victories which you won on the 
fields of Meeanee and of Hyderabad. Courage may win a 
battle, but it is something more than courageous when a 
victorious army turns a conquered people into friends and 
peaceable subjects ! 

Such, soldiers ! have been the results of your labours, 
and your dangers ; and those regiments which return to 



330 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's 



CHAP. XIII. their respective presidencies, return with the becoming 
1846> pride of men who have well performed their duty, and 
gained the approbation of their sovereign and their govern- 
ments — the greatest reward that well-disciplined soldiers 
can receive ! 

For myself, I remain at my proper post as governor of 
Scinde, and the commander of that division of the Bom- 
bay army stationed on the new line of frontier. But it 
becomes your general, who best knows what you have 
done and what you have suffered, to make known on the 
breaking up of the army the things it has achieved for 
India — his admiration of its merits and his gratitude for 
its assistance. The military spirit which animated the 
force that marched last year to Bhawulpoor, was probably 
never surpassed : no army was ever more worthy of India, 
nor more possessed the confidence of its commander." 

This forcible exposition increased the obscene violence 
of his enemies, because it displayed the truth they were 
so anxious to obscure ; and their mortification was aug- 
mented at the time by two public testimonies to his merit 
from the duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough. 
For the first moved the sovereign to confer on him the 
rank of lieutenant-general in India — an advancement 
hitherto confined to commanders-in-chief. The second 
offered the following concise but comprehensive eu- 
logium. 

" It is unnecessary for me to declare in words my entire 
approbation of Sir C. Napier's conduct. I showed what 
I thought of it by my acts while I was governor-general, 
and I think the services he has performed since I left 
India have been even greater than those I endeavoured, 
but was unable, adequately to reward. His campaign in 
the hills was a military operation even superior to that 
which was for ever illustrated by the victories of Meeanee 
and Hyderabad ; and he has proved himself to be the 
ablest, at least the most successful of all administrators, 
if the success of an administration may be tested by the 
contentment and confidence it gives the people. His 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



331 



services during the late campaign on the Sutlej, when, chap. XIII, 
having had no previous instructions to keep his forces j^T 
prepared, he moved in a few weeks with fifteen thousand 
men and a hundred guns against Mooltan, leaving Scinde 
tranquil in his rear, was of itself sufficient to show to all 
minds capable of comprehending great measures of war 
and policy, not only the perfection of his arrangements 
and the popular character of his just and excellent govern- 
ment, but the immense value in a military point of view 
of the position which his former victories had given to 
Scinde. These matters are however so very little under- 
stood in this country, even by the few who attend to them 
at all, that I fear it may be long before his merits are 
justly appreciated; and people here may discover only when 
it is too late, that Sir C. Napier has possessed that rare 
combination of military and civil talent, both excellent in 
their kind, which is the peculiar attribute of a great mind." 

Scinde was now internally very prosperous, but it was 
still subject to frontier disturbances, and towards the close 
of 1846, the miserable Bhoogtees, defeated by the Mur- 
rees, rejected by the Keytrians, repulsed by the Mazarees, 
and warred against by their former comrades the Jack- 
ranees under Deyrah Khan, had finally cultivated the 
valley of Deyrah for subsistence, desiring rest : but their 
harvest failed and they once more made a foray on Scinde. 
The British cavalry posts immediately took the field. 
Twenty-five troopers under Lieutenant Moore, accompanied 
by some J ackranees, first fell in with them, and the latter 
slew several in a jungle, amongst them a noted chief. 
The Bhoogtees then came out of the bush, and Moore, 
finding their numbers considerable, retired, urged thereto 
by the J ackranees, who declared themselves unequal to a 
conflict, yet offered if so commanded, to kill their horses 
and die sword in hand. There was no need for such 
devotion, and all fell back on Meerpoore, a small place, 
where a supporting force was assembled under Colonel 
Stack. To that point also came Lieutenant Greaves, who 
had likewise fallen in with the Bhoogtees, and sent notice 
of their foray to Shikarpoorc. Stack had a respectable 



332 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. XIII. cavalry force, and some riflemen, sent to him from Shi- 
1846> karpoore on Greaves' s report. That officer had however 
forgotten to send a like notice to Shahpoor, the garrison 
of which could, with timely warning, have moved on Ooch 
and so cnt off the robbers' retreat ; this rendered prompt 
action essential, bnt Colonel Stack remained fonr hours at 
Meerpoore, and finally, made a night march in the desert 
with his cavalry only, and without carrying water or food 
for man or beast. 

At dawn he found the enemy drawn up on a sandy 
waste, covering the retreat of the herds they had captured. 
There were only eight hundred footmen and not all pro- 
vided with matchlocks, but rattling their swords against 
their shields with loud shouts they offered battle. Stack 
had two hundred and fifty troopers, furnished with car- 
bines and pistols of great range; yet he declined action 
and returned to Meerpoore, his men and horse fainting 
from the double march and want of water. This was 
excused on the plea that the enemy had a strong rising 
ground with a nullah in front. An after-examination 
showed that there was no nullah, and the rise of ground 
very slight ; it was then said the mirage common in that 
desert had quite deceived the English commander. Islam 
Khan subsequently declared that he had resigned all hope 
of life at the moment the cavalry retired. He now regained 
his rocks in safety and held a funeral feast, where ven- 
geance against the Jackranees was solemnly sworn for the 
death of the champion killed in the jungle. The failure 
on this occasion was certainly in the execution. The 
efficiency of the general arrangements was proved by the 
robbers being found by so many parties ; and soon after- 
wards Lieutenant Younghusband of the police showed 
what the result of a fight woiild have been. For hearing 
of a minor foray, he with only thirty-four mounted 
police pursued a superior force, overtook it after a march 
of thirty-five miles in the desert, and in a sharp encounter, 
where Aliff Khan the swordsman distinguished himself, 
killed ten and carried off seven prisoners, with a chief 
named Dora. 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



333 



Stack's error was disquieting, because the slightest CH AP. X 
success elated those barbarians inordinately, and the 1846. 
Bolan tribes might join the Bhoogtees; the Scinde 
Moguls and the camel corps were therefore sent to the 
frontier ; but meanwhile the Bhoogtees, always in trouble, 
had fought with the Murrees again, and losing the battle 
were quieter for a time. At Bombay the whole affair 
was, as a matter of course, proclaimed to be one of Sir 
C. Napier's crimes ; for at this period he could not move, 
or utter a word in public without furnishing a topic for 
torrents of scurrility ; and always there were abundance 
of correspondents to furnish the newspapers with a 
thousand easy and infallible correctives for the civil and 
military errors and disorganization which those persons 
perceived and deplored. Supremely contemptible all this 
would have been, if experience had not demonstrated that 
some members of the council of Bombay were the secret 
instigators and concocters of these calumnies, and that the 
Court of Directors was ready to reward the calumniators. 
With this stimulus to slander, India was deafened with 
statements of his crimes and follies; and one especial 
topic was his inhumanity to the ameers' wives. — " He had 
torn away their personal ornaments to swell his prize- 
money, and still remorselessly persecuted those helpless 
females, having recently treated the aged mother of the 
excellent Shadad with peculiar barbarity, intercepting her 
correspondence with her virtuous son and opening her 
letters to add mental anguish to bodily sufferings. — -She 
was actually pining from hunger under his government 
while her jewelled ornaments were being offered for sale 
in Bombay to swell his brutal profits ! " with much more 
of a like nature. 

This starving lady, had however, in conjunction with 
her sisterhood, and notably the widow of Kurreem Ali, 
taken advantage of the conqueror's extreme delicacy 
towards them, after the battle of Meeanee, to abstract 
nearly two millions sterling from the ameer's public 
treasury ! And they were at this time, while complaining 
of destitution, for the starving story originated with them, 



334 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



CHAP. XIII. expending ten thousand pounds upon a tomb for one of 
1846. the princes ! She and Kurreem's widow, in concert with 
the latter* s confidant, Mirza Kosroo, a Persian slave and a 
clever violent man, were engaged in secret machinations 
with the young ameers residing in Ali Moorad's court, 
and it was in pursuance of some of their schemes that leave 
had been asked and obtained to send letters to Shadad. 
Secret information led to the arrest of the messenger 
App. XVI. on the frontier, when, as foretold, a large sum in coin 
and ingots of gold was found artfully concealed in his 
baggage. Whether this treasure was designed directly to 
aid Shadad's escape, or to pay Buist and his employers for 
their advocacy did not appear, because the general, while 
barring this improper intercourse with a state prisoner, 
returned the gold, and the letters, unopened, to the lady. 
' In this manner passed the year 1846, but in 1847 Sir 
C. Napier, while treating with disdain the calumnies of 
his enemies, felt that he must give a permanent character 
to his interior policy before he quitted Scinde, foreseeing 
that once placed under the civil government of Bombay 
the object would be to overturn and destroy all that he 
had effected, were it only to prove that he had effected 
nothing. Minor mischief he could not prevent ; but he 
resolved that the people at large should not be thrown 
back into barbarism, and therefore hastened the action of 
his regenerating policy as to the tenure of land. By that 
policy he aimed to make the great men landlords, their 
retainers tenants, and their serfs independent labourers, 
instead of remaining as heretofore military barons, vas- 
sals and slaves. He had long meditated on the prin- 
ciple, had gradually prepared the people for the change, 
and was now determined silently and quietly to complete 
it — trusting, and, as it proved, judiciously trusting that the 
extreme ignorance of the Court of Directors on all that 
really affected the interests of the nations under their 
rapacious rule would enable him to effect his object with- 
out official interference. Once done, by no evil intermed- 
dling of power could it be undone. " And I shall then," 
he said, " stand upon a rock and defy them." 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



335 



It has been shown before that all the land of Scinde CHAP. XIII. 
was by law and custom vested in the government, which lg46 
was entitled to resume any jagheer or crown grant at 
pleasure ; but at the great Durbar, held in 1844, jagheers 
had been given on life tenancy, subject to a rent, a portion 
of the land being retained, in the nature of a fine, to be 
let to poor ryots on government account. This system had 
been gradually expanded, to accustom the people and the 
jagheer dars to changes preparatory to the great one now to 
be effected. 

Jagheers were of all sizes, from three hundred thousand 
acres down to small estates ; but not above a fourth part 
of any had been or could be cultivated by the holders, and 
the remainders were wastes, only valuable as they gave 
importance by their royalties, and an excuse for a greater 
warlike following, to be subsisted by oppression and 
plunder; but the suppression of military tenures having 
taken away that advantage the extent of jagheer no longer 
conferred such dangerous greatness. The system of life 
tenancy had worked well, and was spreading ; for always 
the jagheer dars were free to choose under which tenure 
they would hold ; and the principle was now to be extended 
in the hope of giving the population, rich and poor, new 
views of social organization, by making the great men 
territorial nobles and gentlemen instead of turbulent 
rapacious waiters on despotism. 

With that view they were offered an absolute hereditary 
right of property in all the land they had, or could culti- 
vate ; but the remainder was to be resumed by government 
as a fine, or purchase of the fee-simple ; and the resumed 
lands, nearly three-fourths of the whole, were to be let to 
ryots and immigrant settlers, at very low rents and with 
the advantages of being free from both rent and taxes for 
two years. The cultivators and the immigrants of both 
races would thus be attached irrevocably to the new order 
of things; and the noble Beloochees would be satisfied 
with a secure title and enjoyment of all that was really 
valuable in their jagheers. Their importance in the state 
would be increased by this enjoyment of independence, but 



336 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER^ 



. xiii. their clannish power abolished, and their hitherto oppressed 
serfs would enjoy freedom and gain good subsistence while 
they contributed largely to the revenue by bringing the 
waste lands into cultivation. The sirdars came slowly into 
the scheme at first, because they could not easily divest 
themselves of their suspicions, that no government could 
be of good faith, and hence that Sir C. Napier's departure 
would destroy their security of title ; but it has since 
spread, as such a wise, great and benevolent measure 
should spread. 

The complete mastery the general had obtained over all 
the people of Scinde was thus evinced ; for the new prin- 
ciple was established without constraint, without commo- 
tion, without remonstrance or discontent; but from his 
first assumption of power, his measures were always 
advanced to consummation, with the cautious sagacity of 
sound legislation. " My motives for this step," he said, 
a are that a host of poor ryots, hitherto slaves, not only to 
the ameers but to the jagheerdars, will be enfranchised 
and enabled to live in comfort if industrious ; and I know 
that the nobles can never be good or contented subjects 
unless we give them public employment and honour them. 
When civilization advances they will, under this system, 
find themselves rich, and they will embark in mercantile 
pursuits and agricultural improvements, because they will 
find their property safe and need not as heretofore make 
themselves formidable as military chiefs to retain it. But 
had I left them in possession of their enormous jagheers, 
and their military tenures, and their royalties, they 
would have always been dangerous subjects. We have 
now put them down as military chieftains, and we can 
keep them down because of their semi-barbarism; but 
hereafter we should find it very difficult to deal with their 
more civilized sons, if they continued to hold such immense 
tracts of land, which advancing civilization will change 
from wastes to fruitful possessions. Even under my 
system they will become very powerful; but I have 
established a counter-check by opening a way to raise 
a race of independent farmers attached to the govern- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



337 



ment. This is all I can now do for Scinde and its fine CHAP. XIII. 
people." ^ 

That he conld do no more good was daily becoming 
more evident, and his resolution to free himself from the 
stupid spiteful enmity of ungrateful masters was fixed; 
yet, ere he took that step, he thought it politic to show 
himself to the people after the number of troops had 
been reduced, and while the false impression that the 
ameers would be restored was prevalent. Wherefore as 
the body of Nusseer Khan, the chief of the captive Hyder- 
abad ameers, who died about this time, had been brought 
to Scinde for interment, he resolved to carry the corpse 
with him up the river. The Bombay faction had looked 
for disturbance on this occasion, thinking there would 
be a great public ceremony, but the prudence of the 
general baffled that expectation. " I would," he said, 
" give the deceased ameer a pompous funeral, but reason 
forbids it, and I balk my own desires and reject the 
prayers of my son-in-law, McMurdo, who invoked me, 
exclaiming, c But, general, a dead enemy!' I did not 
want the hint, and I like him the better for having given 
it ; but to accede would raise a notion, that the supreme 
government had ordered the ceremony as a prelude to the 
restoration of the ameers and if bloodshed followed blame 
would justly attach to me. Much therefore as I might 
wish to honour a fallen enemy, who however had no 
honour according to our ideas, I refuse myself the credit 
of such a display, because I have no right from personal 
vanity, and after all it is but that, to risk the shedding 
of blood. Lord Ashley has, unintentionally, by urging 
this restoration retarded the tranquillity of Scinde and 
caused great loss to private Hindoo families ; but as to 
restoring the ameers, as far as I am concerned, he could 
do nothing more contributive to my reputation in these 
countries. The poor know I devote myself to their in- 
terests, and they know the cruel treatment they would 
receive from the Talpoor race if they again became 
masters. Experience has taught them a lesson, and I 
defy anything but English bayonets to replace the ameers ! 

z 



338 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER's 



CHAP. xiii. Lord Ashley and myself will appear before a tribunal 
1847. where truth alone can be heard, and he will then learn — 
I will not say to his cost for I am told he is a good man — 
but he will learn that I have acted with honour and 
humanity to the ameers and to the people of Scinde ; that 
I have seen my way with more knowledge of the country 
than he has ; that I have never done an act of injustice, 
but have raised the character of the English for truth and 
honour where the political agents had sunk it ; and that 
he has been from first to last in error about Scinde. 

" Well ! time will tell on these matters and I abide 
mine, though I do not think any justice will be done to 
me while I am alive, and when I am dying I will not say 
with that great man Sir J ohn Moore ' I hope my country 
will do me justice' for I am so hardened by undeserved 
abuse and misrepresentation, that I care not whether 
justice is done to me or not. Yet it is discouraging, how- 
ever firm the heart may be, to see persons like Lord Ashley, 
ignorantly assenting to the running down the character of 
a man who has lost two of his family in this trying climate, 
and who is risking the lives of the rest, and his own life, 
from a determination not to abandon his post while he 
can be of use. I am however hardened — not in feeling, 
but by principle and reason — against abuse. I have done 
nothing but what was right and honourable. I have in no 
instance violated religion or honour to obtain success; on 
the contrary, I have attained it by a rigid adherence to 
both, and I hold those who so foully abuse me in just 
contempt." 

With these sentiments he continued to work conscien- 
tiously, and by the light of his own genius amidst the dark 
cloud of falsehood raised to shroud his actions from the 
knowledge of his countrymen ; but in July, 1847, a severe 
illness, which nearly sent his wife to the grave, hastened 
by a few months his resignation of power, and in October 
he embarked for England with all the honour that his 
troops could offer to show their veneration, and every 
good wish that a people grateful for happiness and security 
bestowed, could express. Nor was this a transient feeling 



ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 



339 



with the Beloochee and Scindee races ; for this after- CHAP. xill. 
proof of its depth and sincerity has been given; one as j^T" 
irrefragable as that furnished by the grateful peasants of 
Cephalonia, when they cultivated his farm in his absence. 
In 1850, when returning from the supreme military 
command of India through Scinde — when it was known 
that he was at variance with the governor-general and was 
abandoning India for ever — the grateful Belooch chiefs 
asked leave at Kurrachee to present him with a sword of 
great value, not, as they said, because he was their con- 
queror, but that he had, after conquest, secured to them 
their rights, their dignities and possessions, and made that 
conquest a benefit to them and their race. 

This is a noble contrast to the feelings which have actu- 
ated Lord Dalhousie and the Bombay government; for 
with that littleness which forgets the public welfare in the 
indulgence of personal malice, they have, since Sir C. 
Napier's departure from Scinde destroyed as far as their 
power went every great work and institution projected by 
him for the benefit of that country. 

The camel baggage corps if not entirely put down, has 
been so withered by intentional neglect as to be useless. 

The completion of the barracks at Hyderabad, perhaps 
the most excellently contrived for the soldiers 9 health and 
comfort of any in the British dominions, has been peremp- 
torily stopped when one wing was finished, the other 
advanced ; and all the materials gathered are left to rot 
alongside the walls which are perishing from exposure ! 

The continuation of the great mole at Kurrachee has 
been abandoned under positive orders, issued in disregard 
of the loud cries of the shipping and mercantile community 
for its completion. Those cries have indeed been so loud 
and imperative, that the present able and vigorous com- 
missioner for Scinde, Mr. Frere, confident in the just 
feelings of Lord Falkland to support him, has, it is said, 
resolved to resume the work. The petty jealous folly 
which stopped it remains however the same, it is Mr. Frere 
not Lord Dalhousie who has displayed sense. 

The construction of the aqueduct for conveying the 
z 2 



340 



SIR CHARLES NAPIEIi's 



CHAP. xill. Mulleear water to the town and vessels lias never been 
1847 permitted. 

The great canal system for scientifically irrigating Scinde 
has been abolished, and the control of the waters, so ab- 
solutely essential to the agriculture and revenue of the 
country, has been thrown again into the hands of the 
ignorant and fraudulent kardars. 

To these retrograde acts must be added the breaking up 
of the annual mart for horses and other commodities at 
Sukkur, and the refusal to sanction the building of a safe 
magazine at Bukkur. Commerce with Central Asia was 
forwarded and the army supplied with fine animals at a 
cheap rate by the first establishment, and the want of the 
second exposes Bukkur, Sukkur and Boree hourly to a 
terrible explosion. These and many other minor injurious 
interferences present a lamentable picture of destructive 
folly and ignoble jealousy. 

While Sir C. Napier was yet in the land, the last deci- 
sive blow was given to that robber system which he had 
sworn to extirpate — a blow terrible in its details of blood, 
but a crowning measure of mercy for the tranquillity of 
Scinde. 

Notwithstanding their skirmish with Lieutenant Young- 
husband, and their subsequent disastrous fight with the 
Murrees, Islam Khan's Bhoogtees, always pressed by 
hunger, made another foray on the Scindian frontier. 
Moving down the Teyaga ravine, they first assaulted one 
of the Kyharee forts, were repulsed, and their further 
march tracked by a young officer named Mere wether, who 
from Shahpoor followed them with a detachment of the 
Moguls and some auxiliary Kyharees. He found them, 
about seven hundred in number, thirty-five only being 
mounted, arrayed in a deep line near the foot of the hills, 
but preparing to cross the desert. They first sought by 
a flank movement to gain a jungle on their left, but Mere- 
wether galloping across their front cut them off ; yet their 
position was still strong, amidst rocks and bushes, if they 
had staid quiet. They however, thinking the gallop of the 
Moguls was to avoid an action rushed forward firing 



ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE. 



341 



matchlocks, clashing sword against shield, shouting and CHAP. XIII. 
howling in a frightful manner, whereupon the horsemen im?. 
wheeled and charged through them. The shock was rude, 
but the undaunted Bhoogtees closed again and keeping 
shoulder to shoulder still made for the hills, followed by 
the Moguls who plied their carbines with a terrible exe- 
cution. Having crossed a rivulet the robbers turned and 
stood to receive another charge and carbine-fire, and then 
without breaking renewed their efforts to retreat, yet 
were once more cut off from the hills and finally brought 
to bay. Merewether offered quarter, but they bore his 
fire until only one hundred and twenty remained, who 
sullenly threw down their arms. Two of their mounted 
men escaped, all the rest were killed or taken, and eight 
chiefs died sword in hand. 

Islam and Ahmed Khan, the two principal men, were 
not present in this fight, and so avoided the general ruin, 
but their stout-hearted tribe was destroyed; for though 
only one hundred and twenty Moguls were engaged the 
earth was cumbered with six hundred Bhoogtee carcases ! 
There was here no cruelty to cause this dismal butchery 
— all the ferocity was on the side of the sufferers. Long 
had Sir C. Napier striven to abate that ferocity and induce 
them to settle alongside the Jackranees in Scinde ; he had 
personally endeavoured to soften the temper of the cap- 
tive chief Dora, had given him land and sent him with 
renewed offers of protection and possessions for his tribe ; 
and in the fight Merewether had adjured them to accept 
of quarter. Hence, while admiration for their constant 
intrepid temper is mingled with pity for their destruction, 
justice proclaims that their blood was on their own heads ! 

So ended Sir C. Napier's administration of Scinde ! 

He had found that land domineered over by a race of 
fierce warriors, who hated the English from political and 
religious motives, and who were preparing for war, with 
a well-grounded distrust of British public faith and honour, 
and a contempt for British military prowess — a contempt 
which the disaster at Cabool and several recent minor 
defeats in Khelat seemed to warrant. 



342 



SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 



CHAP. XIII, He had found it under the oppressive sway of an oligarchy 
1847< of despots, cruel, and horribly vicious in debauchery ; 

setting such examples of loathsome depravity, as must 
finally have corrupted society to its core and made 
regeneration impossible. 

He had found the rural subject population crushed 
with imposts, shuddering under a ferocious domination, 
wasting in number from unnatural mortality and forced 
emigration — the towns shrinking in size and devoid of 
handicraftsmen. The half-tilled fields were sullenly cul- 
tivated by miserable serfs, whose labours only brought 
additional misery to themselves ; and more than a fourth 
of the fertile land was turned into lairs for wild beasts by 
tyrants, who thus defaced and rendered pernicious what 
God had created for the subsistence and comfort of man. 

He had found society without the protection of law, or 
that of natural human feelings ; for slavery was widely 
spread, murder, especially of women, rife, blood-feuds 
universal, and systematic robbery so established by the 
force of circumstances as to leave no other mode of 
existence free, and rendering that crime the mark and sign 
of heroism. Might was right, and the whole social frame- 
work was dissolving in a horrible confusion where the 
bloody hand only could thrive. 

He had found the Beloochees with sword and shield, 
defying and capable of overthrowing armies. — He left them 
with spade and mattock submissive to a constable's staff. 
He found them turbulent and bloody, masters in a realm 
where confusion and injustice prevailed — he left them 
mild and obedient subjects in a country where justice 
was substituted for their military domination. 

He had found Scinde groaning under tyranny, he left 
it a contented though subdued province of India, respected 
by surrounding nations and tribes, which he had taught 
to confide in English honour, and to tremble at English 
military prowess as the emanation of a deity. He found 
it poor and in slavery, he left it without a slave, relieved 
from wholesale robbery and wholesale murder, with an 
increasing population, an extended and extending agri- 



ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE. 



343 



culture, and abundance of food produced by the willing CHAP. xill. 
industry of independent labourers. He left it also with 1847> 
an enlarged commerce, a reviving internal traffic, expand- 
ing towns, restored handicraftsmen, mitigated taxation, 
a great revenue, an economical administration, and a 
reformed social system — with an enlarged and improving 
public spirit, and a great road opened for future prosperity. 
He had in fine, found a divided population, misery and 
servitude on the one hand, and on the other a barbarous 
domination — crime and cruelty, tears and distress, every- 
where prevailing. He left a united regenerated people 
rejoicing in a rising civilization the work of his beneficent 
genius. 



344 



SUPPLEMENT. 



In the foregoing chapters, the administration of Scinde 
has been sketched rather than described ; a full exposition 
mnst be sought for in Sir C. Napier's correspondence ; and 
should that proof of his qualities for command be ever laid 
before the world, it will show how entirely he loved 
justice, and how conformable to the spirit of Christianity 
was his whole government. It will then be seen that he 
deserved well of his country, and of the directors who 
treated him so basely : but neither worth nor success 
could abate their ungrateful hostility, which continued to 
pursue him in England. 

It had been the constant usage when conquests were 
made in the East, for the Court of Directors to move the 
Crown to order a distribution of " booty " prize-money 
being so officially termed ; but this was by the Court of 
Directors refused to the victorious army of Meeanee, 
Appendix IX. which was thus forced to appeal directly to the sovereign. 

This appeal was successful, but for some reason not ex- 
plained, though not difficult to divine, the Court of 
Directors was made trustee for a fair distribution, and 
immediately proceeded to make a foul one ; namely, that 
Sir C. Napier, " not beiny a commander-in-chief, should, 
according to the prevalent usage in India, share only as a 
major-general, and have but a sixteenth instead of an 



SUPPLEMENT. 



345 



eighth" This was notified to the Lords of the Treasury 
as the Court of Directors' decision ! 

There was however more to be done. A decision it 
was, and as mean and base a one as ever disgraced a 
public body, but it was not a final decision. The royal 
warrant provided an appeal to the Lords of the Treasury ; 
and though the Court of Directors withheld all official 
notice of its decision from Sir C. Napier, who was then in 
Scinde, thus indirectly seeking to debar him of his right of 
appeal by lapse of time, his friends in England, apprized of 
what was going on through other channels, were permitted 
by the Lords of the Treasury to put in a plea for the absent 
general. Then was poured into the public ear, all possible 
anonymous scurrility, and resistance to oppression was 
represented as a sordid seeking for dishonest gain at the 
expense of the soldiers who had fought the battles ! 
Moreover at the very time the decision, shameless as it 
was shown to be, was made by the directors, one of their 
body, Sir J. Weir Hogg, prompted a member of the 
House of Commons, Mr. Baillie — the prompting being 
readily accepted in all its foulness — to assert, in opposition 
to a suggestion that the general had not been duly 
honoured, that " he had received seventy thousand pounds 
as prize-money ! " — a sum exceeding the amount of the 
eighth which Sir J. W. Hogg was then endeavouring to 
reduce one-half, and also knew well, that far from being 
received, neither the greater nor the lesser sum could 
be paid for several years ! Neither prompter nor speaker 
on this occasion could understand, that to a generous 
mind money was not an equivalent for honours withheld 
when glorious actions had been performed : that was a 
mystery they could not penetrate. 

The directors' decision was, on appeal, reversed by the 
Lords of the Treasury, and Sir C. Napier's advocate, Mr. 
John George Phillimore, dissecting it with a firm and 
skilful hand, exposed all its malignant weakness. He 
showed, that the denial of rank as commander-in-chief was 
advanced in direct contradiction of the governor- general's 



346 



SUPPLEMENT. 



minute conferring that appointment, and in opposition to the 
whole stream of his official correspondence — that the direc- 
tors had studiously suppressed all facts bearing on the real 
question, and had as studiously brought forward irrelevant 
matter to obscure the truth — that all former decisions, all 
usage, all analogy precedent and rule laid down, whether 
by former courts or by royal authority, contradicted the 
Directors' assertions, and marked their decision, indelibly, 
as a pitiful display of personal hostility, offensive alike to 
custom, to law, and to honour ! Yet here, justice again 
imperatively calls for the admission, that amongst the 
directors were men who did not join and were incapable 
of joining in this proceeding, though powerless to prevent 
the corporate act. 

As a corporation the Court of Directors acted in a base 
manner. From the moment Sir C. Napier appeared as 
a victorious general under the auspices of Lord Ellen - 
borough, he was marked by that court, and through its 
influence by the crown ministers, for slights and ill usage, 
because his exploits gave lustre to a policy which it had 
been factiously decided to decry. In that spirit the park 
guns had been silenced, and the thanks of parliament for 
his battles withheld for a year, though the noise of both 
was readily furnished for intermediate actions scarcely to 
be called victories. 

Every scurrilous writer, from the pompous libellers 
of the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, to the penny- 
paid slanderers of the daily journals, were set to assail his 
character and depreciate his actions ; and while he was 
denied all legal and customary official protection, insub- 
ordinate officers were inordinately rewarded for assailing 
him in publications violating at once discipline, decency, 
and the orders of the court itself — orders issued with 
Machiavelian policy, to give an appearance of condemning 
what it was secretly encouraging and openly rewarding. 
Miserable expedients also were resorted to for abating his 
reputation. Lord Ripon forgot to publish his despatches 
— ministerial orators omitted his name at public banquets 



SUPPLEMENT. 



347 



when lauding the generals who had gained Indian victo- 
ries : and those contemptible arts were continued when he 
returned to England. He only of the officers who came 
back from the East with any pretensions to celebrity was 
uninvited to city feasts, was ungreeted by the offers of 
city honours. When tributes of respect, springing from 
real public feeling, were paid to him, the London journals, 
a few excepted, left them unnoticed; and that this was 
the result of an extraordinary sinister influence was proved 
by its constancy, aud by the following fact. The town- 
council of Portsmouth, in presence of an enthusiastic 
assemblage of inhabitants, presented an address to Sir 
C. Napier on his landing ; and he was escorted to the 
town-hall by all the regular officers of the garrison, and 
those of the royal marines. No account of this complimen- 
tary proceeding appeared ; and when the mayor of Ports- 
mouth sent an authentic report to one of the leading 
journals for publication it was refused, though he offered 
to pay for it as an advertisement ! 

The contrivers of those artifices in their eagerness to 
obscure a great man's fame, forgot that history and pos- 
terity would remain, even though the English public had 
been so indifferent as to accept such pitiful impositions 
on its judgment. But it did not do so. Unexpected and 
imminent danger to India caused the real national feeling 
to burst forth with a violence overwhelming all despi- 
cable arts ; and those ministers who had lent them- 
selves to the Court of Directors' passions and enmity, were 
compelled by the nation to present to their sovereign 
the slandered, neglected, victorious general, as the man 
whom England called for in the hour of danger — 
and then the directors, licking the dust with fevered 
tongues, besought him to accept honours and confer 
safety ! 

Scornfully forgetful of past injuries, Sir C. Napier put 
ministers and directors from his thoughts, and looking 
only to the sovereign and the people, returned to India, 
there to meet, as he foretold, the same ungrateful male- 



348 



SUPPLEMENT. 



volence when danger should pass away. Forced by insult to 
resign his high command a second time, he is again a butt 
for injustice, and supercilious neglect ; but for posterity, 
for history, he will always be the daring victor of Meeanee 
and Hyderabad, the intrepid subduer of the hillmen, the 
successful regenerator of Scinde, the firm military reformer 
of India — the man on whom the universal English nation 
called in the hour of danger to uphold a distant tottering 
empire. 



THE END. 



APPENDIX. 



i. 

The nature of the ameers' government to which the 
Bombay faction gave the character of " patriarchal " is 
here shown. 



Extract from a Report of the Kurrachee Collector, to the 
Judge- Advocate-General on the mode of examining 
witnesses in criminal trials under the Ameers. 

November, 1844. 

The ameers had no regular rules for examination of 
witnesses or for administering justice. The most common 
practice was to ask the witness, without administering an 
oath, what he knew, and in the event of his professing 
ignorance, should the judge entertain suspicion of his 
truth, he was forthwith put to the torture to make him 
tell what the judge considered he ought to know. This 
torture was either the hanging him up by the thumbs, 
and applying a red-hot ramrod to different parts of his 
body ; or by pricking him with a dagger ; or by applying 
a naked blade to his throat, with an intimation that his 
throat would be severed unless he at once told the truth. 
These atrocious modes have been practised, to my know- 
ledge, by different hakims or governors of Kurrachee 
since I have been in Scinde, and on two occasions with 
success ! 

Extract from a Report of the Hyderabad Collector and 
Magistrate. 

November, 1844. 

Oaths were generally in the ameers' time administered 
to parties in civil suits, but there were then no such things 



350 



APPENDIX II. 



as regular criminal trials in Scinde. The usual way was, 
if the case was one of murder to leave the respective 
tribes to settle the matter by retaliation or otherwise. In 
case of robbery or other ordinary crimes, the kardar 
ascertained as he could by verbal information, by tracking, 
and other modes, who the delinquent was, and when he 
had seized him, put him in the stocks and thrashed and 
tortured him until he confessed. Any man whom there 
was good reason to think able to throw a light on the 
case, but who refused or tried to evade giving evidence, 
was treated in like manner, till his reluctance was over- 
come. There was also the ordeal by fire and that by 
water, wherein, if the accused was burned, or unable to 
remain below water the regulated time without being 
drowned, or if he refused the ordeal altogether, he was 
without more ado found guilty. 

In the above cases I suppose always the accused to be 
a Hindoo or Scindee, or a Beloochee of some tribe whose 
chief was powerless; for otherwise he would not have 
concealed anything, but have kept the property in defiance 
of complainant and kardar, and cut down the first man 
sent to apprehend him. 



II. 

Compressed Extracts from a Report by C. W.Richardson,Esq. 
Deputy Collector in Scinde. 

July, 1845. 

Sugar has been planted and grown in considerable 
quantities throughout upper and lower Scinde on the 
banks of the Indus for many years, and I am led to 
believe the culture of it may be increased to any extent. 
The culture was in the ameers' time much diminished, 
from the exorbitant taxes on the ground ; but the soil on 
both banks is admirably adapted for the sugar-cane. The 
richness of the soil from the annual alluvial deposits 
obviates the necessity of manure, which in every other 
part of India is absolutely requisite and entails besides 



APPENDIX II. 



351 



much labour and expense for carriage and collection. In 
Scinde the principal labour is ploughing and clearing the 
land of jungle-bush and weeds. In many parts of India 
it has been found difficult and even impossible to raise 
sugar-canes, from the great quantity of water required 
independent of the labour of drawing it from deep wells ; 
but near the Indus they can be supplied in abundance and 
certainty. Notwithstanding the advantages of rich soil 
and abundant water, the inhabitants during the ameers' 
sway have taken no interest in the cultivation of sugar ; 
and even now with ameliorated taxation they do not take 
care or trouble ; hence the cane which ought to be of a 
superior kind is generally stunted and small, and the juice 
is of an inferior flavour. 

A great deal of the cane is sold as an esculent in large 
towns and the villages in the vicinity of the cane-farms ; 
some portion is however compressed in a rude manner 
for goor, but the people are ignorant of any good 
process. By the introduction of superior canes from the 
Mauritius and other places, and a better cultivation of the 
indigenous cane with superior manufacture, the actual 
produce of goor might be doubled; meanwhile sugars of 
every description are imported, chiefly from Muscat. 
In many parts of Bengal sugar-manufactories have been 
established with success ; yet nowhere have the facilities 
been so great as in Scinde, where soil, climate, abundance 
of water, easy irrigation and transport are all combined ; 
it needs but. the hand of government to make sugar- 
cultivation flourish. The expense of a large sugar-manu- 
factory would not be very great, and a handsome return 
would soon be realized, and induce private speculators to 
commence enterprises which would largely increase the 
revenue. The sugar-mills should be established in the 
vicinity of the cane, as the latter dries and ferments 
rapidly after being cut ; and it would be well to encourage 
the ryots to raise the cane, make the goor and bring it 
under conditions for sale at the government sugar-manu- 
factory. The cost of an iron mill sent from England 
would be about three hundred pounds, and the govern- 



352 



APPENDIX III. 



ment outlay of the establishment be about three hundred 
and sixty pounds ; but if the government had the 
ryots instructed how to produce the best raw material 
and then purchased it, the cost of an iron mill would 
be spared. 

Joined with the institutions for making sugar might be 
one for indigo, for which valuable product the soil, from 
Sukkur to Kotree, is generally very favourable ; but 
below the latter place the dews are so heavy as to be 
injurious to the plant. Any quantity of indigo may be 
grown in Scinde ; and the alluvial soil on each side of the 
Indus, saturated by inundations, should produce indigo of 
a quality rally equal to, if not better than that of Bengal ; 
and I doubt not would do so ; for in fact Scinde is just 
Bengal over again, without its rains, and the rains are the 
great enemy of the Bengal planter. In the districts of 
Kanote and Mahajanda, ninety or a hundred maunds of 
indigo are yearly made, and the quality of the drug is 
good, but a rough mode of manufacture greatly depre- 
ciates its value. 



III. 

Extract from one of many Letters addressed by Sir C. 
Napier to the supreme Government about the Mullaree 
river } which were unanswered. 

August, 1845. 

As we have now passed over the season for rain and 
have not had any at Kurrachee, the tanks are all dry and 
the wells very low. The consequence of this is bad water, 
and bowel-complaints are attacking the soldiers. I assure 
you it would be very desirable for the health of this can- 
tonment if we were to have the Mullaree river brought 
into camp, the expense, which I forwarded in August 
1844, would be only twelve thousand pounds : a small 
sum compared to the great advantages of health and 
convenience which would result from this work. 

The water here is drawn from wells, and is strongly 



APPENDIX IV. 



353 



impregnated with soda and other matters. Sometimes 
you dig and come to fresh water at ten, twenty, or thirty 
feet ; then go a foot deeper and it is perfectly salt. There 
are wells in the cantonments within two hundred feet of^ 
each other, and in some cases a great deal nearer — one is 
salt the other fresh. The earth is full of saltpetre and 
soda they say. However the water is deleterious 
whatever it be composed of, and you would do a great 
favour to Kurrachee if you will order us to begin this 
work at once. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 
To Sir Henry Hardinge, &c. 

Note. — A medical board was afterwards directed by 
government to report on the water at Kurrachee and 
declared it to be "pure and good water." Nevertheless it 
contained the foreign substances mentioned in the above 
letter with the addition of alum : and invariably produced 
bowel complaints when first used by new . comers. It 
was by all unlearned men considered unwholesome. More- 
over this board examined it at a time when rain had just 
fallen, and as all the wells were then full the proportion 
of deleterious matter was greatly reduced. — W. N. 



IV. 

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ellenborough written when 
preparing to commence the Campaign against the Hill- 
men. 

Sukkur, 19th December, 1844. - 

I have this day arrived here, the anniversary of the 
day on which I left it two years ago ! It reminds me of 
all your lordship's kindness to me, and of the danger to 
which this empire lias been exposed by your recall ; and 
in the words of one of our greatest men, Sir John Moore, 
I will say I hope all the mischief that may happen will 
not happen. I left Kurrachee the 11th of November, and 
have found the country a dead level with, if I may use 
the expression, rows of mountains running through it in 

2 A 



354 



APPENDIX IV. 



a direction, more or less, north and south. These hills 
do not gradually rise so as to form undulating sections ; 
they are all strongly defined like walls and full of fossils. 
Paragraph A. One day we marched through quantities of petrified wood ; 

this we found at Mulleree camp — so marked on Walker's 
map. When we passed Pokune the country changed to 
hill and valley, and between those two watering-places 
the highest part of the country appears to be. Thence it 
becomes rocky and the alluvial soil disappears, but we again 
come upon it on reaching Chorla. Up to that all is barren. 

Between Pokune and Chorla the country is wild in 
the extreme ; rocks rolled together apparently by some 
grand convulsion of nature. I heard from one guide that 
there is a quantity of alum here — he said he had got it 
and sold it. I would have halted there a week were it 
not that I am so ignorant of geology and mineralogy that 
I should have lost time, and Scinde would have gained 
nothing, nor science either. There are hot springs among 
these hills, and we observed a low range of hillocks ten 
to twenty feet high, running parallel to the great range of 
the Hala, and formed of stones like cinders. One wise 
man of our party pronounced them a " concrete of vege- 
table matter," so I suppose they are. However they have 
a curious appearance and are quite different from their 
neighbours. I carried away some pieces which I keep 
against the time I meet a learned man, the breed of which 
I am afraid is rather scarce in Scinde, and I have begged 
a little philosopher from Sir H. Hardinge, if he has one to 
spare, for travelling in Scinde to tell us what treasures we 
possess. 

From Chorla I passed through Peer Aree where Colonel 
Eoberts surprised Shah Mohamed. It was well done, 
and I am sorry the colonel did not get the C. B. ; that 
march and capture of the Lion's brother were of great 
use in settling the country, and a march at that time 
of year was no ordinary movement. 

At Sehwan I examined the ruins of what is called 
Alexander's Tower. I have seen a great deal of Grecian 
ruins, and this is decidedly not Grecian. It probably is 



APPENDIX IV. 



355 



the site of the colony left by Alexander, because the 
rocky bank makes it probable the Indus has always run 
here and occasionally Greek coins are found, but the 
ruins are those of a fortress destroyed by Aurengzebe. 
From thence to Sukkur the land has much cultivation 
though not a hundredth part is cultivated. Still it is 
rich and so may all between Kurrachee and Pokune be — 
immense plains of rich soil untouched by man ! The 
formation makes it difficult to find water, but to me 
it is beyond a doubt that water may be found every- 
where by sinking wells, and to that I will give my best 
attention as soon as I can. My idea is to increase and 
improve the wells where they have been already made by 
poor people; then, as the advantages are there felt and 
agriculture increases round them, and the people grow 
richer from growing markets and decreasing robbery, 
they will themselves sink new wells distant from those 
existing. This seems to me the most rational mode of 
proceeding — a slow one, but that is inevitable — one needs 
patience in these things, yet the more anxious I am to be 
of use, the more difficult I find it to be patient. 

I found a set of robbers of the Bin tribe — not Beloochee, 
but Scindee Bins — they had remained faithful to the 
Kalloras and the ameers persecuted them. They were 
driven by the ameers from the Delta to the moun- 
tains some years ago, and have from that time lived by 
plunder ; but being intruders the Belooch robbers were 
hostile to them and were supported by the ameers, the 
poor Bins lived a hard life. They petitioned me for land 
and protection, and I gave them waste land in the vicinity 
of Jurruck. This has been one good done by my tour. 
Another is that I found, in despite of my exertions, slavery 
existing to a great and cruel extent. This was made 
known by the slaves coming to me when they found I 
mixed with the poor people and had an interpreter, for 
they crowded round my tent everywhere. I instantly 
seized ten or twelve slave-masters, men of rank and 
influence, and for three weeks I have marched them as 
prisoners through the country. * * * I am 

2 a 2 



356 



APPENDIX IV. 



extremely displeased at this slavery still existing, and I 
believe it to be only in Captain Preedy's collectorate, and 
in the close neighbourhood of the mountains, where 
obedience to the law only establishes itself step by step 
and cannot be enforced at once as in the flat lands — it 
is a great point for robbers to have their retreat secure in 
their war against the law. However my harsh treatment 
of the slaveholders has struck a terror that I hope 
will really destroy slavery. 

Wullee Chandia has behaved with perfect fidelity. He 
captured Nowbut Khan, a robber chief who has defied 
me for a year, plundering and murdering without remorse. 
On his plundering a caravan of seventy-five camels and 
killing the camel-men I offered 1,000 rupees for his capture, 
and he is now in Fort Bukkur, and with him another 
great robber, Sobah Guddee, who also defied me. Fitz- 
gerald marched seventy-five miles with the camel corps 
and surprised this chief in his mountain hold ; 400 of 
his men were out, he and forty were at home. He fought. 
His son and two nephews died gallantly in arms with their 
backs to a tree. Lieutenant James, deputy- collector, 
begged of them to surrender but they refused, saying, 
they were Sobah Guddee's son and nephews and would 
not lay down their swords and shields. I am sorry they 
could not be saved. Their father had less courage ; his 
character is that of a cruel unsparing robber, and the 
whole country rejoices at his fate; Lieutenant James 
says, people turned out in crowds to see him pass 
and expressed their satisfaction. He shall be tried by 
a military commission. I think the capture of these 
men will stop robbery in bands for the future, and 
I now hope I may say the right bank of the Indus 
is orderly and tolerably secure. There are however 
one or two gentlemen with whom I had conversation 
as I passed their villages, who are very fit subjects 
for capital punishment. One was very active. in pursuing 
Nowbut when he plundered the caravan : he recovered 
sixty-three of the camels and very generously gave 
eighteen to the owners. As I passed they complained 



APPENDIX IV. 



357 



and I sent a policeman to him. He is old, and if ever 
villany was depicted in man's face it is so in this chief's 
countenance. 

I find in many cases here taxation taking one half the 
produce, I will reduce it everywhere, and nnder all cir- 
cumstances to one-third. It is objected that the revenue 
will suffer. It will at first, but there will be a reaction ; 
more people will then come and settle in the plains and 
there will be more jungle cleared, and increased cultiva- 
tion will more than cover the loss to the revenue for two 
or three years. The government has plains of good land, 
.some twenty miles long by eight and twelve in breadth, 
untouched, and by giving great advantages to the ryots so 
many will settle as to repay the temporary loss of revenue, 
and the additional comfort will diminish the disposition to 
robbery. But these wild men must get comfort on easy 
terms at first, or they will not change their swords for 
ploughshares. I have turned all this much in my mind as 
I rode through the country thinking how I could best 
serve it. The result is to reduce taxation and rent — they 
are really one — to one-third of the produce of land at all 
hazards. If I do harm I must be punished by my own 
regret, and the Company must place here a better man. 
I have the collectors against me, and I do wrong therefore, 
if wrong it be, of my own will, no one else can be blamed, 
except your lordship for putting me here ; but I am too 
thoroughly convinced that my principle is right to have 
fear. However I will go slowly and gradually to work. 

I am resolved also upon another step — that of making 
advances to the poor ryots of a little money, say, as far as 
thirty rupees to purchase a pair of bullocks ; and to give 
them land rent free for two years on condition of clearing 
jungle. I am told they will run away with the money. 
This may happen in one or two cases but I wholly dis- 
believe it will be general. These Scindees I think an 
exceedingly honest people. As to the hill chiefs it is 
another thing; robbery is a profession made necessary 
with them by bad government, which has left men of a 
certain rank no other mode of existence. No officer is 



358 



APPENDIX IV. 



robbed, every kind of property is safer in Scinde than in 
Bombay. I am therefore sure that by these little ad- 
vances to poor families I shall clear the jungle rapidly and 
raise up that class for which England was once so cele- 
brated — yeomen. I am also gradually breaking down the 
system of jagheers. Whenever a jagheerdar dies, I either 
resume the jagheer and divide it amongst zemindars and 
ryots, or let it to the son of the jagheerdar for a regular 
rent, depriving the jagheer of its royalties — they try hard 
to preserve their privileges of life, death, and taxation. 

The black mail is a terrible affair; I cannot see how to 
deal with it for several years. Our police works admirably. 
They fight stanchly, and their inclination to bully has 
been taken out of them on one or two occasions rather 
severely ; so they no longer give offence to the people as 
they did at first. 

The system of trying great culprits by military commis- 
sions answers well as far as I can judge, and the magistrates 
deal out substantial justice in minor cases. I read every 
process and sign every sentence myself, and I find my 
labour increases : the people like our system and the 
number of trials is very great. I fear if they increase I 
shall hardly be able to go through them for want of time. 
I have now given your lordship a general idea of how we 
go on. Perhaps I may add, that with allowance for 
Eastern manners, the flocking of the people round my 
tent everywhere to make salaam, and the shouting loud 
prayers for me as I rode through their villages, were signs 
that they are rather content than otherwise, with my 
government. Another good sign is my riding with only 
the Scinde irregular horse through these wild tribes. 
Insult might have been offered, and maintained also, by 
these mountain chiefs ; for I could not have entered their 
mountain defiles with a slender escort of cavalry far from 
any support. I felt however confident in the disposition 
of the people or I should not have clone so. 

I have just heard the Delhi Gazette states that Scinde 
is positively to be given back to the ameers. Unless 
government puts a stop to these reports they must do 



APPENDIX IV. 



359 



harm ; they keep the Hindoo population in great alarm, 
and they will not spend money in any speculation while 
these doubts exist. Some of them tell me frankly, " We 
have money, but if we show this, (which we would do if 
we were certain of the English remaining) and you restore 
the ameers we shall be lost men : they would not leave 
us a shilling, and we might be tortured to make us confess 
to more." 

They are going to take Cutch from Scinde ; they are 
wrong and I have said so in answer to a very weak paper 
sent by the directors to Sir Henry, who sent it to me. I 
hope they will do so as far as I am concerned, for Cutch 
adds to my labour and I feel no interest about it; but 
Colonel Roberts, who has been all his life a personal friend 
of the Rao, has I think done much good. The Bombay 
government is very sore, Cutch having been taken from 
it. However all these external matters have little interest 
for me ; I am wholly engrossed by Scinde, and always 
fear I do not do half what ought to be done — indeed I 
know I do not, yet I strive hard, for the interest I feel for 
the country is past description, and daily increases. I 
hope I shall never be offered the commander-in-chiefship 
of Bombay, especially now, when they seem going on 
badly I fear, though they have the advantage of " single- 
handed James Outram " " with full powers " as the papers 
inform us. I am ignorant of the nature of this social 
warfare, but it seems to train on, and will open men's 
eyes to the advantage of your lordship's vigour at Maha- 
rajapoore ! I suspect they will find that they removed 
your lordship when you had " scotched not killed the 
snake;" but for that blow at Gwalior, the insurrection 
in the southern Mahratta country would probably have 
worked well with the northern, and that long line of 
country been in arms. Nor are the Mahrattas a despi- 
cable enemy — the spirit of Sevagee is still amongst 
them. 

I have given Sir G. Arthur the 6th N.I., and the 13th 
light infantry, not numerous but stanch old soldiers, 
worth double the number of young ones. I cannot give 



360 



APPENDIX V. 



him more ; I know not what effect his disturbance may 
have on Scinde, and I have lost the 78th. That beautiful 
regiment arrived here in high health, and every other part 
of Scinde was healthy ; but the first week in November 
they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in 
hospital, about 200 dead, men women and children. I 
am sending them away as fast as I can to Hyderabad. As 
to any movement against the hill tribes at this moment I 
have no men ! This place is just a depot of fever — not a 
man has escaped, it is as bad as last year. 

•* •* * * ■* 



V. 

Extracts from Letters to Lord Ellenborough and Sir 
H. Hardinge touching the mutiny of the Sepoys and the 
sickness of the troops. 

Mutiny — I am afraid the mutiny is not over. I met 
Hunter to-day for the first time, and he knows the sepoys 
well — he has no confidence in the present calm. 

I cannot delay telling you that General Simpson and 
Hunter are both of opinion that all is not right among the 
Bengal troops here. The soldiers of the 4th have of late been 
putting very unpleasant questions to their officers about 
pensions to their families in case of their (the sepoys') 
death. The 64th expect to get those pensions ; the other 
regiments want to know why they who have not mutinied 
should not have the pensions also. In short there is 
reason to believe that great discontent prevails. Some of 
the 4th have said that if the 64th go back to India they 
mean to follow them. * * *- * 

It is with great pleasure I correct a mistake that both 
I and my adjutant-general made as to the opinion of 
General Hunter regarding the sepoys, He is satisfied 
that all is now right. General Simpson is not ; nor is it 
the general opinion of the officers as far as I can discover 



APPENDIX V. 



361 



quietly, for it is not a thing to be talked about — one must 
find out without asking. 

Sickness. — I have this day sent the first division of the 
78th to Hyderabad — not a man in the whole regiment 
can stand under arms ! and not above 120 of the 64th 
N.I. and about 80 of the 4th N.I. Some of the guards 
have not been relieved for five weeks ; but fewer native 
soldiers have died than of the 78th regiment. I have 
also sent the European battery or rather the men to 
Larkaana : the guns and horses were left behind ; there 
were no men able to take them. This is a crippled force 
to do anything with — only 200 men and they have been 
ill ! I brought the Scinde horse through the hills with 
me as a guard j they and the camel corps are the only men 
I have able to use their arms, except 300 volunteers from 
the 13th whom I have left at Larkaana. I was afraid to 
bring them to this den of fever. Five or six of the 78th 
died this day ; and I fear many more will go. In this 
state, hostility on the frontier, and crippled by this terrible 
fever you will I am sure approve of my acting as cir- 
cumstances may demand, I may be obliged to keep the 
volunteers. * * •• • / * ' # 

As to the 78th, that a severe fever raged through the 
cantonment is certain ; the natives suffered as much as the 
Europeans. But my own opinion is, and I am backed up 
in it by Dr. Robertson of the 13th, a high authority, that 
the mortality in the 78th was as much owing to drink as 
to fever ! no medical man can say that malaria fever or 
remittent fever does not fix upon the brain and the liver 
— they all say this — they all say that ardent spirits do 
the same, and the received opinion of mankind is so, even 
to vulgar songs, " Gin it burns my liver." Now let us 
take the soldier. I do not mean the 78th in particular — 
it is, say in beautiful order and no drunkenness — but the 
Highlander takes his allowance to the full as well as any 
other man. Observe then that the government allows 
him two drams a day — that is to say, three glasses or 
nearly one-third of a quart bottle. One he takes before 
breakfast, and one after. And will any one tell me, who 



362 



APPENDIX V. 



have lived my whole life amongst these men that they do 
not, aye ! the soberest of them who drinks at all, add at 
least one if not three more ? I laugh when I hear their 
officers, men of little experience, and who do not pay the 
attention I have done all my life to the habits of soldiers 
- — I laugh when I hear these young men say their men 
don't drink ! ! by which they mean get drunk. I have 
said the truth. These sober and well-behaved men pitch 
in at least half a bottle of spirits daily. But I want no 
exaggeration. I will take the government allowance of 
nearly one-third of a bottle of raw spirit, swallowed daily, 
and I ask common sense if that is not enough to keep the 
liver and brain in a constant state of inflammation, more or 
less. And I ask of any medical man to say, if a remittent 
fever supervenes, whether the chances of recovery are not 
against the patient ? 

For those who are more guided by authority than 
reason, I heard Sir John Moore say, he thought the 
third of a bottle of wine too much for a young man to 
drink regularly every day in England. Yet here we give 
a boy one-third of a bottle of raw spirits ! My second 
authority was Doctor Bailey, the great Bailey, who said to 
* * * « if y 0U wan t to recover your stomach and 
have health never touch wine or beer" — " Oh ! but I am 
used to wine I cannot leave it off so suddenly" — " That 
is egregious nonsense, an argument used only by men 
who don't like to give up their wine." So much for 
authorities ; but common sense must tell every one that 
the government allowance is enough to ruin the health of 
the young men who come to this hot climate. I again 
appeal to medical men. The strength of a young soldier 
carries him through the remittent fever and his ration 
of raw spirits; he is weak indeed and at death's door, 
but nature triumphs. He leaves the hospital, his body 
disposed to dysentery ; the hospitals are full, the attend- 
ance, from the sickness, scarce, surgeons worked to death. 
When weak and low the convalescent gets his dram and 
his spirits at once rally. Young and uneducated, he 
attributes this to the dram doing him good; after a while 



APPENDIX V. 363 

the exhilaration goes off, and then languid and feeble he 
tries another — he won't get drunk, he knows that is had ; 
but he goes close to it, and in a few days the internal 
irritation turns to dysentery, or that is upon him from 
the first perhaps, and he takes the drains to cure it — in 
either case he is gone. Now here is a good youth without 
vice, merely using what government allows him, which 
he naturally thinks good for him, and his comrades tell 
him so j it kills him, and when he dies the result is laid 
on climate. Xow climate is strong, yet medicine and 
regimen can wrestle with and overthrow it ; but medicine 
cannot overthrow climate and the third of a quart bottle of 
raw spirits, taken daily preparatory to fever before going 
into hospital, and as a restorative after coming out ! 
I have taken a sober soldier who drinks only his ration j 
and how few there are who confine themselves to that ! 
I am told that some "tee-totallers" have died. I do 
not doubt it; there may be hundreds of exceptions — 
sobriety does not make a man immortal — but I will still 
say that the mortality is divided between drink and 
climate, and also want of sufficient care and attendance 
which in these heavy attacks cannot be provided — 
surgeons and attendants get sick and die like other people. 

I have entered largely into this question because 
I know its importance. Dr. Robertson of the 13th 
(Queen's) told me that in his long Indian service, 
wherever it happened to be impossible to get spirits the 
hospitals were invariably empty ! He had not a sick man 
in Jellalabad until they were relieved and spirits arrived. 
When that regiment had leave to volunteer here he said, 
" Now you will see, the moment the bounty is paid my 
hospital will be filled with cases of fever and dysentery" — and 
so it was. Yet in the face of these facts and of medical 
opinions, and of common sense, we give rations of spirits 
to soldiers ! — and men of sense will assert that it does 
no harm ! It may be so, and the government seems to be 
of the same opinion. However the natives who do not 
drink spirits recover in far greater numbers than the 
Europeans do. 



364 



APPENDIX VI. 



[Extract of a Letter to Doctor Kirk.'] 
My own opinion is immoveable, that among the many 
concurring causes of death in cases of malaria, of which 
I have seen much in all countries, especially in the Medi- 
terranean, drink is one of the most vigorous. I do not 
mean drunkenness. I mean swallowing a certain portion 
of spirits every day — especially with young soldiers whose 
habits before entering the army were those of sobriety. 
The young soldier winks his eyes as he swallows his first 
dram, and is obliged to make, as they say, " two bites of 
a cherry." He then comes to tossing it off with ease — 
then he likes it, and then he buys another in addition to 
the ration drams which are given him twice a day — to 
train him I suppose ! Now, do not run away with the 
idea that I am such an ass as to attribute malaria fever to 
drink as a cause. I am persuaded that on certain occa- 
sions, and in certain circum stances it is a preventive of 
malaria fever ; but I am confident a man who never gets 
drunk, but regularly imbibes a certain quantity of alcohol 
daily, prepares his brain and liver for fever, and an attack 
will run him hard — especially if this alcohol is poured into 
an empty stomach. What can be worse than the silly 
Indian habit of drinking a glass of wine before dinner to 
enable the stomach to take more than it has strength to 
manage ! 



VI. 

Sir C. Napier's Observations on the 6th section of the new 
Articles of War for the Indian Army, re -introducing 
corporal punishment. 

December 29, 1844. 

With regard to the note to Sec. 6 "Criminal Offences," 
which I received subsequently to writing my previous 
observations, I think the greatest care should be taken 
not to tie up the courts-martial by defined rules when it 
can be avoided. 

1°. Because, where no criminal jurisdiction exists the 



APPENDIX VI. 



365 



Country must be one lately come under the power of the 
East-India Company. 

2°. Such a country is probably in a state of barbarism, 
like Scinde. 

3°. The most decisive, and at times the most severe 
measures are necessary to secure the peace and control 
the chiefs of such a country. 

4°. Such measures cannot be supported by the good 
sense of a court-martial (if it be tied down by accurately- 
defined crimes and punishments, and by rules formed for 
objects which are quite different) by military judge-advo- 
cates, who believe they understand law, and yet are 
ignorant of law. They thus destroy the real vigour, the 
efficiency and spirit of military courts without gaining the 
advantage of real legal principles. They produce a non- 
descript which is neither military nor legal. The result 
is that the military spirit of courts-martial is daily 
changing into the captious spirit of quibbling ; and the 
use of such quibbles, the only part of law these gen- 
tlemen know, may do great harm when a lawyer pleads 
before a judge and jury. The latter hear the ingenuity 
of the lawyers on both sides, and then have the deep 
learning and experience of the judge to clear away the 
quibbles and place the case before them in a plain unpre- 
judiced manner. With his charge impressed upon their 
minds they retire and decide on their verdict. Very 
different is the case with a court-martial. A military 
judge-advocate, who unhappily for the service fancies 
himself versed in law, and two or three of the members, 
who believe themselves equally enlightened, lay down 
all sorts of rules which they have decided to be law, and 
screw and twist every word and sentence in the charge, 
which is thus placed on the rack of their ignorance ; and 
the most determined culprit often escapes by this quib- 
bling spirit. There is no adverse counsel, no learned 
judge to clear the law and expound it. It has been laid 
down by extreme ignorance, to people who are equally 
ignorant and carries the force of law, without being law. 

The courts are thus placed in a false position, for these 



366 



APPENDIX VT. 



ignorant men are the judges as well as the jurors ; there 
is no real judge to control or instruct them, no refuge 
from their self- sufficiency , and the military spirit of 
courts-martial is lost. I mean the consciousness amongst 
them that they are courts of honour and conscience assem- 
bled to arrive at the truth, without regard to the means, 
if they be such as honesty warrants and common sense 
dictates — the members, satisfied that the prisoner is guilty 
or innocent acquitting or condemning accordingly. 

The judge-advocate being a soldier of some experience 
should regulate the forms of the court according to the 
customs of war and the Articles of War, and not according 
to writers on military law, who are no authority whatever. 
The judge-advocate, not having a vote, has no other 
responsibility and can give his whole time to correct the 
court if it acts against the Articles of War, or the rules of 
the service. He probably knows no more of them than 
the senior members ; but as he is taken off other duty he 
is supposed to be more ready, and to have the details more 
at hand. But if he forgets that he is a soldier and fancies 
himself a lawyer all becomes illegal quibbling, produced 
by the legal castle the gentleman has built in the air, and 
for which he finds inhabitants amongst the weak-headed 
portion of the members. 

Now if the new articles define too much the jurisdiction 
of courts-martial, where no criminal jurisdiction exists ; it 
is my opinion that great confusion quibbling and illegal 
proceedings will take place. We have no learned judge 
to charge, and our courts are not juries in any point of 
view. But if the new Articles of War will merely say, that 
where no criminal judicature exists, courts-martial are to 
take cognizance of all criminal offences, we shall have 
courts which will judge as honest enlightened men of 
education always judge when untrammelled — that is to say 
they, together with the approving authorities, will do sub- 
stantial justice, which is all that a newly-acquired territory 
can want till its habits demand, and its revenues can pay 
for a regular code of laws with proper officers. Then the 
military rule ceases. * * * * * 



APPENDIX VI. 



367 



The way in which the judge-advocates at head-quarters 
go on is in my humble opinion subversive of our code ; 
and is making courts-martial absolutely dangerous to a 
general officer. It is no longer a question whether a man 
is guilty or innocent ; but whether he can get out of a 
scrape by quibbles. At Newcastle-upon-Tyne I brought 
a soldier to trial on the occasion of the regiment 
attacking the new police. The case was a gross one. 
The captain of the man's company sat by the prisoner with 
a very clever attorney, who so bullied the court^that, if 
I recollect aright, the man was acquitted. Here every 
European soldier demands " a day for his defence " and 
produces a very fine written defence ; some of these are 
very clever, but -very mischievous from their^ pert^and 
saucy tone to the prosecutor, and their legal quibbles — 
these are well paid for of course. Now all this is exceed- 
ingly bad I think. 

By our judge-advocates-general not being in their 
proper places they are ruining discipline. D'Aguilar's 
book was good as a help ; it sticks to the Articles of War ; 
but all the others, which bring their miserable modicum of 
law into play, and God knows it is bad law, do a world of 
harm. We soldiers are not lawyers, we never can be 
lawyers ; but we may be, and are — and we are daily 
getting worse — great quibblers, and in time we shall 
not be able to convict a criminal. The other day there 
was a doctor, a known drunkard, tried. Several officers 
proved he was drunk, one being his senior medical officer, 
whose evidence was, " The assistant-surgeon was drunk/' 
— "Are not so and so the signs of blood to the head?" 
— " Yes." — " Might I not have blood to the head?"— 
" Yes ! but you were drunk." The court then asked the 
medical witness. " Did you apply any test ! " — "No." An 
acquittal followed, and the drunkard is turned into an 
hospital in such a climate as this, and the unfortunate 
patients see him reeling from bed to bed, and must take 
what he prescribes ! ! It is horrible ! Yet not a man 
of that court had a doubt of his guilt. 

Another doctor here, whom I also tried, got off with 



368 



APPENDIX VII. 



being put a few steps down the list, though he actually 

fell down upon Colonel 's daughter who had the 

fever, while attempting to feel her pulse ! She died, poor 
girl, and no wonder. Those men got off by the spirit of 
quibbling; the honour of the medical profession, and, 
what I care more for, the safety of the soldiers was sacri- 
ficed in one instance, not by this judge-advocate who is 
not troubled with the law rage, but by the quibbling 
members of the court. 



VII. 

Compressed Observations on the necessity of restoring Cor- 
poral Punishment in the Indian Army. 

I have long considered the flogging question as regards 
native troops, and my opinion is fixed. I entirely concur 
in the governor-generaPs remarks upon the orders of Lord 
Combermere, General Barnes, and Lord William Bentinck. 
The abolishing flogging was a great mistake and injurious 
to the Indian army. Discharge from the service is not 
the greatest punishment to a bad sepoy, though it is to a 
good one. And it is severe to give that highest punish- 
ment — made more terrible and disgraceful by hard labour 
in irons along with felons — to a well-drilled sepoy of 
previous good character, a man attached to our service, 
who has, perhaps only in a single instance, broken the 
rules of discipline ; a man who, born under the fiery sun 
of India, is by nature subject to flashes of passion that 
cannot be passed over but do not debase him as a man. 
It is unjust and therefore injurious, and even disgraceful 
to the military code, which thus says, ' ' I punish you in 
the highest degree, and stamp you with infamy for having 
a weakness, more or less common to all men/' These 
transgressions, chiefly ebullitions of anger, are to my 
knowledge often provoked by young officers who fre- 
quently command regiments, and by others not in com- 
mand. These gentlemen at times fancy, because they 
" passed in the languages," that they are masters of Hin- 



APPENDIX VII. 



369 



dostanee, when they cannot speak a sentence correctly; 
and if they could, the chances are a Mahratta or Guzerat 
sepoy would not understand them. In some disputes 
both grow angry. If the officer commits himself by unjust 
abuse, it passes over, unless he brings the man to trial 
and thereby exposes himself. If the private is wrong he 
is dismissed and worked in chains like a felon. There is 
now no other punishment ; and in the field scarcely this ; 
so that the power of punishing ceases when it ought to be 
most vigorous, and order becomes almost a matter of 
personal civility from the sepoy to his commander. Heally 
one is astonished how the army preserves any discipline ! 
It proves that the sepoy loves the service, and how unjust 
it is for an outbreak of temper to give a punishment so 
terrible to him. Their own expression admirably depicts 
this injustice. " If we deserve punishment flog our backs 
but do not flog our bellies." Lord William Bentinck was 
a man I loved personally, as my old and respected friend 
and commander; but he did not see the severity, I will 
almost say cruelty to the sepoy of a measure, which he 
deemed to be the reverse. 

Taking the sepoy's own prayer as the basis of our system, 
I would reward him and flog him, according to his de- 
serts — his good conduct should benefit his belly, his bad 
conduct be laid on his back. An Indian army is always in 
the field and you have no other punishment but shooting. 
In the campaign against the ameers I availed myself of 
provost-marshals to flog. Some of the newspapers called 
upon the sepoys to mutiny. I stood the risk. Had I not 
done so, and showed the Scindians they were protected on 
the spot, instead of feeling safe and being safe they would 
have been plundered, and would have assassinated every 
man who passed our sentries, and instead of bringing 
supplies would have cut off our food : thus to save the 
backs of a few marauders hundreds of good soldiers would 
have been murdered. And if the campaign had not failed 
in consequence, such hatred would have been engendered 
that at this moment we should have only the ground we 
stand upon. Instead of my riding as I am doing with a 

2 b 



370 



APPENDIX VII. 



slender escort, I should be praying for reinforcements; 
instead of chiefs arresting robbers at my command, all 
would have been in arms against me. All this was avoided 
by having at once ordered every pillager to be flogged. 
And plenty these were — I dare say not less than sixty 
were flogged the first two days. Some religious people 
said "it was unholy" forgetting that our Saviour scourged 
the money-changers in the Temple. Some attorneys' 
clerks in red coats said " it was illegal but I flogged on, 
and in less than a week the poor ryots instead of flying, 
or coming into camp to entreat protection (which I could 
only give by the lash) they met us at the entrances of the 
villages and furnished us with provisions. That some 
plunder goes on still I know ; so there does in England ; 
but the principle of protecting the people from the insults 
of armed men has been established; the people know it 
and are attached to a government which thus protects 
them. Without the use of the lash plunder would have 
raged — officers would have made personal efforts to stop 
atrocities, and what the great duke calls "the knocking- 
down system" would have prevailed, and shooting and 
hanging alone could have saved the army. 

In the courts-martial here on native soldiers, insolence 
to officers is a strong feature ; and the prisoners who in a 
moment of anger have been heedless of imprisonment 
and dismissal express deep regret when too late; but I 
think they would master their tempers had immediate 
corporal punishment awaited them. I observe that in 
nearly every case the officers and non-commissioned 
officers have fairly cautioned the offenders, but the suffer- 
ing from dismissal being in some degree remote the angry 
sepoy braves it. Formerly he loved a service which 
punished him when he deserved it, yet still kept him — 
he does not in the same degree love one which discards 
him for one fault not in itself dishonourable. In the 
former state the army was his home, but that feeling has 
been weakened by the second. 

I must take another view. The state has to be con- 
sidered as well as the culprit. The good soldier does not 



APPENDIX VII. 



371 



enter into the question at all, which is confined to culprits 
and the state. The state enlists, arms, drills, pays, and 
at an enormous cost places the culprit in presence of the 
enemy. The army exists by its discipline — all safety, all 
hope of victory depends on discipline. A wild violent 
malicious or drunken sepoy breaks through that dis- 
cipline. You cannot confine him with hard labour — that 
is impossible. Dismiss him ! He will join the enemy and 
teach him to shoot your good soldiers. But say there are 
five hundred culprits, five hundred well-drilled soldiers to 
join the foe! They will not do so. Worse and worse as far as 
humanity, justice and policy are concerned ; for they will die 
of starvation or be murdered by the enemy, and that, because 
they are still faithful to a service which rejected them ! 

I am convinced corporal punishment must be restored, 
whether the sepoys like the measure or not ; and at once, or 
the governor-genera? s observation will prove prophetic — 
"Belay tends to confirm the general order of 1835 by 
usage, and weakens the power as well as the right of 
returning to the former system of discipline." If a right 
be not exercised, it grows so weak that to exercise it 
becomes impossible ; or a tyranny which divests it of pro- 
priety and makes justice revolting. I do not agree that 
if once a sepoy works in chains with felons, dismissal 
should be a necessary consequence. I doubt the necessity. 
It is not so with us. Infamy is a matter of volition. 
I would say to the sepoys, "The state has bought you 
from yourself ; the bargain was voluntary ; it paid a great 
price for you and you shall perform your contract — you 
shall go again in irons if you do not. The road of repent- 
ance and honour is again opened for you." In same cases 
dismissal may be necessary, but it should be left to the 
commander-in-chief, when recommended by courts- 
martial. 

With regard to caste it has attained an importance 
beyond its due. I would not outrage any man's religious 
prejudices ; if he chooses to redden a stone and worship 
it, let him do so : but if, seeing I respect his prejudices, 
he goes beyond that and says, "Now worship you likewise," 

2 b 2 




372 APPENDIX VII. 

I am surely a fool to do so ; for he next will say, " I have 
drawn a circle round this stone., your house stands inside 
my circle and the god has ordered me to pull down your 
house, it is a respect due to my religion." And if I obey 
another demand will follow. But if instead of submitting 
to his absurd demand I at once punished his impertinence, 
he would have felt that I was just and not foolish. This 
appears to be our way with caste. We are meanly, unbe- 
comingly and mischievously nourishing prejudices that Ave 
ought not to pay court to, for we have abundant examples 
of the natives being ready to break through them if 
properly treated — that is to say neither insulting them nor 
permitting them to insult us. The 35th lost caste by 
their intimacy with the 13th when defending Jellalabad. 
They are attacked I understand by their own people. 
What is the result ? They glory in their friendship with 
the 13th. These natives have good sense. Insult them 
and they resist ; act upon just principles and they will go 
hand in hand with you to the end of the chapter. I see 
great danger from giving undue importance to caste, as 
I understand is done in the Bengal army. They pay, 
apparently, little attention to caste in the Bombay army. 
If a high-caste man in private life touches a low-caste man 
he is denied. If this happens in the ranks he is not 
defiled. This shows that good sense effects the object 
despite of prejudices, which ought not to be considered 
insurmountable though not to be interfered with lightly. 
The highest caste man, if he commits crimes can bear 
being flogged and will do so if administered justly, and 
that he sees we are resolved to punish him. 

The great danger of our Indian system is this. We 
keep Indian princes on their thrones and allow them to 
tyrannize under our protection, while we teach the people 
not to bear their oppressions ! The Kolapore irregular 
horse have just turned traitors ; had this happened at the 
moment flogging was restored it would have been attri- 
buted to that cause ; and that necessary punishment would 
have fallen into disrepute. This may seem a digression ; 
but I wish to show that the whole Indian fabric is inti- 



APPENDIX VII. 



373 



mately connected, and that we are in no danger from 
introducing wise measures ; but we are so from old 
measures, wise and necessary perhaps in their day, but 
dangerous now from the growth of the empire, when our 
stations are so distant, so isolated, and consequently 
weaker against sudden outbreaks by native princes. If 
flogging be objected to by the Bombay army, it might be 
dangerous to restore it until the Kolapore insurrection is 
quelled ; but from all I hear it will not be objected to 
by officers, native or European, nor by the sepoys. I had 
here an instance of how firmness acts on caste. A 64th 
mutineer, a Brahmin, refused to drink the water at 
Kurrachee which was carried to him by low-caste men : 
he said he would rather die. My answer was he might 
choose to die or live, but if he did not work I would flog 
him, and he gave no more trouble ; his plain sense told him 
that he must submit ; but had I yielded he would have 
made other demands. If the independent native princes 
are put down, their people justly ruled, and the sepoys 
punished as justly as they are paid, our hold of India 
will last for ages. 

While I thus strongly advocate corporal punishment, I 
must be clearly understood to wish its adoption only 
under very stringent rules ; such as I find in the new 
copy of the Articles of War which appear excellent ; but I 
object to the same number of lashes being given to the 
sepoy as to our soldiers ; he is a weaker man, more deli- 
cate of fibre, and has a softer skin — I think half the 
number would have equal effect. How the sepoy bears 
solitary confinement I know not, it is not used in the 
Bombay army ; but I think a month too much for 
Englishmen even in the English climate. When com- 
manding the northern district I inquired into this, and 
found magistrates, and medical men, civil and military, 
thought it too long. The sepoy is likely to bear it better 
— he eats opium and sleeps. 

The additional responsibility given to regimental com- 
manding officers by the new Articles of War makes it more 
necessary to have experienced officers in command. At 



374 



APPENDIX VII. 



present lieutenants are frequently in command of regi- 
ments, and if this evil be not remedied no rules can 
prevent the deterioration of the Indian army; exclusive 
of the danger in active service. The native officers and 
sepoys have the greatest respect for experienced officers ; 
but they cannot respect youngsters, without knowledge or 
experience, in the same degree as they do men who have 
been their instructors and protectors, men who first made 
them soldiers and have led them against the enemy. The 
young officers are anxious to learn, but like other trades 
they must serve their apprenticeships under master work- 
men. Now who is to teach them ? A brother subaltern ? 
Preposterous ! As to lieutenant-colonels, they seem never 
to be left a moment with their regiments. This is a great 
injury to the service, and it is a matter intimately con- 
nected with the judicious infliction of corporal punishment. 
It becomes more than ever important to have field officers 
at the head of regiments and they should not be changed 
as the custom is. I do not mean that a lieutenant- 
colonel is never to have any other command, but that his 
removal should be a rare occurrence. The 64th regiment 
at the execution of the mutineers was under a lieutenant ! 
a very young one ! That fact seems ominous for the 
Indian empire ! I speak with fifty years' experience of 
soldiers generally, and with two years' experience of an 
Indian army constantly in the field; a period sufficient 
for a general to learn something of the nature of his 
troops, if he is capable of learning anything — if not, a life 
spent among them would be unavailing. 

There are people in India who think differently, who 
believe bile and a knowledge of the native character is 
acquired by the same process, and that men with the 
largest livers must necessarily be the greatest generals 
and diplomatists. Without admitting this doctrine en- 
tirely, I maintain that a certain degree of age and 
experience is necessary to command a regiment, or that 
reverence with which European officers are still held by 
the native soldiers will decline- A regiment is a school 
and if it has no experienced master the army must decline, 



APPENDIX VII, 



375 



especially when the character of the people as well as the 
profession is to be taught — the Indian army's fidelity and 
efficiency depends more on its regimental officers than any 
army in the world. When a lieutenant commands, unless 
he has naturally an extraordinary character, he becomes a 
butt for his brother youngsters ; he makes mistakes from 
inexperience which become subjects of mirth for the young 
men, and of course for the sepoys. All this is injurious 
to the respect for the " sahib " character which should be 
maintained and cherished with the sepoys. I would have 
more captains, or call the present captains divisional 
captains, placing them at the head of grand divisions, or 
two companies, each company having a brevet captain or 
captain-lieutenant, so that experienced men should be at 
the head. I would let the divisional captains on parade 
be posted in front of the centre of his two companies like 
a squadron leader in the cavalry. This would be better 
than five companies with captains, and five commanded 
by subalterns ; because every sepoy would then have an 
experienced divisional captain to look up to ; I would not 
allow captains to be on the staff, but form a staff as an 
exclusive corps. In this manner having experienced and 
respected officers in regiments, I would seek to make 
corporal punishment little needed, much feared, and 
effectual in this noble army ; for better soldiers or braver 
men I never saw — superior in sobriety, equal in courage, 
and only inferior in muscular strength to our countrymen. 
This appears to me, as far as I am capable of judging, the 
true character of the Indian army in the three presiden- 
cies, and I have had men of each under my command. I 
may be in error ; let abler men judge ; but to me it is as 
clear as the sun in the heavens, that unless the East-India 
Company keep officers of high rank at the head of their 
regiments, and more captains with companies, it will ere 
many years pass have cause for regret — native officers will 
gain influence and finally take the command. If I am 
answered "It is too expensive," I reply "It is more 
expensive to lose India." Every part of this magnificent 
army is in the highest degree interesting. It is one grand 



376 



APPENDIX Til. 



arch, the keystone of which is pay, and accordingly it is 
the best paid army in the world ; and the Company has 
a right to hold the soldier to his bargain. Nor does the 
sepoy shrink; he glories in the service and nothing bat 
unfortunate mistakes on our part will make him swerve 
from his fidelity. 

Paragraph A. The Bombay government has said that I was " unne- 
cessarily alarmed" because I complained that the remit- 
tances from the sepoys in Scinde were not duly received 
by their families in the presidencies. I differ with the 
Bombay government. It was just one of those important 
details, which might, if it was not instantly attended to 
give a dangerous shake to the fidelity of the army, espe- 
cially when mutiny had made its appearance in the Bengal 
and Madras troops. It signifies nothing, whether the 
error which caused the nonpayment arose in Scinde or 
Bombay • with our difference of opinion on that point the 
public can have no interest ; the danger was that the sepoy 
should feel a want of reliance in the faith of government, 
and be uncertain as to the fate of his family. I therefore 
took good care that he should not feel this ; and that 
the moment that a mistake arose he should see that the 
supreme government — the Bombay government, and the 
Scinde government — were all at work to correct the evil. 
I made a great stir about the matter purposely, that the 
sepoy should feel safe ; and I would do the same thing 
again, so far from thinking I was unnecessarily alarmed. 
It is utterly impossible to be too cautious in such a case — 
the second I have had to complain of, since I came to 
India, and in both I have had thorough support from Sir 
George Arthur, the governor. The first took place before 
his arrival ; but when he came he at once took the matter 
in hand; and I believe (for I left Poonah), satisfied the 
sepoys of the 24th N.I. whom I found in a state of extreme 
indignation and very justly so. Thus in the short space 
of three years I have tioice seen the sepoys very much 
wronged in the most important of all points and this, not 
by the supreme government, for the Company is generous in 
the extreme to its troops, but from the neglect of individuals. 



APPENDIX VIII. 



377 



All this proves that officers of experience must be with 
regiments and companies, and I strongly recommend this 
reform when the re-adoption of corporal punishment is 
promulgated, as a matter of precaution ; but I repeat that 
in the Bombay army the general opinion is that measure 
will be popular with all ranks. 

On reading the account of the battle of Maharajahpoore 
I was struck, by finding that many of our sepoys' rela- 
tions came from the enemy to see them the day before the 
action. Those men fought us the next day and were 
enemies because they were too short for our ranks, in 
which I presume they would otherwise have been! I 
could not help reverting to Napoleon's plan of voltigeur 
battalions for men of under-size. 

I do not know whether I shall be thought to have 
written sense or nonsense ; but I have done my best to 
understand the Indian army ; and if my zeal has drawn 
from me a more extended opinion than I was called upon 
to give I hope to be forgiven for the honest motive. 



VIII. 

Memoranda on the Baggage of an Army. Addressed to 
Lord Ellenborough. 

Hyderabad, 18th May, 1843. 

In acknowledging your lordship's letter of the 12th 
April, which letter reached me last night, I have to observe 
that your lordship refers to suggestions, relating to a 
camel corps, contained in some letter I have never received. 
With regard to the other observations with which I have 
been honoured, and also the report of Sir W. Nott which 
I have attentively read, I must agree with that officer as 
to the difficulty of making a report beyond the confined 
limits of one's immediate experience. I will therefore 
without further preamble lay before your lordship the 
results of my own experience during the campagn I have 
served in India ; for in the Peninsula we used a superior 
animal to the camel, that is to say the mule. 



378 



APPENDIX VIII. 



The Camel. 

This animal seems to be the favourite beast of burden 
in these provinces ; and one more unfitted for military 
purposes can scarcely be imagined. His faults are. 

1°. He is extremely delicate in his constitution. 

2°. He is liable to diseases the treatment of which appears 
to be but little understood ; for if the camel grows ill from 
fatigue or any other cause, the cessation of that cause 
seems to have no effect in producing a recovery. The 
horse or the mule when exhausted by fatigue is quickly 
recovered by rest. Not so the camel, he grows daily 
weaker and weaker, he expresses his sufferings by the 
most piteous groans and in a short time dies in spite of 
every care. 

3°. He requires an immense time to feed, and in 
military movements it is frequently impossible to give 
him this time, and always difficult in an enemy's country ; 
for it is immediately after a march when everybody is 
fatigued that the camel requires his nourishment and the 
camel-driver feels least disposed to attend to his wants. 

4°. The least wet completely impedes his march in 
clayey ground ; his soft foot slips in moisture ; his long 
unwieldy hind legs split widely asunder, and the weight 
on his back prevents his recovering his position, both 
his hip joints are dislocated in an instant, the great force 
of his muscles prevents the possibility of setting the 
dislocated joints and the animal is lost. The smallest 
ditch after a shower of rain is sufficient to stop the 
baggage of an army for many hours. The baggage arrives 
late, and daylight is nearly gone before the animal can be 
turned out to graze. If his grazing-ground be at a con- 
siderable distance, and an enemy in the neighbourhood, 
it is impossible to send him to it, and he goes four-and- 
twenty, perhaps six-and- thirty hours without food, except 
such as may be carried with the troops, which enormously 
increases the number of animals and the difficulty of 
making military movements. 

5°. In mountainous and in rocky ground the camel 
appears to me unfit to carry burdens ; I have remarked, on 



APPENDIX VIII. 



379 



all occasions, when ascending a hill he is frequently 
obliged to stop for want of breath, and unless rest is thus 
given him he cannot pass mountains without being dis- 
tressed in an extraordinary degree, I discovered this 
when watching the progress of the camel battery over 
steep sand-hills. They did not exhibit the same evidence 
of suffering that a horse does. There was no panting, no 
apparent want of breath, but the animals suddenly became 
powerless and apparently unable to move. After a few 
moments^ rest they recovered, and again put forth their 
strength. Their soft feet are quite uncalculated for rocky 
ground and prevent their exertion. 

6°. The length of the animal, and the slowness of 
his movements, when loaded, make the baggage cover 
an enormous space of ground, and demand, when in 
presence of an enemy, an immense force to guard it. 
Such appear to me to be the natural defects of the 
camel as a military beast of burden and they cannot be 
remedied. 

Ill-treatment of the Camel. 

Under ill-usage the camel quickly succumbs, and he 
always receives it in some one of the following ways, 
generally speaking in all conjoined. 

1°. The proper load for a camel is in these countries 
from 200 to 300 pounds weight. It is impossible accu- 
rately to estimate the load of a camel, but the average 
may be taken at 250 lbs. Now this is invariably exceeded. 
I have frequently detected 800 and even 900 lbs. weight 
upon a camel. The sepoy has no mercy upon these 
animals, nor have the Europeans much, and the latter 
are even more violent in their treatment of the animal 
afterwards : they constantly beat them ferociously and 
tear out the cartilages of their noses. Naturally of a 
gentle disposition he pines and dies under this mal- 
treatment. 

2°. He is never sufficiently nourished. 

3°. He rarely gets sufficient rest. 

4°. His drivers are generally of the lowest and most 
brutal description of persons. 



380 



APPENDIX VIII. 



5°. Owing to ignorance or carelessness, Lis load is ill 
put on, and few things destroy the power of the camels 
sooner than an ill-balanced load, for the length of his 
leg becomes a powerful lever to distress him when the 
load is on one side. 

Such are the evils, natural and artificial under which 
those unhappy animals labour, when pressed into the 
military service. Let us now inquire into their few 
perfections. 

1°. He goes longer without water than the horse or 
the mule. 

2°. In Scinde, and other countries where the tamarisk 
and other shrubs of which he is fond abound, he is 
easily fed and it is not necessary to carry forage, as is 
always necessary for the horse and frequently for the 
mule. 

3°. In the sandy desert for which the conformation 
of his feet seems peculiarly fitted, he is perhaps more 
valuable than the horse or the mule ; he does not suffer 
much from extreme heat, and if fairly loaded, not hurried, 
and well fed, he is capable of making long marches with- 
out suffering. For example, when I marched to Eruaum- 
ghur the camels of the camel battery performed their 
work well. It was very severe, but I increased their 
rations, they were carefully attended to by Captain 
Whittie, and more camels were put to each gun than was 
allowed by the constitution of the battery. Had I adhered 
to the regulations with regard to food and number of 
camels to each gun, the batteiy would never have reached 
Emaumghur. If this battery had been drawn by horses we 
must have carried forage for them, the number of animals 
would have been immensely increased, we should not have 
had water sufficient for them, and the enterprise would 
have been rendered much more difficult, if not altogether 
impracticable. Here then the camel was in his element 
and did his work well. 

Having now stated as far as I have been personally able 
to judge, the advantages and disadvantages of the camel 
as applicable to military carriage, the next point to be 



APPENDIX VIII. 



381 



considered is, what ordinances are necessary to render his 
good qualities as efficient as possible, and render his 
natural deficiencies less inconvenient. I am convinced, 
and long ago wrote a memoir on this subject, that the 
baggage of an army can never be rendered properly move- 
able even in Europe or America, still less in India, unless 
it is formed into a corps perfectly organized. It was with 
great satisfaction therefore that I found your lordship was 
disposed to such a project. It applies to every country, 
every army and every climate. It is a general principle 
by which most difficulties regarding baggage may be 
removed, and all of them reduced and made comparatively 
trifling. I am not aware of anything which would better 
exemplify the advantages which arise from the division of 
labour. 

The baggage of an army is perfectly susceptible of being 
reduced to order ; but for that purpose a base of rigid 
organization must be thoroughly established. How can 
such an organization be produced among a thousand 
camels, uncouth camel-drivers, sepoys, servants, all assem- 
bled on a dark morning at three or four o' clock, jostling, 
shouting, fighting for places, the baggage-master hoarse 
with useless roaring to people who do not mind the least 
what he says — and exposed perhaps to the attacks of 
insolent camp-followers. How can any order or system 
be introduced by him into such a mass of wild confusion, 
and introduced too within the space of half an hour 
allowed for the baggage to assemble and march ? The 
thing is utterly impossible and the consequence is that 
the movements of the army are impeded, the duties of the 
baggage guard most fatiguing to the troops, and the 
baggage itself liable to be cut off, or which is worse driven 
in among the troops producing a great risk of general con- 
fusion and defeat. The fact is that a general officer's 
character when he commands an Indian army is greatly 
endangered by the baggage, the great mass of which, and 
the immense number of followers, if they are driven upon 
the fighting men, is quite sufficient to produce total 
defeat. 



382 



APPENDIX VIII. 



The organization required is to form a corps of camels, 
horses, mules, bullocks, and donkeys, the division of which 
is an arrangement of detail for after-consideration. But 
I shall here speak of camels only as being the chief 
beast of burden with an Indian army ; and sufficient to 
exemplify the principle. The " corps of camels," then, 
should have its colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants, 
ensigns (for it especially requires standards), non-com- 
missioned officers and privates, the latter being also the 
camel-drivers. All these should be armed, and I should 
say that the proportion would be as much as two to every 
camel, of whom, on the line of march, one should lead two 
camels, and one form their guard. These minor matters, 
however, are details for future arrangement, and must 
vary according to the state of the country, its formation 
and the description of roads. 

The next point to be considered is the arrangement of 
the baggage itself. An order should be issued prohibiting 
the use of any other than a regulation form of box, of 
bed, of table, of chair, and of every article carried by officers 
or private soldiers in the field, or indeed at any time ; for 
in peace, if an officer wishes to have an inordinate quantity 
of baggage let him send it by whatever means would be 
open to him were he a private gentleman, but it is not just 
that the public service should be hampered by their trum- 
pery. The size, the weight, the form, the number of every 
article in the officer's or private soldier's possession would 
be at once ascertained by the practised eye of the officers 
and non-commissioned officers of the camel corps; they 
would immediately detect the slightest irregularity, and 
on the roadside burn the extraneous article, taking care 
to inform the owner at the end of the day's march that a 
portion of his baggage had been burned. The halter for the 
camel, the string by which he is led, and his saddle should 
all be minutely according to regulation, and the last should 
be made so as to admit of a man being carried together with 
the baggage ; for preparation should be made beforehand 
that in case a temporary exertion should be demanded of 
the camel on an emergency to carry sick or tired men, 



APPENDIX VIII. 



383 



the increased weight may be placed without deranging the 
equilibrium of the baggage. 

The advantages of such an organization seem to be as 
follows. 

At the hour appointed the drilled officers and non-com- 
missioned officers conduct their detachments of camels to the 
head-quarters of the regiments to which they are respec- 
tively attached; there the servants of the officers await 
them and are ready to guide the privates who conduct 
and guard the camels to their masters' tents, where the 
officers deliver their baggage and that of their companies 
to the drivers ; the whole being according to regulation 
and made to fit in a particular form on the back of the 
animal ; each article has its particular and well-known 
place and the whole is packed in an instant however dark 
the night may be. The soldier camel- drivers then return 
to the head-quarters of the regiment, where their officers 
await their coming and assemble them by some peculiar 
signal of trumpet or drum. From thence they march to 
the " rendezvous" where the superior officers arrange 
them in that formation which a habit of doing their work 
has taught them to be most suitable to the description of 
country through which they are marching. The whole is 
systematic and methodical, no time is lost; the camels 
are not unnecessarily harassed, the loads are all of an 
equal weight and that weight suited to the power of the 
weakest camel and balanced with precision ; the march is 
liable to no interruptions, or difficulties greatly beyond 
that which would attend the march of the troops them- 
selves ; and the steady pace of the camel would generally 
enable the commander to ascertain with precision the 
moment of arrival. A small body of cavalry would then be 
sufficient guard, for if the baggage were attacked it could 
throw itself into squares, the animals kneeling down 
with their heads towards the centre ; (a position in which 
I ordered them to be placed at Meeanee) and form a living 
redoubt of great strength ; for from behind the baggage 
a fire would be kept up by the baggage-men, and no 
cavalry could reach them with their swords. 



384 



APPENDIX VIII. 



The certainty of the hour at which they would reach 
the encamping-ground would prevent the soldiers being 
detained in the sun and waiting for their tents; each 
company or section of camels would at once proceed to 
the several departments and regiments, and in an instant 
they would be unloaded by the camp-followers and at 
once marched to their grazing-grounds, instead of being 
detained (as they now are) for many hours after arriving 
at the encamping-ground. Thus they would have the 
whole day to feed, they would be attended to by their 
respective officers and drivers, instead of what happens 
under the present system, and which I have myself 
detected fifty times at least, viz. That the idle driver of 
a government camel, afraid of being flogged for losing the 
animal, goes into the jungle, ties him fast by the nose to 
a small bush (which the poor brute devours in five 
minutes) and goes to sleep, leaving the animal to fast till 
the guard of cavalry which is scattered all over the jungle 
drives them home at night. The commissary, supposing 
very naturally that the beast has been feeding all these 
hours and having other duties himself, is unable to attend 
to the camels and prevent such villanies. Here the " divi- 
sion of labour" would act with its wonted force to the 
advantage of the camel. 

When order, method, responsibility, are fairly introduced 
into a body of men, a moral feeling also arises, and instead 
of the base, thieving, cowardly crew which now form the 
mob called the baggage of an army, the camel corps, 
systematic and orderly, would feel proud of their work and 
courageously defend it too in case of need; and the general 
of an army could with safety detach his baggage to a consi- 
derable distance without danger. He would be sure that 
it would accompany him in the most rapid movements, 
for its commander and his officers, perfectly acquainted 
with the relative strength of their animals, would on all 
occasions of emergency make a temporary distribution of 
the loads, relieving the feeble camel without distressing 
the strong one; the sick camel would be also at- 
tended to. 



APPENDIX VIII. 



385 



I believe that the loss of camels in the force which I 
have commanded in the present campaign is considered 
to be exceedingly small. I do not think in the whole five 
months that we conld have lost 150 camels altogether; 
and when it is considered that they were chiefly composed 
of miserable animals, nearly worn out in Affghanistan, 
this number I am told may be considered as nothing. 
I attribute it in a great measure to my endeavour to 
approximate as much as possible to the system I have 
proposed, namely, attaching the baggage-master the pro- 
vost-marshal and the commissary as much as possible 
to the baggage on the line of march, and ordering them 
to flog without mercy the camel-drivers and camp-fol- 
lowers who were disobedient. I also ordered the baggage- 
master to burn all baggage which was over the weight, 
yet in spite of this I more than six times found camels 
loaded with eight hundred-weight and even upwards ! As 
matters now stand, fire is the only thing to deal with 
baggage in an Indian army, and the only way to preserve 
the camel from overloading — no activity and zeal can 
supply the want of regulation, and no regulation can be 
applied except by means of a camel corps. 

There is another advantage in a camel corps which I 
have not yet mentioned. You are always secure of the 
efficiency of your carriage, whereas on the campaign in 
which I am now engaged this is by no means the case. 
The influence of the ameers nearly crippled my operations 
about ten days before the battle of Meeanee. The con- 
tractor's house and family fell into the hands of Nusseer 
Khan at Shikarpoore, and he had made his contract with 
us when Shikarpoore was occupied by a British force. 
The result was, that on the day when he was to have 
furnished 1,000 camels only 170 were forthcoming, and 
during the two nights previous to the battle of the 24th of 
March about 200 of the hired camel-drivers disappeared : 
such accidents as these are severe trials upon the moral 
courage of a commander. With regard to bullocks and 
other beasts of burden the same principles will apply, 

2 c 



386 



APPENDIX IX. 



namely : systematic arrangement to insure justice to the 
animals and orderly movement. 

I will send a copy of this memoir to Captain Thomas in 
order that he may make any remarks which his ability and 
experience may prompt, though I am inclined to think 
he will agree with me in what I propose, for the subject 
has long been a matter of much reflection. 

It does not appear to me that the system I propose is 
in any way influenced by locality, because it is entirely 
based upon the principle of doing justice to the animal, 
which saves their lives, and consequently diminishes the 
difficulty of supply and the expense produced by an 
increased demand, which of course raises the value of the 
animal. 

The whole subject seems to me to be one of great sim- 
plicity, but whether or not I have succeeded in stating my 
ideas clearly I cannot say. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 



IX. 

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ripon. 

Bhoogtee Hills, 7th February, 1845. 

Prize-money, — I enclose to your lordship a direct 
application from myself, (to the lords of the Treasury) 
though I confess I feel a dislike to do so after having been 
deliberately, and I will say, most atrociously accused in the 
House of Commons by Lord Howick, of having sacrificed 
the lives of thousands of my fellow-creatures, and amongst 
the rest many of my brother officers and intimate friends, 
from the infamous desire of getting prize-money, which 
neither I nor any man in my army could have expected. 
Who could have expected such a victory as Meeanee in 
its results ? Who expected the unconditional surrender 
of Hyderabad? However it is idle to occupy you with 
refutations of Lord Howick's accusation. 

My interest is so united with that of the troops that we 
go together, and her Majesty will decide what is proper. 



APPENDIX X. 



387 



I must do what you think just for the sake of others, 
though it has the awkward addition of being personal and 
will of course be said so by the public. Having nothing 
but what I have saved from my salary, since I came to 
India, I am not so hypocritical, or so foolish, as to deny 
that I should be very glad to have prize-money; but I 
assure you, Lord Ripon, that I have thought very little 
about it, being quite satisfied that whatever share I had in 
the conquest of Scinde has been amply rewarded by the 
grand cross and the approbation of government. 

Your lordship says, you conclude the batta issued must 
be considered part of the prize-money. I am no judge of 
these matters, but I know that the men who fought will 
not be at all satisfied to have the batta issued to regiments 
which were not in Scinde (78th, 86th and many native 
regiments) deducted from their prize-money. The whole 
force reckoned that the batta was given to cover their loss 
of health from the unexpected and unparalleled epidemic, 
in which hardly a man of 16,000 escaped suffering in 
health. If the batta be deducted it would I imagine be 
only so much of it as was paid to the troops of Meeanee 
and Hyderabad. Whether we have a right to prize-money 
I put aside as a distinct question, to be decided by her 
Majesty. But if we are to have it, the division should 
I think be made as it would have been on the field of battle. 
Extend the principle of deducting batta given to troops who 
neither made the capture, nor preserved it, nor were in 
Scinde at all until long after the treasure was in Bombay, 
and I do not see where a line is to be drawn. The 
batta of the whole Indian army might with equal justice 
be deducted ! In a few words. The Company takes the 
prize-money to cover its military expenditure. 



X. 

Hill Campaign. — My last letter informed your lord- 
ship that I was preparing to attack the enemy. You 
will ere this reaches you have heard that we made a 

2 c 2 



388 



APPENDIX X. 



most successful one, and as the details will reach you 
officially I will not enter on them here. I am now 
following up my attack with very great difficulty. The 
robbers will I fear retire within the Mooltan frontier 
which I dare not enter. Any military man will tell you 
that a warfare amongst arid sandy deserts and barren 
mountains, and against the inhabitants of those mountains, 
is one of the most difficult that can be made and 
requires the greatest caution. To enter the defiles of 
these mountains is not possible without making the 
means of retreat secure. To get intelligence of the enemy 
is all but impossible, and to catch him quite so, if the 
Mooltan people admit him. 

Believe me, my Lord Bipon, that the Punjaub must be 
conquered. I am hostile to the extension of territory 
beyond the Sutlej on principle, but I am satisfied that 
we must go into the Punjaub. Lord Howick will say I 
want to go there for prize-money ; but I do not ; I can 
hardly bear the fatigues of war. I do not want to go to 
the Punjaub, yet I apply the words of Cato — the Punjaub 
is the Indian " Carthago/ 3 only it must be conquered not 
destroyed ! Its present state will, amongst other and 
greater evils, force you to keep 10,000 men in Scinde 
more than the occupation of Scinde requires. I positively 
deny that I love war and want to see wars ; I am most 
unjustly accused ; but I do know that unless the Court 
of Directors are very careful they will some day find, that 
in endeavouring to make a show of peace they will be 
doing what unskilful surgeons often do — heal the skin and 
leave a sinus full of matter beneath. Look at the state of 
the Mahratta country at this moment. How is it possible 
to suppose that we can be safe, while native princes are 
left on their thrones within our territories. Outside ! Yes ! 
That is a distinct case. I hope to put many regiments at 
Sir Henry's disposal after I finish this war, which I hope 
to do within a fortnight ; but who dare prophesy in such 
a war as this ? 



APPENDIX XI. 



389 



XI. 

Names of the Volunteers from the YSth Regiment who 
Scaled the Rocks of Trukkee 8th March, 1845. 
Sergeant John Power — Reached the top^Was slightly 
wounded. 

Corporal Thomas Waters — Did not quite reach the top 
— Two medals. 

Private John Kenny — Did not quite reach the top — 
Three medals. 

Private John Acton — Reached the top — Slew three 
enemies — Killed — Two medals. 

Private Robert Adair — Reached the top — Slew two 
enemies — Killed — Two medals. 

Private Hugh Dunlap — Reached the top — Slew two 
enemies — Killed . 

Private Patrick Fallon — Reached the top — Killed — 
Two medals. 

Private Samuel Lowrie — Reached the top — Slew the 
enemy's commander and another — Killed — Two medals. 

Private William Lovelace — Reached the top — Killed. 

Private Anthony Burke — Reached the top — Slew three 
enemies — Two medals. 

Private Bartholomew Rohan — Reached the top — Slew 
an enemy — Severely wounded — Two medals. 

Private John Maloney* — Reached the top — Slew two 
enemies — Saved Burke and Rohan — Severely wounded — 
Two medals. 

Private George Campbell — Reached the top — Slew two 
enemies. 

Private Philip Fay — Did not quite reach the top— 
Two medals. 

Private Mark Davis — Did not quite reach the top — 
Two medals. 

* John Maloney was wounded with his own bayonet after he had 
driven it through a Beloochee, for the latter unfixed it, drew it out 
of his own body, stabbed Maloney and fell dead ! 



390 



APPENDIX XIII. 



Private Charles Hawthorne — Did not quite reach the 
top — Two medals. 

Sepoy Ramzan Ahier — Did not quite reach the top. 



XII. 

Extract of a Letter from Sir Roderick Murchison, upon 
the Geological Specimens collected in the Cutchee Hills 
by Captain Vicary during Sir C. Napier's Campaign. 

I return the report of Captain Vicary on the geolo- 
gical features of the Beloochistan hills, the reading of 
which produced much interest and a good discussion at 
the Geological Society. It was curious to ohserve that 
among the camel-load of fossil shells sent here by Sir 
C. Napier several specimens are perfectly identical with 
fossils of the uppermost beds of the chalk in the Pyrenees ; 
thus the age of the chief ranges of Beloochistan, and also 
I believe of Affghanistan, has been for the first time 
determined. 



XIII. 

Letters to the Governor of Bombay touching Forged and 
Stolen Letters published by Dr. Buist. 

Kurrachee, 13th August, 1845. 

To the Governor of Bombay. 
Honourable Sir, — The Bombay Times of the 23rd 
July has published a letter to the governor-general of 
India in council, and to this has affixed my name. Sir, 
I never sent such a letter to the governor-general ; nor 
any letter on the same subject to his excellency. I 
therefore enclose to your honour in council an affidavit 
to that effect, and request that the editor of the Bombay 
Times may be prosecuted for the forgery of a state paper, 
and for affixing my name to the same ; or that such other 
steps may be taken as your honour in council may deem 
to be the proper course to punish the delinquent, and to 
insure the integrity of the public offices against the 



APPENDIX XIII. 391 

corrupt influence of the Bombay Times. If the editor 
gives up the name of his informant, and that he is in 
Schide, I will either try him by a general court-martial 
here, or send him a prisoner to Bombay, as the law 
officers judge most proper. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 

The Governor of Bombay 
in Council. 



Extract of a Letter to the Governor -General. 

16th November, 1845. 

I do not understand what the verbose letter of the 
Bombay government means. A state paper is stolen. It 
is found in the Bombay Times. Surely the proprietors of" 
that paper can be called upon to say where they got it ? 
It is like any other description of property, inviolable ! 
My reason for never sending you the letter in question 
was a good one. Captain Powell commanding the Indian 
flotilla told me he thought it would give offence to the 
navy, for they did not like orders issued to them through 
a military orderly-book. I therefore thought it better not 
to risk making the seamen discontented, as the great 
object is to work well together ; but to my surprise I saw 
my letter in the Bombay Times, as having been sent to you ! 
Whereas it is a draft and is in my own possession now ! 

It is very clear that now the Bombay Times can get, and 
will get, any paper he wants if it leaves my writing-box, 
or perhaps the editor can reach it there — I may leave 
my key out of my pocket accidentally. 

By Mr. Lemessurier's doctrine any secret state paper 
may be published with impunity, provided that it really 
was authentic and had been written. The mode by which 
it was obtained and who obtained it appears to be a 
matter of no importance. I am pretty certain that I 
know the man who stole the paper, and so does Powell ; 
but we have no proofs and the Bombay government will 
not make the Bombay Times tell. Its own editor boasts 
of its connection with government — -see Mr. Buist's letter — 
but I believe he told no secret. 



392 



APPENDIX XIV. 



XIV. 

Letter to the Governor -General relative to Lieutenant- 
Colonel Outran? s published slanders. 

3rd August, 1845. 

Right Honourable Sir, — Captain Outram, a brevet 
lieutenant-colonel in the service of the Honourable Com- 
pany, has published a libel reflecting on my character as 
governor of Scinde ; and has added the monstrous accusa- 
tion that I caused the destruction of her Majesty's 78th 
regiment. 

I shall not trouble your excellency in council by the 
detail and easy refutation of the mis-statements delibe- 
rately published by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram ; but I am 
ready to do so. I simply send a copy of that part of his 
production which has reached me. 

I have not either by word or deed, privately or publicly 
given to this officer any cause for hostility. 

His libel professes to be an answer to a work published 
by my brother Major- General Napier. Now, I in Asia 
am assuredly not answerable for what another man 
publishes in Europe ! I may consider such a publication 
to be good or bad, eloquent and true; or vulgar and false; 
but I cannot be responsible for it. 

Even if Lieutenant-Colonel Outram were to form the 
tribunal before which general officers are to be dragged 
like criminals to receive judgment, I could not in the 
present circumstances be amenable to his, or any juris- 
diction ; for not only was General Napier's book written 
at such a distance as to be beyond the reach of consulta- 
tion, but it has only been read by me within forty- 
eight hours ; and the work altogether contains a mass 
of matter on which I was previously but imperfectly 
informed. 

My whole conduct as regards Lieutenant-Colonel Outram 
is explained in the two Blue-books on Scinde. It was 
direct — open-^official — and public ! In short I can only 
attribute this officer's hostility to me, and the untruths 



APPENDIX XIV. 



393 



which he states, to that malicious blind vindictiveness 
which we frequently see arise from disappointed self-suffi- 
ciency acting on feeble intellects. I had preserved an 
army, and the Blue-books contain the proof, that had 
I attended to the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, 
that army would have been annihilated. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Outram is responsible for what he 
puts his name to. I am responsible for what I put my 
name to, and General N apier is responsible for what he 
puts his name to ; but none of us are responsible for what 
another man writes. 

I therefore formally demand through your excellency in 
council the protection of her Majesty's government, and 
that of the Honourable Court of Directors, against the 
libels of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram. 

I have served with faith, zeal, and hitherto with unusual 
success, and always in strict obedience to the orders of the 
supreme government of India. 1 have devoted myself to 
the honour and glory of her Majesty's and the Company's 
troops ; and more especially to that part forming a part of 
the Bombay army with which I am intimately connected, 
both as my companions in arms and by private friendship ; 
yet a captain in that army, a man whose ignorance was 
nearly causing its destruction, has with unprovoked malice 
put forth these * * * * * and scurrilities. If I had given 
this officer any cause of complaint, redress through the 
proper channel was open to him ; as it is to every officer 
and soldier in the Queen's and Company's service. 

I have up to the present moment received the marked 
approbation of her Majesty, the Parliament, the British 
Government, the Court of Directors and the supreme 
government in India. But it is impossible for any man to 
command a military force if a captain in the army, of which 
that force forms a portion, is thus openly and foully to 
traduce and hold up such general officer to the scorn and 
contempt of the troops under his orders. 

I do not complain, Honourable Sir, of the effect of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram' s publication on the troops 
generally, because they know me too well for such * * * * * 



394 



APPENDIX XV. 



to do much harm, or produce any other result than 
that of contempt for the writer. Yet in particular cases, 
it may do mischief ; for what are the poor Highlanders to 
think, when in their barracks at Poona they read the 
gross * * * * * adduced as having been uttered by me to 
the disparagement of their noble regiment? And when 
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram tells them in print, that their 
general is more ignorant than any subaltern of five years' 
standing under his command, and that he recklessly 
destroyed their comrades. 

I have the honour, &c. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 



XV. 

Extract from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the 
Governor- General. 

7th November, 1845. 

We have received our medals, sent to us amongst the 
commissariat stores as a bale of goods, without ribands or 
any means of hanging them on our breasts! As Lord Ripon 
has taken nearly three years to prepare them they might 
have been finished ! Those I received from Bengal came 
in a more gentleman-like way from the commander-in- 
chief, and through the adjutant-general — the orthodox 
channel. Lieutenant-Colonel Penefather sent me mine, and 
some officers here received theirs through private hands 
long before ! Indeed it was from them I first heard of the 
arrival of the medals. Those gentlemen were annoyed 
and brought their medals to me. However all this is 
Bombay style, and don't much signify, or rather does not 
signify at all. 

Compressed Extracts from a Letter addressed by Sir 
C. Napier to the Governor-General, touching the secret 
schemes of the Ameers and their women. 

9th September, 1845. 

I have traced a correspondence between Shere Mohamed 
(the Lion) and Shadad at Surat, and the channel is the 



APPENDIX XV. 



395 



zenana of the ameers, which is entirely governed by a 
man named Mirza Koosroo, a very violent man. When 
going through the zenana in the fortress to give up the 
treasure there to the prize agents, Mirza made all sorts of 
difficulties — no blame to him — to give time for the abs- 
traction of treasure by the departing ladies. He stopped 
every moment and began disputing with the agents, and 
when an attending havildar said " Come, come," and took 
Koosroo by the arm but without violence, the latter seized 
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson by the throat and tried 
to choke him. He was made a prisoner, and the Bombay 
Times said / flogged him cruelly. I did .not flog him at 
all ! I sent for him, and telling him such conduct would 
not do set him free again. This admonition was the only 
punishment he received ; but a sepoy seeing McPherson 
so handled was going to put his bayonet into Mirza and 
McPherson saved him. He was left by the ameers 
in charge of their intrigues, together with Noor's widow 
Kurreem. She gave seven lacs to Nusseer for the war, 
and took, it is said, and was said at the time, six lacs 
from the fortress. I however refused to let her baggage 
be overhauled. 

From information, I have now arrested a slave named 
Mayboob. In this man's secret box and a bag were found 
about 3,000 rupees in gold mohurs, with other articles — 
one a rich hilt of lapis lazuli belonging to the ameers. 
We also traced his intercourse with Shadad, and found 
in his box a letter from Shere Mohamed. Mayoob says 
the gold belonged to Mirza Koosroo, and he says it 
belongs to the ladies, who, we can prove, have before 
through the same channel sent to Shadad 8,000 rupees, or 
some such sum. I have given all the money to the ladies. 
We found a quantity of the richest Cashmere shawls and 
silks, which there is little doubt were abstracted from the 
treasury of the ameers " the Toshkhana." These I also 
gave back, as the washermen, on whom they were detected 
said they were presents from the ameers, and that was 
possible though not probable as the amount is so large. 
One of these men had given his three daughters to 



396 



APPENDIX XV. 



Nusseer Khan, and the other, a handsome man, is sup- 
posed to have been Shadad' s. * * * * * 
I thought it right to return the articles as not becoming 
in government to doubt the generosity of their highnesses 
for such favours, or to go into an examination of such 
matters. 

The correspondence of Shere Mohamed with the ex- 
ameer Shadad is another affair. By all I hear the latter lives 
quite familiarly with the officers and is under no restraint 
whatever. I have written to Sir Gr. Arthur about this, 
because we should have mischief if this villain is allowed 
to lay his train. I wish he was removed to Bengal, where 
he would be properly watched and out of reach ; and as 
Mirza Koosroo was a Persian slave I think it would be 
wise to send him to the ameers. The ladies flatly refuse 
to leave Scinde and will continue to intrigue, and if I take 
the least step to prevent it no terms will be bad enough 
to describe me ! Some other information, crossing upon 
that which led to what I have discovered, makes me fear 
Ali Moorad is not going on right. I do not think he is 
doing any actual mischief, but I suspect he is carrying on 
some correspondence with people to the west. He is 
watched and I shall give him advice, if I find cause, and 
plain speaking steadies him for a short time. But he 
has got some bad counsellors, who are not friends to the 
Feringhees on religious grounds. 

I hope it will be practicable to put Shadad in some 
fortress in Bengal ; it is not good to keep him in a presi- 
dency where all but the governor himself, think and tell 
him he is a martyr, and not a felon. 

There does not appear the remotest symptom of any 
jagheerdars, much less of the people, having been mixed up 
with these things ; indeed from first to last it has been 
clear they never liked the ameers nor cared whether they 
were dethroned or hanged. The Scindees and Hindoos 
hated them, and the Beloochees were indifferent. Every 
Beloochee looked to the immediate chief of his tribe, 
and those chiefs thinking our object was to despoil them 
fought : finding this erroneous they are quite satisfied ! 



APPENDIX XVI. 



397 



This as far as we strangers can judge seems to be the real 
state of the case, and it is the opinion of all the Europeans 
in Scinde. If we are wrong the Beloochees must be the 
most expert conspirators to deceive both us and the 
Hindoos ! The hill campaign was a strong test. The 
Punjaub war, if it takes place, will be another and a 
stronger one. 



XVI. 

Letters to the Widow of the Ameer Noor Mohamed. 

17th October, 1846. 

Lady, — You asked me to let you send four men to the 
ex-ameer Shadad, and you said they were to bear letters 
and a few clothes which you specified. I had reason to 
believe you were also sending a large sum of money to the 
ameer. This very much surprised me on three accounts. 
First because you did not mention to me that you were 
sending money — secondly because you must be well aware 
that large sums of money are not allowed to be sent to 
state prisoners except through government — thirdly I 
was surprised, because, not long ago you and the other 
ladies stated to me that you were starving. Now lady, I 
had your men stopped, and the police found a large sum of 
money in bars of gold and coins of gold and silver in their 
possession, which you were sending and which I have 
ordered to be safely returned to you, and also your letters 
unopened. As your instructions about the money, if such 
instructions they contain, may require to be altered, your 
fresh letters, or those returned, shall be forwarded for 
you to the ameer, but no treasure shall be sent to him 
except through, and with the knowledge of, government. 

C. Napier, Governor. 

28th October, 1846. 

Madam, — I understand and approve of your feelings for 
your son. I did not object to your sending him money, 
but to your sending money clandestinely, for it was con- 
cealed in a bag of rice ; and to your telling me you were 



398 



APPENDIX XVII. 



starving, when in addition to the handsome allowance paid 
to you by the Honourable the East-India Company, you 
had means of sending large sums constantly to the ameer 
Shadad ; for you know and I know it is not the first time. 
This money shall be sent to your son if the governor- 
general pleases, and if you wish I will ask his leave, but I 
cannot allow money to be sent in large quantities without 
the permission of the governor- general. The ameer is not 
kept in poverty, and allow me to say you know this per- 
fectly well ; and you also know, and all Hyderabad knows, 
how the English general was to have been treated by your 
son had the former been so unfortunate as to fall into 
your son's hands ! You know well Madam that I have 
always treated and shall always treat you and the other 
ladies with proper respect and honour, both because you 
are women and because your husbands and 'sons are 
prisoners. Your sons are fed and protected by govern- 
ment, and I regret to be obliged to differ with a lady 
when she asserts what I know to be inaccurate. I cannot 
allow the government I serve to be accused unjustly ; I 
do not know why your days are passed in distress, no one 
molests you, you have a handsome allowance from govern- 
ment, and you are not prisoners. You are free to go to 
your son if you choose. I am afraid that the people about 
you cheat you and tell you falsehoods — and therefore I 
will have this letter delivered into your own hands. I 
have the honour to be with great respect, 

Madam, 

Your most obedient humble servant, 

C. Napier. 



XVII. 

Major-General Hunter touching the progress of the Horse- 
mart at Sukkur, established under his superintendence 
by Sir C. Napier. 

I think I sent about 300 or 350 horses to Bengal — there 
was no doubt but 1,000 horses could have been got yearly, 



APPENDIX XVII. 



399 



after the horse-venders were aware that a sale could be 
effected at Sukkur : the demand in common years for the 
army never could exceed that number, indeed 600 would 
I fancy be enough. For horse-artillery and European 
dragoons I paid 450 rupees each horse, and they were 
most excellent. For light field-batteries I never gave 
above 300 for each horse, and they were the best adapted 
for that work of any I ever saw ; far superior to the under- 
sized stud-horses, which were much too light for gun- 
draught, and never could be put to use under the same 
sum that the full-sized horses cost. 

The supply would yearly have increased both in number 
and quality, I am sure. The first year I got only suffi- 
cient to complete Foster's Bombay battery; the second 
I completely horsed Smith's battery and the Bundlecund 
Legion, and the 7th Bengal cavalry ; and eighty horses 
I sent up with the return troops to Hindostan. I am so very 
fond of horses, and being well acquainted with the manners 
and customs of the northern horse-dealers, I doubt not 
that I could have formed a capital horse-market at Sukkur, 
and had Lord Ellenborough remained governor-general 
there would have been a great trade into Sukkur. He 
caused many letters to be written to me on the subject, 
but after he went nothing was done from Calcutta ; and 
the assistance you gave me was in the third year quite 
upset by an order from Colonel Benson, by the authority 
of Lord Hardinge, desiring me to purchase no more horses 
for the Bengal army. You of course then directed only a 
sufficient number for the Bombay troops quartered in 
Scinde. To my certain knowledge many of the horses 
that went from Sukkur, by merchants, to Bombay, were 
purchased at five and six hundred rupees each and sent 
back to Sukkur for remounts, but that was before your 
time. No reason was ever assigned to me for giving up 
Sukkur as a mart, and I am quite at a loss to know what 
cause there could have been for so doing. Certainly we 
had sufficient proof that the light field-battery, nine- 
pounders of the Bundlecund Legion, were respectably horsed 
entirely by Sukkur-purchased horses. I think I made over 



400 



APPENDIX XVIII. 



seventy to Alphorts when he arrived, to replace an equal 
number I was obliged to cast which he brought from 
Hindostan : these went off without training in any way to 
harness, - and performed a campaign of fifty-two days 
through the Bhoogtee hills, and not one of them died or 
was lamed. (" Mowatt's troop it was that made the long 
march to the hills with me to Ooch." — Note by Sir Charles 
Napier.) On our return to Sukkur, Captain Mowatt (now 
colonel) also wrote to me that all the horses he got for his 
troop were excellent. You may recollect my writing often 
to you of the sad complaints the horse-dealers made at 
none of their horses being purchased the last year, when 
they in hopes of a sale brought some 1,200 noble nags. 
It was a great mistake stopping that market ; no money 
was carried out of the country by those northern mer- 
chants, as what I paid them for horses they gave back 
for English or Indian cloth and other articles. 



XVIII. 

The following observations by Captain Rathborne chief 
collector of Scinde confirmed by the comment of Mr. 
Edwardes the civil magistrate at Simla, show one source 
of enormous profit to the Company by the conquest of 
Scinde ; and the results thus set forth as clearly prove 
the incapable baseness which still strives to injure Sir 
C. Napier, by misrepresenting that conquest as a barren 
and expensive one. 

Observations by Captain Rathborne. 

Hyderabad, 30th July, 1850. 

What Lord Ellenborough says is true about the forty- 
two lacs increase on opium-passes. But he omits to take 
into account the Company's profits on the opium grown 
by itself in Bengal. It must be obvious, that the same 
circumstance (viz. the closing up every route) that has 
enabled it to levy 275 rupees more per chest on opium in 
transit from foreign territories, must have procured it a 
proportionate enhancement of price on the opium grown 



APPENDIX XVIII. 



401 



within its own. The price of Patna opium for export to 
China must necessarily be very much affected by the price 
of the Malwa, which eventually meets it in the same 
market — it would be absurd to suppose speculators would 
buy opium at monopoly price from the Company in Bengal, 
if they could get the Malwa opium at the mere cost of 
production and growers' profit through Scinde. The 
effect of Scinde being an open route was not felt in its 
full extent at the time, because for the last few years 
preceding the conquest the state of Scinde had been 
adverse to its being used very largely as a route for so 
valuable a drug as opium is. Nor were the ameers — cut 
off as they were by their institutions from all communi- 
cation with the civilized world — aware of the advantage 
their country possessed in this respect. But with peace 
would have come security, and with increased intercourse 
with us, knowledge ; and eventually, there can be no doubt, 
we should have had to compel them by force to close 
the route, or in other words recur to the old story 
of war, or our opium revenue in India would have been 
annihilated. 



Continuation of Observations by the same. 

Hyderabad, 15th August, 1850. 

With reference to opium I enclose a report of Sir John 
Hobhouse's speech on Mr. Bright's motion, which shows 
the increase in the number of chests sold by the Com- 
pany of its own opium in the six years subsequent to the 
conquest of Scinde, and the actual amount sold. All this 
is wholly independent of the opium on which passes have 
been granted, and in respect of which Lord Ellenborough 
considers Scinde ought to be credited to the extent of 
forty-two lacs (£420,000) a year. 

When, as in the case of opium, government raises a 
revenue in two ways — one by charging an export-duty 
of 1,000 rupees (£100) a chest on the opium of every one 
else; the other by selling its own opium at public 
auction with the privilege of exporting duty free — it must 
be quite clear that in each case the amount of tax will be 

2 D 



402 



APPENDIX XVIII. 



just the same, though in one it assumes the shape of pass- 
duty, and in the other that of monopoly profit to govern- 
ment. For were it otherwise, either the Calcutta or the 
Malwa tradewould cease. No one would pay 400 rupees duty 
on Malwa opium in addition to the government charges 
if, duty and charges included, he could get it cheaper in 
Calcutta. And on the other hand, no one would pay a 
higher rate to the monopolists in Calcutta than — duty and 
charges included — he could get opium from Malwa, 
because the opium in each case, it must he borne in 
mind, is eventually to meet in the same market, that of 
China. 

This being so, the same cause that has enabled the 
government to levy a higher duty by 275 rupees a chest 
on Malwa opium, has in reality given that increase per 
chest on its own, if there have been no other causes 
leading to depress the price of opium while this was 
raising it. This will be visible in a clear rise of the price 
of opium per chest to that amount at the Calcutta rates ; 
but if there have been other depressing causes at work, 
and the actual sum paid per chest has fallen, the fall has 
not been in the monopoly profits but in the growers' 
charges ; and the fall has still been less by that amount 
than it otherwise would have been. 

Allowing these data to be correct — and be they tested 
as they may they will prove so — there is in addition to 
the forty- two lacs (£420,000) increase on passes, allowed 
per annum by Lord Ellenborough to be credited to Scinde, 
the sum of 41,347,150 rupees, being 275 rupees increase 
per chest on the 150,426 chests of the Company's own 
opium sold within that period. This in English money 
will be in round numbers, four millions one hundred and 
thirty -four thousand pounds sterling ! 

The proper person to comprehend the value of Scinde, 
taken in this light, would be a Spanish minister of finance, 
who has an instance before his eyes in Gibraltar, of the 
loss of revenue to a country from an outlet for smuggling 
being in adverse possession. In regard to a drug like opium, 
the only possible thing that could prevent the revenue 



APPENDIX XIX. 



403 



being utterly ruined by such a circumstance, would be the 
ignorance of the barbarian holder of power over our 
finances in this particular — an ignorance that in these 
days of enlightenment both with Blacks and Whites never 
could last long. 

I mark another passage wherein Sir J. Hobhouse takes 
credit for the amount expended on canals in Scinde ! 
I must say it does seem a good joke, this perpetually twit- 
ting us about the cost of the province, and then taking 
credit for the principal item as a proof of the liberality 
generally of the Company's government. 



Comment on the above Statement by Mr. Edwardes, Civil 
Magistrate at Simla. 

September 5th, 1851. 

I return you with best thanks Captain Rathborne's 
statement. I have studied it carefully and fully coincide 
in the correctness of his reasoning. 

I have also submitted it for the judgment of our com- 
missioner of customs, one of the soundest financiers in the 
country, and he fully agrees with Captain Rathborne, that 
the increase he mentions may fairly be attributed to our 
holding possession of Scinde and closing that formerly 
important outlet for contraband trade. 



XIX. 

Notes by Major Beatson, on his Separate Operations, and 
March to blockade the Northern Entrance of Trukkee, 
1845, written at the time. 

On the 20th of February 1845 I joined the camp of his 
excellency Sir Charles Napier, governor of Scinde, about 
two miles below Goojroo : I had with me a portion of the 
Bundlecund Legion, consisting of two nine-pounders, a 
squadron of cavalry and the first battalion of the infantry 
of the legion. 

2 d 2 



404 



APPENDIX XIX. 



On the 21st Sir Charles directed me to take up a position 
at Goojroo which the enemy had left on the approach of 
his excellency's force : giving me two horse -artillery six- 
pounders, instead of my nines, which were considered too 
heavy for hill-work. 

My position commanded both the pass from the west- 
ward, and the valley opening to the north of Goojroo. 

On the morning of my arrival I accompanied Captain 
Malet and Ali Moorad to the place where the road to 
Deyrah goes off to the left ; but we saw nothing of the 
enemy. 

On the morning of the 23rd I went up the hills 
to the north-west of Goojroo, accompanied by Cap- 
tains Winter, Barry, and Hayes, with an escort of fifty 
sepoys. 

In a very difficult watercourse, near the top of the 
first range of hills, I found the remains of fires which 
must have been recently left, and also of one or two 
fires on the face of the hills ; but did not see a man. 

On the 24th we went to the top of the hills to the south- 
west of Goojroo ; after my return to camp, in the fore- 
noon, some of the Belooch horsemen made an attempt to 
carry off the camels at graze, but on being pursued, they 
made off by some of the numerous paths well known 
to them, but which we knew nothing of, and left the 
camels as yet I have not lost a single animal. 

On the 25th I went up the valley to the north of 
Goojroo, over a very rugged pass, and descended into the 
sandy bed of a river, the only apparent entrance for 
which is through a chasm about thirty feet wide, formed 
by perpendicular rocks on each side, of about two hun- 
dred feet in height; so regular is this chasm, that it 
looked as if a column of infantry had opened from its 
centre by subdivisions, closing fifteen paces outwards. 

One shot was fired from an inaccessible hill in the 
neighbourhood; but we saw no person. 

Goojroo was an important post : the enemy had no 
choice but to force that or go into Trukkee, and he chose 
the latter alternative, which enabled the general to finish 



APPENDIX XIX. 



405 



the war. It was clearly the enemy's desire to avoid 
fighting from the first, or he never would have allowed Sir 
Charles's force to go without opposition through passes 
where he might by rolling down rocks have destroyed the 
force without losing a man. 

I had at Goojroo a striking instance of the confidence 
which such a man as Sir Charles Napier inspires in all 
soldiers who serve under him : — the exigencies of the ser- 
vice, caused by the crippled state of our camels, rendered it 
necessary that my men should be put on half-rations of 
unground wheat, and with only enough of even that for a 
few days when we took up our position at Goojroo ; but 
there was never a murmur from any man of the legion, and 
when we were sometimes reduced to our last day's half- 
rations the feeling of every soldier was " the general will not 
forget us !" And true enough, he did not forget us ; for as 
sure as the sun was about to disappear behind the Belooch 
hills in the evening, a string of camels with supplies was 
seen ascending the pass, thus justifying the confidence of 
the soldiers that their general had not forgotten them — and 
recollect, these soldiers generally were the high-caste men 
of Hindostan — Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Mahomedans — 
the two former of whom would die rather than eat any- 
thing but grain. But the whole secret is, they had con- 
fidence in their general, and where soldiers have that 
they will do anything. 

On the 2nd March I received orders from Sir Charles 
Napier to proceed with a field detachment from Goojroo 
to blockade the rear of Trukkee, while his excellency's 
force took up a position in front of that place. My 
instructions were to march if possible north-west from 
Goojroo to Lutt ; but I found the country impracticable See Piar 2. 
for guns. I therefore descended the pass into the Deyrah 
plain, and skirted the hills till I came to " Deolet Gorai " 
and then went due north through a very difficult pass 
into the Murrow plain, where I found Ali Moorad with 
his force encamped, and where I was joined by the volun- 
teers of her Majesty's 13th under Lieutenant John Barry, 
and the camel corps under Lieutenant Bruce : — the former 



406 



APPENDIX XIX. 



brought me a despatch from Sir Charles Napier directing 
me to act independent of Ali Moorad in blockading the 
north of Trukkee. On my arrival I informed the ameer 
that I should march immediately my rear-guard came 
through the pass ; on hearing which he immediately struck 
his tents, and moved off in the direction of Trukkee, which 
he did not appear to intend to do till he found that I was 
determined to move on whether he did or not. The delay 
in getting the rear of my force through the pass gave Ali 
Moorad a few hours' start, and enabled him to keep some 
miles in front of me all day — the difficulties of the 
country frequently obliging me to dismount the Euro- 
peans from the camels to drag the guns up passes, which 
the horses were found quite unequal to. 

An instance of the tact and cunning of the Beloochees 
occurred on this march : I was riding at the head of the 
column, about dusk in the evening, when three horsemen 
with red turbans were passed up from the rear of the 
column under an escort of the Bundlecund cavalry, they 
having represented themselves as AH Moorad' s horsemen, 
come from Sir Charles Napier with orders for me to halt, 
as Beejar Khan had given himself up and the war was at 
an end. I asked them if they had brought me a letter 
from Sir Charles : this did not disconcert them in the 
least, and they at once replied that they had been sent on 
ahead, to give me the intelligence, and that others were 
following with the letter. Their story was so plausibly 
told, that I must confess I thought there was truth 
in it ; but at the same time I was too old a soldier to 
halt without written instructions to do so, after I had 
received Sir Charles's positive orders to blockade the rear 
of Trukkee as soon as possible : I therefore told the 
three horsemen to go on to Ali Moorad, and I would con- 
tinue my march till the letter came from Sir Charles. 
On joining Ali Moorad next day I mentioned the circum- 
stance to him, when he immediately declared they must 
have been a party of the enemy who had tried to deceive 
me, as none of his men had come up with any message to 
him from the rear. 



APPENDIX XIX. 



407 



I must here mention that the only distinguishing mark 
between Ah MooracTs men and those of the enemy was 
that the former wore red turbans, and the latter white, or 
green: — the Beloochees were too knowing not to take 
advantage of this ; so the three who professed to bring me 
the orders to halt, had donned red turbans for the occa- 
sion, thus the disguise was complete as to dress ; and I 
must confess the ruse was well planned and skilfully 
carried out. Talleyrand could not have kept his counte- 
nance better, or told his story more plausibly than the 
Beloochees did. The instructions I got from Sir Charles 
Napier were, on getting to the north of Trukkee, to 
blockade the pass but not to attack the enemy without 
orders, and to report to his excellency every day. I did 
write and send off my reports every day; but I am 
inclined to believe that Ali Moorad played me false and 
did not forward my reports to Sir Charles, and I was 
obliged to trust to Ali Moorad to do so, as my men were 
totally unacquainted with the country. After I had been 
several days in rear of Trukkee I sent a European officer 
with an escort, and a letter to Sir Charles, and I have 
reason to believe that was the first he received since I left 
Goojroo. I was subsequently confirmed in the belief that 
Ali Moorad had not forwarded my letters. 

After we had been some days in rear of Trukkee, I 
got impatient at seeing or hearing nothing of the enemy, 
and also at receiving no intelligence of what was going on 
with Sir Charles's force in front of Trukkee — I therefore 
determined to go some distance into Trukkee to recon- 
noitre. I told Ali Moorad of my intention, and moved off 
to the right into Trukkee at daybreak, leaving the ameer 
with his force at the mouth of the pass : to my astonish- 
ment on my return I found that Ali Moorad had moved 
off with his whole force to the left, out of sight, and left 
the principal pass into Trukkee, quite open : this was not 
only a strange kind of co-operation, but it also crippled 
my subsequent movements by obliging me to leave a 
part of my force to guard that pass which Ali Moorad' s 
force had occupied. When I went into Trukkee the 8th 



408 



APPENDIX XIX. 



March to look out for some men I had seen on the hills 
to the right (supposed to he part of the enemy, which 
they turned out to be, and I believe Beejar Khan was 
with them) on a triangular table-land, it appeared from 
where we were, to us who were unacquainted with that 
difficult country, to be inaccessible ; and so it was every- 
where, excepting by foot-paths, by which only one man 
could ascend at a time — so that a few men at the 
top to roll down stones could have kept our army in 
check. 

In an endeavour to turn this position to the right, in 
hopes of finding a way to get up on the other side, one of 
my flanking parties consisting of a few of those daring 
soldiers, the volunteers of her Majesty's 1 3th, ascended the 
apex of the triangle by a goat-path overhanging a tremen- 
dous precipice. The Beloochees had a breastwork on the 
table-land about twenty paces retired from the top of 
this path, behind which were concealed about seventy 
men, who overwhelmed the small party of Europeans 
as soon as they got to the top ; first giving them a volley 
with their matchlocks, and then attacking them sword in 
hand, killing several and driving the others down the rock : 
the volunteers did all that men could do, and fought most 
gallantly ; but seventy against ten ! the former having all 
the advantage of position, while the latter were blown by 
the steep ascent and unexpected attack, were too great 
odds. One European drove his bayonet through the 
breast of a Belooch, but white so entangled, about a dozen 
swords flashed about his head, and he was of course cut to 
pieces : — the parties of volunteers under Lieutenant Barry 
and Lieutenant Darby, seeing their comrades engaged, 
immediately rushed to their assistance, but a deep chasm 
prevented their getting even to the bottom of the ascent ; 
all they could do was to open a fire from the opposite 
side ; but the distance was too great, the balls all falling 
short — their marks were afterwards seen on the rocks 
below the enemy's position. 

The bravest of the brave could not have done more than 
these few men of her Majesty's volunteers — but they were 



APPENDIX XIX. 



409 



overwhelmed in a position where their comrades could 
give them no assistance — and even after I collected all 
my detached parties we could find no practicable way of 
getting at the enemy's position on the triangular table- 
land. We afterwards found there was a path on the 
opposite side, but our men being unacquainted with the 
country we did not discover the path till too late. 

Early next morning I got a note from Captain Curling 
informing me that Beejar Khan had surrendered. I there- 
fore suspended operations. I also got a letter from Colonel 
Frushard, mentioning that the enemy had agreed to sur- 
render and that the war was at an end. 

On rejoining Sir Charles Napier at Shahpoor, his excel- 
lency did me the honour to appoint me to the command 
of Shikarpoore and of the line of frontier outposts, as far 
as the Larkaana river to the south, and Shahpoor to the 
northward. 

I was subsequently also appointed by Sir Charles 
Napier to be president of the military commission for the 
trial of all serious criminal cases at Shikarpoore, and on 
the frontier. The Calcutta Revieiv, for September 1850, 
says, Major Jacob was left in command of the frontier. 
This is a mistake — Major Jacob did not succeed to the 
command of the frontier till 1846 after the Bundlecund 
Legion left it. 

Note. — The position on which the Beloochees killed 
the men of the volunteers was such as the other 
men, who had been through the campaigns of Afi?- 
ghanistan, declared they had never seen anything at 
all to compare to in that country — "My eye what a 
place ! " was their exclamation. It was an almost per- 
pendicular rock to be ascended by a footpath, on which 
only one man could go up at a time — and supposing 
the enemy to let them get up unmolested to the top, 
there was not room for more than ten men to form in 
front of a breastwork capable of containing a hundred 
men, with the rear open and reinforcement constantly 
coming up from the base of the triangular table-land — 
besides which from the width of the ravine no musketry 



410 



APPENDIX XIX. 



fire was of any use in covering the advance of an attack- 
ing party, which would thus have had to ascend by single 
men as before described in the face of a strongly-posted 
enemy. This the Beloochees were no doubt well aware 
of, and seeing that the few men of the volunteers were 
separated from the rest of their party by one of those 
chasms so common in that country, they allowed them to 
ascend the precipice unopposed till they had got them on 
the top in front of their breastwork, where they expected 
them to be an easy prey, which they were not — for 
the Europeans fought like devils, and slew more than 
their own number of the Beloochees before they were 
overpowered. 



The gentlemen of the pipeclay school will probably ask 
why was this flanking party so far separated from the 
main column, and where were the connecting files ! My 
answer is, You were never in Trukkee or you would 
not ask : — it is there quite impossible to keep either dis- 
tances or communication. I have seen an officer, whom 
I knew to be a gallant fellow under the enemy's fire, 
lose his head on the ledge of a rock overhanging a pre- 
cipice, so that several soldiers were obliged to help him 
across. I have seen others caught by the feet between 
two rocks, and several men required to extricate them, 
with the loss of their shoes : — if this will not explain to 
the martinet why distances and communication were not 
kept, I have nothing left for it but to recommend him to 
"try Trukkee." 

In 1846 came the first Punjaub war; and there never 
would have been a second had Sir Charles Napier's plan 
of operations been carried out : — that it would have been 
carried out successfully, it is only necessary to mention 
that Sir Charles himself would have taken command of 
the force to march to Deyrah Ghazee Khan and thence to 
Mooltan. Such a move would have as effectually settled 
the Punjaub in 1846 as Scinde was settled by the battles 
of Meeanee and Hyderabad. 



APPENDIX XX. 



411 



XX. 

The following letters properly belong to the History of 
the Conquest of Scinde, but having been obtained since the 
publication of that work, are inserted here. 

The question as to whether Koostum's cession was, or 
was not voluntary, has been decided by the annexed letter 
from that ameer, written to his son at the time, but only 
produced in 1850 in consequence of an official inquiry 
instituted as to Ali Moor ad's conduct : it disposes com- 
pletely and peremptorily of all the falsehoods published on 
the subject by the ameers and by their English coadjutors 
and bewailers. 

Meer Roostum Khan to his Son Meer Mahomed Hussain. 

Dated 17th Zekaght, 1258,— 20th Dec, A.D. 1842. 

[After compliments.] According to the written direc- 
tions of the general (Sir C. Napier) I came with Meer 
Ali Morad to Dejee Kagote. The meer above mentioned 
said to me, " Give me the Puggree and your lands, and 
I will arrange matters with the British." By the persuasion 
of this Ali Morad Khan, I ceded my lands to him, but 
your lands, or your brother's, or those of the sons of Meer 
Mobarick Khan, I have not ceded to him : nor have I ceded 
the districts north of Roree. An agreement to the effect 
that he will not interfere with those lands, I got in the 
handwriting of Peer Ally Gohur and sealed by Meer Ali 
Morad, a copy of which I send with this letter for you 
to read. 

Remain in contentment on your lands, for your districts, 
those of your brothers, or of the heirs of Meer Mobarick 
Khan (according to the agreement I formerly wrote for 
you) will remain as was written then, and Meer Ali 
Morad cannot interfere in this matter. 

Dey Kingree and Badshapore I have given to Peer Ally 
Gohur in perpetuity ; it is for you also to agree to it. My 



412 



APPENDIX XX. 



expenses and those of my household are to be defrayed by 
Meer Ali Morad. 

(True translation.) 
(Signed) Jn. Younghusband, 

Lieutenant of Scinde Police. 

Sukkur, 4th May, 1850. 

The letter of which the above is a translation was given 
to me by Meer Mahomed Hussain.'* It bears the seal of 
Meer Roostum. 

(Signed) Jn. Younghusband. 



Letter from Sir C. Napier to Sir Jasper Nicholls, Com- 
mander-in-Chief, in reply to the tatter's Censures on the 
Conduct of the Operations in Scinde. 

25th June, 1843. 

I have just had the honour to receive your excellency's 
note of the 9th of March, in which you observe, " But I 
see you made that an arduous struggle, which might have 
been an easy success had you detained the 4i\st regiment 
and some part of Colonel Wallace's detachment" 

This is a serious charge against me. Whether you will 
think it justly grounded, or not, when you hear my 
defence, I cannot say ; but you will I am sure excuse my 
desire to stand higher in your opinion as an officer than 
I appear to do. 

To begin with the 41st. Versed as your excellency is 
in Indian warfare, I need not tell you that a European 
regiment cannot march, especially in hot weather, without 
"carriage." The 41st had none. They were on the 
Indus in boats. I had not and could not obtain sufficient 
" carriage" for the force I had with me; much less could 
I assist the 41st. The want of carriage obliged me to 
leave the 8th native infantry at Roree. The 41st must 
have joined me, if they could have joined me at all, 
without carriage for sick ; for ammunition ; for water ; 
for tents ; for provisions. How could they have joined 
me ? Impossible ! 

* The son of Meer Roostum. 



APPENDIX XX. 



413 



But this was not all, though sufficient. Up to the 15th 
the ameers of Hyderabad had loudly declared their perfect 
submission to the will of the British government — they 
disclaimed all union with the ameers of Kyrepore. The 
latter had not an army that my force was not fully equal 
to cope with; and the governor-general and the govern- 
ment of Bombay had reiterated their positive orders to 
me to have the 41st ready to embark at Kurrachee on 
the 20th of February. I knew the cause of their anxiety, 
and that it was very important the 41st should embark 
the 20th. Was it for me in January, when all the ameers 
had declared their acceptance of the new treaty, to write 
to Sukkur in the face of superior authority and order the 
41st to halt? Not to join my force, for that was impos- 
sible, but to halt ! I suspect the governor-general and the 
government of Bombay would not have been much satis- 
fied with my conduct had I done so. The 41st therefore 
arrived at Sukkur on the 4th of February and found 
orders instantly to proceed on its voyage, and it passed 
Hyderabad the 10th February, five days before the 
ameers declared war, and when Major Outram, an 
accredited agent of mine, was by their own invitation 
living in their capital, and assuring me of their earnest 
desire for peace — he being the person supposed to know 
more of Scinde than other Englishmen, and more of the 
ameers individually and personally. 

On the day of the action the 41st were at Kurrachee. 
I being inland and my letters constantly intercepted could 
not know where the 41st was, except that it was some- 
where on the Indus, that is someivhere or other on a 
range of three hundred miles I I did not hear of its arrival 
at Sukkur till it was past my reach had I supposed 
it was required, which I did not, how could I suppose so ? 
By reference to my journal I find that on the 13th 
February, being then at Syndabad, I received no less than 
two expresses from Major Outram to say and impress 
upon me that there were u no armed men at Hyderabad III " 
At that moment however the town was full, and 25,862 
men were in position at Meeanee, six miles off ! short 



414 



APPENDIX XX. 



miles, for the battle was seen from the walls. I think 
after the above statement your excellency will acquit me 
of having had the power to reinforce my army with the 
41st regiment ; but this and more shall become public if 
any inquiry be necessary. 

Now for the second part of your excellency's charge, 
viz. that I might have had an easy success, had some part 
of Colonel Wallace's detachment been with me. 

In the first place the whole brigade under Colonel 
Wallace, as far as I recollect, and my memory is 
tolerably strong, could not turn out fifteen hundred rank- 
and-file : it must therefore have been a large portion to 
have made the battle of Meeanee an easy success. How- 
ever, say I had five hundred ; assuredly that number 
would not have changed the character of the engagement. 
It would have brought a larger force of the enemy into 
action very possibly, and consequently both their loss and 
ours would have been greater in that proportion; but 
the action would not have been an " easy success/' No ! 
nor an easier success. But what excuse had I to weaken 
Wallace, who was apparently, at the time we divided, in 
more danger than I was ? He was about to seize an 
extensive district, and if any resistance were to be made 
assuredly there it might have been expected. 

Supposing me to have made the military error of 
sending a feeble force to execute what was expected to be 
a perilous operation, and that I had brought a thousand 
men down with me to the south, what would have been 
the result? Water was everywhere scarce, and often- 
times I had scarcely sufficient for the small force with 
me. Had I had the Bengal column also 3 or a large 
portion of it, I must have marched in two columns, with 
the interval of a day between them to let the wells fill 
after being emptied by the first column. The result 
would have been, that I should have been unable to have 
given battle till the 19th of February, before which 10,000 
Chandians under Wullee Chandia — 7,000 under Meer 
Mohamed Hussain and 10,000 under Shere Mohamed 
would have joined the troops at Meeanee ! When the 



APPENDIX XX. 



415 



victory was decided all these were within six or eight 
hours of the field of battle — an additional 1,000 on my 
side, an additional 27,000 on that of the enemy would 
not have rendered my success more " easy." 

Your excellency will say that these things were not 
known to me at Roree when I first marched south. All 
were not, but enough were ; 1°. I knew there was a great 
want of water. 2°. I knew I could carry spare provisions 
with me if the country refused supplies, but I should not 
have had carriage for this if the Bengal column was with 
me. The additional baggage would have been nearly as 
large as our own baggage, and all the wells would have 
been drunk dry. The Bengals had carriage for their 
baggage, but not for additional water and spare provisions 
independent of wells and of their bazaar. 

Suppose I could have conveniently brought down the 
Bengal troops, and left the north unguarded. Still men 
are not prophets. The ameers of Hyderabad were at 
peace with us — I was marching against those of Kyrepore. 
The latter had not 10,000 men, I wanted no increase of 
numbers to encounter them; nor did any man believe 
they intended to fight : nor the ameers of Hyderabad 
neither. Even on the 12th of February, Major Outram, 
then in Hyderabad, wrote me two letters assuring me the 
ameers of Kyrepore and Hyderabad had not a single 
soldier. So little did he then even apprehend hostilities. 

The Belooch army suddenly assembled, as if by magic ! 
I saw nothing but disgrace and destruction in an attempt 
to retreat, and I at once resolved to attack, confident in 
the courage of the soldiers. My confidence was not mis- 
placed ; neither will it now I hope, when I trust this letter 
will satisfy you that I brought every man into action that 
was at my disposal. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 
Lieutenant- General Sir Jasper Nicholls, 
Commander-in-Chief. 



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